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Three legislative regimes have governed the England and Wales National DNA Database 
(NDNAD). These are broadly described as restrictive (1995 – 2001), expansive (2001 – 
2013) and semi-restrictive/Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) regimes (2013 – 
present). The actual effectiveness of the three regimes remains abstruse. This research aimed 
to assess the efficacy of the different regimes to advance any reforms that may maximise the 
utility of the database and enhance the protection of public security and the individual’s right 
to privacy. The research focused on the societal and individual interest outcomes of DNA 
databasing. The methodology involved a document analysis of reports of oversight bodies, 
contributing to the establishment of the benefits, challenges and risks of the current regime. 
Secondly, a literature review of research into DNA databasing was conducted. This identified 
key effectiveness indicators for the assessment of NDNAD regimes. A self-administered 
semi-structured questionnaire was used to assess the perception of the public about the 
statutory functions and ethical implications of the NDNAD. The questionnaire also asked 
about views on the most appropriate inclusion and retention criteria for the database. Lastly, 
a stakeholder survey was conducted to determine the views of experts on the efficacy of the 
NDNAD regimes against the effectiveness indicators.  
Overall, a majority of the 201 participants who answered the public survey perceived the 
NDNAD to be effective in detecting, investigating and prosecuting crime. The participants 
were sceptical about the ability of the NDNAD to prevent crime. This suggests a reform of 
the statutory purpose of DNA retention to represent actual outcomes. Most participants 
favoured the inclusion and retention of DNA data from arrested, charged or convicted 
individuals. A selective regime based on offence seriousness was preferred by participants 
for the retention of DNA data from convicted adults. This indicates a reform of the current 
blanket rule which allows indefinite retention. The surveyed expert group (n = 31, mainly 
law enforcement officers) perceived the expansive regime to be the most effective for public 
security, implementation cost and efficiency reasons. The findings imply discrepancies with 
the current law governing the NDNAD. Whilst participants of the public survey support 
further restrictions to the PoFA regime, the expert group favoured the expansive regime. The 
survey evidence suggests a need for a statutory requirement to generate systematic data 
about the actual effectiveness of the NDNAD. Further, a consultation scheme should be 
established to account for the acceptability of the NDNAD regime among a representative 
sample of the public. These reforms will help improve the legitimacy of the law and ensure 
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Chapter 1: General introduction 
This chapter defines the focus of this research and introduces the key concepts used 
throughout the dissertation. Section 1.1 outlines the basic definitions in DNA databasing. 
Section 1.2 covers a brief overview of the research framework and aims. Section 1.3 defines 
the term DNA databasing, its scope and relationship with the concepts of privacy and public 
security. The section concludes with an overview of the England and Wales National DNA 
Database (NDNAD). In section 1.4, the term ‘retention regime’ is reviewed in the United 
Kingdom (UK) context. The terms efficacy, effectiveness and efficiency and their 
relationship with DNA databasing are introduced in section 1.5. The problem statement and 
justification for the research is outlined in section 1.6. The seventh section highlights the 
significance and original contribution of the research, namely, establishment of the benefits, 
challenges and risks of the current NDNAD regime; identification of key indicators or 
NDNAD outcomes to assess effectiveness; empirical data about the current public and 
expert views on the inclusion and retention criteria for the NDNAD and the effectiveness of 
NDNAD regimes; and identification of key areas to reform/improve the current regime. The 
last section outlines the structure of the thesis with an overview of each chapter. 
1.1 Basic terminologies in forensic DNA databasing 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the genetic material that stores genetic information of 
humans and most organisms.1 It encodes the information needed for building cells, tissues 
and organs of an organism. The genetic material is hereditary and is passed on from parent 
to offspring. The DNA molecule is a double helix structure made up of a string of subunits 
called nucleotides.2   
A gene refers to specific sections of the DNA nucleotide sequence that codes for a protein 
or a functional biomolecule or predict phenotypic characteristics, such as, hair, eye, and skin 
colour.3 Some specific DNA sequences, called noncoding DNA, neither code for a functional 
biomolecule or control phenotypic characteristics or their biological function is not fully 
understood.4 These noncoding areas are characterised by repetitive core sequences that vary 
                                                 
1 Jeremy M Berg, John L Tymoczko and Lubert Stryer, Biochemistry (7th edn, WH Freeman and Company 
2012); R Garrett and Charles M Grisham, Biochemistry (5th edn, Brooks/Cole, Cengage Learning 2012). 
2 Berg, Tymoczko and Stryer (n 1); Garrett and Grisham (n 1). 
3 Garrett and Grisham (n 1); Berg, Tymoczko and Stryer (n 1); Manfred Kayser, ‘Forensic DNA 
Phenotyping: Predicting Human Appearance from Crime Scene Material for Investigative Purposes’ (2015) 
18 Forensic Science International: Genetics 33. 




in number within and between individuals (termed length polymorphism).5 Except for red 
blood cells which lack nuclei, every cell of the human body has genomic DNA.6 Therefore, 
all biological fluids or body tissues contain DNA, which can be profiled for human identity 
purposes. The technical terms, history and evolution of forensic DNA identity testing and 
databasing are detailed in Chapter 2. In the rest of this subsection, the general terms and 
concepts in DNA databasing are briefly defined. 
Forensic DNA Databases are computerised database systems that store forensic DNA 
profiles derived from biological samples taken from known individuals and biological 
evidence recovered from crime or incident scenes (including a person). The biological 
samples are usually saliva taken in the form of a mouth swab whilst the biological evidence 
includes saliva (e.g. extracted from cigarette butts), nasal secretions, semen and vaginal 
secretions (e.g. from condoms or vaginal/anal swabs), bloodstains, bones, hair, urine, faecal 
matter and ‘touch’ DNA – which cannot be attributed to a specific biological source.7 The 
principal focus of this study is the retention of DNA records from known individuals (i.e. 
subject or reference samples/profiles).  
A collection of the physical-biological samples/evidence including their DNA extracts is 
referred to as a Forensic DNA databank.8 The forensic DNA profile refers to a unique set of 
10 – 24 pairs of numbers and a pair of gender-specific letters (XX for female, and XY for 
Male).9 The numbers are derived from the noncoding areas of the DNA. The DNA profile 
can be used to identify a person with a high degree of certainty, but it cannot predict the 
health, disease risk, ancestry or the physical appearance of an individual. Other forensic 
                                                 
5 John Butler, Forensic DNA Typing (2nd edn, Elsevier 2005). 
6 Ted Gordon-Smith, ‘Structure and Function of Red and White Blood Cells’ (2013) 41 Medicine 193; Berg, 
Tymoczko and Stryer (n 1); Richard Li, Forensic Biology (2nd edn, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group 
2015); Zhong-Wei Zhang and others, ‘Red Blood Cell Extrudes Nucleus and Mitochondria against Oxidative 
Stress’ (2011) 63 IUBMB Life 560. 
7 Mark A Jobling and Peter Gill, ‘Encoded Evidence: DNA in Forensic Analysis’ (2004) 5 Nature Reviews. 
Genetics 739; Kelly Virkler and Igor K Lednev, ‘Analysis of Body Fluids for Forensic Purposes: From 
Laboratory Testing to Non-Destructive Rapid Confirmatory Identification at a Crime Scene’ (2009) 188 
Forensic Science International 1; Butler (n 5); Roland AH van Oorschot and Maxwell K Jones, ‘DNA 
Fingerprints from Fingerprints’ (1997) 387 Nature 767; Timothy J Verdon, R John Mitchell and Roland AH 
van Oorschot, ‘Evaluation of Tapelifting as a Collection Method for Touch DNA’ (2014) 8 Forensic Science 
International: Genetics 179. 
8 John Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing: Methodology (Elsevier 2012). 
9 Dennis Y Wang and others, ‘Developmental Validation of the GlobalFiler® Express PCR Amplification 
Kit: A 6-Dye Multiplex Assay for the Direct Amplification of Reference Samples’ (2015) 19 Forensic 
Science International: Genetics 148; Scottish Police Authority, ‘Scots Forensic Service to Lead Europe in 
DNA Technology’ (Scottish Police Authority, 11 August 2015) 
<http://www.spa.police.uk/news/322981/296781/> accessed 23 December 2016. 
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genetics technologies, such as, Forensic DNA Phenotyping (FDP)10 and ancestry testing11 
are required to predict these phenotypic characteristics by analysing the physical DNA 
sample. It must be noted that monozygotic (identical) twins have similar DNA and hence 
DNA profiles from such individuals are indistinguishable.  
The main purpose of forensic DNA databases is to help solve legal issues (mainly crime) 
that are otherwise unsolvable by traditional investigative techniques, such as, interrogation 
of suspects and witnesses or involved parties. When a profile from a crime without a suspect 
matches a subject (known person’s) profile on the database, it is referred to as a cold hit.12 
This can lead to the identification of the unknown suspect and potentially the resolution of 
the crime. Another type of database hit is a warm hit, where a crime profile matches an 
already identified suspect.13 The warm hit can be used to corroborate other evidence or verify 
the identity of the suspect, though this can be achieved without the database. The retention 
of DNA data is relevant for generating cold hits. The database also allows the identification 
of serial offenders by linking different crimes. Another potential benefit of DNA databases 
is the possibility to analyse crime patterns, which can aid the police in identifying crime 
hotspots.14 This can help the police to develop effective proactive measures to counter crime 
or prevent crime. One of the main predictors of how well a DNA database fulfils the 
functions above is the quality of DNA databasing law.15 Hence, using the NDNAD as a case 
study, this research sought to assess the efficacy of the legislative regime that governs the 
retention of DNA records.  
1.2 Research aims 
The main aim of this research was to identify any reforms that may maximize the utility of 
the NDNAD and enhance the protection of public security and the individual’s right to 
                                                 
10 Kayser (n 3). 
11 Chris Phillips, ‘Forensic Genetic Analysis of Bio-Geographical Ancestry’ (2015) 18 Forensic Science 
International: Genetics 49; C Santos and others, ‘Forensic Ancestry Analysis with Two Capillary 
Electrophoresis Ancestry Informative Marker (AIM) Panels: Results of a Collaborative EDNAP Exercise’ 
(2015) 19 Forensic Science International: Genetics 56. 
12 Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing: Methodology (n 8) 231; Matthew Gabriel, Cherisse 
Boland and Cydne Holt, ‘Beyond the Cold Hit: Measuring the Impact of the National DNA Data Bank on 
Public Safety at the City and County Level’ (2010) 38 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 396; Simon J 
Walsh, James M Curran and John S Buckleton, ‘Modeling Forensic DNA Database Performance’ (2010) 55 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 1174. 
13 Gabriel, Boland and Holt (n 12); Walsh, Curran and Buckleton (n 12). 
14 Carole McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (2006) 46 British 
Journal of Criminology 175. 
15 Damir Marjanović and others, ‘Forensic DNA Databases in Western Balkan Region: Retrospectives, 
Perspectives, and Initiatives’ (2011) 52 Croatian Medical Journal 235. 
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privacy. To achieve the research aim, the study was conceptualised within a framework of 
the effectiveness/efficacy of the different retention regimes governing the NDNAD. 
Effectiveness can be perceived (perceived effectiveness), which concerns the attitudes or 
beliefs of people about whether a system is achieving its purpose or not. Secondly, 
effectiveness may be apparent (potential effectiveness) in the sense of an assessment of the 
potential of a system to meet its expected goals/purpose. Thirdly, effectiveness can be actual 
(actual effectiveness), in terms of the real outcomes of a system, and how it meets its real 
expectations or predefined standard outcomes. Lastly, effectiveness can be considered as a 
combination of all the above. In the context of forensic DNA databases, actual effectiveness 
may be difficult to measure. This is due to the inter-relationship between the use of the 
NDNAD and other policing tools/strategies in addressing public security outcomes such as 
the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of crime. This challenge is 
confirmed by the Strategy Board16 and Ethics Group17 for the NDNAD as an explanation for 
the lack of data on conviction rates, for example, of the NDNAD.  
Based on recommendations of the Ethics Group,18 initial specific research aims (Figure 1.1), 
and corresponding methodology (Appendix I) were drafted to assess the ‘potential 
effectiveness’ of the different retention regimes enacted to govern the NDNAD. This focused 
on the match rate output of the database. Approval for this project was granted by the 
Strategy Board (Appendix XV), however, the required data could not be extracted due to the 
configuration of the NDNAD. The database does not store arrest or conviction records of 
subjects – known individuals. This data is stored separately on the Police National Computer 
(PNC). The only data that could be obtained were the total number of subject profiles, crime 
scene profiles, crime scene-to-subject matches, subject-to-crime scene matches, annual 
crime scene load match rates and annual subject load match rates from April 2003 to March 
2017. The raw data is shown in Appendix XI. Due to the limitations of the available data, 
the match rate analysis based on regime characteristics was not pursued. The gaps identified 
emphasise the necessity of including systems to evaluate the potential and actual 
effectiveness of DNA database retention regimes from the onset of its creation. 
                                                 
16 FIND Strategy Board, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2017 to 2018 (Forensic Information 
Database Strategy Board 2019) 21. 
17 National DNA Database Ethics Group, Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database 2014 
(National DNA Database Ethics Group 2015) 18. 





Figure 1.1 - Research aims to assess potential effectiveness of NDNAD retention regimes using match rates 
The final specific research aims explored in this study focused on the ‘perceived 
effectiveness’ of DNA databases and retention regimes among the public and primary 
stakeholders (experts). Whilst the weight of this evidence alone is limited, it contributes to 
the ‘cumulative effectiveness’ of DNA databases in terms of its legitimacy or acceptability 
in society. To achieve the overarching aim of the research, the study assessed relevant 
government and organisation reports, reviewed available literature, and carried out public 
and stakeholder surveys.  
The specific aims of the study were: 
1. To identify the benefits, challenges, risks and emerging issues associated with the 
implementation of the provisions of Part 1 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
(PoFA) governing the retention of forensic DNA records (i.e. DNA samples and 
profiles). This aim was achieved by conducting a document analysis of reports of 
NDNAD oversight bodies.  
2. To determine the perception of the public about the public security functions of the 
NDNAD as specified by section 63T(1)(c) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (PACE)19 including:  
a. prevention of crime 
b. detection of crime 
                                                 
19 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
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c. investigation of an offence 
d. conduct of a prosecution 
3. To ascertain the views of the public about the most appropriate inclusion criteria and 
retention period for DNA records from different categories of individuals who may 
be subject to DNA sampling for policing purposes. Specific aims 2 and 3 were 
achieved by carrying out an online public survey targeting citizens and residents of 
England and Wales. 
4. To assess the views of primary stakeholders (experts) about the effectiveness of the 
different NDNAD retention regimes. The objectives for this aim were to review the 
literature to identify effectiveness criteria that are relevant for assessing the efficacy 
of retention regimes; develop, test and refine the wording of questions based on the 
identified effectiveness criteria; and assess the reliability and validity of the 
questionnaire; and administer the questionnaire to the study participants. 
5. To identify areas of possible reform to the legislative regime governing the retention 
of forensic DNA records in England and Wales. This aim was achieved by analysing 
the findings from the document analysis, literature review and surveys. 
1.3 Forensic DNA databasing 
The term forensic DNA databasing has been used by Goulka et al.20 to refer to ‘the shape 
and use of a DNA database, including how profiles are added to it and how searches are run.’ 
In broad terms, forensic DNA databasing can be described as a dynamic process that 
involves the enactment of DNA laws and policies; establishment of DNA regulatory bodies; 
the institution of DNA quality management systems; the collection, retention, use and 
destruction of forensic DNA records (CRUD); and the development of infrastructure to 
support CRUD. This research is mainly concerned about the retention aspects of forensic 
DNA databasing. Hence, this term mainly refers to the retention of DNA records throughout 
the thesis. The next sub-section describes the scope of forensic DNA databasing globally.  
                                                 
20 Jeremiah Goulka and others, ‘Toward a Comparison of DNA Profiling and Databases in the United States 
and England’ (RAND Corporation 2010). 
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1.3.1 Scope of forensic DNA databases 
Forensic DNA databanks or databases have revolutionised the investigation of crime since 
they were first introduced in England and Wales in April 1995.21 Williams and Johnson22 
describe the ‘common trajectory’ of forensic identity testing, starting from initial case-by-
case application in resolving violent crime to the development of DNA databases for the 
investigation of a wide range of offences, including property crime. Currently, over 94 states 
in the world operate a national forensic DNA databank/database or are planning to establish 
one.23 There are 8 operational national DNA databases in continental Africa, 17 in Asia, 40 
in Europe, 15 in North and South America and 2 in Australasia (Table 1.1).24 More than 67 
million forensic DNA profiles are held in DNA databases globally, with China (> 44 
million), the United States (> 18 million), and the United Kingdom (> 7 million) having the 
largest databases.25  Whilst DNA databasing continue to grow with increasing match rates, 
there is limited information on how effective they are in resolving crime. 26  Available 
information is only limited to individual cases where DNA played a critical role in 
identifying unknown suspects.  
  
                                                 
21 Peter D Martin, Hermann Schmitter and Peter M Schneider, ‘A Brief History of the Formation of DNA 
Databases in Forensic Science within Europe’ (2001) 119 Forensic Science International 225; Butler (n 8). 
22 Robin Williams and Paul Johnson, Genetic Policing: The Use of DNA in Criminal Investigations (Willan 
Publishing 2008). 
23 Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, ‘Welcome to the Genetics Policy Initiative!’ (Forensic Genetics Policy 
Initiative, 5 July 2016) <http://dnapolicyinitiative.org/> accessed 3 September 2019. 
24 Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, ‘Global Summary’ (Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, 10 February 
2016) <http://dnapolicyinitiative.org/wiki/index.php?title=Global_summary> accessed 11 April 2017; 
ENFSI, ‘ENFSI Survey on DNA Databases in Europe-June 2016’ (ENFSI, 2017) <http://enfsi.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/ENFSI-Survey-on-DNA-Databases-in-Europe-June-2016.pdf> accessed 11 April 
2017; INTERPOL, ‘Global DNA Profiling Survey Results 2016’ (INTERPOL 2016). 
25 Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, ‘Global Summary’ (n 24); Ge Baichuan, Peng Jianxiong and Liu Bing, 
‘The Tactics System and Capacity-Building of National DNA Database’ (2016) 41 Forensic Science and 
Technology 259; FBI, ‘CODIS - NDIS Statistics as of July 2019’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019) 
<https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics> accessed 3 September 
2019; Home Office, ‘National DNA Database Statistics: Q1 2019 to 2020’ (Home Office 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/national-dna-database-statistics> accessed 21 August 2019; 
Human Rights Watch, ‘China: Police DNA Database Threatens Privacy’ (Human Rights Watch, 15 May 
2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/15/china-police-dna-database-threatens-privacy> accessed 30 
May 2017. 
26 Paul Wiles, Annual Report 2016: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (Office 
of the Biometrics Commissioner, UK 2017) 13-14. 
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Table 1.1- Countries with an operational national forensic DNA database27 
 
In some states, DNA databasing is mainly restricted to convicted individuals, for example, 
the New Zealand DNA Profile Databank (DPD), whereas others, such as, the England/Wales 
NDNAD, permit short retention periods28 for DNA data from arrestees and volunteers.29 The 
website of the Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative 30  provides a detailed analysis of the 
inclusion and retention criteria for different national DNA databases around the world. As 
the need for international collaboration in fighting cross-border crime, such as, human, sex 
and drug trafficking, terrorism and illegal migration rises, it is expected that more states will 
consider establishing a national forensic DNA database. The European Union (EU) Council 
Decision 2008/615/JHA, for example, requires all EU member states to create a national 
DNA database that can be searched automatically by other member states.31 Though there 
has been significant progress in achieving this goal, differences in DNA retention policy or 
legislation have been highlighted as a potential setback in the transnational exchange of 
                                                 
27 INTERPOL, ‘Global DNA Profiling Survey Results 2016’ (n 24); Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, 
‘DNA Policy Info by Country’ (Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, 2017) 
<http://dnapolicyinitiative.org/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page> accessed 10 November 2017. 
28 Example: 3 years when arrested for a qualifying (serious) recordable offence 
29 Filipe Santos, Helena Machado and Susana Silva, ‘Forensic DNA Databases in European Countries: Is 
Size Linked to Performance?’ (2013) 9 Life Sciences, Society and Policy 1; Criminal Investigations (Bodily 
Samples) Act 1995. 
30 Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, ‘DNA Policy Info by Country’ (n 27). 
31 ENFSI DNA Working Group, DNA Database Management Review and Recommendations (ENFSI 2016). 
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DNA data.32 This gap highlights the need to identify the most effective retention regime for 
databases. 
1.3.2 Forensic DNA databasing and privacy 
A concept that has consistently featured in the debates about DNA legislation is privacy. 
Privacy is a complex concept to define and it may be subject to social context and 
technological advancement. Shils33 defines privacy as a state of ‘zero-relationship’ among 
members of a community (either two individuals or two groups or an individual and a group). 
Gavison34 also defined privacy as ‘a limitation of others' access to an individual’. Perfect 
privacy is achieved when a person’s information is not available to others, not observed, and 
is physically inaccessible to others. Privacy also means the independence of an individual, 
group or organisation to decide when, how, where, why and what information about them to 
release to others.35 Practically, the state of zero-relationship, control over private information 
and inaccessibility may be difficult to achieve in a real society, especially in a society 
dependent on technology that facilitates networking or interconnectivity, monitoring of 
movement and social interactions with limited regulations. For example, there is a massive 
amount of open-source information about individuals and organisations available online, 
which can easily be accessed. The individual has limited or no control over the use of such 
information. Further, the literature suggests a privacy paradox where individuals tend to 
exhibit differences between their attitudes and behaviour towards privacy-related 
technologies (such as, online applications) based on different circumstances.36 
Another definition of privacy is that it is an ‘area of a man's life which, in any given 
circumstances, a reasonable man with an understanding of the legitimate needs of the 
community would think it wrong to invade’.37 This definition broadens the scope of privacy 
and may cover other areas, such as, family life, the home, correspondence or professional 
                                                 
32 Filipe Santos, ‘The Transnational Exchange of DNA Data: Global Standards and Local Practices’ in K 
Jakobs and Knut Blind (eds), Proceedings of the 22nd EURAS annual standardisation conference: 
Digitalisation: Challenge and opportunity for standardisation. (Verlag Mainz 2017); Helena Machado and 
Rafaela Granja, ‘Ethics in Transnational Forensic DNA Data Exchange in the EU: Constructing Boundaries 
and Managing Controversies’ (2018) 27 Science as Culture 242. 
33 Edward Shils, ‘Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes’ (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 
281. 
34 Ruth Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421, 428. 
35 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head 1970). 
36 Nina Gerber, Paul Gerber and Melanie Volkamer, ‘Explaining the Privacy Paradox: A Systematic Review 
of Literature Investigating Privacy Attitude and Behavior’ (2018) 77 Computers & Security 226. 
37 Justice (the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists) as cited in Gavison (n 34), 426. 
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association. Both international and national laws provide for the protection of the right to 
privacy of individuals including their family life, home and correspondence.38  
In summary, privacy can be described as a state whereby:  
a) a person’s body, actions, thoughts, feelings and desires, health status or physical 
condition, their relationships, possessions and interactions with their environment; 
and,  
b) any material and/or information retrieved, generated or inferred from them, such as, 
their DNA material, DNA profile, fingerprints, photographic image, physical 
appearance and origin, religious beliefs or way of life, political opinions, sexual life, 
habits, behaviour and communication records are concealed from others in the same 
social environment. This is also applicable to a group of people, an organisation or 
institution. 
Forensic DNA databasing and/or databanking introduces several privacy concerns. Firstly, 
the phenotypic characteristics (including health or disease risk, age, geographical origin, 
ancestry and physical appearance) of an individual and their biological family can be 
predicted from the DNA sample. Secondly, an individual and their biological family can be 
tracked using the stored forensic DNA profile – a form of biosurveillance.39   Without 
appropriate safeguards, employers, for example, may be interested in accessing databanks 
to determine the genetic predisposition of prospective employees who have their DNA 
material or that of their relative retained. They may also be interested in finding out whether 
a prospective employee has their DNA records or is related to an individual on the ‘criminal’ 
database. This may introduce a form of ‘genetic discrimination’ in employment. 
Unconvicted individuals on the databank/database may be denied important services because 
of genetic discrimination or adverse inference of criminality may be drawn against them.40 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (the Convention) stipulates 
that: 
                                                 
38 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; European Convention on Human Rights 1950; Human 
Rights Act 1998. 
39 Robin Williams and Paul Johnson, ‘Circuits of Surveillance’ (2004) 2 Surveillance & Society 1. 
40 MPA Civil Liberties Panel, Protecting the Innocent: The London Experience of DNA and the National 
DNA Database (Metropolitan Police Authority 2011) 
<http://policeauthority.org/metropolitan/downloads/scrutinites/dna.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017. 
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1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. 
Based on the above, any interference with the privacy of an individual must be proportionate. 
This means the interference should be necessary (or relevant) to achieve a defined legitimate 
objective, and the process should be adequate, non-excessive and balanced with any 
competing interests.41 For convicted individuals, there appears to be a consensus for their 
DNA records to be stored due to their potential risk to society and/or high propensity to re-
offend.42  The estimated recidivism rate among violent offenders is over 60% within three 
years.43 The retention of convicted individual’s profiles may help in achieving key public 
security objectives, such as, crime prevention, investigation, detection, prosecution and 
resolution of crime.  The retention of DNA samples and profiles of unconvicted individuals 
has been controversial because there is limited data to justify retention.44  
                                                 
41 Els J Kindt, Privacy and Data Protection Issues of Biometric Applications: A Comparative Legal Analysis 
(Springer Verlag 2013). 
42 Butler (n 8); Carole McCartney, Forensic Identification and Criminal Justice: Forensic Science, Justice 
and Risk (Willan Publishing 2006); Bob Bramley, ‘DNA Databases’ in Jim Fraser and Robin Williams (eds), 
Handbook of forensic science (Willan Publishing 2009). 
43 Butler (n 8); Jean McEwen and Philip Reilly, ‘A Review of State Legislation on DNA Forensic Data 
Banking.’ (1994) 54 American Journal of Human Genetics 941; Patrick A Langan and David J Levin, 
‘Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994’ (2002) 15 Federal Sentencing Reporter 58; Patrick A Langan, 
Erica L Schmitt and Matthew R Durose, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 (Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice 2003). 
44 McCartney, Forensic Identification and Criminal Justice: Forensic Science, Justice and Risk (n 42); S and 
Marper v The United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581; Kate Beattie, ‘S and Marper v UK: Privacy, DNA and 
Crime Prevention’ [2009] European Human Rights Law Review 229; Human Genetics Commission, Nothing 
to Hide, Nothing to Fear? Balancing Individual Rights and the Public Interest in the Governance and Use of 
the National DNA Database (Human Genetics Commission 2009) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/nov/uk-dna-human-genetics-commission.pdf> accessed 29 March 
2017; Carole McCartney, Tim J Wilson and Robin Williams, The Future of Forensic Bioinformation 
(Nuffield Foundation 2010) <http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/future-forensic-bioinformation> accessed 29 
March 2017; Carole McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets: The Retention of DNA 
for Forensic Purposes’ (2012) 51 The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 245. 
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1.3.3 Forensic DNA databasing and public security 
The legal justification for the privacy intrusiveness of forensic DNA databases/databanks 
has mainly relied on public security grounds.45 The definition of public security, based on 
paragraph 2 of article 8 of the Convention, encompass the protection of national security, 
public safety, the economic well-being of the state, and protection from threats directed at 
the public.46 Article 8 also includes the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals.47 
In this regard, public security can be described as the protection of the state and its structures 
as an institution, the public as an entity, and individuals (especially where the person 
represents the public, such as, crime victims) from any form of threat to their economic, 
social, environmental, and cultural well-being and health. The threats include crime or 
disorder, terrorism, disaster, disease outbreaks, military attack, political instability, 
disruption of economic relations, and non-enforcement of human rights, international and 
national laws. In the context of crime-fighting and forensic DNA databasing/databanking, 
public security, based on section 63T(1) of PACE, can be defined as the utilisation of DNA 
databasing/databanking technology: 
a) in the interests of national security,  
b) for the purposes of a terrorist investigation,  
c) for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation 
of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution, or  
d) for purposes related to the identification of a deceased person or of the person 
to whom the material relates.48 
In this research, section 63T(1)(c) is considered broadly as a summary of the four public 
security functions of the database. Hence, the term public security refers to the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of crime throughout the thesis. The next section 
briefly describes the England and Wales NDNAD, which is the focus of this research. 
                                                 
45 Helena Soleto Muñoz and Anna Fiodorova, ‘DNA and Law Enforcement in the European Union: Tools 
and Human Rights Protection’ (2014) 10 Utrecht Law Review 149; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The 
Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues (2007) <http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/The-
forensic-use-of-bioinformation-ethical-issues.pdf> accessed 11 October 2016. 
46 Kevin Aquilina, ‘Public Security versus Privacy in Technology Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2010) 26 
Computer Law & Security Review 130. 
47 Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: Science and Public Protection (Home 
Office 2009). 
48 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 16. 
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1.3.4 Overview of the England and Wales National DNA Database 
The England and Wales National DNA Database is the world’s largest database by the 
proportion of the entire population in the database (over 8.3% of the UK population). It holds 
DNA profiles from all police forces in England and Wales as well as profiles from the 
separate Northern Ireland DNA Database (NIDNAD) and Scotland DNA Database 
(SDNAD). Additionally, DNA profiles from the Channel Islands (Isle of Man, the Bailiwick 
of Jersey and the Bailiwick of Guernsey) are exported to the NDNAD. As of June 2019, the 
database holds more than 6.4 million subject profiles (of which ~5.5 million are known 
individuals) and over 0.63 million crime scene profiles.49 A search of the database, on 
loading a new crime scene profile, can provide unknown investigative ‘leads’, identify 
unknown offenders or eliminate suspects and link different crimes. As of 2017/18 fiscal year, 
the chance of a match between a newly loaded crime scene profile and a subject profile in 
the database is 65.5%.50  
Although less than 1% of crimes are detected using the NDNAD, its detection rate has been 
reported to be higher than crimes without DNA evidence.51 Estimates reported by Bramley52 
in 2009 suggest that the detection rate for recordable crimes where DNA is loaded on the 
NDNAD is higher (40%) than the rate for recordable crimes without DNA (26%). When 
filtered by crime type, the detection rate for DNA crimes53 was higher than non-DNA crimes 
(domestic burglary: 41% vs 16%; vehicular theft: 63% v 8%). About half of DNA detections 
are estimated to yield conviction of which a quarter result in a custodial sentence.54 The 
estimated crime prevention rate was 7.8 crimes per custodial sentence.55 These estimates 
suggest that the NDNAD could be of value to crime detection and prevention. However, this 
may apply to crimes where DNA can be recovered from the crime scene and loaded on the 
NDNAD. As noted by the Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material 
(Biometrics Commissioner), the resolution of most crimes do not involve DNA.56 This 
means that the comparison of the above detection rates should be interpreted cautiously.  
                                                 
49 Home Office, ‘National DNA Database Statistics: Q1 2019 to 2020’ (n 25). 
50 FIND Strategy Board, Annual Report 2017 to 2018 (n 16). 
51 Bramley (n 42); McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (n 14); Wiles, 
Annual Report 2016 (n 26). 
52 Bramley (n 42). 
53 i.e. cases where DNA is loaded on the National DNA Database 
54 Bramley (n 42). 
55 Bramley (n 42). 
56 This may be the case when identity is not in question or there was no obvious crime scene or DNA was not 
deposited during the crime. See Wiles, Annual Report 2016 (n 26) 10. 
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The practical value of the NDNAD can be illustrated using the 1999 case of Keith Samuels,57 
a serial rapist from Northampton who committed seven rapes from 1984 to 1990. Advances 
in DNA technology allowed police detectives to establish that biological evidence (semen) 
recovered from the crime scenes originated from the same individual. In 1998, Keith 
Samuels was arrested for a cheque book fraud, leading to his DNA sample being taken, 
profiled and loaded on the NDNAD. The reference profile matched the crime scene profiles 
from the rapes. This led to his subsequent conviction and nine life sentences in 1999. The 
reports of the Strategy Board for the NDNAD contains several examples of individual cases 
where the database contributed to investigations or case resolution.58 
The crime detection potential of the NDNAD has influenced significant government support 
and financial investment in its development and expansion.  For example, about £300 million 
was invested in the NDNAD through the Government’s DNA Database Expansion 
Programme (DEP) by 2005.59 The programme aimed at increasing the collection of DNA 
samples from crime scenes and rapid sampling of suspected individuals, as well as advancing 
the DNA analysis technology to allow the analysis of low template60 and degraded DNA. 
The DEP was facilitated by legislative reforms in England and Wales that widened the pool 
of individuals that could be sampled and added to the database, including those arrested, 
charged or convicted of a recordable offence.61 This inclusion criterion (i.e. entry in the 
NDNAD) is still applied to the database. Several ethical and policy issues regarding data 
privacy and human rights have been raised about the retention of DNA records, particularly 
records of unconvicted individuals. These issues have evoked several debates focused 
mainly on public security and privacy, and other related areas such as the presumption of 
innocence, proportionality and necessity, the onus of proof, liberty, bodily inviolability, 
informed consent, equality and autonomy of individuals.62 The next section outlines how the 
                                                 
57 Williams and Johnson, ‘Circuits of Surveillance’ (n 39); Lisa Smith and John Bond, Criminal Justice and 
Forensic Science: A Multidisciplinary Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan 2014); Lisa Tolfts and Rebecca 
Keay, ‘Caught by His Lust for Call-Girls; a Chance Call about Cheque Fraud Led to Police Capturing 
Britain’s Most Wanted Serial Rapist in the Bedroom of This Hotel in Rugby’ (The Free Library, 15 April 
1999) <https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Caught+by+his+lust+for+call-
girls%3B+A+CHANCE+CALL+ABOUT+CHEQUE+FRAUD...-a060456713> accessed 19 January 2017; 
BBC News, ‘Serial Rapist Jailed for Life’ BBC News (14 April 1999) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/319446.stm> accessed 19 January 2017. 
58 FIND Strategy Board, Annual Report 2017 to 2018 (n 16) 21. 
59 Forensic Science and Pathology Unit, ‘DNA Expansion Programme 2000–2005: Reporting Achievement’ 
(Home Office 2005). 
60 i.e. smaller quantities of DNA samples, sometimes referred to as ‘touch DNA’ 
61 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s 82; Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 10. 
62 Carole McCartney, ‘Forensic DNA Sampling and the England and Wales National DNA Database: A 
Sceptical Approach’ (2004) 12 Critical Criminology 157; Nuffield Council on Bioethics (n 45); Victor 
Toom, ‘Forensic DNA Databases in England and the Netherlands: Governance, Structure and Performance 
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debates on public security and privacy have shaped the evolution of retention regimes for 
the NDNAD. 
1.4 Retention regimes 
Forensic DNA databasing is generally governed by legislation to ensure that it operates 
lawfully, ethically and efficiently in the prevention and early resolution of crime. The 
retention regime refers to the legal system that governs whose DNA samples/profiles can be 
stored and the length of retention. The general factors considered in the development of an 
appropriate retention regime for forensic DNA data include definition and size of the active 
or previously active criminal population (i.e. individuals who have committed crime, are 
committing crime, or are likely to commit crime), recidivism rate or re-arrest rate, and 
heterogeneity of offences committed by individual offenders. 63  The different inclusion 
criteria used or proposed for DNA databases worldwide include a comprehensive/universal 
DNA database (UDNAD),64 convicted individuals database, suspected individuals database, 
arrestee database, volunteer database or a combination of these with or without 
databanking 65 . The models for the length of DNA sample/profile retention include: 
indefinite; until the death of subject or one hundred years; temporal retention based on the 
seriousness or nature of the offence, age, the maximum length of sentence, recidivism or re-
arrest record; until the sampling purpose is fulfilled or a mixture of these.66  
                                                 
Compared’ (2012) 31 New Genetics and Society 311; S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44); Sheldon 
Krimsky and Tania Simoncelli, Genetic Justice: DNA Data Banks, Criminal Investigations, and Civil 
Liberties (Columbia University Press 2011); Jungnyum Lee, ‘The Presence and Future of the Use of DNA-
Information and the Protection of Genetic Informational Privacy: A Comparative Perspective’ (2016) 44 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 212. 
63 Jim Fraser, Forensic Science: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2010); Walsh, Curran 
and Buckleton (n 12); Dick Leary and Ken Pease, ‘DNA and the Active Criminal Population’ (2003) 5 Crime 
Prevention & Community Safety 7; Butler (n 8); Ken Pease, ‘DNA Retention after S and Marper’ in Home 
Office, Keeping the right people on the DNA database: Science and Public Protection (Home Office 2009); 
Andromachi Tseloni and Ken Pease, ‘DNA Retention after Arrest: Balancing Privacy Interests and Public 
Protection’ (2011) 8 European Journal of Criminology 32. 
64 Robert Williamson and Rony Duncan, ‘DNA Testing for All: There Are Two Fair Possibilities for 
Forensic DNA Testing: Everyone or No One.’ (2002) 418 Nature 585; DH Kaye and Michael E Smith, 
‘DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage’ (2003) 
2003 Wisconsin Law Review 413; R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire and R 
(on the application of Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2002] EWCA Civ 1275. 
65 i.e. storage of the actual DNA sample 




1.4.1 Retention regimes for the England and Wales NDNAD 
The retention regimes for DNA data from England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland 
are independent of each other though they currently share several similarities (Table 1.2). 
The law in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland are relatively the same. Table 1.2 
summarises the current retention regime applied in each jurisdiction. The regimes that have 
been applied to forensic DNA data from England and Wales can be broadly divided into 
three: ‘restrictive regime’ (1995 – 2001), ‘expansive regime’ (2001 – 2013) and ‘semi-
restrictive regime’ (2013 – present). The first regime, brought into force following 
amendment to PACE by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA), is 
characterised by indefinite retention of all DNA samples and profiles from convicted 
individuals, and destruction of DNA records after an individual is acquitted or the case is 
discontinued. 67  All loaded profiles are subjected to speculative searching against other 
profiles. Challenges associated with this regime include delays in the destruction of 
unconvicted individuals’ DNA records, which renders some relevant database hits unlawful 
and inadmissible in court. 68  Another challenge is repeated sampling of unconvicted 
suspects.69 
The expansive regime was introduced following amendments to PACE by section 82 of the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPA) and section 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 (CJA). This regime removed the obligation for the police to destroy DNA records of 
unconvicted individuals and permitted the indefinite retention of DNA samples and profiles 
of almost every individual who encounters the police. In December 2005, the records of 
200,300 individuals who had been arrested but not charged were retained in the NDNAD. 
About 4.2% (8,493) of these individuals were identified as suspects in 13,964 other offences 
including murders, sexual assaults, aggravated burglaries and the supply of controlled 
drugs. 70  This statistical evidence suggests that the retention of DNA records from 
unconvicted individuals could aid future investigations, improve early detection of crime 
and possibly serve as a crime deterrent. The major challenge with the expansive regime is 
the infringement of the right to privacy of innocent individuals. Studies and reviews that 
evaluated the English/Welsh, Scottish, Dutch and Canadian retention regimes note the 
disproportionality of the expansive model against the right to privacy of unconvicted 
                                                 
67 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, pt IV. 
68 Bramley (n 42). 
69 Bramley (n 42). 
70 Bramley (n 42). 
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individuals.71 Prior to 2008, the UK Court of Appeal and the House of Lords supported the 
expansive regime.72 
Table 1.2 - Summary of current retention regimes for forensic DNA data in the UK73 
 
*Including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (s. 63M), Terrorism Act 2000 (para. 20E of sch. 8), 
Counter-terrorism Act 2008 (s. 18B), Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (para. 11 of 
sch. 6), Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (s. 18G). 
In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that the expansive regime does 
not maintain a fair balance between the individual’s right to privacy and public security. This 
                                                 
71 Michelle Kisluk, ‘Comparison of Data Protection in Forensic DNA Databanks in Canada and the United 
Kingdom’ (Masters, Unpublished, Central European University 2008) 
<http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2009/kisluk_michelle.pdf> accessed 12 May 2016; J Fraser and Scottish 
Government (Funder), ‘Acquisition and Retention of DNA and Fingerprint Data in Scotland’ (University of 
Strathclyde 2009) Report <http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/18671/> accessed 11 October 2016; Toom (n 62). 
72 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Respondent) ex parte LS (by his mother and litigation 
friend JB) (FC) (Appellant) and R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Respondent) ex parte 
Marper (FC) (Appellant) [2004] UKHL 39; R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
and R (on the application of Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (n 64). 
73 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012; Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2013; Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995. 
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ruling in the case of S and Marper v the United Kingdom74 informed the development of the 
PoFA regime, which is described as semi-restrictive. The regime requires the destruction of 
all DNA samples after profiling or within six months,75 recognising the sensitivity of the 
actual DNA material. DNA profiles of most convicted individuals can be stored indefinitely 
and profiles from some first-time convicted minors and unconvicted individuals can be 
stored for a short period of time (Table 1.2 above).  
Since the implementation of the PoFA regime in October 2013, over 1.7 million profiles of 
unconvicted individuals have been deleted from the database and over 7.7 million DNA 
samples have been destroyed after DNA profiling.76 These deletions were carried out to 
ensure compliance with the PoFA regime that seeks to balance public and individual 
interests. Following the implementation of the new regime, reports of the NDNAD Strategy 
Board (now Forensic Information Database (FIND) Strategy Board77),78 the Ethics Group 
(now Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group (BFEG))79 and the Biometrics Commissioner80 
indicate an improvement in the protection of the genetic privacy of individuals, particularly 
the retention of DNA records from unconvicted individuals. The new regime has also 
improved the match rate of the database compared to previous retention regimes (Figure 
1.2). This suggests that the current regime may be potentially more effective in protecting 
public security than previous regimes. However, it is not clear whether the increasing trend 
                                                 
74 S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44). 
75 Retention of DNA samples can be extended beyond six months when required for prosecution disclosure 
purposes under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The sample must however be destroyed 
after fulfilling its purpose. 
76 Home Office and James Brokenshire, ‘Protection of Freedoms Act Implementation and National DNA 
Database Annual Report 2012 to 2013’ (GOV.UK, 24 October 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/protection-of-freedoms-act-implementation-and-national-dna-
database-annual-report-2012-to-2013> accessed 11 March 2016; Alastair MacGregor, Annual Report 2014: 
Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, UK 
2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/biometrics-commissioner-annual-report-2013-2014> 
accessed 11 October 2016. 
77 The remit of FIND Strategy Board now includes the National Fingerprint Database. 
78 National DNA Database Strategy Board, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2013 to 2014 (National 
DNA Database Strategy Board 2014); National DNA Database Strategy Board, National DNA Database: 
Annual Report, 2014 to 2015 (National DNA Database Strategy Board 2015); National DNA Database 
Strategy Board, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2015 to 2016 (National DNA Database Strategy 
Board 2017); FIND Strategy Board, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2016 to 2017 (Forensic 
Information Database Strategy Board 2018). 
79 National DNA Database Ethics Group, Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database 2014 
(n 17); National DNA Database Ethics Group, Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database 
2015 (National DNA Database Ethics Group 2016). 
80 MacGregor, Annual Report 2014: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 76); 
Alastair MacGregor, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material 
(Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, UK 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/biometrics-commissioner-annual-report-2014-to-2015> 
accessed 11 October 2016. 
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in the match rate is associated with the deletion of profiles or changes in the law. The match 
rate trend should be interpreted cautiously because the number of reference and crime scene 
profiles loaded in the NDNAD has decreased whilst the number of matches remains 
relatively similar between 2003 to 2017 (See Appendix XI).  
According to reports of the Biometrics Commissioner, some profiles that require retention 
have been deleted from the NDNAD, creating a potential risk to public security.81 Also, the 
Biometrics Commissioner notes that the State may risk the failure to detect and prevent 
crime due to non-retention of all arrestee data.82 A further risk is that some profiles have 
been retained unlawfully due to challenges with the retention process and the IT system for 
the database. The current policy on this issue requires the police to check the legality of each 
match before acting. However, unlawful hits are being used for intelligence purposes and 
this may constitute a breach of privacy.83 Further details of the benefits, challenges and risks 
of the current regime are provided in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 1.2 - Trend of NDNAD match rate from 2003/04 to 2017/18.84 The match rate measures the chance 
that a crime scene profile loaded on the database matches a subject profile. The graph shows a gradual 
increase in the match rate, with highest rates observed within the PoFA period 2013/14 to 2017/18. 
                                                 
81 MacGregor, Annual Report 2014: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 76); 
MacGregor, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 80), 
para 108. 
82 MacGregor, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 80). 
83 MacGregor, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 80). 
84 National DNA Database Strategy Board, Annual Report 2015 to 2016 (n 78); FIND Strategy Board, 
Annual Report 2017 to 2018 (n 16); See Appendix XI. 
 20 
 
1.5 Efficacy, effectiveness and efficiency of DNA database retention regimes 
Efficacy can be described as the ability of a substance, intervention, instrument, method or 
system to yield the desired output or outcome for which it was designed after making the 
required input.85 Efficacy is closely related to effectiveness, which measures the level at 
which actual outcomes meet expectations.86 Efficiency measures the value or worth of a 
system by comparing its actual outcomes to that of alternative systems or a cost/input-benefit 
analysis of a system.87 
In the context of forensic DNA databasing and criminal investigation, an efficacious 
retention regime should ensure that the data of the ‘active or previously active criminal 
population’ are retained in the database for a justifiable period whereby it will assist in the 
maintenance of public security. As established in existing literature and European court 
cases,88 the public interest in the creation of databases should be balanced with the civil 
liberties of individuals, particularly the right to privacy. Hence, an efficacious retention 
regime should also be compatible with human rights law. The database itself can be said to 
be efficacious when it contains both reference and crime scene profiles and generates 
relevant hits. An effective database system should contribute to public security and an 
efficient forensic DNA database system should result in better public security outcomes than 
alternative systems or its public security outcomes should merit the input required in its 
operation or implementation. This research is focused on the efficacy or effectiveness of the 
legislative regime for the NDNAD because the size and contents of the database are shaped 
by the law. 
                                                 
85 The Law Dictionary, ‘What Is EFFICACY? Definition of EFFICACY (Black’s Law Dictionary)’ (The 
Law Dictionary, 19 October 2012) <http://thelawdictionary.org/efficacy/> accessed 3 April 2017; Business 
Dictionary, ‘What Is Efficacy? Definition and Meaning’ (BusinessDictionary.com) 
<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/efficacy.html> accessed 3 April 2017; Cambridge 
Dictionary, ‘Meaning of “Efficacy” in the English Dictionary’ (Cambridge Dictionary) 
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/efficacy> accessed 3 April 2017. 
86 The Law Dictionary, ‘What Is EFFECTIVENESS? Definition of EFFECTIVENESS (Black’s Law 
Dictionary)’ (The Law Dictionary, 19 October 2012) <http://thelawdictionary.org/effectiveness/> accessed 8 
April 2017. 
87 Kees van der Beek, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Forensic DNA-Databases’ (Promega 
Corporation 2015) <https://www.promega.com/-/media/files/products-and-services/genetic-identity/ishi-26-
oral-abstracts/9-van-der-beek.pdf> accessed 9 April 2017; The Law Dictionary, ‘What Is EFFICIENCY? 
Definition of EFFICIENCY (Black’s Law Dictionary)’ (The Law Dictionary, 19 October 2012) 
<http://thelawdictionary.org/efficiency/> accessed 9 April 2017. 
88 S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44); Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, Establishing Best 
Practice for Forensic DNA Databases (FGPI 2017) <http://dnapolicyinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/BestPractice-Report-plus-cover-final.pdf> accessed 3 October 2017; Aycaguer v 
France [2017] ECHR 587; Independent Advisory Group on the Use of Biometric Data in Scotland, Report of 
the Independent Advisory Group on the Use of Biometric Data in Scotland (Scottish Government 2018). 
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1.5.1 Measuring the efficacy or effectiveness of retention regimes 
One approach to measuring the success of forensic DNA database laws is the assessment of 
the outcome of its resultant database. Bieber89 highlights three broad outcomes of DNA 
databasing to focus on when measuring effectiveness: 1) Case resolution; 2) Crime reduction 
and prevention; and, 3) societal and individual interests. 
1.5.1.1 Outcome 1 – Case resolution  
The first outcome, case resolution, can be described as the extent of utilisation of the 
database during the criminal justice process – from the investigation of incidents/crime to 
court and/or final disposal.90 Presently, there is limited statistical evidence of the actual case 
resolution rate (including conviction rates) of DNA databases. This is associated with the 
fact that DNA evidence is rarely used as the only evidence in a case.91 Although the legal 
authorities in England and Wales have established that ‘where DNA is directly deposited in 
the course of the commission of a crime by the offender, a very high DNA match with the 
defendant is sufficient to raise a case for the defendant to answer’,92  this principle infers that 
DNA ‘only’ cases are dependent on the overall circumstances of the case.93  Therefore, it is 
difficult to exclusively ascribe the resolution of a case to a DNA database hit. This makes it 
complicated to determine the ‘independent’ case resolution effectiveness of DNA databasing 
though its value has been demonstrated in many individual serious crimes, such as, the case 
of Keith Samuels and Joseph Kappen.94  
One way of evaluating how effective the database could be in resolving crime is the 
assessment of its output metric, match or hit rates. Based on the recommendations of the 
NDNAD Ethics Group,95 the ‘potential’ impact of the database on case resolution could be 
demonstrated by assessing the match rate data filtered by:  
a) retention regimes (e.g. PoFA/semi-restrictive vs expansive regimes); 
                                                 
89 Frederick R Bieber, ‘Turning Base Hits into Earned Runs: Improving the Effectiveness of Forensic DNA 
Data Bank Programs’ (2006) 34 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 222. 
90 Bieber (n 89). 
91 FIND Strategy Board, Annual Report 2016 to 2017 (n 78). 
92 R v FNC [2015] EWCA Crim 1732, para 27. 
93 R v FNC (n 92); R v Tsekiri [2017] EWCA Crim 40; R v Bryon [2015] EWCA Crim 997. 
94 Tolfts and Keay (n 57); Nicole Martin, ‘Dead Man Named as Triple Murderer after DNA Tests’ (6 June 
2002) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1396492/Dead-man-named-as-triple-murderer-after-
DNA-tests.html> accessed 4 September 2019. 
95 National DNA Database Ethics Group, Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database 2014 
(n 17) 20. 
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b) inclusion criteria or retention categories (e.g. data of those convicted of serious 
offence vs minor offence vs arrestees); and  
c) retention periods (e.g. 3 years old subjects’ data vs 9 years).  
The filtered match rate data could provide a general understanding of who to include in the 
database and how long data should be stored to maximize the utility of the database and 
enhance the protection of public and private interests. One limitation, however, is that a 
DNA hit does not indicate necessarily that a crime will be ‘solved’ or the hit will be probative 
in solving the crime. For example, only 37 of 625 international DNA hits reported to Dutch 
authorities in 2010 proceeded to court.96  Although the total number of NDNAD hits that are 
used in court or contribute to crime resolution is unknown,97 the number of probative hits is 
expected to be lower than the initial hits generated from the database. There are several 
‘innocent’ reasons an individual’s DNA may be found at a crime scene. Other evidence is 
required in most cases to corroborate DNA match evidence to secure a conviction or solve a 
crime. This is because the DNA hit only suggest the possible presence (but not actions) of 
an individual at the crime/incident scene before, during or after the crime incident. Though 
limited in demonstrating database effectiveness, a DNA hit suggests that a crime could 
potentially be solved speedily and efficiently either by identifying unknown offenders and 
witnesses or eliminating suspects. Hence, the filtered match rate analysis could show if the 
composition of the database is adequate and can aid the police in resolving crime. 
As part of this research, the proposed filtered match rate analysis was considered in assessing 
the efficacy of retention regimes. As stated earlier, a match rate project was designed, and 
approval was sought and granted by the NDNAD Strategy Board/Ethics Group.98 However, 
there were difficulties in obtaining the filtered match rate data due to the way records are 
stored in England and Wales. The NDNAD does not store conviction/arrest records. These 
are stored separately on the PNC. Hence, it was not possible to filter the match rate by 
retention regime, inclusion criteria or retention periods.  
1.5.1.2 Outcome 2 – Crime reduction and prevention 
This outcome considers the incapacitation and deterrence effects of the database. Firstly, it 
is hypothesised that when a true offender is identified using the DNA database, this may lead 
                                                 
96 ENFSI DNA Working Group, DNA Database Management Review and Recommendations (n 66) 28-29. 
97 FIND Strategy Board, Annual Report 2016 to 2017 (n 78). 
98 See Appendix I – methodology for match rate project 
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to a reduction in crime rates.99 A reason for this claim is that the offender may be convicted 
and held in custody. A lengthy custodial sentence means that such an offender will not be 
available to commit further crimes, thereby preventing crime and reducing crime rates.100  
The second hypothesis holds that retaining DNA records from individuals could reduce 
crime rates. An explanation for this claim is that once people are aware that their DNA 
records are held on the database, they will desist from committing crime since the database 
increases the chances of being caught.101 There have been attempts to measure outcome 2 in 
the United States and Denmark by assessing crime rates and recidivistic behaviour.102 
Although the studies recorded some positive results, there are several confounders with the 
association of DNA databasing to crime rates and recidivism. Firstly, crime rates are not 
representative of all crimes that occur due to recording practices. For example, estimates by 
the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) show that whilst about 11.2 million 
crimes were committed in the 2019 reporting year, about 5.9 million crimes were recorded 
by the police.103  Secondly, there are several factors that impact on the crime rates. These 
include socio-economic factors, gender, age, recidivism, incomplete crimes, reporting 
patterns, the definition of crime and variations in court disposals. Considering these 
limitations, ‘proof that any single new program in the justice system directly reduces crime 
rates would be difficult to convincingly demonstrate statistically’.104 Lastly, according to 
research by McCartney,105 a deterrence effect may be difficult to prove for many reasons. 
One of these is that recidivistic offenders are likely to change their modus operandi to 
prevent being caught rather than desisting from crime.  
                                                 
99 Jennifer L Doleac, ‘The Effects of DNA Databases on Crime’ (Social Science Research Network 2016) 
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2556948. 
100 Bieber (n 89). 
101 Doleac (n 99). 
102 Doleac (n 99); Jennifer L Doleac, ‘How Do State Crime Policies Affect Other States? The Externalities of 
State DNA Database Laws’ (Social Science Research Network 2016) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2892046 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2892046> accessed 11 January 2017; Jennifer L Doleac and others, ‘The 
Effects of DNA Databases on the Deterrence and Detection of Offenders’ (Social Science Research Network 
2016) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2811790 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2811790> accessed 22 May 
2017. 
103 Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in England and Wales: Year Ending March 2019’ (Office for 
National Statistics 2019) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales
/yearendingmarch2019> accessed 4 September 2019. 
104 Bieber (n 89) 230. 
105 McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (n 14). 
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1.5.1.3 Outcome 3 – Societal and individual interests 
The third outcome, societal and individual interests, can be described as the relationship 
between the operation of the database and, actual and perceived public safety, privacy and 
other civil liberties.106 This outcome is important because it establishes the legitimacy or 
acceptability of the operation of the database and demonstrates whether the database is 
perceived as an effective crime control tool. An assessment of outcome 3 can inform 
policymakers about public support for the establishment and continuous development of 
DNA databases. As explained earlier, due to challenges in obtaining reliable statistical data 
to address the case resolution and crime prevention outcomes of the database, this study 
focused on outcome 3, specifically on perceived societal and individual interests of the 
database. 
1.6 Problem statement and justification 
The Marper decision in 2008 and reviews of the legislative framework governing the 
NDNAD have established the need to ensure proportionality in the operation of DNA 
databases.107 However, successive Governments have interpreted proportionality differently 
and provided disparate responses to the questions: whose DNA data should be stored on the 
NDNAD? And for how long? This is partly because there is limited empirical evidence to 
adequately demonstrate the actual and overall effectiveness of DNA retention in ensuring 
public security (described as the ‘Marper gap’ in this thesis). Existing policies on DNA 
databasing are mainly informed by the perspectives of different members of the public,108 
judicial decisions, and criminal career research.109  
                                                 
106 Bieber (n 89). 
107 McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets’ (n 44); Helen Wallace and others, 
‘Forensic DNA Databases–Ethical and Legal Standards: A Global Review’ (2014) 4 Egyptian Journal of 
Forensic Sciences 57; Brian Blakemore and Christoper Blake, ‘Can the National DNA Database Be Effective 
and Comply with Human Rights Legislation?’ (2012) 85 The Police Journal 191; Lee (n 62). 
108 The public is defined as a dynamic and diverse group made up of the different members of society 
including but not limited to government institutions, professionals, stakeholders, students and citizens. (see 
Julian Roberta and Manon Jendly, ‘A Rendezvous between Forensic Science and Criminology: Toward a 
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The last major assessment of public perspectives about DNA retention in England and Wales 
was carried out in 2011 by the Metropolitan Police Authority Civil Liberties Panel 
(MPACLP), prior to the implementation of PoFA.110 The study included engagement with 
criminal justice professionals and organisations, civil liberty groups and the 'general' public 
and an online survey of the views of Londoners (n = 615). Most respondents to the online 
survey (84%) supported the view that DNA records from unconvicted individuals should not 
be retained on the NDNAD. Criminal justice professionals who participated in the study 
expressed concerns about public security risks with the ‘majority view’ in the survey. In 
2014, Wallace et al.111 reviewed the ethical and legal standards governing national DNA 
databases around the world. The review highlighted a growing global consensus to limit 
forensic DNA databanking112 by destroying samples after profiling and the exclusion of 
DNA data of unconvicted individuals from databases.  Whilst the majority view in the 2011 
study and the suggested global trends are partly consistent with PoFA, the literature suggests 
that public views may not be well‐informed due to a lacuna in public education about DNA 
databases and limited information about the actual effectiveness of DNA databases.113  
According to the reports of the Biometrics Commissioner, the introduction of PoFA has 
resulted in some benefits including an improvement in the output of the NDNAD. 114 
However, several challenges and potential risks to public security and civil liberties have 
been identified (see detailed analysis in Chapter 3). Moreover, the PoFA regime has not yet 
been subjected to a research‐informed review since it was enacted.115 Although some cases 
in Europe have approved the principles established by the Marper ruling, 116  available 
literature related to forensic DNA databasing in England and Wales suggests that 
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proportionality may still be lacking.117  The contributing factors to this gap include the 
temporal retention of DNA data from some unconvicted individuals without adequate 
support of the value of retention.118 Another factor is the indefinite retention of DNA data 
from all adults convicted of a recordable offence without considering the type or seriousness 
of offence and effectiveness of retention.119 This issue is yet to be decided by the ECHR in 
the UK case of Gaughran.120 A third factor relates to the position that the non-retention of 
all arrestee data after the conclusion of investigations/proceedings may lead to public 
security risks by reducing the capacity of the police to detect crime.121 These factors may 
result in legal challenges in future.  
To help fill the research gaps identified above, this thesis firstly analysed the reports of the 
oversight bodies of the NDNAD to identify recurrent themes on the benefits, challenges and 
emerging issues associated with the implementation of PoFA. Secondly, as a follow‐up to 
the 2011 MPACLP study, this research explored the current views of the public about the 
retention of forensic DNA data in England and Wales using an online survey. Thirdly, the 
perception of primary stakeholders (such as, law enforcement professionals) who are well 
informed about the legal framework and operation of the NDAND was assessed. The 
stakeholders’ survey focused on the effectiveness of the different NDNAD retention 
regimes. Unlike the general public, the stakeholders are directly exposed to the benefits, 
challenges and risks of the DNA retention regime. In summary, the research found 
inconsistencies between the views of respondents to the surveys and the current retention 
regime for the NDNAD. The public survey indicated support for discriminatory retention of 
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data from convicted adults based on offence seriousness. In contrast, participants of the 
stakeholder survey thought the expansive regime is the most effective system for the 
NDNAD. This thesis suggests a need for reform of the current indefinite retention rule for 
convicted adults and adoption of efficient elements of the expansive regime such as 
automation of procedures or ‘bright-line’ rules and creation of a national intelligence 
network.  
1.7 Significance and original research contribution 
There are no public security and human rights standards for the retention of forensic DNA 
data worldwide.122 This is mainly due to variations in the interpretation of proportionality 
and how to ensure a balance between public security and privacy. The assessment of the 
different aspects of the efficacy and impact of NDNAD regimes can be useful to the criminal 
justice system of England and Wales, other jurisdictions in the UK and potentially the world.  
In the absence of systematic and objective data on the effectiveness of the NDNAD regimes, 
this study focused on the aspect of the societal and individual interest outcome of DNA 
databasing.  
Figure 1.3 summarises the specific and original contributions of the research based on the 
overall findings. The figure highlights areas of possible reform, such as the legal definition 
of the NDNAD functions, and how proportionality and effectiveness may be improved. The 
research is significant because the determination of an appropriate law to govern DNA 
databases has been described as a societal choice.123 The findings from the study are relevant 
as they can inform policymakers about the ‘choices’ of the society they represent, including 
perceptions about the effectiveness, inclusion and retention criteria for databases.  
It is noteworthy that the proportionality issues of forensic DNA data retention are not unique 
to DNA databases or databanks. These issues also apply to other biometric databases, such 
as, fingerprint databases (e.g. the UK’s IDENT 1) and the proposed custody images database 
in England and Wales. The NDNAD Ethics Group previously recommended the application 
of the PoFA retention regime to the proposed custody images database which currently holds 
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over 19 million images of both convicted and non-convicted individuals.124 There is a need 
to generate empirical evidence to establish the efficacy of the PoFA regime and assess 
whether it can be applied to other forensic biometric technologies. The findings of this 
project would, therefore, help in setting public security and human rights standards for other 
forensic biometric databases. 
                                                 
124 National DNA Database Ethics Group, Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database 2015 
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Figure 1.3 - Original and specific contributions of the present research on the efficacy of the retention regimes governing the National DNA Database
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1.8 Conclusion: chapters overview 
This chapter established the focus of this research, emphasising the inconsistencies in the 
definition and scope of proportionality in DNA databasing, lack of systematic data on the 
actual effectiveness of the NDNAD and justification for the empirical method for this 
research. To aid in the understanding of the research, Chapter 2 provides a detailed account 
of the trajectory of forensic DNA typing and databasing, providing context to the relevance 
of debates on effectiveness, public security, privacy and proportionality.  
The first aim of the research, namely to establish the status of the implementation of the 
PoFA regime, is addressed in Chapter 3. This examines the impact of the PoFA regime 
through document analysis of reports of NDNAD oversight bodies. The review found that 
the regime may represent a ‘double-edged sword’, improving performance whilst creating 
some public security and privacy risks. Chapter 4 provides a literature review of research on 
or related to the effectiveness of DNA retention regimes. This review identified seven key 
indicators for effectiveness that informed the design of research questionnaires. Chapter 5 
covers the methodology for the public survey which received 201 responses.  
In Chapter 6, the second aim of the research is addressed, exploring the views of the public 
about the public security functions of the NDNAD. The results showed a positive belief in 
the NDNAD as a tool for detecting, investigating and prosecuting crime.  The function of 
the NDNAD in preventing crime was doubted. Chapter 7 evaluates the survey results about 
the entry of DNA data in the NDNAD (Aim 3). The results indicated general support for the 
inclusion of data from arrestees, charged and convicted individuals. However, there was an 
indication for a selective approach based on offence seriousness. Chapter 8 examines the 
survey results on the retention periods for convicted and unconvicted individuals (Aim 3). 
This generally confirmed support for the PoFA regime. However, participants favoured a 
discriminatory retention criterion for convicted adults based on the gravity of offence. 
Chapter 9 examines the survey results on voluntary participation in the NDNAD (Aim 3). 
The most important trigger for participation was whether the data will assist the police to 
solve crime. 
Chapter 10 addresses the views of primary stakeholders about the effectiveness of the three 
retention regimes (Aim 4). The survey received 31 responses. The results indicated wide 
support for the expansive regime as the most effective for public security and 
implementation efficiency/cost reasons. The last chapter (Chapter 11) brings together the 
findings from the research and outlines recommendations for potential future legal reform 
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(Aim 5). The main limitations of the study are also highlighted and suggestions for future 
research in this area are outlined.
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Chapter 2: Evolution of forensic DNA databases 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide context to the debates on public security, privacy, 
proportionality and the effectiveness of DNA databases. The chapter shows the progress of 
forensic DNA analysis to databasing, and currently the transnational exchange of DNA data. 
Section 2.1 explains the scientific terms in DNA analysis. This is followed by the timeline 
for the analytical procedures in section 2.2.  In the third section, the process of establishing 
a national DNA database is described with a brief overview of the historical proliferation of 
databases globally. Section 2.4 considers the NDNAD in detail, focussing on its size and 
composition, the legislative, operational and governance framework. The fifth section 
reviews the oldest and/or largest national databases around the world and how they compare 
to the NDNAD. Section 2.6 reviews the international exchange of forensic DNA data. The 
chapter concludes in section 2.7 with an outline of patterns in the development of DNA 
databasing and the need to measure effectiveness.  
2.1 Introduction to DNA and terminology 
As noted in Chapter 1, the subunits of the DNA molecule are the nucleotides. These are 
made up of three chemical compounds: a nitrogenous base, a pentose sugar (2-deoxy-D-
ribose) and a phosphate. 125   There are two types of nitrogenous bases: purines and 
pyrimidines. The purines in DNA are guanine (G) and adenine (A); the pyrimidines are 
cytosine (C) and thymine (T). In the DNA double helix structure, G in one strand pairs with 
C on the other strand, and A pairs with T based on the Chargaff’s rule, a phenomenon 
referred to as complementary base pairing or Watson-Crick base pairing.126 The nucleotides 
in each strand are joined through the phosphate group by forming a type of bond called 
phosphodiester bonds. Details of the basics, structure and chemistry of nucleotides and DNA 
are detailed in Nelson and Cox,127 Garrett and Grisham,128 and Berg et al.129 
The human nuclear genome consists of ~3.2 billion base pairs (bp) of which ~2000 – 2500 
genes have been identified.130 In addition to nuclear DNA, the cell mitochondria contain 
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circular DNA of 16,569 bp, which has 37 genes.131 The DNA sequence of genes is made up 
of protein-coding and noncoding regions called exons and introns, respectively. The protein-
coding regions make up only ~1.5% of the genome. 132  Sequences called intergenic 
sequences separate the different genes. In the cell, the complete DNA molecule is organised 
as chromosomes. All but sex cells have 22 pairs of autosomal chromosomes and either the 
XY sex chromosome for males or XX for females. Sex cells are haploid and hence contain 
only one of each pair of the 46 chromosomes. For the diploid set of chromosomes, one of 
each pair is inherited from each parent.  
The term locus refers to the location of a gene or specific DNA sequence on a chromosome. 
Alternative forms of a gene are referred to as alleles. When the same allele is found on both 
chromosomes within a pair, this is termed homozygous. The term used for different alleles 
is heterozygous.  Heterozygosity is characterized by variation in DNA sequences resulting 
from mutation events that introduce base pair insertions, deletions or changes.133 Insertion 
of base pairs increases the length or size of the DNA sequence whereas deletion of base pairs 
decrease size. Base pair changes (termed point mutation, e.g. change of a C nucleotide to T) 
do not alter the length of the DNA sequence at a locus.134 In the forensic context, the 
variability in the size of specific DNA sequences at a locus is also termed allele.135  
Tandem repeat is a term that refers to specific core sequences of DNA that are repeated 
consecutively in the noncoding regions.136 These are classified based on the size as variable 
number tandem repeats (VNTRs) and short tandem repeats (STRs).137 The core sequences 
of VNTRs and STRs have a size range of 6 – 100 bp and 2 – 7 bp, respectively.138 Forensic 
DNA typing is predominantly based on analyses of these tandem repeats and tetra-nucleotide 
repeats (i.e. 4 bp core sequence) of STRs are currently the most common in commercial test 
kits.139 The number of repeats is the allele for a STR or VNTR locus. The structure of a STR 
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is illustrated in Figure 2.1. It shows alleles 7 and 8 of the tetra-nucleotide repeat AATG of 
the TH01 STR locus.140 
 
Figure 2.1 - Structure of different alleles of the TH01 STR locus 
Forensic DNA identity testing is possible because the number of times the STR/VNTR core 
sequences repeat vary within and among individuals. The human genome consists of 
thousands of STR loci resulting in the generation of individual-specific combinations of 
alleles.141 The discriminatory nature of DNA profiles allows the identification of individuals 
with a high degree of confidence. The next section details the historical development of 
forensic DNA testing. 
2.2 History of forensic DNA analysis 
The first method used for forensic DNA identity testing is DNA fingerprinting.142 Sir Alec 
Jeffreys pioneered this method in the 1980s, which uses a technique called restriction 
fragment length polymorphism (RFLP).143 The RFLP technique is based on the analysis of 
VNTRs. It involves the digestion of DNA using restriction enzymes. These cut the DNA at 
specific sites that vary among individuals, hence generating DNA fragments of different 
sizes.  After digestion, radiolabelled DNA probes (either multi-locus probe (MLP) or single-
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identity tests such as Y-STR analysis.  
143 AJ Jeffreys, V Wilson and SL Thein, ‘Individual-Specific “fingerprints” of Human DNA’ (1985) 316 
Nature 76; AJ Jeffreys, V Wilson and SL Thein, ‘Hypervariable “minisatellite” Regions in Human DNA’ 
(1985) 314 Nature 67; AJ Jeffreys and others, ‘DNA “Fingerprints” and Segregation Analysis of Multiple 
Markers in Human Pedigrees.’ (1986) 39 American Journal of Human Genetics 11; Tamaki and Jeffreys (n 
136); Peter Gill, Alec J Jeffreys and David J Werrett, ‘Forensic Application of DNA “Fingerprints”’ (1985) 
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locus probe (SLP)) are used to detect the DNA fragments in a technique called Southern 
blotting.144 The probes are designed to hybridize with regions of DNA containing VNTRs. 
The variability of VNTRs between individuals allows the generation of individual-specific 
profiles (‘DNA fingerprints’). Though discriminatory, the VNTR-based method has several 
limitations:  
1) a large quantity of DNA is required for analysis and it takes several days to weeks to 
obtain results;  
2) the method works on intact DNA, and double-stranded DNA (dsDNA) is required 
for restriction enzyme digestion;  
3) the DNA fingerprints for multi-locus probes are difficult to interpret and the 
technique lacks automation; 
4) there are difficulties in inter-laboratory comparison of profiles due to variations in 
results.145 
The second and most common forensic DNA typing method was developed in the 1990s and 
is called DNA profiling146 or STR typing.147 The STR-based method uses the polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) technique developed by Kary Mullis in 1985.148 The PCR allows DNA 
amplification or synthesis of specific DNA sequences in vitro using Taq DNA polymerase, 
an enzyme derived from Thermus acquaticus (a thermophilic bacterium).149 Millions of 
copies of a specific DNA sequence are created within 2 hours through multiple replications 
by PCR. During this process, the double-stranded DNA molecule is separated into single 
strands. Short DNA sequences (oligonucleotides) called primers are used to initiate the 
synthesis of new strands of complementary DNA. Forward and reverse primers that 
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hybridize with the ends of the target sequence are used. The PCR mechanism and its 
application in forensic DNA typing are detailed in Butler.150 
STR typing has several advantages over the RFLP VNTR-based method. Firstly, multiple 
loci can be analysed in a single reaction using multiple primer sets (referred to as 
multiplexing).151 Secondly, results can be obtained in less than 24 hours. Thirdly, minute 
quantities of DNA and degraded DNA can be analysed. Lastly, the process is automated, 
and the results can be interpreted easily.152 
Forensic DNA profiling or STR typing involves five main stages: 1) preparation of the 
biological sample and DNA extraction, 2) determination of the quantity of DNA, 3) STR 
amplification, 4) capillary electrophoresis, and 5) interpretation of results. The sample 
preparation stage involves mechanical, chemical and enzymatic treatment of the biological 
sample to release the cellular DNA in solution.153 The sample treatment depends on the 
source or nature of the biological material. For a solid tissue, such as, bone, mechanical 
treatment by crushing and grinding fragments of the bone into a fine powder for downstream 
processing is adopted. The powdered sample is incubated in a buffer and agitation releases 
the cells in solution. Detergents, such as, sodium dodecyl sulphate (SDS) are added to the 
sample to break the cell and nuclear membrane. This is followed by treatment with 
proteinase K, an enzyme that digests proteins. The purified DNA is obtained by washing all 
proteins, lipids and other contaminants away. There are several methods for purifying the 
DNA: phenol-chloroform extraction method, Chelex method and the solid-phase silica gel 
column (SSGC) extraction method. 154  Currently, the most common, safe and efficient 
method is the SSGC extraction method.155 The QIAGEN QIAamp DNA Investigator Kit 
uses this technique for extraction and purification of DNA.156 An advantage of this protocol 
is that it can be automated using the QIAcube instrument.157  
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Following extraction and purification, the DNA is quantified to ensure that the right amount 
of DNA (0.2 – 1 ng) is used in the subsequent stage.158 DNA profiling produces quality 
results when an optimal quantity of DNA is used in the amplification stage. Too little or high 
amount of DNA may lead to errors in the interpretation of the results. Early methods for 
quantifying forensic DNA samples included UV absorbance spectroscopy, fluorescent 
spectroscopy, gel electrophoresis, human-specific probe hybridisation and end-point PCR 
methods.159 The current and most common method for quantifying DNA is based on the 
PCR technique and is known as quantitative real-time PCR (qPCR).160 The method involves 
the amplification of a target DNA sequence complementary to a designed fluorescent DNA 
probe (such as, the Scorpion probe used in the QIAGEN DNA Quantiplex Kit).161 As new 
DNA is synthesised, the amount of DNA is detected by comparing the level of fluorescence 
with a standard curve. One advantage of the qPCR method is that the probe detects only 
human DNA and serves as a quality check. Further, it helps determine the type of DNA 
analysis to carry out on the sample. 
In the amplification stage, the target STR markers are co-amplified using specially designed 
primer sets. The first STR typing multiplex system developed by the former Forensic 
Science Service (FSS) targeted four STR loci and was known as the Quad or Quadruplex.162 
The target STRs were, TH01, FES/FPS, F13A1 and vWA.163 A random match probability 
(RMP) is the statistical approach for determining the value of DNA evidence. It measures 
the chance of a matching DNA profile from a random individual selected from the 
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population.164 The RMP calculation assumes that the sources of the two matching profiles 
are unrelated. The RMP for the Quad was ~1 in 10000, indicating a high significance.165  
The second multiplex system of the FSS was developed in 1995. This was based on 6 STR 
loci and the amelogenin locus found on the sex chromosomes.166 Females are homozygous 
for the amelogenin locus whereas males are heterozygous. The 6 loci system was known as 
the second-generation multiplex (SGM) and consisted of the TH01, D8S1179, D18S51, 
D21S11, FGA and vWA STR loci.167 The SGM decreased the RMP to 1 in 50 million, 
increasing the discriminatory power of the DNA test. The NDNAD was set up in 1995 using 
the SGM system.168 In 1999, the United Kingdom adopted the AmpFlSTR®SGM PlusTM 
(SGM+) system developed by Applied Biosystems. 169  The SGM+ tests 10 STR loci 
including the SGM loci and the amelogenin locus. The four additional loci to the SGM were 
D3S1358, D16S539, D2S1338 and D19S433. The RMP for a full SGM+ profile is less than 
1 in a trillion.170 However, this is reported conservatively in UK courts as less than 1 in a 
billion because the relevant population is less than a billion.171  
Since 2009 there has been a substantial expansion of STR markers used in the UK and 
Europe. The aim of these markers is to prevent the chance of adventitious matches,172 
harmonise DNA testing and databases globally, and facilitate forensic DNA data sharing 
across different jurisdictions.173 The European Standard Set loci (ESS) was established in 
1998 following an Interpol initiative to create a DNA record of sexual offenders.174 This 
comprised 4 STR markers: FGA, TH01, vWA and D21S11. The ESS was expanded in 1999 
with 3 additional loci (D3S1358, D8S1179 and D18S51), and in 2009 with 5 other loci 
(D1S1656, D2S441, D10S1248, D12S391 and D22S1045).175 The European standard has 
further expanded to 16 loci with the addition of 4 extra loci (D2S1338, D16S539, D19S433 
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 39 
 
and SE33) in commercial kits.176 In July 2014, the UK moved from the SGM+ kit to the 
Next Generation Multiplexing (NGM) or DNA-17 profiling system which tests for all the 
European standard markers which include the SGM+ loci. The DNA-17 system has been 
further expanded in Scotland with the introduction of the DNA-24 or GlobalFiler system 
developed by Thermo Fisher Scientific.177 The GlobalFiler system tests for 22 STR markers 
including the DNA-17 loci, one male-specific marker (Y indel) and amelogenin.178 The six 
extra markers in DNA-24 are CSF1PO, TPOX, D5S818, D13S317, D7S820, and 
DYS391.179  
Like Europe, parallel developments have also occurred in North America. The United States 
established the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) loci of 13 STR markers in 1997.180 
Canada and more than 50 countries in the world subsequently adopted the CODIS 
software.181 The CODIS markers have now (since January 2017) been expanded to 20 
markers including the 12 ESS loci.182 Table 2.1 shows the common STR markers in the 
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Table 2.1 - Standard set STR markers in the United Kingdom (England and Wales), United States, Europe 
and Interpol.183 (Common STR markers among the standard sets are in coloured font) 
 
The fourth stage of DNA profiling is the detection and identification of the amplified STR 
markers using a technique called capillary electrophoresis (CE).184 The technique separates 
the different alleles (amplicons) based on their size (bp) and charge. The CE consists of a 
gel polymer (polyacrylamide) in a glass capillary tube that serves as a molecular sieve to 
separate the DNA fragments. DNA is negatively charged hence moves towards the positive 
electrode end (anode) of an electric field set across the gel. Smaller DNA fragments move 
faster than larger fragments and the CE detects the time it takes for the fragment to reach the 
end (retention time). Using a combination of size and colour of the fluorescent-labelled 
fragments, the amplicons are detected and compared to standard-sized DNA makers and a 
standard of all alleles found at each locus (referred to as allelic ladder). 
In the final stage, the output of the CE is interpreted using a software called Gene Mapper.185 
This allows the scientist to identify the alleles at each locus for the DNA sample. A string of 
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numbers ‘unique’ to the DNA sample is obtained and recorded as the DNA profile. Figure 
2.2 illustrates an electropherogram of a full DNA profile obtained after DNA profiling. Two 
peaks at a locus indicate the DNA donor is heterozygous at that particular locus. A single 
peak indicates the individual is homozygous. The DNA profile, which is the string of 
numbers is recorded as shown in Table 2.2. The random match probability of the DNA 
profile is then calculated using available data from a population database. Using the profile 
in Table 2.2, the RMP calculation from the ENFSI website called STRs for Identity ENFSI 
Reference Database (STRidER)186  yields a value of 1.3554 x 10-39 from the European 
population database (Figure 2.3). In the UK, the RMP value will be reported as 1 x 10-9 (i.e. 
1 in a billion), which indicates an extremely strong significance of the DNA match. 
 
Figure 2.2 - Illustration of a DNA profile electropherogram of a single individual. The alleles at each locus 
are presented as peaks. One peak at a locus indicates the DNA donor is homozygous at that locus whereas 
two peaks indicate a heterozygote. 
  
                                                 




Table 2.2 - Example of a DNA profile obtained using the QIAGEN ESSplex SE QS Kit.187 The same number 




Figure 2.3 - Random Match Probability calculation using the ENFSI STRidER online software. 
The DNA profile/fingerprint can play an important role in police detective work. Firstly, it 
can help the police identify, associate or eliminate individuals from a criminal investigation. 
Secondly, it can help the police to corroborate events. The utility of DNA in terms of its 
reliability has established it as the gold standard of forensic science.188  In the UK, the first 
criminal case utilising DNA as an investigative tool was the case of Colin Pitchfork in 
1987.189 Two teenage girls, Lynda Mann and Dawn Ashworth, were found raped and fatally 
strangled in 1983 and 1986, respectively. Richard Buckland initially confessed to the murder 
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of Ashworth, but DNA fingerprinting of semen samples recovered from the two victims 
revealed that the same perpetrator committed the offences. The DNA evidence also excluded 
Buckland as the offender. Leicestershire Constabulary, in collaboration with the FSS, 
conducted a mass screening of 5000 local males with the aim of identifying the offender via 
a DNA match. Unfortunately, the operation found no such DNA match. A breakthrough in 
the case occurred when a colleague of Colin Pitchfork, Ian Kelly, was overheard in a pub 
proclaiming that he had donated his DNA on Pitchfork’s behalf during the mass screen. The 
police subsequently arrested Pitchfork in 1987 and his DNA matched the crime scene 
samples. He admitted to the crimes, pled guilty in court, and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. This case illustrates how individuals can be identified or excluded as suspects 
in a crime using DNA. 
2.2.1 Additional forensic DNA testing methods and procedures 
Other polymorphic DNA analyses are also employed in forensic DNA testing. One method 
is Y-STR profiling which uses the same method as autosomal STR profiling.190 The method 
is based on analysis of the 100s of STRs identified on the Y chromosome. The DYS391 
found in the DNA-24 profiling system is a Y-STR marker. This test is not as discriminatory 
as autosomal STR profiling. The Y chromosome is only found in males and is inherited as a 
single haplotype block through the paternal lineage. All males with the same paternal lineage 
have the same Y-STR profile. The Y-STR profiling is useful in alleged rape offences for 
distinguishing male DNA from female DNA, which tends to dominate in mixed samples.191 
Further, it can be used to confirm the number of perpetrators in cases involving multiple 
male suspects. Lastly, Y-STR profiling can be used to narrow down suspects in familial 
searching. 
Another type of forensic DNA testing is mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) analysis.192 The 
mtDNA analysis method uses another type of polymorphism called single nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP).193 Although the specific sequence of DNA may have the same sizes, 
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the base composition may differ due to point mutations194. There are variations in the base 
composition of specific regions of the DNA within and between individuals. Specific regions 
of the mtDNA called hypervariable (HV) regions demonstrate these characteristics and can 
be typed for identity testing.195 The early method used for sequencing the HV regions was 
the Sanger Sequencing technique.196 Massively parallel DNA sequencing (MPS) or next-
generation DNA sequencing (NGS) techniques have superseded this technique.197 MtDNA 
is useful when DNA is highly degraded (for example, DNA extracted from bones) and STR 
profiling yields inconclusive results. Like Y-STR profiling, the discriminatory power of 
mtDNA analysis is low since it is a lineage marker. The mtDNA is inherited as a single block 
from the maternal lineage and all individuals who share the same maternal lineage have the 
same mtDNA sequence.198 The mtDNA is not transmitted through the paternal lineage 
because the mitochondria found in the tail of spermatozoa is dissociated during fertilization 
in the womb.199  
The SNP MPS method is also now being applied together with STR typing in autosomal 
DNA analysis.200 The advantage of the SNP/STR MPS combination is that both length and 
sequence polymorphism can be detected, hence improving the discriminatory power of the 
DNA identity test. Further, where the length polymorphism test is not possible, the MPS 
method can be employed to identify individuals. One other advantage of the MPS based 
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system is that mRNA (messenger ribonucleic acid), STRs, SNPs and insertion/deletions can 
be analysed simultaneously.201 
It is also worth mentioning another developing forensic DNA analysis method called FDP.202 
This technique involves the prediction of physical or phenotypical characteristics of 
individuals by analysing the genes. Current genetic markers used for this purpose are genes 
that predict hair, skin and eye colour. FDP can be useful in criminal inquiries where the DNA 
of a suspect is not available for comparison. The technology seeks to provide intelligence 
about the biological appearance of the crime scene DNA donor, thereby narrowing down the 
investigative search.  
Other current trends in forensic DNA analysis include the development of Rapid DNA 
Profiling (RDP).203 The RDP utilises a portable technology that allows the police or crime 
scene investigators to analyse DNA at the crime scene. Results can be obtained in 
approximately 1 hour. In 2016, RDP was approved in the UK following a pilot test of the 
technology by Police Forces.204 DNA profiles obtained from the RDP are exported to the 
NDNAD. 
Standard STR profiling is not always possible and modifications of the standard procedure 
may be required. Two other important procedures are the low copy number (LCN) and DNA 
mixture analyses. The LCN is the analysis of low quantities of DNA recovered from minute 
amounts of biological fluids or touched surfaces (containing ~15-30 cells or less than 100-
200 picograms of genomic DNA).205 The analytic procedure for LCN DNA is similar to 
standard STR analysis with a few modifications to enhance the sensitivity of the profiling 
test. One approach is to increase the number of PCR cycles from 28 cycles (standard) to 30-
34 cycles.206 Another approach is to modify the parameters of the capillary electrophoresis 
stage.207 Other approaches include the purification of the sample after the PCR stage or 
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reduction of the volume of the PCR sample.208 LCN DNA can be transferred directly or via 
secondary and tertiary means.209 There is also variation in the persistence of LCN DNA on 
different objects. The transfer and persistence characteristics of LCN DNA and the analytical 
procedures utilised affect the interpretation and probative value of LCN DNA in criminal 
investigations.210  
A DNA mixture occurs when a biological sample has more than one source.211 This is 
common in sexual offences, sampling of objects handled by multiple individuals and DNA 
contamination cases. STR profiling of mixed samples generates an output profile of more 
than one individual.212 The analysis of mixtures is more of an interpretation of the DNA 
results rather than modification of the technical procedure and there are several computer 
software developed to aid this process.213 The approaches for mixture interpretation include 
subtraction of the reference profile from the output profile, peak-height analysis of the 
electropherogram and residual analysis of profiles to determine the most probable profile of 
the mixture contributors. 214  These complex approaches can provide investigative leads 
including the identification or elimination of individuals from a criminal or missing person 
investigation.215 
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This section demonstrated the advancement of technology for forensic DNA analysis. There 
appears to be a trend towards harmonisation of the technology around the world and a focus 
on increasing the discriminatory power of profiles. Whilst the reliability of DNA analyses 
has significantly improved, it is yet to be demonstrated how effective they are in contributing 
to the overall crime problem.216 The next sections consider national forensic DNA databases 
and their development, particularly in the UK but also other selected states around the world.  
2.3 National Forensic DNA databases 
An important aspect of forensic DNA analyses is the possibility of storing DNA records in 
searchable electronic databases. The technology creates the potential for the police to 
identify suspects where there are none known to the police. Further, such databases can help 
the police to find links between different crime scenes. The retention of DNA records has 
also helped in verifying the innocence of previously imprisoned individuals through post-
conviction DNA testing. Several post-conviction inquiries, particularly in the United States, 
have led to the freeing of some victims of wrongful conviction.217 
Forensic DNA databases are commonly built with autosomal STR profiles. ‘Criminal’ 
databases based on Y-STR profiling or other polymorphic systems are still in the 
developmental stage.218  In addition to the storage of STR profiles, some jurisdictions allow 
the storage of the physical DNA samples. The process of developing a national forensic 
DNA database involves:219  
1. Building a forensic DNA analysis infrastructure: DNA databases are effective when 
they hold DNA profiles from known individuals and crime scenes. Establishing a 
DNA database needs investment in the basic infrastructure to collect and process 
DNA samples for retention in the database. This includes the establishment of 
laboratory facilities, training of personnel and research as well as ensuring that DNA 
is collected from scenes of crime and suspects. 
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2. Establishment of a common set of DNA markers: a standard set of STR loci are 
required to allow comparison of DNA samples among all participating law 
enforcement units and to allow genetic information sharing among different 
jurisdictions (see section 2.2 for established common markers).  
3. Creation of an appropriate population database: the current DNA profiling 
technology targets very few segments of the entire human genome. This implies that 
DNA profiles cannot be considered ‘unique’ thus making the interpretation of 
matching profiles a statistical probability exercise. Population databases provide 
information about the frequency of each possible STR allele or genotype in a specific 
population. This ethnic or racial-specific data allows forensic scientists to estimate 
the random chance of occurrence of a profile in the relevant population. The ENFSI 
STRidER 220  online database holds available population data from different 
populations in the world. The database is regularly updated with new information to 
ensure that RMPs are reliable for use in court. 
4. Development of a specific legislative framework: The use of DNA evidence 
constitutes an infringement of the privacy of individuals thus appropriate legislation 
is required to ensure that the sampling, retention, use and destruction of DNA records 
is legal, proportionate, necessary and ethical.  
5. Formation of dedicated governance and operational framework for the database: Due 
to the ethical implications of running a forensic DNA database, proper structures 
must be in place to keep a high level of public trust, transparency and accountability. 
In some jurisdictions, law enforcement agencies handle the oversight of the database. 
Other jurisdictions have set up independent interagency boards including public body 
representatives to govern the operation of the database. This latter arrangement is 
perceived as necessary for maintaining public confidence and transparency in 
Government surveillance and intelligence strategies.  
6. Development of database software and secure networked computer system to store, 
analyse and transfer data: DNA databases store large data that needs software with 
powerful algorithms for managing profiles, searching and matching data, and 
calculating match probabilities. To avoid security threats or cyber-attacks, a secure 
network must be established in the operation of the database. The system must 
incorporate the CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) model for 
                                                 
220 ENFSI DNA Working Group, ‘STRidER 2.0’ (n 186). 
 49 
 
information security, ensuring that database information is accessible to only the 
participating law enforcement agencies. 
7. Establishment of a quality management system to guarantee the reliability of data fed 
into the database and results from the database: maintenance of data quality in the 
operation of DNA databases is critical to ensure that DNA match evidence is 
admissible in court. This is achieved by ensuring that the forensic DNA data ‘supply 
chain’ including individuals follow international quality standards such as ISO/IEC 
17025.221 Compliance with quality standards prevents or reduces errors and database 
contamination. In addition to international standards, law enforcement agencies or 
an independent forensic science regulator, depending on the jurisdiction, issue 
quality assurance standards.  
The list of countries with operational national forensic DNA databases as of 2019 is provided 
in Table 1.1 (Chapter 1). In Europe, five national DNA databases were created within the 
first five years of the establishment of the NDNAD: Netherlands and Austria in 1997, 
Germany in 1998, and Finland and Norway in 1999. 222  These early databases shared 
common STR loci with the SGM markers.223 Since 2000, the number of national databases 
in Europe has increased to forty, all sharing common markers in the ESS standard set loci to 
facilitate the exchange of forensic DNA data. Most European databases run on either a 
nationally designed or CODIS-based software or both.224 
The United States of America pioneered the development of national databases in North and 
South America with the creation of the CODIS national database in 1998. 225  Canada 
followed with the establishment of the CODIS-based National DNA Data Bank in 2000.226 
The last two decades have seen an emergence of limited CODIS-based national DNA 
databases in other countries across the Americas, such as, Jamaica (2002),227 Argentina 
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(initiated in 2004),228 Panama (2006),229 Chile (operational in 2008),230 Colombia (2008),231 
and Brazil (formalised in 2013/14)232. 
The first database to be established in Asia was the Jordan DNA Database in 2000, followed 
by Hong Kong (China) and Bahrain in 2001, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates in 2002, 
Saudi Arabia in 2003, China and Japan in 2004, and Malaysia in 2005.233 The number of 
databases has since increased to seventeen as of 2019. These run on a nationally designed or 
CODIS-based software. 
In Africa, South Africa pioneered the development of national DNA databases by setting up 
their database in 1997.234 The second database was established in 2000 by Tunisia. Between 
2000 and 2017, the number of operational DNA databases has risen to eight: Egypt and 
Morocco (2004), Botswana (2006), Mauritius (initiated in 2009), Namibia (2011), and 
Sudan.235 The database software utilized is nationally designed, based on CODIS or the 
South African STRlab.236 
Lastly in Australasia, the New Zealand DPD was established in 1995 and the Australian 
National Criminal Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD) became operational in 2001, both 
running on nationally designed database software.237  
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In summary, this section shows a trend towards a continuous establishment of national DNA 
databases globally. However, it is not yet clear how effective this policing technology is.238 
The next section details the size and composition of the NDNAD, its legislative and 
governance structure and operational framework. The oldest and/or largest national DNA 
databases around the world are also discussed and compared to the NDNAD in section 2.5.  
2.4 The UK National DNA Database 
The size of the UK NDNAD has risen from 42,593 DNA profiles (subject + crime scene) in 
the 1995/96 fiscal year to more than 7 million profiles as of June 2019.239 Within the 2001/02 
to 2017/18 period, the number of subject load (i.e. the number of reference profiles loaded 
on the database) and crime scene load (i.e. the number of crime scene profiles) has decreased 
from 566,026 to 259,099 and 53,235 to 40,078, respectively.240 The main trigger for subject 
sampling and inclusion in the NDNAD is an arrest for a recordable offence. The fall in the 
annual subject profiles has been attributed to an increase in the use of alternatives of arrest, 
such as, voluntary attendance and a reform of the police bail policy.241 The decline in the 
annual crime scene load has been linked to changes in policing priorities and allocation of 
resources for criminal investigation.242 Table 2.3 shows the records of the NDNAD as of 
June 2019. More than 91% of the subject records are profiles from sampled individuals in 
England and Wales, reflecting the relatively large population of England and Wales. The 
statistics also indicate that ~14% of the subject profiles are duplicates, representing the 
difference between the number of individuals and subject profiles held in the database (Table 
2.3). The duplicates are due to multiple independent sampling of the same individual with 
different names.243   
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Table 2.3 - Records of the UK NDNAD as of 30th June 2019244 
 
The information associated with subject profiles held in the NDNAD includes the subject’s 
gender, ethnic appearance, and date of birth.  The profile record on the NDNAD is linked to 
corresponding arrest details held on the separate PNC.245 There is a substantial difference in 
the number of subject profiles held in the NDNAD for males and females. Whilst males 
represent ~80% of the total subject profiles for all UK forces and in England and Wales, 
females represent ~19%.246 Less than 1% of the subject profiles have no assigned gender. 
The gender disparity mirrors the fact that males perpetrate a relatively high proportion of 
crimes.247 The ethnic composition of subject profiles held on the NDNAD (as assigned by 
the subjective judgement of police officers) is ~75.5% White North European, ~7.6% Black, 
~5.3% Asian, ~2.3% White South European, ~0.8% Middle Eastern, ~0.6% Chinese, 
Japanese or SE Asian, and ~8% unknown.248 The age composition is ~99% adults (18 and 
over) and ~0.6% juveniles (from 10-17 years).249 A similar ethnic and age composition is 
observed for data obtained from England and Wales alone.  
2.4.1 Legislative framework of the UK (England and Wales) NDNAD 
The law governing forensic biometric data in the UK can be categorised as general and 
specific legislation. The general statutes include the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA)250 and 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)251. The DPA incorporates the EU General Data Protection 
                                                 
244 Home Office, ‘National DNA Database Statistics: Q1 2019 to 2020’ (n 25). 
245 MacGregor, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 80). 
246 Home Office, ‘National DNA Database Statistics: Q1 2019 to 2020’ (n 25). 
247 Office for National Statistics, ‘Overview of Violent Crime and Sexual Offences’ (Office for National 
Statistics, 11 February 2016) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/compendium/focusonviolentcrim
eandsexualoffences/yearendingmarch2015/chapter1overviewofviolentcrimeandsexualoffences> accessed 13 
November 2017. 
248 Home Office, ‘National DNA Database Statistics: Q1 2019 to 2020’ (n 25). 
249 Home Office, ‘National DNA Database Statistics: Q1 2019 to 2020’ (n 25). 
250 Data Protection Act 2018. 
251 Human Rights Act. 
 53 
 
Regulation 2016 (GDPR)252 into UK law. Section 205(1) of the DPA defines biometric 
information as:  
Personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the 
physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual, which 
allows or confirms the unique identification of that individual, such as facial 
images or dactyloscopic data.253 
Biometric data is described as sensitive information that requires strict regulation for its 
collection, processing, retention and use. The HRA specifies the rights of individuals and 
circumstances under which these rights may be limited. The principal right with respect to 
biometrics is the right to privacy (Article 8 of the Convention).254 Two principles upheld by 
the general laws, with respect to the limitation of rights, are the principles of proportionality 
and necessity in the processing of biometric information. 
Part V of PACE established the statutory rules for sampling, retention, use and destruction 
of DNA for criminal investigation purposes.255 The initial provisions of PACE classified 
blood, semen, urine, saliva, pubic hair and swabs of body orifices as intimate samples.256 
Samples taken from other body parts including the nail or under the nail, and ‘non-pubic’ 
hair were classified as non-intimate samples.257  A DNA sample could be collected from 
suspects only when it was relevant to the investigation of a serious offence.258  Except for 
urine and saliva samples, the collection of intimate samples required the authority of a 
superintendent of police or above, sampling by a registered medical practitioner, and written 
consent of the individual.259 Refusal to consent to intimate sampling could be treated as 
corroborative evidence.260 The same rules applied to non-intimate samples except that a 
police officer could take samples.261 Further, non-consensual sampling was permitted where 
a person was held in police custody.262   
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The initial PACE retention regime permitted indefinite retention of DNA records (both 
sample and derived information) of convicted individuals and required the destruction of 
DNA records of ‘innocent’ individuals on completion of investigation or any proceedings.263  
This regime applied to the limited SLP RFLP-based database established by the FSS in the 
early 1990s. 264  Following collaborative work between the FSS and the police, and 
recommendations by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice,265 a new database and less 
restrictive legislation were proposed in 1993. The proposed legislative regime was included 
in the CJPOA266 which amended PACE.  
The provisions in CJPOA allowed DNA samples to be taken from individuals charged with 
less serious offences and removed the ‘relevance requirement’ for sampling. 267  This is 
because saliva and mouth swab were reclassified as non-intimate samples, allowing non-
consensual sampling of individuals by the police.268 Other changes introduced by CJPOA 
were the revocation of the evidential use of refusal to consent to intimate sampling and the 
introduction of speculative searching of all profiles held in the database against other 
profiles.269  The provision for deletion and retention of DNA records under PACE was 
maintained. Additionally, under circumstances where the profile of an innocent individual 
is retained, it could not be used as evidence or for investigative purposes.270 Further changes 
to the DNA legislation was introduced by the Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act 1997 
which permitted sampling of some individuals held in custody under the Mental Health Act 
1983.271 
Following the establishment of the STR-based NDNAD in April 1995, the CJPOA retention 
regime led to a series of issues including multiple sampling of non-convicted suspects, 
procedural delays in the destruction of samples/profiles and challenges in court.272 In the 
murder case of R v Weir,273 for example, a conviction was secured using DNA match 
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intelligence arising from an unlawfully retained subject profile in the NDNAD. The initial 
conviction was overturned at the Appeal Court due to the unlawful retention of the DNA 
profile. In another rape case, R v B,274 the defendant was found not guilty because the 
prosecution relied on an unlawful DNA match intelligence. Such issues generated concerns 
about public security and the House of Lords ruled that a trial judge should exercise 
discretion on the admissibility of evidence related to unlawful matches.275 
The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, section 82, removed the obligation for the police 
to destroy DNA records of unconvicted individuals suspected of a recordable offence (i.e. 
generally an imprisonable offence). Additionally, the law permitted profiles obtained from 
volunteers with written consent to be speculatively searched on the NDNAD. Volunteers 
under CJPA could not withdraw consent. Further changes were made by section 10 of the 
CJA which permitted DNA records of all arrestees of a recordable offence to be retained 
indefinitely whether convicted or not. The sampling authority was reduced to the rank of 
Inspector, and a civilian detention officer276 could take non-intimate samples. The changes 
in the law paved the way for a significant expansion of the NDNAD. Other additional 
changes during the expansive DNA retention regime was the use of the NDNAD in cases of 
missing persons and disaster investigation.277 
2.4.1.1 S and Marper v the United Kingdom 2008 
The expansive regime raised genetic privacy concerns about the retention of DNA from 
unconvicted individuals. The compatibility of the regime with Article 8 of the Convention 
was questioned for individuals arrested and charged, but not convicted of a recordable 
offence. This issue featured in the appeal cases of ‘S’ and ‘Marper’ in the UK and the ECHR. 
In 2001, S, a 12-year-old boy with no previous convictions, and Mr Marper, then 38 years 
old, were arrested and charged separately with attempted robbery and harassment, 
respectively. The police legally took their biometric records (fingerprints, DNA samples and 
profiles) after each was charged with the respective offences. In June 2001, S was acquitted 
of all charges and Mr Marper’s case was discontinued. The law, however, permitted their 
biometric records to be retained indefinitely despite their lack of criminal convictions. The 
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Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police denied a request for the destruction of their 
biometric records.  
At the Divisional Court in March 2002, S and Marper challenged the compatibility of the 
expansive regime with Articles 8 (right to privacy) and 14 of the Convention.278 Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) stipulates that:  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.   
Following a critical analysis of the law, the Divisional Court ruled that the indefinite 
retention of biometric records from charged but unconvicted individuals is justified for 
public security reasons. The discretionary powers of Chief Constables to retain biometric 
records was ruled to be proportionate and compatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the 
Convention. The Court dismissed the application for judicial review.  
In September 2002, the judgement was upheld at the Court of Appeal by a majority of 2 
(Lord Woolf CJ and Waller LJ) out of 3.279 Demurring from the majority, Sedley LJ stated 
that retention of DNA from unconvicted individuals should be dependent on the level of 
suspicion of the individual. A further appeal to the House of Lords in 2004 was also 
unsuccessful.280 A majority of the Law Lords thought that the retention of biometric records 
does not or may not constitute an interference with privacy. Baroness Hale of Richmond 
dissented from the majority, noting the retention of DNA and fingerprint data interferes with 
the right to privacy and requires justification. The Law Lords, however, unanimously 
‘balanced’ the competing interests in favour of public security, establishing the expansive 
regime as a compatible system with the Convention rights. 
The case of S and Marper was heard at the ECHR in 2008.281   The Grand Chamber 
unanimously held that the expansive regime was disproportionate and incompatible with 
Article 8. The court emphasised the absence of ‘weighty reasons’ to support the retention of 
biometric data from the applicants. The ECHR judgment of incompatibility demanded legal 
                                                 
278 S, R (on the application of) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire & Anor [2002] EWHC 478 (Admin). 
279 R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire and R (on the application of Marper) v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (n 64). 
280 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Respondent) ex parte LS (by his mother and litigation 
friend JB) (FC) (Appellant) and R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Respondent) ex parte 
Marper (FC) (Appellant) (n 72). 
281 S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44). 
 57 
 
reform so that the law became compliant with the Convention and achieved an appropriate 
balance between the rights of the individual and the State efforts to maintain law and order.  
2.4.1.2 The Crime and Security Act 2010 (CSA) 
The initial response of the Labour Government to the Marper ruling was to introduce section 
14 of the Crime and Security Act 2010 (CSA). The new provisions required that all DNA 
samples be destroyed after DNA profiling or within 6 months after sampling. DNA profiles 
of convicted adults and juveniles (under 18) convicted of a serious offence or at least two 
minor offences were subject to indefinite retention. DNA profiles of juveniles convicted of 
only one minor offence were subject to 5 years’ retention. For unconvicted individuals, the 
DNA profiles of adults and individuals aged 16 or 17 charged or arrested for a serious 
offence were subject to 6 years’ retention. Whilst the same 6-year retention length applied 
to adults charged or arrested for a minor crime, a retention length of 3 years applied to 
juveniles. The retention of DNA profiles of terrorist suspects had a 6 years limit and multiple 
2 years extension following a national security determination (NSD) by a Chief Constable. 
The CSA rules further introduced the withdrawal of consent for the retention of DNA 
profiles from volunteers. 
The CSA retention model was informed by consultations and research carried out by the Jill 
Dando Institute of Crime Science. The research attempted to determine the risk of re-arrest 
among unconvicted arrestees, estimated at ~52% in 6 years.282 The re-arrest rate over a 
period of 15 years was estimated to be higher in unconvicted arrestees than the general 
population.283 The research analysis was heavily criticised primarily because the data relied 
upon was unclear.284 Due to a change in government, the CSA regime was never brought 
into force. Instead, PoFA was drafted by the subsequent Coalition Government to govern 
DNA and fingerprint data retention in England and Wales.285 
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2.4.1.3 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)  
The current legislative regime governing the NDNAD is the Protection of Freedoms Act 
2012.286 Like the CSA rules, the new biometric regime requires the destruction of DNA 
samples after profiling or within 6 months of collection. This recognises the sensitivity of 
the information that can ‘theoretically’287 be obtained from the DNA sample. Section 2 of 
PoFA generally permits DNA data retention until the conclusion of investigation or any 
proceedings. The continued retention of DNA profiles of individuals arrested or charged 
with a minor offence, but unconvicted – is unlawful. 288  For all convicted individuals 
(including cautions and warnings), DNA profiles can be retained indefinitely in the 
NDNAD.289 The only exception is the DNA profiles of juveniles convicted of a first minor 
offence with a sentence of fewer than 5 years. These are subject to 5 years’ data retention 
plus the duration of their sentence.290 
A ‘qualifying offence’ is a legal term that describes offences that are serious including 
murder, sexual or violent crime, terrorist offences or burglary.291 Under the PoFA regime, 
the DNA profile of individuals arrested or charged with a qualifying offence is subject to 3 
years’ retention, even if they remain unconvicted.292 This rule applies where the individual 
has no prior criminal record. For the unconvicted arrestees, this 3-year retention period is 
subject to the approval of a Biometrics Commissioner. On the expiry of the 3-year period, 
retention can be extended for 2 years with the consent of a District Judge. Other retention 
categories set out in the new law are individuals issued with a penalty notice for disorder 
(PND) and cases where an NSD has been made. Both PND and NSD cases are subject to 2 
years’ biometric data retention.293 The latter can be renewed continuously.  
Further changes to the PoFA regime were introduced by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act 2014 (ASBCPA) and the Policing and Crime Act 2017 (PCA). Section 144 
of the ASBCPA permits non-consensual resampling upon data deletion. Initially, PoFA 
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required a causal relationship between the taking of DNA (sampling arrest) and any charge 
or conviction before data retention.294 Section 145 of ASBCPA removed this requirement, 
allowing a sample taken in one offence to be used for another offence.  
Section 70 of the PCA provided for the retention of biometric data taken from an unrelated 
arrest of an individual who has a criminal record outside England and Wales. Individuals 
who fall under this retention category are subject to PoFA rules and the scope of sampling 
applies to all offences equivalent to a recordable offence under English and Welsh law. 
Analysis of the legislative framework in this section reveals the contrast in the interpretation 
of proportionality by successive governments and the courts. The result of this challenge is 
the implementation of arbitrary retention regimes for the NDNAD. The implementation and 
impact of the current PoFA regime are discussed in Chapter 3. The next section details the 
governance and operational structure of the NDNAD. 
2.4.2 Governance and operational framework of the NDNAD 
On the establishment of the NDNAD in 1995, an NDNAD User Board (NUB) was 
constituted to oversee its operation. 295  The NUB comprised representatives of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and FSS. The FSS held the Custodianship 
position for the NDNAD. The Custodian’s role was to set standards, provide accreditation 
and carry out compliance checks on laboratories involved in the processing of DNA for the 
database. 296  To be accredited as a forensic DNA supplier, laboratories must receive 
independent accreditation from the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) based 
on ISO/IEC 17025. 297  Additionally, the Custodian established a proficiency-testing 
programme and quality standards review for laboratories. This process served as a check to 
ensure that quality standards recommended by the ENFSI DWG are maintained.298 Another 
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role of the Custodian is to ensure that information held in the NDNAD is linked to arrest, 
sampling and demographic records held on the PNC.299  
Prior to 2003, the NUB was transformed into the NDNAD Board comprising representatives 
of the Home Office, ACPO, police forces, ACPO Scotland, the Custodian, and the FSS. The 
Chairmanship of the Board was held by ACPO. In addition to its oversight function, the 
Board was responsible for the strategic development of the database. Significant changes to 
the membership of the Board was brought about following criticism and recommendations 
by the Science and Technology Select Committee (House of Lords) in 2001 and the Human 
Genetics Commission (HGC) in 2002.300 Both bodies called for an independent Board that 
includes lay members. A separate research ethics group was also proposed by HGC to 
scrutinize research involving the NDNAD.  
The NDNAD Board was reconstituted in 2003 with the previous membership and a 
representative of the HGC. The first annual report of the Board was also published in the 
same year. 301  As part of the response to form an independent governing body for the 
NDNAD, the Custodianship was initially held by the FSS ‘independent’ Chief Scientist. In 
2005, the NDNAD Board became the NDNAD Strategy Board with three core members: 
ACPO, Home Office and the Association of Police Authorities (APA).302 The Custodianship 
role was then transferred to the Home Office following the privatisation of the FSS in 
December 2005.303 In 2007, the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) took over 
the Custodianship of the database and the NDNAD Ethics Group was formed to oversee the 
ethical aspects of the database.304 The Custodian, representatives of HGC, NPIA, ACPO 
Scotland, the Ethics Group, Information Commissioners Office (ICO), the Forensic Science 
Regulator (formed in 2008), the police and administration in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
became non-voting members of the Strategy Board. The new arrangements excluded police 
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forces and DNA laboratories as members of the Board. This ensured a level of independence 
of the governance structure from users of the database.   
The last seven years have seen significant changes in the governance and operation of the 
database. In the 2012/13 fiscal year, the operation of the database was transferred from the 
NPIA to the Home Office.305 The Forensic Information Database Service (FINDS) of the 
Home Office operates the database.306 Another significant change is the establishment of the 
Strategy Board and the Biometrics Commissioner as statutory bodies responsible for the 
oversight of the database. The statutory role of the Strategy Board is provided in section 24 
of PoFA, being required by law to provide guidance on the retention and destruction of DNA 
profiles, governance rules for the database, and to produce an annual report about the 
exercise of its functions. The Strategy Board is comprised of the National Police Chiefs’ 
Council 307  (NPCC), the Home Office and the Association of Police and Crime 
Commissioners308 (APCC) as core members.309 The NDNAD Strategy Board continues to 
run independently from direct users of the database. 
The statutory functions of the Biometrics Commissioner are set out under sections 20 and 
21 of PoFA. The Commissioner’s role is to keep under review the retention and use of 
biometric records and to produce an annual report of its functions. The Biometrics 
Commissioner is a non-voting member of the Strategy Board. Other changes include the 
transformation of the NDNAD Ethics Group to the Biometrics and Forensics Ethics 
Group.310 The Ethics Group operates on a non-statutory basis and its ethical oversight now 
covers the operation of the NDNAD and other forensic biometrics, such as, fingerprints and 
facial images. The Ethics Group also produces an annual report about its work and makes 
recommendations.  
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2.5 International comparison of forensic DNA databases 
Forensic DNA databasing has become a common technology in policing within the past two 
and a half decades. More than 94 countries have fully implemented an operational database 
or are developing legislation to establish one (see Chapter 1). There are significant 
differences in the legal, governance and operational framework governing databases across 
the world and in different jurisdictions within a single country. These differences have been 
noted as a setback in realising the full potential of DNA databases in protecting the public 
and enhancing national or international collaboration between different law enforcement 
agencies.311 This section employs the traditional comparative research method to review 
selected database systems around the world.312 The approach follows four general steps: 1) 
preliminary considerations – identification of research aim and choice of systems; 2) 
description of the systems; 3) comparison; and 4) critical evaluation.313 The aim of the 
analysis was to gain insight into how the oldest and/or largest DNA databases are 
implemented across different continents and how they compare with the England and Wales 
regime. This is relevant to the research aims because it identifies practices that may inform 
the local reforms proposed in this research. The basis of the comparison is the shared purpose 
of forensic DNA databases in assisting the justice system to resolve legal issues. 
2.5.1 Europe 
Europe currently leads in the number of national DNA databases per continent. The region 
also operates the largest network of national DNA databases.314  Due to these reasons, 
Europe was analysed as a whole. There are more than 13.5 million reference profiles and 2 
million crime scene profiles in European DNA databases.315 Over 2.7 million reference-to-
crime scene profile matches and 0.6 million crime scene-to-crime scene matches are 
estimated from these databases.316 The reference match rate (i.e. number of reference-to-
crime scene matches per total number of reference profiles) is estimated at 24%.317 The UK 
(England and Wales) holds the largest proportion of all profiles in European national 
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databases, more than 47% of reference profiles and 30% of crime scene profiles.318 In 2016, 
the reference match rate of the UK NDNAD (44%) was estimated to be higher than other 
European national databases.319 This suggests the NDNAD may be more representative of 
the active or previously active criminal population than other European DNA databases. The 
match rate statistics and the size of the UK database reflect the differences in the regime 
governing the national databases across Europe.320  
The establishment of a compatible national DNA database was recommended for the 
Member States of the EU in 1997.321  The EU Prüm Decision of 2008 requires all EU 
Member States to create a national DNA database.322 All the 28 States of the EU (including 
the UK) currently have an operational national DNA database.323 The custodianship of EU 
national databases is held by either law enforcement agencies or independent departments 
under the interior (Home Office, UK) or justice ministry. The EU legal framework for 
forensic DNA databasing generally provides that: 
i. DNA samples and profiles are personal data and hence should be subject to national 
data protection legislation derived from the European Data Protection Directive 
95/46324 and standards of data protection set out in the Data Protection Convention 
1981 and Recommendation No. R (87) 15 1987325. 
ii. National DNA databases should be governed by specific national legislation that 
prescribes the conditions for the taking, retention, use, destruction and sharing of 
DNA records. The national legislation should take into consideration the principles 
and recommendations set out in Recommendation No. R (92) 1 1992.326 
iii. Public security safeguards and human right protections of data subjects should be 
consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights and rulings on the 
interpretation of the Convention at the European Court of Human Rights (for 
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example, the case of S & Marper v the United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581, and the 
case of Aycaguer v France [2017] ECHR 587). 
The goal of EU DNA legislation is to ensure consistency and compatibility in the operation 
of DNA databases to facilitate cross-border cooperation.327 Whilst there has been significant 
progress, the operation of databases differs across the EU States.  The sampling regime can 
be divided into four categories: those that allow sampling on arrest or detention, on charge 
(i.e. suspect), conviction, and on specific judicial order. The inclusion/retention regime 
ranges from indefinite to fixed retention based on conviction, type of offence, sentence, and 
age. Most EU countries run a system combining the different sampling and retention 
criteria.328 Compared to the United Kingdom, most EU national databases include data from 
only convicted individuals and those suspected of serious offences. This partly explains the 
large size of the UK NDNAD. All national databases are used to compare crime scene and 
reference profiles to assist in the identification of individuals involved in a crime and to link 
different crimes. Some databases are also used for identification purposes in cases of mass 
disaster and missing person inquiries. Following the Marper ruling in 2008, DNA records 
from individuals with no criminal conviction are required to be destroyed after fulfilling its 
purpose or on expiry of any stipulated retention period. Unlike the UK where data from most 
convicted individuals are subject to indefinite retention, most EU States require data from 
convicted individuals to be destroyed after a fixed retention period (i.e. where indefinite 
retention is prohibited).329  
2.5.2 North and South America: United States 
DNA databasing in the United States has a distinct framework compared to the UK system. 
The CODIS database operates on a three-tier system: National DNA Index (NDIS), State 
DNA Index (SDIS) and Local DNA Index (LDIS) systems. The NDIS operates at the 
national level and includes data from all the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the federal 
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government, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, and Puerto Rico.330 The 
SDIS operates at the State level and the LDIS at the local level. The flow of DNA profile 
information is from the LDIS to the SDIS and then to the NDIS, which is operated by the 
FBI Laboratory.331 Unlike the UK NDNAD, different information categories (indices) exist 
within the CODIS system, such as, the convicted offender, arrestee and forensic (crime 
scene) indices, and other information categories for missing persons.  When measured by 
the number of profiles retained, the NDIS is the second largest database in the world. As of 
July 2019, the NDIS held more than 17.5 million reference profiles.332 About 79% of these 
profiles are from convicted and detained individuals, and profiles marked as ‘legal profiles’. 
The other reference profiles (~21%) are from arrestees. The number of crime scene profiles 
held on NDIS was about 0.95 million. The performance of the NDIS is measured by counting 
the number of investigations aided by DNA matches/hits.333 The match count of the NDIS 
was about 0.48 million matches as of July 2019.334 These matches contributed to about 0.47 
million investigations.  
Compared to the UK NDNAD, the information linked to subject profiles on the NDIS is 
limited to the identifier of the laboratory that submitted the profile, the DNA sample, and 
the DNA analyst.335 No names, personal demographic data or criminal record information 
of the subject are stored on the NDIS.336 The only exception applies to the missing persons' 
database within NDIS, where personal information, such as, the date of birth of the subject 
may be stored.337 
The legal framework for DNA databasing in the United States is based on federal and state 
laws. The DNA Identification Act 1994 (DIA) provided the legal authority for the 
establishment of the NDIS. At the federal level, the inclusion criteria initially covered 
individuals convicted of specified federal offences including terrorism and crimes of 
violence.338 The scope of sampling and inclusion on NDIS was progressively expanded to 
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indicted persons, 339  all convicted individuals, arrestees and detained foreigners. 340  The 
circumstances under which DNA data is deleted from the NDIS and other databases include 
when a conviction is overturned and when the case of an arrestee results in acquittal or the 
case is discontinued.341 At the state level, the inclusion criteria differ considerably. The 
minimum provision in all the 50 states is the inclusion of DNA records from convicted 
individuals. However, this requirement applies to specific offences that vary by state. Whilst 
some states require the inclusion of data from some arrestees, others limit databasing to 
convicted individuals. In the case of Maryland v King,342 the United States Supreme Court, 
by a majority of 5 to 4, ruled that sampling an individual arrested for a serious offence and 
including their DNA records in a state’s database is proportionate for the purposes of public 
security. No infringement of the privacy provisions of the Fourth Amendment was found by 
the ‘King majority’. This ruling, as well as public campaigns, has been considered as a 
gateway for the expansion of DNA databasing in the United States.343 
A multi-agency board at the federal, state and local levels governs the operation of the NDIS. 
The NDIS Procedures Board, set up by the FBI, provides operational procedures for the 
database.344 The Board is made up of representatives from the FBI, selected state and local 
laboratories, and the Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM). 
The SWGDAM took over the responsibilities of the former DNA Advisory Board 
established by the DIA in 2000.345 The working group is responsible for setting up quality 
assurance standards for DNA analysis and databasing.346 Unlike the current governance 
arrangement of the UK NDNAD, the custodianship/management of the NDIS is held within 
a law enforcement agency, the FBI Laboratory CODIS Unit, with the support of the NDIS 
Board.347   
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2.5.3 Asia: China 
There is limited literature on DNA databasing in China available in the English language. 
Most publications included in this section were thus originally in Mandarin and were 
translated using Google Translate and then checked with the assistance of PhD researchers 
proficient in the Mandarin language. The Chinese national DNA database is the largest 
forensic DNA database in the world.348 The proportion of the Chinese population in the 
database is ~3% (less than the UK (~8%) and the US (~5%)). However, the current trend 
towards an expansive model of DNA databasing may increase the proportion of citizens on 
the database. As of May 2016, the database held more than 44 million DNA records of which 
40.7 million were from individuals with criminal records and 1.5 million were from crime 
scenes.349 A separate database for the investigation of human trafficking cases held about 
0.5 million DNA records. The number of hits generated by the national database350 was 
about 4.4 million as of May 2016.351 The separate ‘trafficking’ database contributed to the 
identification of 4,265 missing children. The management or custodianship of the national 
database is under the Ministry of Public Security, the main law enforcement department in 
China.352 Like the United States system, the operational model of DNA databasing in China 
involves three tiers: ministry, province and prefectural or county level. The local databases 
(~400) are linked together within the Ministry of Public Security’s database system.353 In 
2013, Sheng354 reported several key challenges in realizing the full potential of the Chinese 
database including issues with standardization of laboratories and quality assurance, data 
security, and a gap between data processing capacity and demands of service delivery. 
The inclusion and retention regime governing the Chinese DNA database covers convicted 
individuals and crime suspects.355 Article 130 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (as amended on 14 March 2012) allows consensual and non-consensual 
sampling of individuals connected to crime. However, there are reported cases where 
individuals who are not involved in any crime, such as passport applicants, have been 
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sampled for inclusion in local databases.356 Compared to the UK, Europe and the US, the 
legal framework governing the Chinese DNA database(s) is thought to be inadequate and 
lacks privacy safeguards for the innocent.357 There are limited statutory rules on the period 
of retention, use and sharing of DNA information and rights of individuals subjected to DNA 
sampling.358  
2.5.4 Africa: South Africa 
Forensic DNA databasing commenced in South Africa (SA) within two years of the 
establishment of the UK NDNAD. However, DNA database legislation, the Criminal Law 
(Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act 37 (CLFPA), was developed in 2013 and 
implemented from 1st January 2015.359  As of March 2018, the South African National 
Forensic DNA Database (NFDD) held more than 1 million DNA profiles of which 0.4 
million were from the Crime Scene Index, 0.5 million from Arrestee Index, 0.026 million 
from Elimination Index, 0.007 million from Investigative Index, 0.067 million from the 
Convicted Offenders Index, and 0.011 million from Missing Persons Index.360 Over 47% of 
the DNA profiles were added to the NFDD following the implementation of the DNA Act.361 
The estimated investigative leads resulting from a search of the NFDD is about 0.024 million 
for known suspects and 0.011 million for unknown suspects as of March 2018.362 
The type of information linked to DNA records on the NFDD excludes appearance, medical, 
historical and behavioural information of the data subject. 363  Unlike the UK, the time 
window to destroy DNA samples collected from individuals is within 3 months after 
obtaining a DNA profile and its later inclusion in the NFDD.364 The legislative regime for 
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the NFDD supports the indefinite retention of DNA profiles from individuals convicted of a 
Schedule 8 offence (mainly serious offences including theft).365 The DNA profiles of adults 
and children arrested for a Schedule 8 offence are subject to 3 years and 12 months retention, 
respectively. Profiles retained in the Investigative Index (i.e. individuals who are of interest 
in an investigation) are subject to a retention period of 3 months after the conclusion of the 
investigation. DNA profiles on the Elimination and Missing Persons Indices are required to 
be deleted after fulfilling their purpose.  
Compared to the UK NDNAD, the custodianship of the NFDD is held by the Forensic 
Science Division of the South African Police Service (SAPS).366 The custodian develops and 
recommends quality management standards for forensic DNA analysis and the operation of 
the NFDD. The National Commissioner of SAPS has a statutory role to manage and set 
standards on data access and security of the NFDD.367 The Secretary of Police under the 
Ministry of Police oversees and monitors the role of the National Commissioner regarding 
the NFDD. Section 6 of the CLFPA established the National Forensic Oversight and Ethics 
Board (NFOEB) who oversee the implementation of the DNA regime.  Generally, the 
statutory roles of the NFOEB share significant similarities with the roles of the Strategy 
Board, the Ethics Group and the Biometrics Commissioner for the UK NDNAD (section 
2.4.2). The CLFPA allows a membership of up to ten in the NFOEB and requires half of the 
members to be individuals outside the public sector, a retired judge or senior advocate as 
Chair of the Board, and a representative each from the Secretary of Police, Department of 
Health, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and Department of 
Correctional Services.368   
Whilst there are some considerable differences between the SA NFDD and the UK NDNAD 
systems, the legislative regime in both countries share similar features. In the 2008 Marper 
ruling, the Scottish legislative regime was considered to be consistent with principles set out 
in Recommendation No. R(92)1,369 which recommends different inclusion/retention criteria 
for different types of cases.  The PoFA regime was developed based on the Scottish model. 
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According to the DNA Project,370 the CLFPA regime ensures an adequate balance between 
public security and the civil liberty rights of individuals. However, there are concerns about 
safeguards on confidentiality of possible sensitive genetic information such as chromosomal 
abnormalities linked to forensic DNA profiles.371  
2.5.5 Australasia: Australia and New Zealand 
2.5.5.1 Australia 
The largest database in Australasia is the NCIDD of Australia. According to the Australian 
Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC), the NCIDD holds over 1.22 million DNA 
profiles.372 The NCIDD stores profiles from convicted individuals, suspects, missing or 
deceased persons, volunteers and crime scenes. 373  Profiles from these categories of 
individuals are organised as separate indices in the NCIDD. Within the 2017/18 period, the 
NCIDD recorded 0.089 million reference-to-crime scene matches and 0.029 million crime 
scene-to-crime scene matches.374 Like the US and South African systems, there is a level of 
dissociation between DNA profiles and personal information of data subjects on the 
NCIDD.375 Names, date of birth, address and information related to appearance are not 
recorded on the NCIDD. 376  The process of identifying matched subjects is managed 
separately. In addition to the NCIDD which operates at the national or federal level, the six 
states and two territories in Australia maintain their own DNA database with some 
differences in DNA legislation. Full participation of all jurisdictions in the NCIDD was 
achieved in 2009. However, the differences in state/territory DNA legislation has been 
highlighted as a set-back in maximizing the utility of the NCIDD. Reviews into the legal 
framework of the NCIDD have recommended reforms to achieve some level of 
harmonisation in legislation.377  
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The Crimes Act 1914378 is the main statute governing the operation of the Australia NCIDD. 
Generally, the legal framework permits indefinite retention of DNA samples and profiles 
from individuals convicted of specified serious offences, for example, murder.  For suspects, 
the retention period for DNA samples is 12 months after sampling if the case is discontinued 
or no proceedings are instituted against the individual. The sample must be destroyed as soon 
as possible if the suspect is acquitted or no conviction is recorded. Under the authority of a 
magistrate, the retention period may be extended. The national legislative regime uses a 
concept of de-identification of DNA profiles for suspects and volunteer data.  It involves the 
removal of any identifying information associated with DNA profiles after a maximum 
period of 12 months for suspects, and in the case of volunteers, after the purpose for which 
the profile was loaded has been fulfilled. As mentioned earlier, there are some differences 
in state/territory DNA legislative regimes. In Queensland and Victoria, for example, the state 
provisions require the destruction of DNA samples and profiles of suspects if no charge is 
instituted after 12 months or when found not guilty. Whilst there are provisions for the 
destruction of DNA samples in other jurisdictions, provisions on retention limits and 
destruction of DNA profiles are not clear.379  
The operation of the NCIDD is under the management of the ACIC on behalf of the police. 
The ACIC is a government agency under the Home Affairs Portfolio established in 
December 2017.  Until July 2016, the database was managed by CrimTrac which has now 
merged with the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) to form the ACIC.380  The external 
oversight of ACIC functions, including management of the NCIDD, is carried out by the 
ACIC Board, the Inter-Governmental Committee on the ACC, the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Law Enforcement, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Australian 
Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, and Australian National Audit Office. 381 
Unlike the UK NDNAD system, there appear to be no specific independent oversight bodies 
or offices, such as the Strategy Board, Ethics Group and Biometrics Commissioner for the 
NCIDD. 
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2.5.5.2 New Zealand 
The New Zealand DPD is the second oldest national DNA database in the world. The 
national database is organized into two databases: a reference sample database and a crime 
scene database. The DPD holds over 0.19 million subject profiles (~3.5% of the population) 
and 0.039 million crime scene samples.382 The crime scene match rate is estimated at 70% 
and the match rate for crime scene-to-crime scene matches is about 30%.383 Compared to 
the other databases, the DPD has the highest crime scene match rate384 . Harbison and 
Bright385 suggest a possible future integration of information from massively parallel DNA 
sequencing to the DPD.  
The legal framework for the DPD is provided in the Criminal Investigations (Bodily 
Samples) Act 1995 (CIBSA). The current form of the Act, following several amendments, 
allows the retention of DNA samples from individuals convicted, charged or suspected of 
imprisonable offences or specified offences in Part 3 of the CIBSA Schedule (mainly serious 
offences). The regime requires the destruction of DNA samples if charges are dropped or if 
a conviction is quashed. If no charges are progressed against an individual after 24 months, 
DNA records must be destroyed. Apart from these exceptions, samples must be destroyed 
after generating a DNA profile. 386  DNA profiles that can be retained on the DPD are 
restricted to data from convicted individuals.387 The Act permits indefinite retention of data 
but fixed retention periods (4 or 10 years + possible 4 years extensions) apply to data from 
certain convicted juveniles (aged 14 to 16), and in some cases, juveniles can apply for data 
deletion.388 
Section 24O of the CIBSA provides for the operation of a temporary DNA database in 
addition to the DPD. The temporary database stores profiles of individuals charged with an 
imprisonable or a Part 3 Schedule offence.389 As of the 2017/18 reporting period, there were 
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about 0.0082 million profiles in a temporary database.390 Profiles on both the DPD and the 
temporary database can be used for forensic comparisons (i.e. comparison to crime scene 
profiles). The retention period for profiles in the temporary database is until 2 months if no 
charges or the conclusion of any proceedings, acquittal or withdrawal of charges or transfer 
to the DPD if required by law.  
The Environmental Science and Research Institute (ESR) manages the New Zealand DPD 
and temporary database for the police.391 The ESR is a government-owned agency that 
provides scientific and clinical services such as forensic, food, pharmaceutical and 
environmental analyses. Unlike the UK, the governance of DNA databasing in New Zealand 
lacks a robust independent oversight arrangement. Whilst the Privacy Commissioner can 
audit the compliance of databases to privacy rules, this is not mandatory.392  Lynch and 
Campbell393 recommend adoption of the UK model of a statutory advisory board to monitor 
the implementation of the law as well as the compliance of DNA practices to legal 
requirements.  
In summary, the holdings and matching performance of the selected databases differ from 
the UK NDNAD. Due to the limited information on match outcomes and variations in match 
counts, it is difficult to determine the relative aggregate effectiveness of the databases. 
However, the match output demonstrates the utility of the databases in resolving crime by 
identifying offenders or eliminating suspects. Secondly, the selected systems show variation 
in the type of information associated with retained DNA profiles in databases. Butler394 
supports the policy of excluding personal information of data subjects in databases as a 
means of protecting privacy. ‘Profile anonymity’ as a privacy measure has been applied 
successfully in the operation of elimination databases for crime scene workers.395 This policy 
is practised to some extent for the US, South Africa and Australia national DNA databases. 
Although this measure could be useful in maintaining the security of data, it is not clear how 
this ensures a balance between public security and individual privacy rights. The personal 
information of data subjects is still accessible to the local laboratory or local police force 
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that submitted the data.396 The differences in the legislative regimes reflect the complex 
interpretation of proportionality between public and private interests. The rules on inclusion 
criteria and how long to store data appear to be ‘arbitrary decisions’.397 Comments from the 
literature on the governance arrangement of DNA databases favour the current UK model of 
an independent oversight body rather than a law enforcement agency or government-owned 
agency.398 This model is thought to be more transparent and ensures that the police are 
accountable in the use of individuals’ personal genetic data and allow objective ethical 
scrutiny of the use of forensic DNA.399 
2.6 International exchange of forensic DNA data400 
With the increase in cross border crime, the international exchange of intelligence for 
policing purposes has become very necessary. Approaches to the transnational exchange of 
DNA data can be categorised into four: international DNA databasing, linked national DNA 
databases, request-based exchange of data and a combination of these.401 As demonstrated 
below, most countries operate a combination system of data exchange.  
2.6.1 International DNA databasing 
International DNA databases are either ‘global’ or regional. An example of the global system 
is the Interpol DNA Gateway platform that was established in 2002.402 Currently, 84 member 
countries participate in the Interpol DNA Database (IDD) with a holding of more than 0.18 
million DNA profiles.403 Although it takes minutes to generate hits from the database,404 it 
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has been reported that the Interpol exchange process can take about 143 days.405 The United 
Kingdom is a participant of the IDD and exports a limited number of DNA profiles to the 
Interpol database.406 The IDD holds DNA profiles from convicted individuals, suspects, 
missing persons and unidentified human remains and crime scenes. The IDD excludes 
personal information of data subjects and the profiles are governed by the national laws of 
the submitting law enforcement agency. This policy indicates that, overall, domestic laws 
dictate access and uses of data and the protection of the rights of IDD data subjects. 
According to Interpol,407 the database was instrumental in Project Pink Panther (2007 - 
2016), where a group of individuals involved in transnational jewellery thefts were 
apprehended.  
The Europol Information System (EIS) is a regional criminal intelligence and information 
database that includes a DNA database containing profiles from the EU Member States.408 
The EIS was established in 2005 and stores information on serious international crime, 
convicted and suspected individuals and other information related to crime. Like the Interpol 
database, profiles stored on the EIS are subject to national laws of the submitting agency. 
Access to data stored on the EIS can be restricted by the submitting agency and may only 
allow access where a hit is obtained.409 According to Europol,410 the EIS holds more than 
0.147 million data of persons as of 2017.  The Europol Programming Document indicates 
the agency is considering a partnership with the EU Prüm framework to increase the scope 
and capabilities of its DNA and biometric exchange system with third countries.411 
2.6.2 Linked or networked national DNA databases 
The EU Prüm arrangement is modelled as a network of separate national databases of 
member countries.412 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
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Spain signed the Prüm Treaty on 27th May 2005. The arrangement was adopted into EU 
legislation in 2008, requiring all member states to create a database that can be accessed by 
other member countries. Council Decision 2008/615/JHA and Council Decision 
2008/616/JHA provide the legal framework for the EU Prüm regime. The types of 
intelligence covered under Prüm include DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration 
information. The DNA data exchange operates under two stages: hit/no-hit query and further 
information sharing.413  In the first stage, DNA data from one country is automatically 
searched on the database of another country to identify any matches. If a match is obtained, 
the case progresses to the second stage where identifying information of the data subject is 
shared with the requesting country. Currently, between 6 and 13.5 million subject profiles, 
and 2 million crime scene profiles may be available for exchange under Prüm. This is due to 
the inclusion of the UK in June 2019. 414  Conditions for UK participation include the 
restriction of searching to data of convicted individuals, crime scene profiles and 
unidentified human remains, and the establishment of an independent Prüm Oversight 
Board.415 Compared to the Interpol exchange process, it takes approximately 15 minutes to 
exchange data via Prüm.416 The regime requires all EU states to establish national contact 
points (NCPs) to facilitate and manage the exchange of intelligence data.417 The operation 
of the data exchange scheme is governed by national legislation that determines the powers 
of NCPs.  
As of July 2019, 25-member states (including the UK) were actively exchanging DNA data 
with other member states under the Prüm regime.418 Whilst some countries, such as, the 
                                                 
of the European Union, ‘Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the Implementation of 
Decision 2008/615/JHA on the Stepping up of Cross-Border Cooperation, Particularly in Combating 
Terrorism and Cross-Border Crime’ (2008) L 210 Official Journal of the European Union 12. 
413 See Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 
2008 on the Stepping up of Cross-Border Cooperation, Particularly in Combating Terrorism and Cross-
Border Crime’ (n 322). 
414 Home Office, ‘UK and EU Law Enforcement Boost Co-Operation on DNA Databases’ (GOV.UK, 13 
June 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-eu-law-enforcement-boost-co-operation-on-dna-
databases> accessed 7 September 2019. 
415 House of Lords, ‘Prüm: UK Opt-In’ (Hansard Online, 9 December 2015) 
<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2015-12-09/debates/15120956000220/Pr%C3%BCmUKOpt-In> 
accessed 26 March 2018; European Union Committee, ‘The United Kingdom’s Participation in Prüm’ 
(House of Lords 2015); Wiles, Annual Report 2016 (n 26); Council of the European Union, ‘Implementation 
of the provisions on information exchange of the “Prüm Decisions”’ (Council of the European Union 2017). 
416 Home Office, ‘Government Sets out Case for Joining Prüm’ (n 405). 
417 See Article 6 of Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the 
Stepping up of Cross-Border Cooperation, Particularly in Combating Terrorism and Cross-Border Crime’ (n 
322). 
418 Council of the European Union, ‘Draft Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the “PRÜM 
DECISIONS” Ten Years after Their Adoption’ (n 411); VIEmedia, ‘Great Britain Started on July 8, 2019 
with Austria Prüm-DNA-Cooperation’ (19 July 2019) 
 77 
 
Netherlands, Germany and Austria exchange data with 20 or more other states, countries, 
such as, Belgium, Denmark and the UK exchange data with a few other states.419 The non-
operational states are Greece, Ireland and Italy.420 Available studies421 on the performance 
of the Prüm regime have found a disproportionate impact in the transnational exchange of 
DNA data among member states. Factors contributing to this observation include differences 
in legislation, size and age of databases, variation in operational procedures, and uneven 
connection between states. 422  Presently, there’s scarce information on the actual 
effectiveness of the regime and some studies have recommended a follow-up of confirmed 
DNA hits to address this gap.423 Another recommendation is the assessment of stage 2 of the 
Prüm regime to enhance transparency, accountability and trust in the regime.424 
2.6.3 Request-based exchange of DNA data 
The request-based exchange of DNA data is practised by several countries around the world. 
Countries with bilateral agreements allow conditional automated searching of databases for 
public security reasons. Features of this scheme include the requirement that the exchange 
of DNA information must be ‘necessary’ or ‘relevant’ and ‘proportionate’ for a policing 
purpose and the prioritisation of serious crimes.425 Generally, the sharing of DNA data 
follows the two-stage process of Prüm. In the UK, the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
manages the international exchange of DNA data under this model.426 The Interpol I-24/7 
network is used as a channel for sharing data. One major disadvantage of this approach is 
the time taken to share information. The process has been described as time-consuming 
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compared to other approaches. 427  The small number of profiles exchanged under this 
approach may reflect this challenge. 
According to the UK Biometrics Commissioner’s 2018 report,428 23 subject profiles and 155 
crime scene profiles were sent from the UK from January – December 2018. Of the searches 
completed in foreign databases, the subject profiles yielded no positive or potential match 
whilst the crime scene profiles yielded 9 matches. Within the same period, 125 subject 
profiles and 475 crime scene profiles were sent to the UK. The respective matches were 15 
for the subject profiles and 50 for the crime scene profiles. Contrary to UK policy on 
international DNA exchange,429 the 2016 report of the Biometrics Commissioner indicates 
instances where data of subjects have been exchanged with associated personal information 
at the first stage.430 A second issue identified was the searching of DNA data related to 
offences other than qualifying (serious) offences.431 Thirdly, there were instances where 
NDNAD searches were conducted without the approval of the database Strategy Board.432 
The Biometrics Commissioner notes that these issues have been addressed to prevent future 
occurrence.   
Like the UK, the request-based system is practised through bi-lateral agreements between 
the United States and at least 30 countries around the world. These include Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Malta, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, the UK 
(only crime scene profiles) 433  and the Netherlands. 434   These bilateral agreements are 
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modelled as the EU Prüm regime. However, there is a focus on serious crime and parties 
exercise autonomy in permitting automated searches of databases based on the principle of 
reciprocity. The extent of implementation of the United States bilateral agreements for DNA 
data exchange is not clear due to legislative restrictions.435 
In summary, the transnational exchange of forensic DNA data has become a common trend 
in fighting cross-border crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. It appears the largest 
exchange system is the EU Prüm framework, involving a network of multiple national DNA 
databases. There is a possibility for non-EU national (such as, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein),436 international or regional law enforcement agencies to partner the Prüm 
Framework. This potential global network of databases may introduce significant 
‘administrative burdens’ on national database managers. Further, due to the volume of 
exchanges, databases may encounter difficulties in managing searches and false-positive 
matches. These challenges imply a need to develop strong algorithms for comparison as well 
as an expansion of existing standard set loci to increase the discriminatory power of profiles. 
A common policy in DNA data exchange is the governance of data by domestic legislation 
and implementation of the two-stage Prüm process. Several studies have noted that national 
differences in operational, legal and ethical policies including privacy safeguards and 
interpretation of proportionality appear to limit the full potential of the DNA data exchange 
systems.437 The current trend dictates a need for legal and operational harmonisation of 
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domestic policies to protect both public security and individual civil liberties. This 
underscores the importance of establishing the actual effectiveness of these databases.438 
Whilst the utility of the DNA exchange system has been demonstrated in resolving serious 
crimes, such as, gang and serial rape, murder and armed robbery, 439  there is limited 
information on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of this crime-fighting tool.440 This 
knowledge base is critical to help establish whether the creation and operation of DNA 
exchange systems is ‘a good return on investment’.  
2.7 Conclusion 
To provide context to the relevance of the national and global debates on public security, 
privacy, proportionality and effectiveness in forensic DNA databasing, this chapter explored 
the development of the science and technology, legal and operational framework of forensic 
DNA databasing. The NDNAD was analysed in detail and compared to selected databases 
around the world: European national databases, the United States NDIS, Chinese national 
DNA database, South African NFDD, Australian NCIDD and New Zealand databases. The 
different approaches to the international exchange of forensic DNA data were also discussed.  
The review shows a global trend to set up, develop and link national DNA databases for 
criminal investigation purposes. Whilst there has been significant progress in the realisation 
of the usefulness of DNA databases, several public security and investigative issues, legal 
and ethical issues have been identified. There seems to be a trend to remove DNA data of 
unconvicted individuals from databases. Further, the legal framework of many jurisdictions 
includes rules to prevent or limit the retention of DNA data from unconvicted individuals. 
The goal of these strategies is to protect the civil liberty rights of individuals and ensure 
proportionality. However, there is presently a lack of data to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of retention regimes and databases. 
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One contributing factor to the investigative issues and debates on ethics and privacy is the 
limited understanding of the category of individuals whose profiles should be retained on 
national databases. There is limited empirical evidence to justify the retention of DNA data 
from innocent individuals and how long data should be retained for innocent and convicted 
individuals. A consequence of this limitation is a gap in determining an adequate balance 
between public security and civil liberty rights of individuals. To help fill this gap, this 
research aimed to assess the efficacy of NDNAD regimes. The goal was to identify legal 
changes that may improve the utility of the database and proportionality between public and 
individual interests. Overall, the public survey suggested that an effective regime should 
limit the inclusion and retention of data from unconvicted individuals. The results also 
showed a need to reform the indefinite retention of DNA data from convicted adults in the 
NDNAD. The surveyed expert group thought the expansive regime was the most effective 
for reasons of security and ease of implementation. This suggested a need to assess and adopt 
effective/efficient elements of the expansive regime, such as, the automation of retention 
procedures or the use of bright-line rules and the establishment of an intelligence network to 
support police work.  
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Chapter 3: Implementation of the PoFA regime: document 
analysis441 
3.1 Introduction 
The first specific aim of the research was ‘to identify the benefits, challenges, risks and 
emerging issues associated with the implementation of the provisions of Part 1 of the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) governing the retention of forensic DNA records.’ 
A document analysis of reports of the main NDNAD oversight bodies was carried out to 
achieve this aim. The PoFA regime was brought into force in October 2013. As described in 
Chapter 2, the regime has transformed the governance, operation, and legal framework of 
the database. More than a million profiles from unconvicted people and millions of DNA 
samples have been destroyed.442 Critical reviews of the PoFA regime highlight the potential 
incommensurate treatment of public and private interests and the continuing lack of ‘weighty 
reasons’ for the retention of data from innocent individuals.443 This chapter reviews the 
annual reports of the Strategy Board, the Ethics Group and the Biometrics Commissioner 
published since the implementation of PoFA. The rationale for this review was to establish 
the direction of research into the efficacy of NDNAD retention regimes and, secondly, 
advance the literature on the PoFA regime, which has not yet been subjected to a research-
informed review.444 
3.2 Methodology 
Fourteen annual reports of the three independent bodies with specific oversight functions for 
the NDNAD were analysed for recurrent themes on the benefits and best practice, 
challenges, risks, and emerging issues associated with the implementation of PoFA. The 
review includes five annual reports of the Strategy Board (2013/14 – 2017/18),445 three 
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annual reports of the Ethics Group (2014 – 2016)446 and five annual reports (2014 – 2018)447 
and a supplementary report448 of the Biometrics Commissioner. The general principles of 
thematic synthesis of literature and qualitative data were used to generate the key themes in 
the review.449 The iterative process involved the coding of text, sorting of relevant codes into 
key themes, comparing the generated themes to the original report and then between the 
reports for similarities and differences. 
3.3 Results of document analysis  
The key themes identified from the fourteen reports are summarised in Table 3.1. This 
section describes the themes from the included reports. These are critically discussed in the 
context of the available literature in section 3.4. There were 21 key themes in relation to 
forensic DNA. As observed in the description below, the reports of the Biometrics 
Commissioner produced more themes than the other independent bodies. This is explained 
by the comprehensive nature of the Commissioner’s reports, as well as the dedicated focus 
upon the PoFA regime, covering the retention, use, transnational exchange and destruction 
of DNA records and fingerprints, and PoFA compliance.450 In contrast, the Strategy Board 
and Ethics Group reports cover other issues that are indirectly related to PoFA.  
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Table 3.1 - Main themes identified from the reviewed reports 
 
3.3.1 Benefits of PoFA implementation 
Five main themes related to the benefits of the PoFA regime were identified from the 
analysed reports. The implications of these benefits are discussed in section 3.4.1. This 
section describes the key benefits identified in the reports. 
3.3.1.1 Improved proportionality 
The implementation of the PoFA regime is reported to have strengthened the level of 
protection of the privacy interests of innocent individuals.451 For example, in cases where 
the retention of DNA profiles of unconvicted individuals is deemed necessary, the PoFA 
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procedures require corroboration of the suspicious involvement of the individual.452 Further, 
the process has reinforced the requirement to provide suspected individuals with detailed 
information on the grounds for the retention of their data and their right to make 
representations.453 Most of the reports indicate a wide acceptance of the PoFA regime as a 
more proportionate system. 454  The implementation of the new regime has increased 
awareness of ethical and legal considerations, including privacy rights, proportionality and 
necessity. The regime has also established critical monitoring and assessment of legal 
compliance with PoFA when retaining DNA profiles, in order to fulfil obligations upon the 
State to respect human rights,455  as demanded by Marper.456  Interestingly, some of the 
reports recommended the application of PoFA rules to new/unregulated biometric 
technologies. 457  The Ethics Group specifically recommended that ‘the retention times 
directed in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 for the retention of DNA samples and 
fingerprints should also be applied to the retention of custody images’. 458  Whilst the 
retention of custody images is considered by some as less intrusive than DNA, the Ethics 
Group believed their retention raise significant privacy concerns. Hence, the need to apply 
the PoFA rules to custody images.459  
3.3.1.2 Increased match rate 
Match rate is an output metric used to assess the performance of the NDNAD. It measures 
the chance that a crime scene profile loaded on the NDNAD matches a subject profile.460 
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Since its establishment in 1995, the NDNAD has provided the highest match rates (62% - 
66% from 2013/14 to 2017/18) following the introduction of the PoFA regime.461 The 
current match rate is reported to be one of the highest across DNA databases in Europe. The 
Ethics Group noted that ‘the initial impression is that the removal of large numbers of 
“unconvicted” profiles has not significantly affected the effectiveness of the database, 
although it is too early to draw firm conclusions’.462 Most of the reports suggested that the 
new regime seems to have had a positive impact on the match output of the database.463  
3.3.1.3 Decreased sample storage cost and strengthened compliance 
Another potential benefit of the PoFA regime, as suggested in the 2014 Commissioner’s 
report, is that it has significantly decreased costs and resources required for storing millions 
of DNA samples indefinitely under previous regimes.464 The new regime has also led to the 
introduction of PoFA compliance checks by UKAS and the Biometrics Commissioner for 
accredited Forensic Science Providers (FSPs) and police forces, respectively.465 This has 
mandated the introduction of adequate processes by FSPs and police forces to demonstrate 
compliance with the new regime. Although compliance checks have not been completed for 
all police forces, the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner asserts that the bulk of 
samples/data that need to be retained or destroyed have indeed been retained or destroyed.466  
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3.3.1.4 Opportunity for case review 
Finally, another practical value of the new regime is the opportunity for case reviews.467 Best 
practice has been identified when Biometrics Retention Units (BRU) are established within 
police forces.468 A BRU can assess cases and identify those that may benefit from extended 
biometric data retention.469 This has led to the identification of shortcomings in some cases. 
For example, the BRU of the Metropolitan Police Service identified a sexual assault case 
with a suspect for whom a No Further Action (NFA) entry had been made but should have 
been charged (the suspect was subsequently convicted).470 Other cases where no biometric 
data were taken have also been identified and the data of the individuals involved have now 
been obtained and added to the NDNAD.  
3.3.2 Challenges of PoFA implementation 
There were 8 main themes associated with the challenges of the PoFA regime. These 
challenges are issues that directly impact the enforcement and/or achievement of the general 
principles of the regime such as proportionality and necessity of data retention, protection of 
public security and civil liberties. In this section, the key challenges from the reports are 
outlined. A discussion of the themes is covered in section 3.4.2. 
3.3.2.1 Police National Computer (PNC) limitations 
The automatic deletion of biometric records on the NDNAD is driven by the PNC, which 
contains records of all arrestees. One critical challenge with the implementation of PoFA is 
the limitation of the PNC configuration.471 The Commissioner’s reports472 extensively detail 
the technical and procedural challenges encountered with the PNC. Firstly, the PNC 
programme requires manual entries to drive the ‘automatic’ deletion of data on the 
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NDNAD.473 Although improvement of the programme could support the new regime, its 
high-cost and resource implications have compelled the police to settle for the current 
‘compromise’.474 This has led to some erroneous retention of biometric data.475 Available 
guidance requires forces to confirm the legality of every match generated before progressing 
an investigation.476  
Secondly, the PNC is incompatible with the PoFA concept, ‘the conclusion of the 
investigation of an offence’, that triggers the automatic deletion of data from innocent 
individuals.477 A substituted trigger is the ‘NFA’ entry made on the PNC.478 For protracted 
investigations where an individual is ‘NFA-ed’ but extended retention is necessary, the 
current guidance requires the Biometrics Commissioner to provide discretionary retention 
advice.479 Thirdly, the efficiency of the PNC is determined by the timeliness and accuracy 
of entries made by forces. Delays in updating the PNC or erroneous entries due to 
misunderstanding of retention markers have resulted in unlawful retention or loss of data in 
some instances.480  
3.3.2.2 Non-engagement of police forces with PoFA 
Another critical challenge with PoFA implementation is poor engagement by police forces. 
The reports of the Biometrics Commissioner emphasised the limited applications made by 
police forces (26 out of 43 forces as of 2018) in the case of individuals arrested for a serious 
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offence (or s63G applications).481 Although the expected annual applications were estimated 
at ~1000 per year, there were 570 applications from October 2013 to December 2018, with 
over 62% (354) of applications by the Metropolitan Police alone.482 Further, there were only 
six applications in the case of individuals charged with qualifying offences (or s63F(7) 
applications) – all made by the Metropolitan Police.483 The reasons for non-engagement 
include financial and resource demands; dissatisfaction among some forces about the 
transfer of risk from legislators; the perception that individuals can be sampled in future 
offences when they become suspects; and difficulties in identifying cases or understanding 
the circumstances in which retention is required.484 
3.3.2.3 Limited data on case resolution rate 
Most of the reports noted the limited data to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new 
retention regime.485 To address this gap, the Ethics Group486 proposed the collection of data 
on the size of each retention category, the match rate of the database before and after PoFA 
implementation, and the match rate for each retention criteria. It is indicated that there has 
been some progress made in this respect.487 However, post-legislative scrutiny of the PoFA 
regime is yet to be completed, 488  and the Biometrics Commissioner’s reports have 
emphasised that such a review should be informed by rigorous research into the efficacy of 
the new retention regime.489 
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The reports of the Strategy Board include data on the output of the database490 and ‘positive 
match outcomes’491 which was 41.6% in 2014/15 and 50.4% in 2015/16.492 The third report 
of the Biometrics Commissioner provided further statistics on the impact of DNA evidence. 
This noted that DNA is linked to case outcome in only 0.3% of all recorded crime (0.9% for 
theft of vehicles, 1.4% for domestic burglaries, 0.6% for rapes and 8.4% for homicides).493 
There is still no information, however, on how DNA contributes to case resolution.494 In this 
regard, the Ethics Group recommended the collection of data on NDNAD match conviction 
rates in sexual assault cases.495 One difficulty in determining these rates is that the DNA 
match is normally one element in a larger body of evidence or, because of the different 
circumstances of each case, it cannot be easily determined if the DNA evidence alone ‘led’ 
to a conviction.496 Moreover, offenders may have been identified by other means and the 
DNA match may have only confirmed identity. 497  The Ethics Group indicated that 
preliminary research had been initiated to address this issue.498  
3.3.2.4 Database contamination and error rates 
The Ethics Group noted that some ‘contaminated data’ may be retained on the NDNAD, a 
situation that undermines principles of data protection 499  and the goal of ensuring 
proportionality.500 This problem is partly due to the non-routine checking of the Police 
Elimination Databases (PED). An ongoing project to establish a Contamination Elimination 
Database (CED) that will be subject to weekly searching is proposed to address this issue.501 
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Another related problem is the limited information on the scale of errors associated with the 
use of DNA.502 This information is important because the rate of subject sampling error had 
been found to be ‘unacceptably high’.503 Issues related to DNA sampling errors and database 
contamination are currently under review and on-going developments.504  
3.3.2.5 Inadequate enforcement of PoFA rules for CTDNAD 
The Counter-terrorism DNA Database is a standalone database that stores DNA profiles 
related to counter-terrorism policing. Prior to the third report of the Biometrics 
Commissioner, the holdings of the CTDNAD was unknown.505 Available data now indicates 
the CTDNAD holds 8,109 DNA profiles of which 17% (1,406) are from unconvicted 
individuals.506 There has been a ‘governance deficit’ and IT issues with the operation of the 
CTDNAD, resulting in the inadequate enforcement of the PoFA regime.507 This challenge 
has resulted in unlawful retention and loss of some data.508 The difficulties with the operation 
of the CTDNAD are compounded by expiry problems due to procedural delays in sample 
transfer from ports509 to the Secure Operations – Forensic Services510.511 Another issue is 
delays in the referral of cases to the Joint Forensic Intelligence Team512 and provision of 
summary assessments and incorrect estimation of expiry dates due to incompatible IT-
systems.513 Further, the Biometrics Commissioner noted ‘(…) difficulty of obtaining reliable 
statistical information about the biometric material on the CT databases [including the 
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CTDNAD] that is subject to the requirements of PoFA’.514 This means that some material 
that requires an NSD application may have been overlooked or data that requires deletion 
may have been retained.515 The establishment of a dedicated unit, oversight by the Strategy 
Board and the development of new IT are expected to minimise the risks associated with the 
above issues.516 
3.3.2.6 Limited statutory guidance on discretionary retention 
Statutory guidance on retention decisions under section 63G of PACE is considered to be 
limited. 517  Further, there is no indication of the extent of disclosure when informing 
unconvicted individuals about the grounds for data retention.518 A consultation to develop 
core principles and guidelines was carried out in May 2013.519 Detailed processes consistent 
with the guidance of the Strategy Board have now been developed.520 This considers factors 
such as the seriousness of the offence, characteristics of the individual, value, proportionality 
and necessity of retention, and whether the individual has been informed of the retention of 
data and their right to make representations.521  
Another issue with discretionary retention is that there is no legal definition or guidelines for 
the section 63E of PACE concept ‘the conclusion of the investigation of the offence’, which 
triggers data deletion. 522  This makes it difficult to determine when an application for 
extended retention is necessary.523 The substituted NFA entry on the PNC for arrestees is 
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limited.524  The discretionary retention procedure is perceived to be complicated and a 
‘bright-line rule’ may be preferable because it is easier and cheaper to implement.525 A 
bright-line rule is when, for example, samples or data of those charged with a qualifying 
offence are automatically subjected to three years’ retention. It is also suggested that the 
abolition of discretionary retention under section 63G and 63F (7) of PACE may not 
significantly endanger public security or decrease the efficiency of the NDNAD.526  
Other guidance gaps with discretionary retention are resampling of individuals after data 
deletion and the PoFA requirement for a causal relationship between sampling arrest and 
any conviction.527 For the former, initial policy permitted resampling by consent when an 
investigation is reopened. Currently, section 144 of the ASBCPA permits resampling 
without consent. For the causal relationship requirement, new section 145 of ASBCPA now 
provides that there is no need for a sampling arrest to lead to charge or conviction before 
retention. This permits a sample taken in one offence to be used in an unrelated offence. 
3.3.2.7 Misapplication of CPIA exception 
The CPIA exception permits extended retention of DNA samples for prosecution disclosure 
purposes.528 Changes under PoFA considered the exception for DNA profiles for all offences 
and DNA samples of individuals involved in a serious offence. A wider application of the 
CPIA exception for samples was introduced by section 146 of the ASBCPA. This applies to 
only the relevant offence for which the sample was taken. The oversight of the CPIA 
exception is inadequate, and some forces, due to uncertainty of the circumstances requiring 
its application, may misapply the rule.529 A new system introduced in January 2016 requires 
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a quarterly review of all ‘CPIA samples’ by police forces.530 This has allowed an estimation 
of the number of CPIA samples, although its application issues persist.531  
3.3.2.8 Inadequate rules for volunteer sampling and samples 
Another challenge with the implementation of PoFA is the lack of adequate rules for 
volunteer or elimination samples.532 This oversight has resulted in prolonged retention of 
volunteer DNA samples since they are subjected to indefinite retention – a situation that may 
discourage individuals from donating samples for use in criminal investigations.533 The third 
report of the Biometrics Commissioner indicated this issue has been resolved and volunteer 
samples are now subjected to PoFA rules (since January 2016).534 A second issue with 
volunteer sampling is the lack of information provided to volunteers on consent forms 
regarding the grounds for retention of their DNA.535 The Ethics Group had indicated that 
‘the consent forms used do not show that the rights of individuals concerned are sufficiently 
protected’. 536  This concern was raised in the first Ethics Group report, prior to the 
implementation of PoFA. 537  An appropriate consent form was finalised by relevant 
stakeholders in 2015 and this was introduced in January 2016.538 
3.3.3 Risks and emerging issues 
The document analysis revealed 8 main themes about the risks and gaps in the 
implementation of the new NDNAD regime. These themes are described below. The 
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analysis shows links between the identified challenges and the consequences of the regime. 
Section 3.4.3 covers the discussion of the themes. 
3.3.3.1 Public security risk due to non-retention of data 
The complexities of discretionary retention have led to and anticipated to result in the loss 
of DNA data and/or deletion of some DNA profiles that need to be retained.539 This problem 
may negatively impact the efficient detection or prevention of crime in the UK. Another 
matter of concern is legal, technical and resource issues related to data retention of 
individuals convicted of serious offences outside the UK. The biometric records (including 
DNA) of thousands of individuals who have foreign convictions have not been subjected to 
indefinite retention (as permitted by law) and hence data have been deleted or will be deleted 
from the database, exposing the public to potential security risks.540 A related ethical issue 
on this subject is that, though permitted under the law, sampling arrests on the grounds of 
having a foreign conviction may constitute a greater breach of privacy than the retention of 
material already obtained. This ethical concern has recently been resolved through the 
Policing and Crime Act 2017,541 which allows the retention of already obtained material 
indefinitely.  
Another public security risk identified in the reports relates to changes in police arrests and 
bail procedures. It is reported that the number of subject samples has declined due to the 
diversion of a significant number of individuals to the new ‘voluntary attendance’ (VA) route 
rather than arrest.542 This is mainly because whilst an arrest may trigger DNA sampling and 
inclusion in the NDNAD, a VA does not. There is limited guidance on this gap and the issue 
is currently under review.543   
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Lastly, although the current PoFA regime seeks to ensure proportionality between public 
and private interests, the Biometrics Commissioner noted that:  
Absent indefinite retention of every arrestee’s biometrics, there will inevitably 
be times when crimes will go undetected or un-prevented because material 
obtained from individuals who have been arrested but not convicted is not 
retained for an indefinite period.544 
3.3.3.2 Breach of privacy due to unlawful retention 
Whilst the bulk of data that are required to be deleted from the NDNAD has been deleted, 
challenges with the PNC, misapplication of the CPIA, oversight, and limited enforcement of 
rules for the CTDNAD have led to the potential unlawful retention of data from thousands 
of individuals.545 These retained data are also subjected to automatic speculative searching, 
the same as lawfully retained samples. Existing guidance to mitigate this privacy risk is the 
requirement that forces check the lawfulness of NDNAD matches before acting upon 
them.546  However, police forces have adopted a policy of using unlawful matches for 
intelligence purposes, an emerging issue which the Biometrics Commissioner indicated may 
potentially breach section 63T of PACE.547 
3.3.3.3 Contention surrounding future benefits of retention 
An emerging contention arising from the implementation of the PoFA regime is whether the 
retention of data from innocent individuals under section 63G(2) of PACE will contribute to 
the prevention or detection of crime in future.548 Whilst some forces believed that retention 
for cases involving domestic violence, for example, will be useful in detecting or preventing 
similar future crimes, the Biometrics Commissioner noted that ‘there will rarely be 
compelling reasons to believe that the retention of the material at issue may assist in the 
prevention or detection of crime’.549 The reasons given are that such suspects will readily be 
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identified by the victim or will be obvious suspects and the police will be able to sample 
them at that time.550 
3.3.3.4 Need for expansion of qualifying offences 
Section 65A of PACE provides the list of qualifying offences that merit extended biometric 
data retention for innocent people. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(Amendment: Qualifying Offences) Order 2013 expanded this list but excluded the 
possession of prohibited weapons and the importation of Class A drugs and their possession 
with intent to supply. 551  It is indicated that Parliament was to consider a legislative 
instrument covering those offences and other offences of a similar substance in mid-2016.552 
The Commissioner’s fifth report indicated this legal issue may be considered by parliament 
in 2019.553   
3.3.3.5 Retention after a match but without arrest 
Following an NDNAD match, current police policy permits retention of DNA profiles 
without an arrest. There is no time limit for how long the sample can be retained whilst the 
match is being investigated. The Biometrics Commissioner had indicated that this policy 
breaches sections 63D(3), 63E, 63P and 63T(2) of PACE which seems to proscribe the 
investigation of an offence without an arrest.554 An amendment to the law and/or police 
guidance policy has been suggested to resolve this issue but this is yet to be considered and 
implemented.555  
3.3.3.6 Complex NSD process 
A National Security Determination is made by a Chief Constable in writing to extend 
retention of data of unconvicted individuals on national security grounds.556  This NSD 
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expires after two years 557  and can be subjected to two years’ renewals afterwards. 
Individuals whose data are considered for an ‘NSD retention’ are not informed about the 
existence of an NSD or the reasons for retention.558 The Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Biometrics Commissioner and the Lord Advocate, provides the statutory guidance 
on NSDs. The role of the Biometrics Commissioner is to review the NSDs and the use of 
retained material.559 The NSD process runs on a dedicated IT system but the Biometrics 
Commissioner has no automatic access to the NSD applications’ underlying information, a 
situation described as time-consuming and labour intensive.560  
Another issue with the NSD process is guidance inadequacies. The Biometrics 
Commissioner had indicated that the statutory guidance on NSDs could be more useful if 
illustrative examples that demonstrate when an NSD is appropriate are included.561 Further, 
changes introduced by section 146 of the ASBCP should be included in the guidance.562 
Other specific issues that make the NSD process complicated include: sample/data transfer 
delays; use of IT system that is incompatible with PoFA – a problem which has led to the 
calculation of wrong expiry dates for some data; NSDs made by officers of insufficient rank 
in a few cases; and reliability issues with statistical information on the number of individuals 
whose data are being held on national security grounds.563  
3.3.3.7 Resource needs for compliance checks 
Following the implementation of PoFA, arrangements were made for UKAS to include 
PoFA compliance checks in its existing annual assessment scheme for FSPs. 564  This 
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arrangement is yet to be formalised.565 Whilst an assessment by UKAS was considered for 
police forces, this was perceived to be ‘unnecessary’ and ‘disproportionate’ among 
stakeholders.566 Hence, the Biometrics Commissioner has been carrying out this duty. About 
six PoFA compliance checks for police forces had been carried out as of the 2014/15 fiscal 
year. 567  The third report of the Commissioner indicated a transition to internal PoFA 
compliance checks by police forces. 568  This internal system will be evaluated by the 
Commissioner to assure PoFA compliance by forces. It has been emphasised that additional 
resources will be needed to carry out PoFA compliance checks effectively.569 In 2018, about 
56% (24) of police forces had received PoFA compliance checks/visits due to an increase in 
the staffing of the Biometrics Commissioner’s office.570 
3.3.3.8 Limited statutory guidance for new genetic technologies 
The reports of the Ethics Group emphasised the need for proper guidance and regulations 
for the introduction of Y-STR profiling and databasing, and DNA phenotyping or massively 
parallel sequencing.571 A comprehensive ethical impact assessment had been proposed on 
this issue.572 Further, wide consultation and debate had been recommended to evaluate the 
ethical issues associated with these genetic technologies. 573  Some of the ethical issues 
include the possibility of searching for genetic links among males using Y-STR profiling 
and discriminatory genetic investigation against males. 574  The phenotyping/sequencing 
technology can facilitate the prediction of the phenotypic characteristics of individuals 
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including eye and hair colour, age, ancestry, geographical area of origin, and health or 
disease risk.575 
In summary, the results suggest that whilst the PoFA regime has resulted in some benefits, 
multiple challenges have limited the realisation of its underlying principles. Further, the 
limitations of the regime have created some public security and civil liberty risks and 
bureaucratic complexities. The next section discusses the themes identified in the document 
analysis. 
3.4 Discussion and conclusion of document analysis 
The aim of this review was to identify the benefits, challenges, risks, and emerging issues 
associated with the implementation of the PoFA DNA retention regime. The key themes and 
findings identified from the analysed reports are discussed together under each topic below. 
3.4.1 Benefits of PoFA implementation 
Against the backdrop that forensic DNA retention has been subjected to political influence 
and restrictions by country-specific laws, there is a need to establish standards to safeguard 
the privacy of individuals and the safety of the public. This is particularly important with the 
increasing requirement of data exchange among different organisations, the increase in 
cross-border police investigations and the demand for international collaboration in law 
enforcement.576 The PoFA regime takes consideration of the principles of proportionality 
and necessity as emphasised in the Marper decision.577 Though some practical benefits have 
been realised, there are still gaps that need urgent attention.  
In 2014, Wallace et al578 carried out a global review of DNA database legislation, focussing 
on human right standards for the effective operation of forensic DNA databases. The review 
concluded that there is a growing global consensus to exclude the DNA records of 
unconvicted individuals from databases. A previous survey by the MPACLP also showed 
that eight out of ten Londoners support the deletion of DNA data of non-convicted 
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individuals.579 This model is perceived to be proportionate or balanced.580 The PoFA regime 
appears to be only partially consistent with these views. The DNA records of most 
unconvicted individuals are excluded from retention. Though data of individuals 
arrested/charged with serious offences can be retained, ‘administrative checkpoints’ 
including the independent Biometrics Commissioner have been instituted to ensure that their 
human rights are adequately protected. This policy could enhance public confidence in the 
operation of the NDNAD.581 The new regime could also improve the level of transparency 
in DNA retention by keeping innocent individuals fully informed when the police request 
extended retention.  
While the PoFA regime would appear to offer a good level of genetic privacy protection for 
the innocent, the system is in sharp contrast with the health service model of informed 
consent, which is applied in medical research and the operation of medical biobanks.582 The 
extended retention of forensic DNA profiles of individuals arrested/charged with a serious 
offence takes no regard of the informed consent of the individual, their right to withdraw 
consent and deletion of data. It appears that the State has more power over these 
arrestee/charged unconvicted individuals, and indirectly this category of individuals seems 
to be less ‘innocent’ than other unconvicted individuals or volunteers. This raises the 
question of the proportionality of the PoFA regime for unconvicted individuals.583  
Another concern with the genetic privacy of individuals is that the PoFA regime focuses 
upon the data of the innocent. Although the DNA profiles of some first-time convicted 
minors are subjected to fixed retention, the bulk of convicted individuals are subjected to 
indefinite retention. There is no consideration of the seriousness of offence and severity of 
the sentence as emphasised by the ECHR in W v The Netherlands584 and characteristic of the 
Dutch system and many others internationally. 585  The indefinite retention rule for all 
convicted adults was considered in the Gaughran case at the UK Supreme Court.586 The case 
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concerned the indefinite retention of biometric records (including DNA) taken from an adult 
convicted of the offence of driving with excess alcohol. The majority decision favoured the 
blanket rule for reasons of the potential benefits of DNA in incriminating or eliminating 
individuals from a criminal inquiry. 587  Further, it was thought that the PoFA rule for 
convicted individuals was within the ‘margin of appreciation’ across Europe.588 In Lord 
Kerr’s dissent, the rule was thought to be disproportionate for lack of regard for the principle 
of spent convictions, the gravity of the offence, and the relevance and sufficiency of the 
reasons for retention.589 The case is yet to be decided by the ECHR, which will examine the 
proportionality of the PoFA regime for convicted adults. 
The PoFA model may be problematic because the stored DNA profile can be used to track 
biological relatives through familial searching. This means that the family of the individual 
may be subjected to indefinite bio-surveillance though innocent. Some issues raised are 
whether individuals have the right to surrender their genetic information to the government 
along with that of their innocent biological family without their knowledge or informed 
consent.590 Further, what assurances are required to ensure that the privacy of biological 
relatives is adequately protected? These are vital considerations in establishing a 
proportionate regime. This is important because the legal system operates by the principle 
of the presumption of innocence, and the retention of genetic information tends to treat 
individuals as suspects through speculative and familial searching.591 
A second benefit of the PoFA regime was an improvement in the match output of the 
NDNAD (current match rate of 66%). This suggests that, potentially, the database may be 
representative of the active criminal population and, if adequately utilised, could improve 
crime detection and case resolution. Nevertheless, given that DNA hits do not always lead 
to case resolution due to changes in legislation, investigative and prosecutorial problems, 
and witness or suspect issues,592 the match rate does not demonstrate the efficacy of the 
database. Database hit outcomes such as the resolution of cold crimes, crime deterrence and 
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reduction of crime, the efficiency of investigations (e.g. through DNA intelligence hits) and 
prosecution, and conviction rates have been recommended in previous studies as adequate 
measures of database efficacy.593 Although the positive match outcome is a step towards a 
more detailed understanding of database effectiveness, it is limited in scope and the efficacy 
metrics suggested in previous studies,594 for example, investigative efficiency, should be 
considered.  
The document analysis also showed that the PoFA regime has accrued other important 
secondary benefits, such as, decreased cost of DNA sample storage, improvement of 
retention compliance checks, and opportunity for case review. In 2006, McCartney 595 
reviewed the DNA Expansion Programme and highlighted the high financial cost and 
resourcing required for the operation of the database, which may be detrimental to resourcing 
other demands upon the police. The requirement to destroy millions of DNA samples and 
profiles under the new regime would, therefore, potentially create opportunities for 
reinvestment in other areas of policing. However, it is not clear if such benefits have been 
realised since new costs (e.g. funding of Biometrics Commissioner) have also been created 
by the regime. Another challenge is that the destruction of all DNA samples means that 
investigators cannot confirm or verify matches without resampling the relevant subject. The 
verification of DNA hits may be relevant in cases involving a low number of matching loci, 
which may be common in the advent of transnational exchange of data.  Further, the DNA 
sample may be crucial in cases where further testing, such as Y-STR analysis, is required to 
narrow down suspects in partial profile or familial searches. These factors suggest a careful 
evaluation of the sample retention regime and its ethical impact on resampling of subjects. 
The introduction of compliance checks for DNA sample retention is an important approach 
to scrutinise police and FSP retention practices. This will help identify gaps between 
law/policy and practice to support the continuous development of effective systems. The 
periodic assessment will also inform the public how retained DNA material is being used, 
significantly improving transparency, accountability, public confidence and the assurance of 
genetic privacy protection. The value of compliance checks requires that the Commissioner 
is adequately resourced to cover all forces. 
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Lastly, whilst there is provision for criminal case reviews in the UK, this is mainly focused 
on cases where injustice is suspected and a first appeal has failed.596 The selection of cases 
for cold case investigative reviews is also highly dependent on the seriousness of the offence, 
availability of resources, opportunities to apply new technology and prospects of case 
progression.597 These factors inform the prioritisation of cases hence some cases may be 
overlooked or re-investigation of the cold case may be delayed. The introduction of BRUs 
offers an opportunity for the police to review all cases to identify those that require an 
extension of biometric data. This means that gaps, shortcomings and opportunities in some 
cases may be identified early for re-investigation. For example, the BRU of the Metropolitan 
Police identified a case where an NFA-ed person should have been prosecuted and convicted 
based on the available evidence.598  
3.4.2 Challenges of PoFA implementation 
The PoFA retention regime is not problem-free. Firstly, there are critical challenges with the 
configuration of the PNC that drives the retention and deletion of DNA profiles on the 
NDNAD. The incompatibility of the PNC undermines the goal of achieving a proportionate 
DNA data retention system. The implication of the current ‘compromise’ system is that 
police can potentially manipulate the system to unlawfully retain or delete data of 
arrestees. 599  There is a need for thorough audit systems for the technology and PNC 
processes to identify the scale of potential breaches and resolve technical problems.  
Secondly, the success of the PoFA regime is highly dependent on the cooperation of the 
police. Poor police engagement puts the public at risk since some crimes (that failed to be 
prevented) may go undetected. Alternatively, the genetic privacy of some individuals may 
be breached. In 2008, Fraser600 reviewed the Scottish retention regime, focussing on the 
temporal retention of DNA data of unconvicted individuals. The review emphasised that an 
approach to biometric retention that coordinates policies and practices of all relevant 
stakeholders is crucial to achieving the aims of the law. The current discretionary PoFA 
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regime seems to have been developed without taking account of the views of the police or 
adequate consideration of police investigative or intelligence-gathering practices and 
principles. This analysis indicated some police forces are dissatisfied with the transfer of 
biometric data retention risks from legislators to the police. The new regime places a demand 
upon police budgets and resources, and other policing areas may suffer if PoFA is 
implemented to the letter. Another reason for poor police engagement is potential PoFA 
awareness or guidance gaps. A thorough appraisal and survey of police perceptions about 
the PoFA retention regime are recommended to understand the underlying issues to resolve 
this challenge. 
The analysis also indicated a potential challenge with database contamination. DNA of 
police officers or crime scene examiners can contaminate crime scenes.601 Due to improper 
handling or poor anti-contamination techniques, laboratory analysts can also contaminate 
evidence items. 602  Furthermore, manufacturers, as revealed in the famous ‘Phantom of 
Heilbronn’ case, may contaminate forensic DNA consumables, such as, cotton swabs.603 
These factors, together with record handling errors, interpretation and transcription of data 
errors, may contribute to database contamination.604 One effective strategy to overcome 
database contamination is the establishment of elimination databases, which can be 
crosschecked to eliminate unwanted DNA data. 605  Another strategy is routine integrity 
checks of loaded DNA data.606 The presence of unwanted profiles on the database can 
mislead the police or delay the resolution of cases.607 Another crucial consequence is that 
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where a subject profile is matched with wrong arrestee/sampling information, data may be 
unlawfully retained or deleted under the current PoFA regime. Moreover, database 
contamination can lead to the wrong estimation of database effectiveness output or outcome 
metrics. The challenge of database contamination is acknowledged in the reports and 
initiatives, such as, the establishment of the CED, may help eradicate contamination and 
mitigate its associated risks. 
Most of the reports indicated that the governance of the CTDNAD is inadequate. This may 
be a contributing factor in the emerging issues associated with the complex NSD process. 
Although the Strategy Board has an oversight function of the CTDNAD, this is mainly 
focused on the technical, scientific and operational aspects.608 To maintain transparency, 
accountability and public confidence in the retention and use of individuals’ data, the current 
statutory governance arrangements for the NDNAD should be applied to the CTDNAD. 
Information about governance, guidance policies, statistics of profiles held on the database 
per retention category, the primary (and any secondary) use of individual’s data and match 
rate should be in the public domain. This is crucial because unlike the NDNAD, unconvicted 
individuals are not informed about the grounds for extended retention of their data through 
the NSD process.  
One key characteristic of the PoFA regime is discretionary retention. This policy introduces 
a level of subjectivity in deciding when the retention of some unconvicted individuals’ data 
is necessary. There could be biases in the number of cases selected or approved for extended 
retention. This is problematic because specific guidance and legal definitions are lacking. 
Although the Biometrics Commissioner and the Strategy Board have developed some 
guidance, this has not been subjected to robust public or Parliamentary debate. Another 
problem is that the discretionary retention policy appears bureaucratic and expensive to 
implement – potentially delaying police work. As suggested by the Biometrics 
Commissioner, it may be worth abolishing the discretionary retention policy and introducing 
a bright-line rule, which could be more cost-efficient. Another issue with discretionary 
retention is the non-consensual resampling of individuals after data deletion.609 The initial 
policy of resampling by consent may be more ethical than the current rule. The new rule may 
have adverse psychological impacts or ethical implications for unconvicted individuals. For 
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609 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s 144.  
 107 
 
example, after an individual has been acquitted of an offence (or an investigation/ 
prosecution halted), the person should note that compulsory resampling is still open – 
granting more power to the State over its citizens’ genetic property. There is a need for public 
debate and consultation with relevant agencies to consider the ethical impact of this policy.  
Another challenge identified in the analysis was the misapplication of the CPIA exception. 
The PoFA regime provides for the destruction of the DNA sample after profiling because of 
its sensitivity. Under some circumstances, however, the DNA sample of a known individual 
may be required for prosecution disclosure purposes, which is provided for by the current 
law.610 The CPIA exception permits the sample to be stored beyond the statutory 6 months’ 
period but it must be destroyed after its purpose has been fulfilled. As stated earlier, sensitive 
private information such as health and disease risk can be predicted using DNA sequencing 
technologies.611 This type of analysis requires the original DNA sample and its retention is 
perceived to be disproportionate and unnecessary in the prevention and detection of crime.612  
To maintain public confidence in the temporal retention and proper use of DNA samples, 
there is a need for transparent and accountable oversight. An effective audit system must be 
established to prevent the misapplication of the CPIA rule by police forces. Access to 
retained DNA samples should be restricted to vetted officers and sufficient information 
about governance, the number of samples held, and use should be in the public domain.  
The final challenge with PoFA implementation was volunteer sampling and samples. 
Volunteer DNA data plays a crucial role in investigative work. It can be used to detect 
contamination or eliminate people who are unlikely to be suspected in a case such as victims, 
relatives or friends.  The sensitivity of the DNA sample calls for restrictive access and 
adequate protection against misuse. Although new policy guidance consistent with PoFA is 
being developed, there is a need for clear statutory regulations informed by public debate 
and consultation with stakeholders. This is important because volunteer data can be 
subjected to the same treatment as arrestees – including speculative and familial searching. 
                                                 
610 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s 146. 
611 Hans Lehrach, ‘DNA Sequencing Methods in Human Genetics and Disease Research’ (2013) 5 
F1000Prime Reports; Børsting and Morling (n 200). 
612 Krimsky and Simoncelli (n 62); Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, Establishing Best Practice for 
Forensic DNA Databases (n 88). 
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3.4.3 Risks and emerging issues 
Though there is limited information to justify the retention of DNA material of unconvicted 
individuals, it is known that some individuals within this category may be actual offenders 
or may commit crime in the future.613 This is also true, however, for the entire population 
who are presumed innocent. Preliminary studies by Pease614 and Tseloni and Pease615 show 
subsequent re-arrest and conviction among unconvicted individuals. The re-arrest rate is 
estimated to be at the same rate as that of individuals cautioned or given non-custodial 
sentences – approximately 52% within 6 years.616 Whilst the reliability of this statistic has 
been questioned,617 both preliminary studies suggest that discretionary retention of DNA 
data from unconvicted individuals based on the seriousness of offence or age may diminish 
crime detection efforts. These conclusions are consistent with the assertion of the Biometrics 
Commissioner that some crimes may go undetected or fail to be prevented because not all 
arrestee data are subjected to indefinite retention. These views, coupled with the introduction 
of the VA route, suggest that the PoFA regime may be slightly skewed towards individual 
privacy rights and there is a need for careful consideration of the competing public interests. 
This consideration is also important because extended retention is mainly considered for 
serious offences.  
Regarding the ethical issues associated with the re-sampling arrest of individuals with 
foreign convictions, the new Policing and Crime Act 2017618 permits indefinite retention of 
material taken from an unrelated arrest. The scope of sampling has also been expanded to 
include all offences equivalent to a recordable offence under English and Welsh law. These 
changes are on par with individuals convicted of recordable crimes in England and Wales. 
It may be safe to assume that the public security risks associated with non-retention of the 
biometric material of this category of individuals will be mitigated by including their DNA 
data in the NDNAD.  
Another important emerging issue identified in the analysis was the contention surrounding 
the future benefits of retention, particularly for domestic violence offences. There is extant 
                                                 
613 Wallace (n 591). 
614 Pease (n 63). 
615 Tseloni and Pease (n 63). 
616 Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: Science and Public Protection (n 47). 
617 McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets’ (n 44). 
618 Policing and Crime Act 2017. 
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research that establishes the heterogeneity of offences committed by individual offenders.619 
Though retention may not be beneficial to a domestic offence investigation involving the 
same victim, retention may be valuable to other offences, such as, stranger rape. Indirectly, 
DNA retention may have a ‘secondary’ deterrence effect on the NFA-ed arrestee of a 
domestic offence. This means the value of data retention should be carefully weighed to 
prevent any possible public security risks. 
Clearly, the restrictions of PoFA may limit the intelligence-gathering efforts of the police. 
There should be adequate guidance and statutory rules on the use of unlawful matches to 
avoid the public security concerns and legal challenges encountered previously under the 
restrictive regime.620 The question remains, if an unlawful match is obtained and the DNA 
link is the only evidence that can progress a case, should it be acted upon? What should be 
the procedure under such circumstances? As pointed out by the Biometrics Commissioner, 
current police practice may be contrary to the law. However, there may be circumstances 
whereby an unlawful match may be the only investigative lead in an unsolved crime. These 
factors should be carefully considered in striking the right balance between public and 
private interests.  
In the Government’s response to the 2015 annual report of the Biometrics Commissioner, it 
was indicated that Parliament would consider a legislative instrument expanding the list of 
qualifying offences by the end of 2016. 621  It is not clear what other offences may be 
considered apart from those suggested by the Commissioner. It appears that the opportunity 
to expand the list may widen the inclusion criteria and facilitate database expansion. It is 
highly recommended that the core principles and relevant factors applied by the 
Commissioner, including the relevance of DNA and the potential crime reduction or 
detection value of retention, are considered. The Government’s response also stated that new 
guidance would be issued to resolve the issue of retaining DNA data after a match without 
arrest.  
Finally, the analysis identified limited statutory regulation for ‘new’ genetic technologies 
that are not specifically covered by PoFA. It appears that Y-STR profiling and databasing 
                                                 
619 Leary and Pease (n 63); Michael Townsley, Chloe Smith and Ken Pease, ‘Using DNA to Catch Offenders 
Quicker: Serious Detections Arising from Criminal Justice Samples.’ (2006) 2 Genomics, Society and Policy 
28; Tseloni and Pease (n 63). 
620 See Attorney General’s Reference No. 3 of 1999 (n 274); R v Weir (n 273). 
621 Brandon Lewis, ‘Response to the Biometrics Commissioner’s Annual Report 2015’ (12 September 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/response-to-the-biometrics-commissioners-annual-report-
2015> accessed 16 March 2017. 
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are being applied, though under strict regulation, without dedicated legislation or 
comprehensive public consultation and debate. In a review of the legislative framework 
governing the NDNAD and the Netherlands DNA database, Toom622 concluded that the 
‘Dutch model’ of dedicated legislation to genetic technology implementation offers civil 
rights advantages over the English and Welsh model of technology implementation to 
‘legislative fixes’. This is consistent with recent recommendations by the Forensic Genetics 
Policy Initiative.623  The inclusion of privacy rules in legislation and from the onset of 
establishing genetic databases is perceived to be easier than its introduction after establishing 
the database.624 To avoid the historical legal challenges associated with the NDNAD, the 
Dutch model should be considered for new genetic technologies. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The document analysis reviewed a total of 14 reports of the two independent statutory 
authorities (FIND Strategy Board and the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner) and an 
independent non-statutory advisory public body (NDNAD Ethics Group) specifically tasked 
with the oversight of the NDNAD. The purpose of the document analysis was to identify the 
benefits, challenges, risks and emerging issues associated with the implementation of the 
new PoFA regime for the NDNAD. The review indicated that the regime may have improved 
the match output of the database, with a current match rate of 66%. Compared to previous 
regimes, it appears the composition of the database under the PoFA regime may be more 
representative of the active criminal population and the regime may improve the crime-
solving capacity of the database. Additionally, the new regime has strengthened the genetic 
privacy protection of UK citizens, particularly the genetic privacy of the innocent. This 
benefit may improve public confidence in the operation of the database. The implementation 
challenges identified ranges from the PNC configuration, legal and procedural issues to 
sufficient understanding of the requirements of PoFA by police forces.  The analysis showed 
that some ‘retainable’ profiles have been deleted and this may potentially diminish crime 
detection or reduction and raise public security concerns. In addition, some DNA data have 
been unlawfully retained and the current police practice permits the use of unlawful matches 
for intelligence purposes. This policy may lead to privacy issues and challenges in court. 
                                                 
622 Toom (n 62). 
623 Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, Establishing Best Practice for Forensic DNA Databases (n 88). 
624 Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, Establishing Best Practice for Forensic DNA Databases (n 88). 
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Although limited in scope, the analysis advances the literature on the global evolution of 
forensic DNA database policy. The review shows that the current law in the UK could 
potentially improve the effectiveness of forensic DNA databases whilst complying with 
human rights law. The challenges identified, however, suggest that there may be a significant 
gap between the law and implementation. Overall, the analysis emphasises the need for 
comparative empirical research to demonstrate the efficacy of forensic DNA databases. 
Systematic and objective research is vital because this analysis focused on reports of 
government bodies and there is a possibility of framing or reporting bias. The crucial areas 
to consider include the perception of the public (as potential subjects and beneficiaries of 
DNA sampling) and stakeholders directly involved in the operation and use of the database, 
and the impact of different retention criteria and retention lengths on the performance or 
effectiveness of the database. This may help establish adequate public security and human 
rights standards for the NDNAD and potentially forensic biometric databases worldwide.  
 112 
 
Chapter 4: Efficacy of forensic DNA retention regimes: a 
literature review 
4.1 Introduction 
Forensic DNA retention practices are suspected to be disproportionate.625 This concern has 
arisen primarily because of the limited statistical evidence to prove the effectiveness of DNA 
databases or to justify DNA data retention, particularly data of the innocent. 626  Other 
concerns noted in the literature include poor engagement of the public in the development 
of DNA legislation;627 diminishing returns on the expansion of DNA databases;628 and poor 
consideration of good practices in ethics and principles of justice.629  
The scarcity of empirical evidence on the efficacy of forensic DNA retention regimes and 
the value of DNA retention has been highlighted by several authors.630 Empirical research is 
relevant because it can assist policymakers to make evidence-based decisions on retention 
policies and establish appropriate safeguards to protect private and public interests. The 
annual reports of the Biometrics Commissioner have emphasised the need for rigorous 
research into the effectiveness of the current semi-restrictive regime in England and 
Wales.631 It is thought that this will ‘inform policymakers and others as to the effectiveness 
and proportionality of that new regime and as to whether the relevant “lines” have been 
drawn in the right place’.632 
This review assessed the existing body of original research on the efficacy/effectiveness of 
different retention regimes, focussing primarily upon the NDNAD. The analysis was carried 
                                                 
625 McCartney, ‘Forensic DNA Sampling and the England and Wales National DNA Database’ (n 62); Robin 
Williams and Paul Johnson, ‘Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Intrusiveness: Issues in the Developing Uses of 
DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations’ (2005) 33 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 545; 
Wallace (n 591); McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets’ (n 44); Toom (n 62); 
Blakemore and Blake (n 107); MPA Civil Liberties Panel (n 40). 
626 McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (n 14); Bieber (n 89); MPA 
Civil Liberties Panel (n 40); S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44). 
627 McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets’ (n 44); Wallace (n 591); Bieber (n 89); 
Blakemore and Blake (n 107). 
628 Wallace (n 591); Wallace and others (n 107); Santos, Machado and Silva (n 29); Krimsky and Simoncelli 
(n 62). 
629 McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets’ (n 44). 
630 Anika Ludwig and Jim Fraser, ‘Effective Use of Forensic Science in Volume Crime Investigations: 
Identifying Recurring Themes in the Literature’ (2014) 54 Science & Justice 81; Santos, Machado and Silva 
(n 29); Walsh, Curran and Buckleton (n 12); Simon J Walsh and others, ‘Comparing the Growth and 
Effectiveness of Forensic DNA Databases’ (2008) 1 Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement 
Series 667. 
631 Wiles, Annual Report 2018: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 115). 
632 MacGregor, Annual Report 2014: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 76). 
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out to inform the direction of this present research. The specific aims of the review were: (1) 
to establish existing knowledge on the efficacy of the NDNAD retention regimes; (2) to 
identify methods or research approaches that have been used to assess the efficacy of the 
different regimes; (3) to identify key performance indicators for measuring the efficacy of 
forensic DNA retention regimes; and (4) to identify research gaps on the efficacy of NDNAD 
retention regimes. 
4.2 Literature review method 
The two methods of conducting literature reviews are narrative and systematic. 633  The 
former is mainly focused on a critical synthesis of the ‘best evidence’ on a defined topic. Its 
major limitation is the lack of a robust methodology for searching and analysing literature 
sources. This is superseded by the systematic review method which employs replicable and 
transparent procedures in searching the literature, and an audit trail of the entire review 
process.634 Due to this enhanced objectivity, narrative reviews currently employ elements of 
the systematic review.635 A systematic review that combines and summarises the results of 
quantitative studies is referred to as a meta-analysis.636 Some of the practical disadvantages 
of systematic reviews include bias in the selection of databases and decisions on 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. Further, the method involves rigid processes that may be time-
consuming and labour intensive.637 In this research, the narrative review was chosen as the 
most appropriate method due to its analysis and reporting flexibility.638 To reduce bias in the 
selection and analysis of literature sources, the general process of the systematic review was 
adopted (Figure 4.1).639  
A scoping review for the PhD research was initially conducted in 2017. The narrative review, 
herein, was carried out in June 2019 to update and revise the earlier version. Firstly, 
keywords were generated from the research topic and specific research aims. These were 
                                                 
633 Bryman (n 312). 
634 David Tranfield, David Denyer and Palminder Smart, ‘Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence-
Informed Management Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review’ (2003) 14 British Journal of 
Management 207. 
635 Bryman (n 312); Bart N Green, Claire D Johnson and Alan Adams, ‘Writing Narrative Literature Reviews 
for Peer-Reviewed Journals: Secrets of the Trade’ (2006) 5 Journal of Chiropractic Medicine 101. 
636 Bryman (n 312). 
637 Bryman (n 312). 
638 Bryman (n 312). 
639 David Moher, ‘Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA 
Statement’ (2009) 151 Annals of Internal Medicine 264; Ann T Gregory and A Robert Denniss, ‘An 
Introduction to Writing Narrative and Systematic Reviews — Tasks, Tips and Traps for Aspiring Authors’ 
(2018) 27 Heart, Lung and Circulation 893. 
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used to identify publications from four electronic research databases: HeinOnline, Web of 
Science™, PubMed and the SAGE. The research topic lies at the interface between law and 
science; thus, it was necessary to search both legal and non-legal databases to identify 
relevant literature. The database search was limited to peer-reviewed and primary research 
published in English between January 1995 and June 2019. This ensured that the research 
was not too broad and unwieldy. The inclusion criteria covered publications worldwide. The 
global context was considered because the issues of forensic DNA databasing applies to all 
jurisdictions in the world, and the England and Wales system has had a strong influence on 
the development of legislation worldwide. Literature primarily focused on Medical or 
Clinical DNA Databases, DNA biobanks, Population DNA Databases and Wildlife DNA 
databases were excluded because they are outside the scope of the research. Publications 
with no original and empirical research content were also excluded from the analysis. 
 
Figure 4.1 - Literature review process 
4.2.1 Keywords, search terms or phrases for database search 
The defined keywords and search terms presented in Appendix II were used to search and 
identify relevant literature from the four research databases. To narrow down the number of 
hits in the databases and identify the most relevant literature, parenthesis, Boolean and 
phrase searching operators (‘AND’, ‘OR’ and quotation marks (“”)) were used.640 Where 
‘AND’ is used, the relevant literature includes both the keywords and/or terms. The operator 
‘OR’ is used to identify literature containing closely related keywords or terms. Search terms 
or phrases in quotation marks are considered as a phrase and the relevant hits include all the 
words in the quotation. The search results from the databases were first exported into citation 
management software for further screening. The initial search in HeinOnline returned many 
hits and additional filters were added to narrow down the search. The filters selected were 
                                                 
640 Renata Phelps, Kath Fisher and Allan Ellis, Organizing and Managing Your Research (SAGE 
Publications, Ltd 2007). 
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‘Articles’, ‘Science and Technology’, ‘Criminal law and procedures’ and ‘Evidence’. During 
the eligibility analysis, the titles of the hits were screened first, followed by the abstracts and 
full text for inclusion. A non-systematic search was also carried out to identify other 
publications that were missed in the database search. This was carried out to minimise 
publication bias, ensure a rigorous literature review and an accurate representation of 
existing literature. The non-systematic approach involved screening of the references of the 
included publications, and research network referrals.  
4.3 Literature review results and discussion 
A total of 738 publications were identified from the database search. The SAGE database 
returned the highest number of hits (n = 325).  The results for the remaining databases were 
279 for HeinOnline, 116 for PubMed and 18 for Web of Science™. Figure 4.2 shows the 
screening process for the included articles. A total of 698 publications were screened after 
excluding duplicates. Seventeen primary research relevant to the topic were identified from 
the database search. Forty-seven additional research publications and grey literature were 
identified from the non-systematic search. The 64 publications were critically analysed 
under three general areas based on the nature/type of research: 1. Public perspective studies; 





Figure 4.2 - Flow chart for the selection of included literature 
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4.3.1 Public perspectives about forensic DNA database retention regimes641 
Discourses about national forensic DNA databases are limited in the public domain.642 The 
dissemination of information regarding the actual effectiveness of these databases is also 
inadequate and public views are suspected to be influenced by the media and fictional 
investigative television programs (CSI effect).643 Public perspectives about DNA retention 
can help policy-makers develop publicly acceptable and proportionate legislative regimes 
for national DNA databases. The views of the public can also inform the development, use 
and governance of the database.644 Lastly, public views can shape the design of public 
education programmes on forensic biometrics and databases. Several empirical studies 
(quantitative and qualitative) in this area have been carried out in the UK and different 
national contexts to fill this lacuna. Table 4.1 summarises the publications included in this 
section and their research focus.  
                                                 
641 An earlier version of this section is published in Science and Justice: Amankwaa AO, ‘Forensic DNA 
Retention: Public Perspective Studies in the United Kingdom and around the World’ (2018) 58 Science & 
Justice 455 
642 McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets’ (n 44); Cate Curtis, ‘Public 
Understandings of the Forensic Use of DNA: Positivity, Misunderstandings, and Cultural Concerns’ (2014) 
34 Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 21; Cate Curtis, ‘Public Perceptions and Expectations of the 
Forensic Use of DNA: Results of a Preliminary Study’ (2009) 29 Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 
313. 
643 Teodorović and others (n 122); Curtis, ‘Public Understandings of the Forensic Use of DNA’ (n 642); 
MPA Civil Liberties Panel (n 40). 
644 Robin Williams and Matthias Wienroth, Public Perspectives on Established and Emerging Forensic 
Genetics Technologies in Europe (EUROFORGEN-NoE 2014) 
<https://www.euroforgen.eu/fileadmin/websites/euroforgen/images/Dissemination_Documents/WP4/William
s_and_Wienroth_-_2014_-_Public_perspectives.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017. 
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Table 4.1 - Characteristics of primary studies assessing views on DNA databasing (n = 30) Cont’d 
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4.3.1.1 Public perspective studies in the United Kingdom 
Effectiveness of DNA databases 
Analysis of existing views on the effectiveness of the UK NDNAD shows mixed attitudes 
among stakeholders. Through qualitative interviews, McCartney 645  investigated the 
perspectives of 14 criminal justice professionals and policymakers about the effectiveness 
of the UK DNA expansion programme and retention regimes. Two types of view emerged 
from the study, which can be described as utility and pragmatic views. These attitudes are 
represented in other qualitative studies.646 Those who hold the ‘utility view’ perceive the 
NDNAD to be an effective tool in solving cold cases and generating intelligence. Further, it 
is thought that the retention of DNA samples allows authorities to upgrade the NDNAD 
when new technology (for example massively parallel sequencing647) becomes available, 
thus, justifying the need for the retention of DNA samples and profiles. For those who hold 
the ‘pragmatic view’, it is thought that the NDNAD is not always useful because not all cases 
involve DNA. Some of these express views supporting ‘no conviction, no retention’. Further, 
they share concerns about overreliance on DNA and the NDNAD and its associated risk of 
abbreviating police detective work. It is also thought that the deterrence effect of the 
NDNAD is debatable because offenders change their ‘modus operandi’. Supported by a 
review of the literature and DNA detection rates, McCartney648  concluded that a large 
database may not be effective in detecting crime. Given that retention of DNA from innocent 
individuals may constitute an infringement on privacy, the study emphasised the need for 
further investigation into the impact of DNA retention policy (and the NDNAD) on crime 
detection. 
Inclusion and retention criteria for DNA databases 
In 2000, MORI Social Research649 investigated the attitudes of a random sample of the 
British public (n = 1038) towards human genetics information.  The quantitative survey was 
                                                 
645 McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (n 14); McCartney, Forensic 
Identification and Criminal Justice: Forensic Science, Justice and Risk (n 42). 
646 Robin Williams and Paul Johnson, ‘“Wonderment and Dread”: Representations of DNA in Ethical 
Disputes about Forensic DNA Databases’ (2004) 23 New Genetics and Society 205; John Downey, Mike 
Stephens and Jan Flaherty, ‘The “Sluice-Gate” Public Sphere and the National DNA Database in the UK’ 
(2012) 34 Media, Culture & Society 439; Nina Amelung and Helena Machado, ‘Affected for Good or for 
Evil: The Formation of Issue-Publics That Relate to the UK National DNA Database’ (2019) 28 Public 
Understanding of Science 590. 
647 Parson and others (n 200). 
648 McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (n 14). 




sponsored by the HGC. With regards to forensic DNA information, most interviewees 
favoured sampling of individuals charged with murder (98%), sexual crimes (98%), and 
burglary (68%). Whilst 48% of the study participants supported the destruction/deletion of 
DNA records of those acquitted, 46% thought that the records should be retained. The 
remaining 6% answered ‘don’t know’. The results generally suggest strong support for an 
NDNAD inclusion and retention criteria covering criminals. 
Between November 2006 and January 2007, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics650 conducted 
a consultation about the use of forensic bioinformation in the UK. The consultation received 
135 responses from individuals (76%) and organisations (24%) within the law enforcement, 
prosecutorial and human rights community and the public. Citing the assumption of 
‘innocent until proven guilty’, there was considerable support for ‘no conviction, no 
retention’ of DNA records, favouring a database of criminals. Many respondents, however, 
thought that absent conviction, retention of arrestee or volunteer DNA should be based on 
informed consent. Some respondents justified the retention of all or some arrestees’ data or 
that of the entire population by citing public security reasons. Another reason in support of 
a UDNAD was equity. For convicted individuals, the range of opinions included indefinite 
retention for all, retention based on re-offending history, and type/seriousness of crime. 
Among those who favoured retention for convicted children, some thought that the retention 
period should be proportionate to the crime. Those who opposed retention for young children 
convicted of minor crimes cited the adverse impact it may have on their development.  
The HGC651 again assessed the views of the British public on DNA retention policy through 
a Citizen’s Inquiry in 2008. The panel was composed of a generally diverse group of 25-30 
UK citizens from Birmingham and Glasgow. Drawing from the outcomes of several inquiry 
sessions with experts, and visits to policy-makers and communities, the panel made 29 
recommendations regarding the operation of the NDNAD. Concerning themes related to 
DNA retention policy, most participants opposed a UDNAD, favoured the exclusion of DNA 
profiles of the innocent and supported the destruction of all DNA samples after profiling. 
Most panellists recommended that retention length for convicted individuals should be 
‘discriminatory’ based on the seriousness of the offence. Also, retention (short or long-term 
based on offence seriousness) should apply irrespective of age.  One critical theme that 
                                                 
650 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (n 45). 
651 Human Genetics Commission, Citizens’ Inquiry into the Forensic Use of DNA and the National DNA 
Database: Citizens’ Report (Human Genetics Commission 2008). 
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emerged from the inquiry is the lack of adequate information about the NDNAD and 
differences in opinion between criminal justice professionals and other members of the 
public.  
In 2009, the UK government published a consultation document652 in response to the Marper 
decision. The document detailed a new DNA retention policy, which was incorporated in the 
Crime and Security Act 2010 (s. 14, repealed). The consultation received 503 responses from 
the public including 402 individuals.653 There was strong support for the destruction of all 
DNA samples after profiling. This policy was perceived to balance public interest and civil 
liberties. However, criminal justice professionals expressed utility views and were 
concerned that this policy may adversely affect the ability of the police to solve cold cases. 
Most respondents favoured the non-retention of DNA profiles for all unconvicted arrestees. 
Some respondents, however, supported the proposal to temporarily store data of individuals 
arrested for a serious offence (ranging from 3 – 14 years). For convicted individuals, most 
respondents favoured indefinite retention of DNA profiles irrespective of the seriousness of 
the offence. However, some expressed concern that this policy is disproportionate, and that 
the seriousness of offence and length of sentence should be considered. Respondents 
supported the deletion of DNA profiles of all children below the criminal responsibility age 
(10 years). For children aged 10 to 18, respondents supported a maximum of 10 years’ 
retention if not convicted and indefinite if convicted. There were criticisms of the 
insufficiency of data available on the efficacy or effectiveness of the NDNAD. This suggests 
that the views of the public on DNA retention policy may be limited by the lack of adequate 
evidence. 
In June 2011, the MPACLP produced a report on public perspectives about the National 
DNA Database. 654  The report was informed by a legal and policy review, public and 
stakeholder consultations, and an online survey of a cross-section of Londoners (n = 615). 
Most respondents to the online survey (84%) were against the retention of DNA from 
arrestees absent a conviction. Participants also expressed concern about the lack of 
justification for retaining DNA records of non-convicted individuals. Among the reasons 
                                                 
652 Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: Science and Public Protection (n 47). 
653 Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: Summary of Responses (Home Office 
2009) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100418065544/http:/www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons
-2009-dna-database/cons-2009-dna-response2835.pdf%3Fview%3DBinary> accessed 3 June 2017. 
654 MPA Civil Liberties Panel (n 40). 
 123 
 
cited was the disproportionality between the high numbers of ‘innocent’ DNA records 
retained relative to the low number ‘NDNAD match’ convictions.  
The consultation with stakeholders and selected citizens highlighted the following reasons 
in support of retention of arrestee DNA records: future detection of serious crime (such as, 
sexual assault); the concept of ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’; and the speeding up of the 
investigative process due to rapid elimination of the innocent. Reasons for non-retention of 
arrestee DNA records were the criminalization of the innocent, disproportionate 
representation of ethnic groups and distrust of the data retention procedure and use of DNA 
records. Like the HGC Citizen’s Inquiry and the Government’s consultation, the report 
emphasised significant differences in opinion between criminal justice professionals, and 
individuals subjected to sampling/retention and human rights advocates. The former group 
supported indefinite or long-term retention of all arrestee data whilst the latter favoured 
temporal or non-retention of arrestee DNA records. The conflict between the different 
groups is attributed to the limited statistical evidence to justify the retention/non-retention 
and periods of retention of DNA records of different categories of individuals. 
Ethical positions about DNA databasing 
Williams and Johnson655 assessed the views of 60 primary stakeholders of the NDNAD 
including human rights advocates using a semi-structured interview approach. Some 
respondents expressed concern about the potential phenotypic and behavioural predictions 
of DNA, and its excessive surveillance power through familial searching, for example. They 
thought that DNA databasing/databanking should be limited because of the ‘genetic 
exceptionalism’ of DNA information. Other interviewees thought that the forensic DNA 
profile derived from the sample has limited predictive power (genomic minimalism). Hence, 
there should be little concern about privacy and civil liberties. This latter group of 
interviewees were those who supported the expansion of the database to include either 
convicted individuals and suspects or the entire population.  There were views in support of 
the destruction of DNA samples after profiling. The ethical positions above have been 
identified in other studies.656   
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Anderson et al.657 assessed the views of young offenders in South Wales about the National 
DNA Database in 2008. The study used a qualitative citizen’s jury model among the 
participants (n = 84, aged 12-19 years). The focus group discussion that informed the Mock 
Trial found a strong level of support for the establishment of a UDNAD. In the mock trial, 
however, the young offenders (12) that served as the jury returned a verdict that disfavoured 
the establishment of a UDNAD due to cost, a threat to civil liberties, inability to achieve 
universality, and diminishing of the presumption of innocence principle (‘Practical and due 
process’ ethical position). The initial outcome of the focus group discussion (i.e. support for 
UDNAD) was attributed to potential stigmatisation or discrimination of young people who 
have their data retained on a more restricted database. 
The analysis of public perspective studies carried out in the UK indicates that the current 
semi-restrictive regime (i.e. the PoFA regime and/or the ‘Scottish model’) is broadly 
representative of the recommendations of the public. However, there are several research 
gaps in the literature. Firstly, there is limited quantitative data on ‘perceived effectiveness’ 
of the NDNAD regimes among the public and stakeholders. Secondly, considering the 
NDNAD public education gap, it is difficult to ascertain whether existing public views are 
well informed. Thirdly, most studies feature a non-representative sample of the British 
population and therefore it is difficult to generalise the findings. Finally, the qualitative 
studies suggest conflicting views among criminal justice professionals and other members 
of the public. This indicates a need to investigate the current views of the public and 
stakeholders following the implementation of PoFA, as well as the actual effectiveness of 
the NDNAD regimes.  This will help establish the relevant categories of individuals and 
appropriate retention periods to improve the performance and management of the database. 
4.3.1.2 Other public perspective studies around the world 
Effectiveness of DNA databases 
There are limited studies on the ‘perceived effectiveness’ of national DNA databases 
globally.658 In countries where quantitative survey data is available, DNA databases are 
thought to be effective in solving crime, supporting the utility view: 78.2 – 88.5% in 
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Portugal,659  67.2% in Serbia,660 and 80.2% in South Korea661. National DNA databases are 
also perceived to be effective in deterring or preventing crime: 74.3% in South Korea and 
47.9% in Portugal.662 Additionally, other studies indicate strong support for the use of DNA, 
national DNA databases or genealogy databases in fighting crime: 88.7% in Switzerland,663 
94 - 97% in New Zealand,664 and 79% in the United States of America665. 
Inclusion and retention criteria for DNA databases 
Like the results of studies completed in the UK, there appears to be strong support for a 
database of criminals in other jurisdictions.666  Views on the retention period for DNA 
records or profiles appears mixed, and there is considerable opposition to the retention of 
data from the innocent. An international study by Wertz (2002) (as cited in Curtis667) 
surveyed the views of 4868 geneticists, general practitioners and patients about forensic 
DNA typing and databasing. Most participants favoured a sampling regime capturing 
convicted sex offenders (95%), convicts of serious offences (89%), those charged with 
sexual (79%) or serious offences (71%). An inclusion criterion covering such ‘convicted 
serious offenders’ and suspects is supported in South Korea (89.2%).668 Wertz also found 
that ‘indefinite DNA retention’ was supported by 90% and 55% of participants for those 
convicted and charged, respectively. Most participants opposed the DNA typing of the 
innocent. 
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In the United States, Dundes669 surveyed 416 residents of Maryland using a convenience 
sampling approach in 1999. The study found strong support for a DNA database of 
‘convicted individuals’ and some suspects. This ranged from convicted violent offenders’ 
(89%), convicted felons’ (77%), all convicted offenders’ (65%) and suspects of violent 
offences (65%). Most respondents opposed DNA retention for suspects of any crime (56%) 
and all newborns (55%). It was found that most participants who supported capital 
punishment (75%) or unrestricted means to solve crime (80%) favoured retention for 
convicted violent offenders. Dundes670 concluded that an expanded DNA database may be 
valuable to crime-fighting. However, there should be appropriate safeguards to prevent 
misuse of the database.  
Gamero et al.671 investigated public awareness of DNA databases in a representative sample 
(n = 1654) of the Spanish population in 2003. The study used a random sampling approach 
to recruit interviewees. Most participants (86.9%) were aware of the usefulness of DNA 
typing in a criminal investigation. This varied by level of education: 81.7%, 87.2%, 90.3%, 
and 66.7% for those with primary, secondary, higher and no formal education, respectively. 
Non-consensual DNA sampling was supported by most participants for accused individuals 
(54.99%) or in cold cases (79.87%). There was strong support for a ‘recidivistic violent 
offenders’ DNA database (RVOD)’ (79.9%), ‘convicted offender’s DNA database’ (72.0%), 
and volunteers’ DNA database (65%). When stratified by profession, participants in the law 
enforcement field were more supportive of RVOD, regardless of the type of offence 
(between 55% – 60%). About six out of ten participants (57.4%) opposed databasing of all 
citizens’ DNA records without consent. Regarding the length of retention, most participants 
(52.1%) favoured DNA retention ‘until the death of the subject’. This retention period is also 
favoured among surveyed South Koreans (79.5%) for convicted serious/violent offenders.672  
In New Zealand, Curtis673 researched the views and expectations of the public about the 
forensic use of DNA in 2009. A random sample of 100 participants was interviewed via 
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telephone. There was a significant support for a database of ‘convicted individuals, suspects 
and arrestees’: convicted sexual offenders (100%), convicted violent offenders (93%), all 
convicted offenders (65%), suspects of sexual offences (75%), suspects of violent offences 
(61%), arrestees of sexual offences (62%), and arrestees of violent offences (52%). More 
than half of respondents opposed retention for arrestees or suspects of any crime and a 
UDNAD. Indefinite DNA retention was supported by 74% of participants. Eighty-one 
percent of respondents were willing to volunteer their DNA records when requested by the 
police. Most respondents (63%) expressed concerns about privacy. It is worth mentioning 
that the main source of DNA information within this population was the media and the author 
identified limited knowledge about DNA analysis and databasing processes. Even though 
the study was representative, the small sample size limits the generalizability of the results.  
Opinion of prisoners 
Like the general population, prisoners also share views of restricting DNA databases to 
criminals or individuals who have had contact with the criminal justice system. In Austria, 
Prainsack and Kitzberger674 interviewed 26 prisoners to ascertain their knowledge and views 
about forensic DNA technology in 2006 and 2007. Most interviewees thought the use of 
DNA is effective in solving crime or eliminating the ‘usual’ suspects in a criminal inquiry. 
The main source of DNA information in this population was the media or television 
programs. Many participants expressed concern about the potential abuse of DNA databases, 
breach of privacy and the possibility of ‘planting’ evidence. Most interviewees opposed the 
establishment of a UDNAD or retention of DNA records from the innocent. Although 
participants noted the potential stigma associated with DNA retention, the study did not 
explicitly address how long data should be stored on databases for different categories of 
individuals.   
In Portugal, Machado et al.675  assessed the views of 31 prisoners about forensic DNA 
databases using a qualitative semi-structured interview approach.  The study was conducted 
in 2009. Most interviewees supported the indefinite retention of DNA records of convicted 
individuals. This view was influenced by the possibility of exonerating wrongly convicted 
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individuals or eliminating the usual suspects using DNA records held on the database. Some 
participants supported the establishment of a UDNAD for similar reasons and the possibility 
to neutralise discrimination or stigmatisation of ex-convicts. The expansion of DNA 
databases to include records of all convicted individuals was supported by other 
interviewees. Like the Austrian study, there were concerns about the potential misuse of 
retained DNA records.  
Voluntary participation in DNA databases 
Machado and Silva676 in 2012 focused on the willingness of a non-representative sample (n 
= 628) of Portuguese citizens to accept the inclusion of their DNA profile in the DNA 
database. Voluntary participation was accepted by 46.5% respondents and this decreased 
significantly with age (p < 0.001) and education (p = 0.011). Most respondents (53.5%) 
answered ‘perhaps’ (30.3%) or would not accept (23.2%). The perception of the DNA 
database as a criminal database was the main influence of non-acceptance (59.6%) to 
volunteer DNA records. Acceptance was mainly influenced by the belief in the idea of 
‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ (18.2%), the utility of databases (20.9%) and UDNAD 
(23.3%). Similar results have also been found in Italy677 (35% acceptance, n = 959) and 
Switzerland678 (34% acceptance, n = 284) among a non-probability sample of university 
students and the general public, respectively. The Switzerland study found that acceptance 
was significantly more likely among women and participants with no university education 
(all p < 0.001).679  
In the Portuguese study, Machado and Silva680 categorised the data by profession (Law 
enforcement (n = 63), health and life sciences (n = 32), research and development (n = 160), 
and other professionals (n = 203)) to assess the perceived benefits and risks of forensic DNA 
database practices. Most participants agreed on the crime-solving efficiency (88.5%) and 
judicial efficiency (78.2%) of forensic DNA databases. However, there appeared to be 
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scepticism about the crime prevention and deterrence effect (47.9%) of databases. The risks 
agreed by the professional group were data insecurity (72.8%), misuse of DNA data (67%), 
stigmatisation (34.9%) and genetic discrimination (25.3%) in descending order.  
Machado and Silva681 also analysed the open-ended questions in the survey to determine the 
motivations for voluntary participation in DNA databases. The study found that voluntary 
participation is motivated by solidarity, altruism and civic responsibility to contribute to 
public protection; resistance to participation is influenced by privacy intrusiveness, misuse 
of DNA data and fear of potential genetic discrimination; non-participation is motivated by 
the idea that only criminals should have their data retained, stigmatization of database 
subjects, and lack of direct benefits of databases.  These reasons have also been identified in 
subsequent surveys.682 A limitation of these studies, however, is the use of non-probability 
sampling which limits the generalisation of the results. Secondly, the findings may be 
attributed to potential media or academic influence on the subject rather than actual 
experience or exposure to the DNA database system. 
In contrast with the above studies, Curtis683 investigated the understanding of a generally 
representative random sample (n = 394) of New Zealand citizens about the forensic use of 
DNA and databasing practices in 2014. Although participants had limited knowledge about 
forensic DNA databasing practices, the majority believed in the crime-solving capacity of 
forensic DNA (93.9%) and would be willing to volunteer their DNA data (75.8%).  Further, 
most participants considered the use of DNA to be relevant in serious crimes such as major 
assault (72.2%) and sexual offences (85.5%). Ethical concerns agreed by most respondents 
included privacy issues (51.4%), errors (66.9%) and ‘planting’ of DNA (57.8%).  
In summary, the available survey results suggest a mixed perspective about voluntary 
participation in DNA databases. The common themes in these studies are participation on 
grounds of contributing to public security and non-participation for privacy reasons and 
distrust of the databasing system.   
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Views of criminal justice professionals versus other members of the public 
In Serbia, Teodorović et al.684 assessed the views of a non-representative sample (n = 558) 
of the Serbian public regarding forensic DNA database practices in 2016. A questionnaire 
was used to survey the general public (n = 162), prosecutors (n = 169), prisoners (n = 156), 
student police officers (n = 51), and prison guards (n = 20). The study found that users of the 
database favoured permissive rules whilst subjects preferred restrictive rules. This 
observation is consistent with the findings of several public perspective studies in the UK.685 
Most respondents (57.9%) supported inclusion criteria including DNA records of either 
convicted individuals (16.1%); convicted and suspected individuals (24.2%); or convicts, 
suspects and volunteers (17.6%). A UDNAD was supported by 34.9% of the population. For 
convicted individuals, 96.3% of respondents favoured retention for those either convicted of 
serious crimes (29.1%), all crimes (41.9%) or all crimes and offences (25.3%). About half 
of respondents (51.6%) preferred indefinite DNA retention (general public (38.9%), 
prosecutors (61.5%), prisoners (56.4%), prison guards (60%), and student police officers 
(41.2%)). The second favoured option was retention until the death of the subject (37.1%). 
For suspects, 36.9% were in favour of inclusion for any crime and 33.3% for only serious 
offences. More than half of each subpopulation preferred indefinite retention whilst 33.9% 
favoured retention until acquittal. Close to half of respondents (47%) indicated concern 
about the privacy intrusiveness of DNA databases. However, a large proportion of 
participants in the prosecutors’ category (51.5%) indicated no concern about the violation of 
privacy.  
In summary, the public perspective studies emphasise the value placed upon the ability of 
forensic DNA databases to solve crime. The outcome of studies conducted in the UK and 
other jurisdictions show considerable public support for the retention of DNA from convicts, 
suspects and potentially all arrestees and the entire population, which is most likely 
predicated upon the belief that the database has crime-solving abilities, which they rate 
highly. There is clear evidence of privacy concerns and the potential misuse of DNA records 
among the public, with a significant number opposing the retention of DNA from the 
innocent. This calls for well-informed public engagement by authorities to assure the public 
of the safeguards established for DNA databases. This is important because it appears public 
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opinion is mainly influenced by the media and television programs rather than facts of the 
system being implemented. 
While studies of public perspectives are relevant in developing appropriate retention 
policies, these studies do not address the actual value of DNA retention to public security. 
Further, there is a scarcity of such studies among a representative sample of primary 
stakeholders who are well-informed about the subject area and are directly exposed to the 
benefits, challenges and risks associated with DNA databasing. There is a need for research 
into the effectiveness rating of the different NDNAD or forensic DNA database retention 
regimes among stakeholders. This will help establish whether the relevant safeguards have 
been put in place to protect both public security and private interests. In England and Wales, 
the recommended stakeholders include all Police Forces, Police Authorities, FSPs, managers 
of the database, prosecution services, human rights committees and advocates and others 
with a direct interest in the use and operation of the database. To fill the identified research 
gap, this project sought to survey the views of these stakeholders and the current views of 
the general public. 
4.3.2 Evaluative research on DNA and database outputs and outcomes686 
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the included studies that have assessed the outputs and 
outcomes of using forensic DNA evidence and national DNA databases. Three groups of 
studies related to database performance or efficiency have been carried out. The first 
analyzes the overall contribution or value of DNA evidence and/or DNA databases to the 
detection of crime. These studies point to the marginal significance of DNA evidence and/or 
databases in crime detection or clearance overall. The second group of studies examine the 
impact of DNA evidence and/or the DNA database on crime detection or prevention 
compared to crimes that do not involve DNA. This group of studies show that crimes, where 
DNA evidence is available, are more likely to result in a detection or case resolution. Finally, 
the third group of studies consider defining statistical models to systematically evaluate the 
performance and efficiency of DNA databases. Only crude estimates of performance or 
effectiveness can be determined with the current models available. 
                                                 
686 An earlier version of this section is published in Forensic Science International: Synergy: Amankwaa AO 
and McCartney C, ‘The Effectiveness of the UK National DNA Database’ (2019) 1 Forensic Science 
International: Synergy 45 
 132 
 




 Table 4.2 - Primary studies assessing the outputs and outcomes of forensic DNA evidence and databases (n = 29) Cont’d 
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A number of the included studies assessed the intelligence function of DNA databases and 
its relevance in criminological research. These highlighted several regime-independent 
factors that may limit DNA databases in achieving their public security goals, such as, the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of crime. Walsh et al.687 showed that 
low DNA submission and load success rates limit the performance of DNA databases. The 
study examined the DNA submission, analytical and match rate trend for the New Zealand 
DPD. Between 1996 and 2001, the reference sample submission (RSS) rate of most NZ 
Police Districts (8/12) was below 5.8 per 1000 population. The crime sample submission 
(CSS) rate for most Police Districts (7/12) was also below 1 per 1000 population between 
1999 and 2001. Over 80% of CSS were related to property crime whilst 12% were related to 
violent crime. Low RSS and CSS were associated with low match rate, indicating a decrease 
in the crime-solving potential of the DNA databank. The analytical trend showed that not all 
CSS get loaded on the database and load success is dependent on evidence type with blood 
and semen yielding rates of 72.5% and 72.4%, respectively. Interestingly, property crimes, 
such as burglary (where the recovery of blood and semen is rare), were found to return higher 
match rates than violent crime, such as sexual assault. This was attributed to the high volume 
of property crime submissions. Overall, the study suggests that pre-loading challenges limit 
the effectiveness of DNA databases, regardless of the retention regime being implemented.  
Using data from the Dutch DNA Database, Lammers and Bernasco688 demonstrated that, 
though DNA databases can link crimes to identify serial offenders, their effectiveness may 
be limited by inadequate sharing of investigative information by police forces. The study 
tested the chance of arrest between 2132 identified and 2282 unidentified serial offenders in 
relation to their geographical mobility. The probability of arrest was found to be inversely 
related to the geographical spread of crime locations. This observation was attributed to the 
inadequate collaboration between different police jurisdictions. Similar studies that utilise 
data from forensic DNA databases and crime records have identified ‘unknown accomplice 
networks’ and ‘serial offending patterns’, which reinforce the importance of cross-
jurisdictional collaboration in resolving and preventing crime. 689  This post-loading/hit 
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challenge suggests that irrespective of the type of retention regime, the public security 
outcomes of DNA databases may not be fully realised.  
Other regime-independent factors that limit the effectiveness of DNA databases are detailed 
in review studies. These include investigative and prosecutorial problems, and victim, 
witness or suspect issues.690 The first includes the probative value of the DNA hit in a case. 
Although the match establishes the presence of an individual at a crime scene, it does not 
always directly establish criminality, except in cases of sexual assaults of minors. Another 
challenge is the prioritisation of cases which may lead to delays in the follow-up of DNA 
hits by detectives or ‘DNA hit cases” by prosecutors. Finally, other corroborative evidence 
may be lacking to prosecute a case. The victim, witness or suspect issues may include decline 
to pursue a case by victims or witnesses; the death of victims, witnesses or suspects; and 
inability to trace individuals linked to a crime.  
Despite the limitations of DNA database efficiency, there are several isolated cases of its 
investigative value. However, systematic evidence of its total value to crime-fighting is 
lacking. This gap is linked to the minimal demand for the evaluation of DNA databases or 
difficulties in assessing efficacy due to inconsistency in data collection, unavailability of 
data and/or defined effectiveness metrics/models.691 The three groups of studies on or related 
to database performance or effectiveness are considered below. 
4.3.2.1 Contribution of DNA evidence and/or DNA databases 
Burrows and Tarling692 investigated the contribution of forensic evidence including DNA in 
the detection of property crime (burglary and vehicle crime). The study used data available 
from the Home Office ‘Pathfinder Project’ (June 2000 – May 2001) that focussed on two 
police forces, Greater Manchester Police and Lancashire Constabulary. Additional 
information from Morgan Harris Burrows’ evaluation of the DNA Expansion Programme 
was also included in the analysis.  Of approximately 1.8 million property crimes committed 
every year, it was estimated that 612,000 (34%) are visited by crime scene investigators. 
                                                 
(2016) 29 Security Journal 584; Marre Lammers, ‘Are Arrested and Non-Arrested Serial Offenders 
Different? A Test of Spatial Offending Patterns Using DNA Found at Crime Scenes’ (2014) 51 Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency 143; Marre Lammers, Wim Bernasco and Henk Elffers, ‘How Long Do 
Offenders Escape Arrest? Using DNA Traces to Analyse When Serial Offenders Are Caught’ (2012) 9 
Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 13. 
690 Bieber (n 89); Gabriel, Boland and Holt (n 12). 
691 Walsh, Curran and Buckleton (n 12). 
692 J Burrows and R Tarling, ‘Measuring the Impact of Forensic Science in Detecting Burglary and 
Autocrime Offences’ (2004) 44 Science & Justice 217. 
 136 
 
Approximately 18% (110,040) of visited scenes yield DNA (either SGM+ (6%) or LCN 
DNA (12%)). The profiling success of the crime scene DNA was found to be 60% for SGM+ 
DNA and 18% for LCN DNA. The match rate for SGM+ DNA was 73.3% whilst LCN DNA 
was 66.7%. Overall, 4% of visited scenes led to suspect identification using DNA 
matches/hits. It was estimated that approximately 10% of property crimes are detected by 
the police and the contribution of forensic evidence (both fingerprints and DNA) is about 
33.3%. The sole contribution of DNA and/or the NDNAD to the clear-up rates was not 
estimated.  Nevertheless, the study shows that though DNA evidence appears to play a 
crucial role in property crime, its overall contribution seems to be very low compared to 
other crime-fighting approaches. This observation is also reported by early reviews in the 
US693 and more recent comments in the UK694 about the aggregate value of forensic DNA 
and/or forensic science in general. The implication of this is a need to ensure value for 
investment in the creation and use of DNA databases. 
Like the results of Burrows and Tarling,695 other reviews focused on property and serious 
crimes have found a low contribution of databases in resolving all crime. In England and 
Wales, the estimated contribution was found to be ~1% for property crimes as of 
2002/2003696 and 15.10% for all murders in 2009/2010697. The property crime review relied 
on publicly available data on the potential number of DNA-related convictions versus the 
number of reported property crimes as of 2002/2003. The murder crime study was based on 
the opinion of Senior Investigating Officers [84]. In the Kennemerland police region of the 
Netherlands, Mapes et al. 698  found that the national DNA database contributed to the 
resolution of 1% and 3% of property crimes and serious crimes (such as murder and sexual 
assaults), respectively. This study utilised data from forensic reports in 2011.  
Briody and Prenzler699 examined the potential effect of DNA databases on property crime 
levels in New South Wales, Australia. The evaluation report of the Vendas Police operation 
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in 2002/2003 was analysed. There was no significant reduction in property crime levels 
before and after the implementation of improved forensic biometric capabilities (DNA and 
fingerprints). A mixed picture was also observed by Dunsmuir et al.700 about the impact of 
DNA database growth on the resolution of violent and property crimes in New South Wales 
from 1995 to 2007. Using police and court data, the study observed positive, zero and 
negative impacts on clear up, charge and conviction rates depending on the type of offence. 
These studies suggest that the realisation of criminal justice or policing outcomes may be 
complex.  
In the United States, Wells et al.701 found that only 1 out of 104 CODIS hits proceeded to 
charge in untested sexual assault kits (SAK). The study examined 491 kits from the Houston 
Police Department (HPD) and hit outcomes were assessed via interviews rather than actual 
follow up of cases. A previous study of 259 cases from the HPD found that only 3% of 
unsubmitted SAKs were useful following testing.702 The above trend has been attributed to 
post-hit challenges and regime independent factors such as lack of cooperation by victims 
and instances where DNA evidence is of no value to the investigation.703 In one study that 
assessed the impact of the law (Texas Senate Bill 1636) facilitating testing of untested SAKs, 
no significant impact on case outcomes was observed.704 The trend of low impact of DNA 
evidence (including use of databases) has also been observed in burglary cases in the United 
States: ≤ 0.3% in 1263 incidents across five jurisdictions in 2003.705 In this study, Baskin 
and Sommers 706  found that witness statements are relatively better predictors of case 
outcomes than forensic evidence in general. 
Whilst the findings from the above studies are crude estimates and based on ‘old’ DNA 
analysis methodologies, they are generally consistent with previous reports and the current 
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outlook of the UK NDNAD as a ‘marginal’ contributor to the resolution of all crime.707 The 
findings generally suggest that DNA evidence and databases should be considered 
‘auxiliary’ in achieving overall public security goals rather than a principal instrument in 
policing or delivering justice.708 Further, the literature indicates that DNA and databases are 
more useful in solving specific types of cases and may have a potential impact in cases 
involving offenders of certain characteristics.709 It is imperative that evaluative studies on 
the actual effectiveness of databases and its regimes are carried out to identify characteristic 
patterns in the applicable cases. This will ensure that databases are cost-effective and focused 
to assist the police. 
4.3.2.2 Comparison of cases involving DNA and cases without DNA 
DNA hit outcomes are favoured above performance metrics, such as, hit/match rates and/or 
the number of investigations aided.710 Studies that have compared the outcome of criminal 
cases involving DNA evidence and cases without DNA were also included in this review to 
gain insight into the potential impact DNA hits could have on cases. In Australia, the work 
of Briody711 assessed the effects of DNA evidence in selected sexual, homicide and property 
crime cases from 1994 to 2001. The Australian NCIDD was established in April 2001.712 
The selected cases were those in which DNA testing was used for confirmation of the 
involvement/identity of already identified or charged suspects. Data were analysed using a 
control-comparison approach to compare: 102 sexual offences with DNA to 98 cases without 
DNA;713 100 property crimes with DNA to 100 non-DNA cases;714 and 75 homicide DNA 
cases versus 75 non-DNA cases715. In all three types of cases, it was found that those 
involving DNA are more likely to reach court than non-DNA cases. DNA evidence was 
associated with more guilty pleas in property offences but not sexual crimes and homicides. 
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Sexual offence cases with DNA evidence were associated with more guilty verdicts by a 
jury, and more and longer custodial sentencing. The three studies suggest that coupled with 
a well-targeted and effectively utilised national DNA database, the judicial outcomes of 
sexual and property crimes and homicides could be improved. 
In a similar prospective randomized study in the US, property crime cases involving DNA 
analysis/CODIS hit was associated with an increase in suspect identification, arrest rate and 
prosecution rate.716 The study analysed a total of 2,160 cases between 2005 and 2007 in five 
cities in the US. Biological evidence was recovered from all the cases included in the study. 
The cases were randomly assigned into two groups: treatment group (DNA analysis group: 
n = 1,079) and control group (traditional investigation group (including fingerprint analysis): 
n = 1,081). Suspect identification, arrest rate and prosecution rate were higher in the 
treatment group (31%, 21.9% and 19.3%, respectively) than the control group (12.8%, 
10.1% and 8.1% respectively).717 These findings were consistent with that of Briody718, 
demonstrating the potential value DNA data retention could have on crime resolution. 
Further analysis of the cost-effectiveness of ‘DNA-assisted arrests’ revealed an average cost 
of ~$14,000 across the different states.719 According to the authors, this cost was higher than 
traditional investigation such as fingerprint analysis. Hence, though DNA may be effective 
in resolving crime, investment in DNA databases should be limited to those crimes where 
DNA is useful. Further, there should be consideration of the availability of resources for 
other policing work.   
Lastly, Cross et al.720 researched the impact of DNA on arrest in sexual offences. The study 
reviewed 528 cases from Massachusetts between 2008 and 2010. It was found that DNA 
could have been influential in only 8 cases where arrests occurred near to the time or after 
laboratory results were provided. This shows that the value of DNA profiling and databasing 
depends on when a profile or match is produced and what influence it can then have through 
the justice process. If a profile is generated more quickly and/or immediately loaded on the 
database, suspects may be identified and processed speedily using DNA evidence (i.e. in 
such DNA-related cases where the identity of the offender is unknown). In this regard, the 
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introduction of rapid DNA testing may be useful in enhancing the potential of databases.721 
However, as shown in this study, the police may use alternative means to identify and 
subsequently arrest suspects. These alternative measures may be more effective than DNA 
profiling and databasing combined. Hence, the outcome of DNA analysis and databases may 
be low. 722  There is limited information on how DNA databasing compares with DNA 
profiling alone (i.e. without the use of the database) and other detective resources.723 Such 
analysis is relevant because it will inform policy decisions on the investment and scope of 
DNA profiling and databasing. 
Cross et al.724 also compared the bulk of cases (91.5%) where the arrest occurred before 
DNA results and the DNA-related arrests. It was found that DNA arrest cases were more 
likely to link to other crimes on CODIS to identify serial offenders. Though limited in the 
number of cases, this study suggests that retaining DNA data from sexual crimes may be 
relevant.  
4.3.2.3 Models to evaluate the performance/effectiveness of DNA databases 
Gabriel et al.725 developed three performance metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of DNA 
databases: 1) Significance of a database hit; 2) case progression and judicial resolution; 3) 
potential reduction of future criminal activity. These three metrics were tested using 198 
DNA cold hits obtained by the San Francisco Police Department, USA, from 2001 to 2006. 
For the first metric, the study found that 90% of DNA hits aided police investigations 
including the identification of offenders. Approximately 40% of the cold hits reached 
judicial resolution including conviction, guilty plea or parole revocation. About 28% of the 
cases were still under investigation or yet to be tried in court. It was expected that the 
progress of pending cases could lead to ~70% judicial resolution. When broken down by 
offence type, the potential case progression/judicial resolution rate for sexual cases (n = 110) 
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was ~50%, homicide (n = 24) was ~91%, burglary (n = 42) was 88% and other crimes was 
40%.   
For the third performance metric, the criminal history of 12 recidivistic sex felons was 
analysed. On average, each felon committed ~25 offences including serious and minor 
offences. The average for sexual offences was ~4 per individual. Compared to published 
data indicating an average of 8 throughout the criminal career of serial sex offenders,726 the 
authors estimated that more than 40 offences could be prevented by DNA databasing through 
its incapacitation effect. However, it was found that the proportion of offences committed 
by the 12 felons before (51%) and after (49%) the introduction of the CODIS national DNA 
database in 1998 was roughly similar. This suggests that the recidivistic behaviour of 
offenders may inhibit the crime reduction ability of DNA databases. For example, 45% of 
sexual crimes were committed during probationary periods of the felons. The authors noted 
that though DNA databases may interrupt criminal activity for a short period, recidivism 
may limit its full public security potential. An expansive inclusion/retention regime may, 
however, increase the periods of incapacitation of serial offenders through frequent detection 
and conviction. 
Walsh et al.727 also developed and tested two DNA database performance metrics: Match/hit 
rate (HR – crime-to-person matches per crime scene profiles loaded) and ‘return index’ (RI 
– total number of matches (NH) per total number of profiles (NS). The two metrics were 
tested using publicly available data from the UK NDNAD, CODIS NDIS (USA), California 
SDIS and the Canadian National DNA Databank (NDD-Canada) prior to 2008. Initially, the 
growth in the size of the databases was analysed. The UK NDNAD, CODIS NDIS and SDIS 
were found to fit a quadratic model with positive changes in growth linked to 
government/state policy (the DNA Expansion Programme (UK), President’s DNA Initiative 
(USA), and Proposition 69 (California)). The growth of the Canadian NDD was found to 
closely fit a linear model, demonstrating consistency in sampling/retention regime. The RI 
and HR were found to be independent of database size, with no correlations observed. This 
refutes the hypothesis that as the size of the database increases, the match rate increases 
(effectiveness hypothesis).728 Though the study establishes a model to assess effectiveness, 
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the implications of the study are limited by the source of data used, the differences in what 
counts as a hit, and lack of detail about the characteristics of the databases examined. For 
example, it is not clear whether only ‘cold hits’ were assessed or all hits. If the main purpose 
of a database is to solve cold crimes, assessing all hits (cold and warm) may be inappropriate.  
In 2010, Walsh et al.729 published an inferential model for determining the performance and 
financial efficiency of forensic DNA databases. The performance formula, referred to as the 
return index (RI) is given by RI= 
H
NC
 ; where H is the number of matches/hits, N is the 
number of reference profiles in the database and C is the number of crime scene profiles in 
the database. The variable H is given by the formula: H =  
αN × ωC
M
 ; where α refers to the 
average fraction of active offenders in the database, ω refers to the average fraction of actual 
offender crime samples, M is the proportion of active offenders from the population. The RI 
model was tested using publicly available data from the UK NDNAD, the USA CODIS 
NDIS and the Canadian NDD. A plot of H versus NC found that the number of matches 
initially increases with the product of the number of reference and crime scene profiles, but 
plateaus over time.  The reasons attributed to this observation include the retirement of active 
criminals and/or incapacitation of offenders making them inactive.  
The DNA Working Group (DWG) of ENFSI730 criticised the Walsh Return Index, noting 
that the model suggests smaller databases are more effective than larger databases. This is 
because the RI is inversely proportional to the size of the database (NC). The ENFSI 
Working Group proposed two alternative performance metrics. The first metric is H/C – the 
number of matches per number of crime profiles loaded in the database. This formula 
demonstrates the ‘potential’ crime-solving capacity of the database and indicates whether 
the sampling of crime scenes is efficient. It is hypothesised that as the size of the database 
increases, H/C will increase. The second metric is H/N – the number of matches per number 
of reference profiles in the database. This metric shows whether the database is 
representative of the active criminal population and/or irrelevant reference profiles are being 
excluded from the database. A test of the H/N metric on European databases shows that the 
England and Wales NDNAD has the highest value (0.44) as at June 2016.731 This suggests 
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that the NDNAD relatively holds data of the right people and the current PoFA retention 
regime may be more effective than other regimes across Europe.  
In 2013, Santos et al.732 classified the inclusion/retention regime of 22 EU states including 
the UK and assessed their database performances. The study used the H/N metric to evaluate 
performance. Two types of regimes emerged from the analysis: restrictive and expansive 
regimes. The first was generally characterised by limited temporal retention of DNA records 
of suspects and individuals convicted of a serious offence. The expansive regime generally 
allows longer periods of retention and/or indefinite retention for suspects and individuals 
convicted of any crime. The match rate data was extracted from the 2011 report of the ENFSI 
DWG. The then retention regime of England and Wales was expansive, allowing indefinite 
retention of all arrestee DNA data whether convicted or not for a recordable offence. The 
study compared the smaller, restrictive databases with bigger, expansive databases. Using 
the Mann-Whitney test, the study found no statistically significant difference in the median 
H/N between the restrictive (0.095) and expansive (0.100) regimes (p > 0.5). This suggests 
that the type of inclusion/retention regime, and therefore the size of the database, may be 
unrelated to the performance of the database.  
Although Santos et al.733 offer a basis for comparative analysis of national databases, many 
factors affect the performance metric used including variations in the implementation of 
legal systems, the age of the database, previous changes in the law, and differences in 
counting database hits. Moreover, the classification of the legal systems may be too broad 
both within and between the two categories. Further useful analysis to determine the impact 
of the law and the value of DNA retention could be filtering the performance ratio by 
retention category, retention period, and crime type in a single state.734 Though there were 
genuine reasons for using the H/N metric, analysis of the crime-solving match rate – H/C 
could be useful in demonstrating the potential contribution of the database to public security. 
A research programme using both H/C and H/N for different retention regimes, inclusion 
criteria and retention lengths in a single state could offer a new understanding of the potential 
effectiveness of databases.  
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Another model used to assess database effectiveness is the instrument variable (IV) strategy 
developed by Doleac.735 This was used to test the effect of DNA databases on crime in the 
United States.736 Firstly, the study analysed the criminal history of offenders before and after 
DNA expansion in 7 states. The probability of re-convicting serious violent and property 
offenders was reduced by 17% and 6%, respectively, within 5 years of expansion.  Secondly, 
the study compared the size of the DNA database to crime rates from 2000 to 2010. The 
growth of the database was associated with 7-45% and 5-35% decrease in violent and 
property crimes, respectively. Analysis of the cost-effectiveness of using DNA databases to 
investigate serious offences showed lower marginal cost than other alternative crime-
fighting measures (<$600 vs $7,600 (longer sentences) or $26,300-$62,500 (police 
officers)). The results of this study were consistent with a similar study by Doleac et al.737 
that assessed the effectiveness of the Denmark DNA Database (DDD). An expansion of the 
DDD in 2005 was associated with a subsequent reduction in recidivism rate by 26% within 
5 years and an increase in crime detection by 0.09 crimes. In comparison, Bhati and 
Roman738 found mixed results across different types of offences, with only robbery and 
burglary showing 2-3% reduction in reoffending risk. This research used a multiple clock 
model to study prisoners released in Florida from 1996 to 2004. The above statistical 
evaluations suggest that the effects of DNA databases are not straightforward.  
The IV strategy was also used by Doleac739 to test the cross-state effect of DNA database 
policies in the USA. The study compared DNA database size and crime rates among states. 
It was found that an increase in the total size of databases in external states increases violent 
(0.0001) and property (0.0003) crime rates in the reference state (p < 0.05). Also, an increase 
in the size of a nearby state's database (< 500 miles) increases violent (0.0011) and property 
(0.0063) crime rates (p < 0.01). A similar trend was observed when the total profiles of 
external states were weighted by distance. Expansion of a nearby state database (100 miles) 
results in higher violent (0.0012 versus 0.00004) and property (0.0042 versus 0.00004) crime 
rates than far away states (3000 miles). It was hypothesised that expansive DNA database 
policies in one state lead to the migration of criminals whilst restrictive policies draw in 
criminals. An alternative effect is that the former lead to incapacitation or deterrence of crime 
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thereby reducing crime across states. The results of the study demonstrated a negative cross-
state effect. It was recommended that to limit the migration of criminals, states must ensure 
equivalence in DNA database policy.  
In summary, the statistical models demonstrate that expansive DNA databases could reduce 
crime rates and limit criminal activity. However, the results should be interpreted cautiously 
since the data relied upon were estimates – which may not be representative of the actual 
effects of DNA databases. Secondly, there are many confounders associated with criminal 
activity and crime rates in a specific state including age, gender, family structure, cultural 
context, educational level of residents, alternative law enforcement resources, employment 
and other crime-reduction policies (such as long custodial sentences and rehabilitation 
initiatives). These factors were not accounted for in the studies. Moreover, the usefulness of 
DNA and databases apply to a small proportion of all crimes as noted in section 4.3.2.1.  
Overall, evidence from the database performance/effectiveness studies suggests that the 
aggregate contribution of DNA databases to crime may be negligible though it appears they 
may offer better criminal justice outcomes, such as high detection or conviction rates in 
specific types of offences. Secondly, models developed to assess the effectiveness of DNA 
databases only provide estimates that may not reflect actual effectiveness. Other studies also 
suggest that the expected performance of DNA databases may be difficult to achieve due to 
several implementation or operational factors. Therefore, considering the privacy issues 
associated with DNA retention, the central question that emerges is whose DNA data should 
be retained? And how long should the data be stored? In the absence of adequate systematic 
data, this research sought to address this question by assessing public and stakeholder views 
about the retention regime governing the NDNAD. The next section considers available 
criminal career research inquiries into the above question. 
4.3.3 Criminal career research: justification for forensic DNA retention 
A summary of the studies included in this section is presented in Table 4.3. All the studies 
were conducted in the UK and sought to understand the appropriate inclusion and retention 
criteria for DNA databases based on patterns in arrest or conviction history. The 2009 Home 
Office 740  consultation document on forensic biometric retention was supported by 
preliminary empirical evidence on recidivism rate and criminal career research authored by 
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Pease.741 The study analysed Metropolitan Police Service data of individuals arrested on 1st 
June of 2004, 2005 and 2006 in London (a total of 532 cases). The inclusion criteria were 
arrestees who had been subjected to DNA sampling. The recidivism (re-arrest) rate period 
was up to a maximum of 4.5 years after DNA sampling. Comparison of recidivism rate 
among arrestees with NFA entry, those cautioned and individuals with noncustodial 
convictions showed no significant difference. The recidivism rate for violent crime was 59%, 
63% and 64%, respectively. This result appears to suggest that deletion of NFA-arrestee 
DNA data may be detrimental to crime detection. 
Table 4.3 - Summary of criminal career research to understand appropriate retention regimes for the 
National DNA Database (n = 5) 
 
In 2011, a separate study of similar data source and characteristics was also published by 
Tseloni and Pease.742 The total number of cases in the study was 599. This showed similar 
results with the previous analysis. The re-offending rate for violent offence was 65% for 
NFA-arrestees, 64% for cautions and 60% for non-custodial conviction. The extended 
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analysis in the second study showed that the recidivistic group were significantly younger 
than the non-recidivistic group (p < 0.001). There was also no significant difference in 
recidivism rate when the data considered the seriousness of offence and age of NFA-
arrestees. The results generally indicate that deleting data of non-serious crime arrestees 
(required under PoFA regime) or deletion based on age may adversely affect public 
protection. On the other hand, the results may support the deletion of DNA records of all 
NFA-arrestees regardless of the seriousness of offence. This may be considered as a privacy-
enhancing approach. 
The 2009 Home Office analysis also utilised evidence from the Cambridge study on residual 
career length (RCL) and the residual number of offences (RNO) to assess criminal career 
patterns.743 The risk curve showed that re-offending is relatively high within a period of 15-
years and declines after a maximum period of 24-years. Detailed and further analysis is 
provided in a separate study published in 2011 by Kazemian et al.744 The study aimed to 
propose a criminal career research approach to predict appropriate DNA retention periods 
for national DNA databases.  
Kazemian et al.745 utilized data of 170 convicted individuals extracted from the Cambridge 
Study in Delinquent Development (CSDD). The initial offence types of the study group were 
either serious or non-serious crime. The research focused on the number of subsequent 
DNA-related crimes committed by the group over time. It was assumed that the subsequent 
crimes represent the number of possible undetectable crimes due to non-retention of DNA 
data. It was found that ~72% (n = 269 of 374) and 63% (n = 237/374) of subsequent crimes 
could be undetectable if DNA data was destroyed after one and two years, respectively. A 
steady decrease in residual offences was observed until 15 years, after which the rate 
normalizes. The maximum limit of the subsequent offence was 25 years after initial 
conviction. This evidence seems to support lengthy but temporal retention periods for 
convicted individuals. When the data was filtered by age group, the juvenile group had a 
higher residual offence than the adult group for all hypothetical retention lengths, levelling 
off after 15 years. The percentage of residual offences were 41%, 19%, 7%, and 5% for 
minor theft, serious theft, crimes against the person, and other offences, respectively, if DNA 
data was deleted after one year. This was observed for all hypothetical retention periods.  In 
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general, the results are consistent with that of Tseloni and Pease746 which demonstrate that 
deletion of DNA data based on offence seriousness or age may have a negative impact on 
crime detection.  
While relevant, the criminal career research approach utilized in the Home Office747 policy 
offer weak evidential support for the retention of DNA data. This is due to the assumption 
that the subsequent crimes would have been detected or solved using DNA hits. There is a 
need for direct measurement of the value of retaining DNA data from different groups of 
individuals and the impact of different retention periods. 
Another Home Office study by the Economics and Resource Analysis Group748 provides a 
detailed analysis of the first re-arrest rate among NFA arrestees compared to the general 
population. The study focused on 17, 238 individuals arrested in April 2006. A total of 6,748 
(39%) were re-arrested within the monitoring period (May 2006 – 1 August 2009). The study 
extrapolated the re-arrest risk among the study population beyond the 3.25 years’ mark to 8 
years. The hazard risk curve showed that the reoffending rate (i.e. re-arrest rate) is higher 
than the general population within a period of six years. The risk was found to decrease from 
year 1 to year 6 at which point it intersects with the estimated HR for the general population 
(5%). Though there is a high level of uncertainty and potential inaccuracies in the statistical 
model used, the research appears to support a retention period of six years for NFA arrestees. 
Consideration of the reoffending rate among juveniles showed that they demonstrate a higher 
risk than adults and the general population. In summary, the findings of the study are 
consistent with the results of other criminal career research. However, the results are 
unreliable in estimating appropriate retention periods for DNA data due to the study 
assumptions.  
As detailed in the study and the methodological review by Houlding and Wilson,749 the 
proxy used to measure recidivism (i.e. re-arrest) is not representative of re-offending in the 
study population. The initial spikes in re-arrest may be impacted by arrests due to violations 
of bail rather than separate offences.750 Secondly, the arrests may not be associated with 
intelligence generated from a match on the NDNAD. Thirdly, the statistical model assumes 
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that, compared to the NFA group, the arrest rate in the general population is constant and 
independent of time, which may be inaccurate.751 Further, the general population and the 
NFA-arrestee groups are made up of subgroups which may have different hazard risks. 
Lastly, the model does not consider the impact of socio-economic factors, such as education 
level on re-arrest or re-offending rates.  
Finally, in 2011, the Crime and Policing Analysis Unit (CPA)752 of the Home Office also 
researched the risk of recidivism among individuals arrested for a serious offence, those 
charged with a serious offence, and convicted individuals. The study compared the hazard 
risks among the different groups to the general population. The goal of the study was to 
provide evidence justifying the retention lengths under the ‘Scottish Retention Model’. 
Using data from the Police National Computer, the study estimated ‘hazard rate curves’ for 
the different retention categories. The study found that, following an initial arrest or charge, 
the hazard rate for the arrestee or charged group approximately decreases to the level of the 
general population (~4% per annum) within a minimum of 3 years. This shows that a 
minimum of 3-year retention period for arrestees or charged individuals may be beneficial 
to crime detection.  
The hazard rate was found to be higher among individuals charged with a serious crime 
(4.3%) than those charged with a non-serious crime (2.6%) after four years of the initial 
charge. The arrestee group did not demonstrate any difference in hazard rate by the 
seriousness of the offence. The hazard rate for individuals issued with a fixed penalty notice 
was comparable to that of the arrestee or charged group. However, a lower hazard rate was 
observed when compared to convicted individuals. The hazard rate at four years was 
comparable for individuals with a first caution and those with a first non-custodial 
conviction. Those with a second caution and/or noncustodial conviction had a higher hazard 
rate than those with a first caution or non-custodial sentence. When the hazard rate was 
filtered by age, juveniles demonstrated a higher risk than adults in all comparisons. 
Generally, the results of this study are consistent with the findings and conclusions of the 
other criminal career research. 
Although the CPA analysis provides useful indications of appropriate retention lengths, the 
study is limited by the characteristics of the general population used as a control for 
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comparison purposes. The limitations of the hazard risk model detailed by Houlding and 
Wilson753 also applies to this research. Another critical limitation is that no statistical tests 
of significance were applied in the comparisons. Lastly, the study does not offer information 
about the actual value of retaining DNA data for different retention categories and retention 
lengths.  
In summary, the reliance on criminal career research to generate evidence to support DNA 
data retention is unsatisfactory. The statistical approach is not based on sound statistical 
assumptions and inferences drawn from such studies may be inaccurate.754 There is a need 
to measure the crime detection value of retaining DNA data for different individuals included 
in the NDNAD and determine appropriate retention periods.  
4.3.4 Metrics for the assessment of the efficacy of retention regimes 
Analysis of the literature and reviews into the effectiveness of DNA databases reveal seven 
important indicators for assessing the efficacy of NDNAD retention regimes: (1) the ability 
of the database to assist criminal justice officials in case resolution (crime-solving capacity); 
(2) the ability of the database to reduce crime through incapacitation of offenders 
(incapacitation effect); (3) the preventative potential of the database through deterrence of 
individuals from committing crime (deterrence effect); (4) protection of the civil liberty 
rights of individuals (privacy protection); (5) compliance of the regime to the proportionality 
principle; (6) the time and non-monetary resource input required to implement the regime 
(implementation efficiency); and (7) the financial input required to implement the regime 
(implementation cost).755  
One of the most important outcomes of the NDNAD is case resolution. Indeed, the statutory 
purposes of the database include assistance to the police in solving/resolving crime.756 An 
increase in conviction is often perceived as the measure of the case resolution success of the 
NDNAD. However, it encompasses the contribution of DNA cold hits to the identification 
or elimination of suspects, linking of different crimes, the conviction of offenders, and 
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saving time and resources of the criminal justice process.757 Bieber758 details four broad 
reasons why conviction may not be an accurate measure of the success of databases: 
variation in the treatment of DNA hits; failure/inability of individuals to testify; time; and 
problems associated with the trial or evidentiary criteria. Besides these challenges, it is also 
difficult to determine whether a DNA hit was the sole predictor of conviction since it is often 
considered with other corroborative evidence in court.759 In the present study, the indicator 
‘crime-solving capacity’ was tested among the stakeholder participants in the survey project. 
This measure was defined broadly as the ability of the database to assist criminal justice 
officials including the police and prosecutors to solve crime.  
The lengthy and/or frequent incapacitation of offenders through imprisonment or other 
incapacitation disposals is perceived to reduce crime rates. 760  The impact of the 
incapacitation effect of DNA databases has been measured indirectly by some authors by 
assessing crime rates.761 However, it is not clear whether the retention of DNA data and its 
downstream incapacitation effect can lead to a significant reduction in crime. Most criminal 
justice disposals are very short or do not involve incapacitation. With the high rate of 
recidivism among convicted individuals, it is more likely for crime rates to increase. Besides 
the fact that not all crimes are detected or reported, available statistics on crime rates are 
crude estimates and may not adequately reflect the success of DNA databases.762 Further, 
crime rates are impacted by several socio-economic factors. Although the incapacitation 
effect may be a weak indicator of the success of DNA databases, it generally demonstrates 
its potential effectiveness towards crime reduction. Many serious crime offenders have been 
identified using the DNA database and their subsequent ‘lengthy’ incapacitation will prevent 
some crimes. This indicator should, therefore, be considered in assessing the efficacy of 
retention regimes.  
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The deterrence effect of DNA databases has been measured indirectly by Doleac.763 Several 
reviews have also emphasized this indicator in assessing the success of DNA databasing.764 
Empirical evidence to adequately prove the deterrence effect of DNA databases is currently 
lacking. Some critics of this indicator are of the view that it may be difficult or impossible 
to prove this effect due to several confounding variables that impact on deterrence.765 
Currently, proposed research methods to estimate deterrence effect include measurement of 
perceived deterrence among first-time arrestees and convicted individuals and assessment of 
criminal records.766 The comparison of the different groups may help determine whether the 
retention of DNA data can modify individual behaviour positively or prevent criminality. 
Preliminary studies of this nature indicate that DNA retention may have the potential to deter 
crime and previous offenders are likely to demonstrate subsequent ‘good’ behaviour.767 
Nevertheless, the HGC768 indicates that recidivistic offenders may not be deterred by the 
retention of their DNA data. Rather, they may change their modus operandi to prevent being 
caught or move to a different jurisdiction where they may not be caught. Moreover, 
offending may be spontaneous or unplanned. Like the incapacitation effect, the deterrence 
effect of DNA databases may be a weak indicator of success. However, given that much 
emphasis has been given to this hypothetical benefit of databases, the deterrence effect 
should also be examined in assessing the efficacy of DNA databasing.  
Several studies have discussed issues related to the genetic privacy protection of retention 
regimes.769 The retention of DNA data of innocent individuals has been the challenge in 
most court cases about DNA databasing practices. The review clearly shows that an effective 
DNA database regime must be lawful and ethical. A database’s public protection goals in 
solving/resolving, reducing or preventing crime must be balanced with the human rights of 
individuals. In the UK, the principal right in question is the right to privacy (Article 8 of the 
Convention) as emphasised at the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords and the ECHR in the 
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Marper decisions.770 Hence, a true measure of the efficacy of DNA retention regimes must 
include how well it protects the genetic privacy of individuals and its proportionality to 
public security interests. These indicators should, therefore, be considered in assessing the 
success of DNA databasing.  
Finally, the time, effort and cost of implementing the DNA retention regime must be justified 
to demonstrate its efficacy. The implementation of the current PoFA regime has involved 
the establishment of the Office of the Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric 
Material, destruction of DNA records, introduction of DNA retention assessment 
procedures, changes in IT infrastructure, DNA retention compliance checks, changes in 
DNA retention practices, establishment of Biometric Retention Units, and education of 
relevant stakeholders.771 These changes mean that more time and effort is now required to 
operate the NDNAD. The annual budget for the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner is 
approximately £300,000.772  This budget is likely to increase with the expansion of the 
Commissioner’s functions to cover DNA retention compliance checks. In addition to direct 
and indirect costs of running the NDNAD (including sampling and processing of DNA), new 
financial costs have been generated with the PoFA regime. It is not yet clear how cost-
effective the new regime is and whether the new roles established are important to DNA 
databasing.  
Assessment of implementation efficiency and implementation cost is important because 
DNA databasing is only one aspect of crime-preventing and justice delivery programmes. 
There are other equally or more important aspects of crime-fighting which must not suffer 
at the expense of DNA databasing. This is particularly important with the limited data to 
convincingly demonstrate the aggregate value of DNA retention. These additional indicators 
should also be considered in assessing the efficacy of DNA database regimes.  
Figure 4.3 summarises a possible conceptual framework about the relationship between the 
identified indicators and the various aspects of DNA databasing, such as the science and 
technology, law, the criminal justice process, legal and ethical concepts. This shows that the 
assessment of effectiveness is important because of its role in shaping the concepts of public 
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security and civil liberties. The perception of NDNAD stakeholders on the efficacy of the 
different retention regimes was tested against the seven effectiveness indicators in the survey 
project. The participants were asked to rank the importance of these indicators and suggest 
any other indicators that are relevant in assessing regime efficacy/effectiveness.  
 
Figure 4.3 - Flow chart showing the relationship between effectiveness and DNA databasing 
4.4 Conclusion 
The literature review shows that the efficacy/effectiveness of forensic DNA retention 
regimes has not been adequately assessed. Consequently, commonly accepted standards for 
forensic DNA data retention are limited. The lack of solid empirical evidence indicates that 
existing retention policies are subjective, and the determination of appropriate retention 
criteria and retention limits is a matter of judgement.773 The findings from this review are 
consistent with the conclusions of previous and current reviews.774 Sociological research 
approaches to assess the value or effectiveness of DNA databases and retention policies 
show significant public support for DNA retention due to the crime-solving potential of 
databases. However, there are concerns about privacy and the proportionality of retention 
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policies. Whilst important, sociological research methods should be complemented with a 
statistical analysis of DNA database output and outcome data. Presently, studies that have 
focused on this latter approach to evaluate the performance or effectiveness of DNA 
databasing only offer crude estimates which do not satisfactorily justify data retention. 
Lastly, findings from criminal career research methods are insufficient in providing evidence 
to determine the characteristics of an effective retention regime. In summary, there is still a 
need to assess the relative value of retaining DNA data from different groups of individuals 
included in the NDNAD and the relative value of different retention periods. A study of this 
nature, supported by current views of the public and relevant stakeholders based on the 
indicators identified from the review, will help establish appropriate standards for forensic 
DNA retention. These standards may also be applicable to other forensic biometric 
databases.   Due to the limitations of collecting systematic data to assess potential and actual 
effectiveness, this research focused on the current views of the public and stakeholders about 
the effectiveness of the NDNAD regime. This study is important because it is 
complementary to the systematic evaluation of databases and serves as a starting point in 
assessing the effectiveness of NDNAD regimes.
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Chapter 5: Public survey on forensic DNA databasing: 
methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The second and third specific aims of this research were to investigate the current views of 
the public about the public security functions of the NDNAD, the inclusion criteria and 
retention periods for forensic DNA records. To achieve these aims, an online survey was 
designed based on the existing knowledge from the literature review.  The survey was pre-
tested and distributed using a non-probability sampling approach. The public survey project 
was approved by the Faculty of Business and Law Ethics Committee, Northumbria 
University (Appendix XVI). This chapter details the methodology for the survey and the 
general characteristics of the study participants. 
5.2 Methodology 
The public survey was carried out from 11 June to 1 October 2018 at the School of Law, 
Northumbria University, UK. The inclusion criteria for the study was all citizens or residents 
of England and Wales aged 18 and above.  The survey link was first distributed via the 
mailing list of the researcher. The survey was also posted on the website of the Chartered 
Society of Forensic Sciences (CSFS) inviting visitors to complete the survey questionnaire. 
Further, friends and colleagues of the researcher were invited to participate in the research 
and circulate the survey among their contacts. The different faculties of Northumbria 
University were also sent the survey link to distribute among staff and students. This required 
organisational consent which was approved (See Appendix IV for organisational consent 
form). A copy of the public survey questionnaire including a cover letter and participant 
consent form is provided in Appendix III. Respondents were required to sign the consent 
form via a tick box as part of the online questionnaire before participating in the study. 
Information collected from the survey respondents was anonymous. 
5.2.1 Survey methodology 
A survey methodology is an approach used to gain insight into the knowledge, attitudes, 
views or behaviours of an entire population. 775  The technique primarily involves the 
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collection of information from a sample of a target population. This is carried out by asking 
respondents the same set of questions systematically.776 It allows qualitative concepts or 
constructs to be transformed into quantitative variables that can be tested using a 
questionnaire and analysed statistically.777 The data collected from surveys can be analysed 
using descriptive statistics and/or inferential statistics to determine the relationship between 
variables. The foundation of the survey methodology is the definition of the concept or 
research question to be assessed, namely, the effectiveness of NDNAD retention regimes. 
This is followed by developing strategies to ensure accurate coverage and sampling of the 
target population, minimize nonresponse, and prevent measurement errors.778 There are two 
main forms of surveys: self-administered questionnaires and interview surveys.779 Examples 
of the former are internet or postal surveys, which do not involve the presence of the 
researcher. Interviews require the presence of the researcher; examples include face-to-face 
or telephone surveys.  
The quality of data collected in surveys is determined by the form used.780 In this study, the 
self-administered survey method was chosen as an appropriate approach for collecting 
information about the views of the public. This approach is relatively simple and cost-
effective to administer to a large group.781 Secondly, the approach minimizes the influence 
of the researcher on the responses of participants, ensuring a level of confidentiality and 
objectivity, and assuring anonymity.782 The absence of the researcher in self-administered 
surveys allows respondents to disclose sensitive information and provide more honest and 
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truthful responses.783 Thirdly, the self-administered survey offers respondents control over 
when and where the questionnaire is completed. 784  Respondents can cross-check their 
responses for accuracy of information.785 The absence of the researcher and high respondent 
control in self-administered surveys ensure that measurement errors are minimized. Lastly, 
the approach allows data to be collected from a relatively large sample made up of a varied 
group of individuals/participants.786  
The question-answering process of the survey method can be challenged by several issues. 
The task of survey respondents includes understanding questions, recalling of relevant 
information, forming an answer/response, formatting the response, and editing the final 
response. 787  This task is affected by the way survey questions are phrased, and the 
characteristics of individuals and the sample population.788 The generalisation of survey 
findings can be limited by these factors. This problem was addressed in this study by 
conducting a pre-test and pilot study prior to administration of the survey instrument.789 
Though self-administered surveys offer data of better quality than interviews, the problem 
of nonresponse is higher than in interviews.790 Strategies to minimize nonresponse include 
attachment of a comprehensive cover letter that encourages response, ensuring that the 
survey instrument is professionally designed, and sending timely reminders to 
respondents.791 
In a study comparing the response rate in Web-based survey (WBS) and Mail-based survey 
(MBS), Saunders792 demonstrated a higher response rate in WBS (49.1%) than in MBS 
(33.5%). However, the quality of data recovered from WBS was lower than in MBS due to 
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partial response or abandonment of the survey. In this study, the WBS was selected as the 
most appropriate mode of data collection because of high internet penetration in the UK.793 
The target population were expected to be IT-literate with reliable and constant access to the 
internet; thus, minimising challenges with the quality of data. Another reason for selecting 
the WBS mode was that it minimises the respondent burden of having to post the completed 
survey questionnaire. In addition to creating a system of reminding participants to complete 
the survey, the WBS strategy can help to reduce nonresponse.794 
5.2.2 Survey design 
5.2.2.1 Questionnaire design 
A set of questions including Likert scales and multiple-choice (MCQ) questions with closed 
and open-ended options were developed based on a review of the literature and the research 
aims. The initial questions were assessed and refined through an iterative process and in-
depth discussions with the researcher’s supervision team and informal consultations with 
academics specialising in forensic science policy research and potential respondents. The 
final research questionnaire consisted of 22 questions: 3 questions related to perceptions of 
the public security functions of the NDNAD; 3 on inclusion criteria; 4 on retention periods; 
3 on volunteer DNA databasing; 1 on additional concerns about retention: and 8 questions 
about demographics and consent.  
The public survey questionnaire (see Appendix III) began with a short cover letter and an 
introduction explaining the purpose of the research and the target population. This was 
followed by detailed research information for participants and a consent form.  Since the 
NDNAD is governed by the laws of England and Wales, a screening question was added to 
restrict participation to citizens or residents of England and Wales. The introductory pages 
also captured a brief definition of a DNA sample and a DNA profile to aid the understanding 
of the questionnaire. This was informed by concerns about the need to clarify the distinction 
between a sample and a profile and the potential information that can be drawn from them.795  
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Writing effective questions in a survey is critical to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
instrument.796 Because the same questions are asked in a survey questionnaire, it is important 
to ensure that respondents understand the questions in the same way. Careful consideration 
was therefore given to the clarity and comprehension of the survey questions. Best practice 
requires that double-barrel questions are avoided (i.e. one question is asked at a time), 
technical and ambiguous terms or concepts are explained, embedded assumptions are 
avoided and where necessary, time frames are specified.797 These strategies were applied to 
ensure equivalence in the understanding of questions and to avoid the possibility of 
respondents guessing responses or providing invalid responses.  
The questionnaire was primarily interested in the views of the public about the effectiveness 
of the NDNAD, the categories of individuals to include in the database and the periods of 
retention for different subject DNA records. The predominant type of questions asked were 
closed questions or rating questions using Likert scales.798 Closed questions, such as the 
Likert questions on the effectiveness of the NDNAD, are designed to limit the number of 
respondent answers. This strategy allows easy coding and analysis of survey data whilst 
maintaining the reliability and validity of the instrument.799  
One disadvantage of closed type questions is that respondents may be limited by the list of 
allowable options or they may not be able to provide a valid answer or answers that truly 
reflect their views, knowledge, attitudes or opinions.800 This may also be a source of item 
nonresponse where respondents are not able to format their response to fit the alternative 
options provided.801 To overcome this limitation, the closed-ended options were designed to 
be as mutually exclusive and exhaustive as possible.802 Additionally, an ‘other’ option was 
included to allow respondents to enter any other answer of their choice that may not have 
                                                 
796 NM Bradburn, S Sudman and B Wansink, Asking Questions: The Definitive Guide to Questionnaire 
Design - for Market Research, Political Polls, and Social and Health Questionnaires (2nd edn, Jossey-Bass 
2004); Fowler and Cosenza (n 787); Schwarz and others (n 788); Groves and others (n 775); Jon A Krosnick 
and Stanley Presser, ‘Question and Questionnaire Design’ in Peter V Marsden and James D Wright (eds), 
Handbook of Survey Research (2nd edn, Emerald Group 2010). 
797 Fowler and Cosenza (n 787); Bradburn, Sudman and Wansink (n 796); P Murray, ‘Fundamental Issues in 
Questionnaire Design’ (1999) 7 Accident and Emergency Nursing 148; Krosnick and Presser (n 796); I 
Brace, Questionnaire Design: How to Plan, Structure and Write Survey Material for Effective Market 
Research (Kogan Page Ltd 2004). 
798 Brace (n 797); James Carifio and Rocco Perla, ‘Resolving the 50-Year Debate around Using and Misusing 
Likert Scales’ (2008) 42 Medical Education 1150. 
799 Brace (n 797); Bradburn, Sudman and Wansink (n 796). 
800 Brace (n 797); Fowler and Cosenza (n 787). 
801 Fowler and Cosenza (n 787). 
802 Fowler and Cosenza (n 787). 
 161 
 
been captured, thereby improving the flexibility of responses.803 Five-point Likert scales 
were used in the rating questions.804 This approach was used to avoid the disadvantages of 
seven-point Likert scales. Carifio and Perla805 report that respondents are more likely to 
choose neutral points in seven-point scales due to the increase in the number of options. 
Word labels were used for each point on the Likert scale rather than numbers or end-point 
labels to ensure the reliability of ratings.806 The literature indicates that public engagement 
about forensic DNA databasing may be inadequate hence public views may be poorly-
informed. 807  A ‘do not know’ option was added to the 5-point Likert scales to allow 
flexibility in responses and to help understand the scale of this gap.808 Open-ended questions 
were also provided to allow respondents to provide any comments about the reasons for their 
answers or selections in the Likert scale and MCQ questions. Finally, the last part of the 
questionnaire included questions about general demographic information: gender, age range, 
level of education and profession. The literature on survey design posits that starting a 
questionnaire with demographic questions may put respondents at ease before answering the 
main questions.809 However, this may be viewed as intrusive or may diminish enthusiasm to 
complete the questionnaire.810 Considering these potential disadvantages, it was thought that 
including the demographic questions at the end may encourage a greater response from the 
public.  
5.2.2.2 Pre-test and pilot study 
The survey questionnaire was pre-tested and piloted for clarity, layout, time of completion, 
ease of understanding, the scope of misinterpretation or multiple interpretations, validity and 
form of data among potential respondents, academics and researchers at the Northumbria 
University School of Law and Centre for Forensic Science. This included approximately 21 
respondents. The pilot questionnaire was run using the Online Surveys software. Participants 
were asked to provide informal feedback and comments to improve the survey instrument 
or comment on any items that are ambiguous or difficult to understand. Issues identified 
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from the pre-test and pilot study were analysed and resolved. Questions that were difficult 
to understand or answer were assessed, reworded and retested. The feedback and comments 
from the respondents resulted in very few changes to the survey. The form of data was found 
to be adequate to answer the research aims. The pilot study provided an opportunity to 
streamline the questionnaire by keeping it short and simple to maximise response.   
5.2.2.3 Survey implementation 
The Online Surveys software package was used to administer the final self-administered 
questionnaire. The link to the online survey was distributed to the researchers’ contacts via 
email and social media inviting them to participate in the study. These participants were 
asked to forward the survey link to anybody who may be interested in filling out the 
questionnaire. In this project, the convenience and snowball sampling methods811  were 
chosen as the most appropriate approach to gather meaningful views of the public. This was 
because, through engagement with the literature, experts and potential respondents, it 
became apparent that the topic appealed to people knowledgeable about forensic science or 
those who have had an experience of the use of biometrics in the legal system. At the 
completion of the survey, the respondent progress report showed that the survey was 
accessed 1,871 times (see Appendix V). Although this indicates a high level of coverage, 
this figure only represents the number of times the survey link was clicked and not the 
number of individuals. Overall, 201 individuals completed the survey questionnaire. Due to 
the sampling approach used and the small sample size, the results of this survey lack 
generalization to the entire England/Wales population. As shown in section 5.3, the 
convenience sample was skewed by region, level of education, age, gender and profession. 
However, the results provide information for comparison with existing findings of public 
views on DNA databasing. Secondly, the results provide a knowledge base for further 
research into the societal and individual interests (effectiveness outcome 3) in forensic DNA 
databasing.  
5.2.3 Survey data analysis 
Coded responses from the public survey were exported into the IBM SPSS statistical 
software version 22. The characteristics and responses of the study participants were 
summarized using descriptive statistics. This is normally used as a first stage analysis of 
                                                 
811 Bryman (n 312). 
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quantitative data including discrete (categorical) and continuous variables.812 Categorical 
variables can either be nominal data (such as, gender, which is unordered) or ordinal data 
(such as, level of agreement, which is ordered). The characteristic of discrete data is that 
they are fixed. Continuous variables are measured as a ratio, which has an absolute zero 
value (e.g. the NDNAD match rate) or numerical values with fixed intervals (e.g. 
temperature).813 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the distribution of data including the central 
tendency and variability or data spread. The central tendency measures include the mean, 
mode, and median, which are approximately equal when data is normally distributed. The 
dispersion/variability measures include standard deviation, range, and interquartile ranges. 
The results of descriptive statistics are presented using a combination of graphs (bar charts) 
and tables, which may reveal possible patterns or relationship between variables. The survey 
data comprised of both nominal and ordinal data. Respondents were asked to indicate their 
level of agreement or disagreement with specific statements about the public security 
functions and ethical implications of the NDNAD using Likert scales. Multiple-choice 
questions were used to seek the views of respondents on the inclusion and retention criteria 
for the NDNAD.  
The differences in responses among the participants were analysed using non-parametric 
statistics.814 Unlike classical statistical tests, nonparametric statistics does not require the 
data to be normally distributed.815 This approach was chosen because of the small sample 
size and the type of variables explored, nominal and ordinal data.816 The statistical tests 
carried out included the Chi-square (and Fisher’s exact) test of association.  
The Chi-square test of association is used to determine if there is a relationship between two 
discrete variables.817 The Fisher’s exact test is reported where the sample size is small and/or 
> 20% of cells have expected count less than 5. The tests were used to analyse the 
relationship between the demographics of participants (gender, age, educational level and 
                                                 
812 David Lucy, Introduction to Statistics for Forensic Scientists (Wiley 2005) 7-15. 
813 Gregory W Corder and Dale I Foreman, Nonparametric Statistics for Non-Statisticians: A Step-by-Step 
Approach (Wiley 2009). 
814 Corder and Foreman (n 813); Jean Dickinson Gibbons and Subhabrata Chakraborti, Nonparametric 
Statistical Inference (4th edn, Marcel Dekker 2003). 
815 Corder and Foreman (n 813). 
816 Joaquim P Marques de Sá, Applied Statistics: Using SPSS, Statistica, MATLAB, and R (Second, Springer 
2007) 171. 
817 Marques de Sá (n 816) 195-197. 
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area of specialisation) and the perceived level of agreement with the public security functions 
and ethical implication of the NDNAD as well as the preferred inclusion and retention 
criteria.  
Finally, the NVivo 12 software was used to organise the free-text responses to the open-
ended questions.818 These were analysed using the thematic analysis approach for qualitative 
data.819 The responses were coded to identify patterns and recurrent themes.  
5.3 General characteristics of study participants 
The total number of respondents to the public survey was 201. Figure 5.1 shows the 
distribution of respondents by region of England and Wales. There was a disproportionate 
number of responses by region, reflecting the sampling approach used in the survey – 
convenience and snowball sampling. A majority of respondents were from the North East of 
England (n = 130). The distribution for the other regions is as follows: 8 North West, 8 
Yorkshire and the Humber, 10 East Midlands, 10 West Midlands, 5 East of England, 7 
London, 11 South East, 5 South West, 2 Wales and 5 unknown (undisclosed).  
 
Figure 5.1 - Proportion of participants by region of England and Wales (n = 201) 
                                                 
818 Bryman (n 312) 601-617. 
819 Bryman (n 312) 584-593. 
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The demographic characteristics of the survey participants are presented in Table 5.1. This 
shows that most participants (62%) were female. This is in contrast with the wider England 
and Wales population which is estimated to be made up of 51% females and 49% males.820 
Most participants (53%) were young adults (18-34 years). Middle and older adults (≥ 35 
years) accounted for 47% of the respondents. The highest level of education for most 
participants (66%) was a PhD/Masters or equivalent higher university degree. Almost all 
participants had at least a secondary or high school education.  
The survey respondents were asked to indicate their primary area of specialisation which 
was then coded into 4 categories (Table 5.1). The percentage of participants who disclosed 
this information was 86%. A higher proportion of respondents (32%) specialised within the 
field of Natural, Formal and Applied Sciences (NFAS). This was followed by the Business, 
Humanities and Social Sciences (BHSS) field (29%); and the Law, Criminology and 
Security (LCS) field (21%). A few participants (4%) were coded as ‘other’. These were 
excluded from statistical analysis due to the small sample size (n=8), and because some 
professions were not specified. The next chapters examine the results of the public survey 
by topic: Public security functions of the NDNAD (Chapter 6); NDNAD inclusion criteria 
(Chapter 7); NDNAD retention periods (Chapter 8); and voluntary participation in the 
NDNAD (Chapter 9).  
  
                                                 
820 Office for National Statistics, ‘Male and Female Populations’ (14 May 2019) <https://www.ethnicity-
facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/demographics/male-and-female-populations/latest> 
accessed 17 May 2019. 
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Chapter 6: Public security functions of the National DNA 
Database 
The law has been described as the ‘final nail in the coffin’ for forensic science.821 It is 
considered as the most crucial factor that determines the effectiveness of DNA databases.822 
This is because the functions and composition of national databases are determined by law. 
In line with the second aim of this research, this chapter evaluates the perspectives of the 
public survey participants about the functions of the NDNAD as specified by existing law. 
The study focused on section 63T(1)(c) of PACE. 
6.1 Public survey results on the functions of the NDNAD 
The public survey assessed the security functions of the NDNAD using four 5-point Likert 
questions from ‘definitely disagree’ to ‘definitely agree’. A sixth point (do not know) was 
included on the scale to allow flexibility in response where participants have no information 
about the NDNAD. The Cronbach’s alpha (α)823 was used to test the internal reliability of 
the dependent variable (termed perceived public security) on a sample of 191 participants. 
Ten participants were excluded because they selected ‘do not know’ or provided no response 
to at least one question. A high Cronbach’s alpha (α) of 0.845 was found for the 4-item scale. 
This indicates an acceptable level of internal reliability.  
Figure 6.1 presents the opinions of the participants on the four different public security 
functions of the NDNAD.   This shows a pattern of an agreement to the enhancement of the 
investigation (83%), prosecution (76%) and detection (68%) of crime by most respondents. 
There appeared to be roughly equal agreement (41%) and disagreement (39%) on the 
enhancement of the prevention of crime. Less than 4% of participants indicated no 
knowledge about the enhancement of each of the public security functions by the NDNAD. 
                                                 
821 Fraser (n 63). 
822 Marjanović and others (n 15). 




Figure 6.1 - Opinion on the public security functions of the NDNAD (*n = 200, no response by one 
participant) 
The response of participants on the public security functions of the NDNAD was also 
analysed by demographic characteristics: gender, age, educational level and primary 
specialisation area. This analysis was carried out to understand the potential influence of the 
independent variables on the perceived enhancement of the four public security functions by 
the NDNAD. Table 6.1 – 6.4 summarises the opinions of the study participants. On the 
enhancement of the prevention of crime, there was no statistically significant association 
between gender, age, educational level or specialisation area and the perceived enhancement 
of the prevention of crime by the NDNAD. The results showed a similar trend by the 
demographics assessed except educational level. When stratified by gender, age and 
specialisation area, approximately equal proportion of participants agreed or disagreed with 
the statement ‘the database enhances the prevention of crime’ (Table 6.1). With educational 
level, a majority of less-educated participants (62%) were more likely to agree that the 
database enhances crime prevention.  
The perception of the study participants on the detection of crime differed from the general 
trend observed for the prevention of crime.  Table 6.2 shows that regardless of gender, age, 
educational level or specialisation area, most participants agreed with the statement ‘the 
database enhances the detection of crime’.  A higher percentage of males, middle and older 
adults (≥ 35 years), highly educated respondents and NFAS participants tended to agree that 
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the NDNAD enhances crime detection. However, there was no statistically significant 
association by the demographic categories examined.  
Like the results for the detection of crime, a majority of respondents in each of the social 
categories agreed to the statement ‘the database enhances the investigation of crime’ (Table 
6.3). Whilst there was no statistically significant difference among the groups, a higher 
percentage of males, highly educated and NFAS participants were more likely to agree that 
the database improves the investigation of crime.  
The demographic analysis also showed no statistically significant difference regarding the 
statement ‘the database enhances the prosecution of crime’. A majority of participants in 
each social group agreed with this statement (Table 6.4). Higher percentages of agreement 
were observed among females, middle and older adults, highly educated respondents and 
those specialised in the LCS fields. 
Table 6.1 - Opinions of participants on the potential of the NDNAD to enhance crime prevention by gender, 
age, educational level and specialisation area.824 
 
 
                                                 




Table 6.2 - Opinions of participants on the potential of the NDNAD to enhance crime detection by gender, 











                                                 
825 NB: Participants who selected ‘do not know’ were excluded from analysis 
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Table 6.3 - Opinions of participants on the potential of the NDNAD to enhance crime investigation by 











                                                 
826 NB: Participants who selected ‘do not know’ were excluded from analysis 
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Table 6.4 - Opinions of participants on the potential of the NDNAD to enhance crime prosecution by gender, 
age, educational level and specialisation area.827 
 
As a follow-up to the questions about the public security functions of the NDNAD, 
participants were asked to rate their agreement/disagreement with the following statement 
about DNA retention: ‘Its potential benefits outweigh any possible human rights or ethical 
concerns’. Only 3% of participants selected ‘do not know’ for this question, indicating that 
most participants were familiar with the ethical implications of forensic DNA databasing. 
Overall, a majority of respondents (57%) agreed to the statement (Figure 6.2). A little over 
a quarter (26%) disagreed and 14% neither agreed nor disagreed.  
                                                 




Figure 6.2 - Opinion on the statement that the potential benefits of forensic DNA retention outweigh any 
possible human rights or ethical concerns. 
Table 6.5 presents a demographic analysis of the responses to the question comparing public 
security to the ethical implications of DNA retention. Two social groups, gender and age, 
showed a statistically significant association with the level of agreement.  For the gender 
category, a majority of males (56%) and females (60%) agreed that the potential advantages 
of DNA retention take precedence over any ethical consequences. However, a higher 
percentage of males (37%) than females (21%) disagreed (p = 0.012). The age category also 
showed that a majority of young adults (62%) and middle/old adults (55%) agreed to the 
statement. Among those who disagreed, there was a higher proportion of middle/old adults 
(37%) than young adults (19%) (p = 0.006). 
Within the educational level group, a majority of respondents with a bachelor’s degree (68%) 
or higher qualification (56%) agreed that the benefits of DNA retention outweigh any ethical 
concerns. Half of those with less than a university degree (50%) agreed to the statement and 
were more likely to disagree (36%) than those with a bachelor’s degree (19%) or higher 
university qualification (30%). However, these differences were not significant (Table 6.5).  
The trend of responses within the specialisation area category was in favour of the benefits 
of DNA retention. A majority of respondents within each group agreed with the statement: 
52% BHSS; 63% LCS; and 66% NFAS. Participants who specialised in BHSS were more 
likely to disagree than the other two areas, but these differences were not significant. 
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Table 6.5 - Opinions of participants to the statement that the benefits of forensic DNA retention outweigh any 
possible human rights or ethical concerns, by gender, age, educational level and specialisation area.828 
 
6.1.1 Free-text responses on the public security functions of NDNAD 
Participants of the survey were asked to provide comments on the public security role of the 
NDNAD. Overall, there were 42 responses of which 38 were informative. The four excluded 
respondents either stated no comments, insufficient knowledge to comment or provided 
unclear responses. Six broad themes were identified following coding of the responses:  data 
security, function creep, the probative value of DNA, proportionality, crime control and due 
process. 
Data security: The predominant concern among participants was the security and access of 
DNA data stored on the NDNAD. Whilst some comments were distinct from the issues of 
proportionality, others introduced further aspects of proportionality to consider. The first 
type of comments included issues of dis/trust in authorities managing databases and security 
of current systems. Some participants thought that law enforcement officers may be 
potentially corrupt and there may be an abuse of the database system. Others mentioned the 
potential exposure of the database to hacking and data misuse due to lack of stringent rules 
                                                 
828 Participants who selected ‘do not know’ were excluded from analysis 
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and robust systems. Those who expressed these views cited recent cyber-attacks of online 
platforms. These comments mean that the perceived effectiveness of the NDNAD may be 
affected by externalities such as police misconduct and trends in crime:  
There are obviously issues around potential police corruption, which we would 
hope has been pretty much eradicated by now but given its prevalence in certain 
areas in living memory I would retain a hesitation as to the robustness of 
procedures. My major concern, however, would be the risk of hacking. Given 
recent exposure of hostile meddling in all manner of online arenas, and the 
number of emails I get from reputable companies apologising for the fact my 
details have been hacked from their websites, I would hope that the risk of 
hacking into the database and meddling with data is taken very seriously indeed. 
Rightly or wrongly, DNA evidence is subject to the ‘CSI’ effect and is seen by 
the general public as being conclusive. If there is potential for DNA records to 
be hacked or otherwise misused the effects could be catastrophic. (PSR109) 
Other data security issues mentioned by some respondents were the potential in/accuracy of 
DNA results and the boundaries of data sharing. One of the challenges cited by participants 
was the possibility of bias in the analysis of results. This was attributed to the nature of the 
relationship between forensic providers and criminal justice agencies:829  
I am concerned that the use of external organisations to analyse forensic DNA 
are more interested in providing the results the Police and the CPS want than 
providing accurate results. I am also concerned about the retention and potential 
sharing of DNA information. (PSR153) 
The second type of comments on data security was about speculative searching of the 
NDNAD. One respondent thought that speculative searches should be restricted and 
proposed a further controlled division of the NDNAD by demographics. This reveals that 
proportionality may not only be conceived within a context of the inclusion and retention 
criteria but also how searches are conducted on the database: 
NDNAD is a useful tool, but speculative searches should be limited to the 
demographic of the 'suspect' based only on 'known' information i.e. Suspect was 
a white male, then ONLY white males should be searched on the database. 
(PSR102) 
Function creep: The second predominant theme from the text analysis was function 
creep.830 The respondents thought that the use of the NDNAD should be restricted to its 
designed purpose and third-party agencies, such as insurance and commercial companies 
                                                 
829 R v Ward [1993] Crim App 96; Paul C Giannelli, ‘Independent Crime Laboratories: The Problem of 
Motivational and Cognitive Bias’ [2010] Utah Law Review 247. 
830 Johanne Yttri Dahl and Ann Rudinow Sætnan, ‘“It All Happened so Slowly” – On Controlling Function 
Creep in Forensic DNA Databases’ (2009) 37 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 83. 
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should be denied access. Some participants alluded to the concept of genetic 
exceptionalism831 to make their argument: ‘There is too much information contained in DNA 
for it to be used so freely, and signed over to private companies’ (PSR12).  
DNA probative value: The probative value of DNA evidence also featured in the concerns 
raised by participants. This was weighed into the debates on ensuring a balance between 
public security and privacy. Whilst the potential usefulness of the NDNAD was generally 
agreed by these respondents, overreliance on DNA was a common issue. 832  Some 
participants emphasised that DNA evidence is only one element of a large investigation or 
body of evidence and its value depends on both technical and legal factors. Reflecting on 
this challenge, one participant questioned whether the benefits of DNA outweigh civil 
liberties:  
The technical reliability of DNA evidence depends on a number of factors 
(quantity and quality of the sample analysed, and lab technique/equipment. I am 
therefore, mindful whether the potential benefits outweigh any possible human 
rights or ethical concerns. As a whole, I agree that National DNA Database 
would be good, if used appropriately and that people/law makers/lawyers are 
aware that DNA evidence is not fool proof. (PSR113) 
Regarding the probative value of DNA evidence, another participant thought that the actual 
effectiveness of databases should be established. This information was thought to be 
essential evidence to inform the development and expansion of the database: ‘I'm concerned 
about utility of databases. How many reported database hits contribute to prosecution? 
Answering that question is vital for determining issues regarding extending DNA retention.’ 
(PSR49) 
Proportionality: The fourth theme from the text analysis was safeguarding proportionality. 
There were mixed views on how proportionality may be ensured in running the database. 
Some participants placed emphasis on civil liberties, others on public security but with 
specific caveats. Among the first group of respondents, human rights were considered to be 
on a par or potentially superior to DNA databasing for public security reasons: ‘Whilst DNA 
database have a legitimate place in the criminal justice system the benefits of mass retention 
of DNA cannot be said to outweigh ANY human rights concerns’ (PSR9). Another 
respondent conceived privacy as an integral part of public security, which was in line with 
                                                 
831 Williams and Johnson, ‘“Wonderment and Dread”’ (n 646). 
832 McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (n 14). 
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comments by former Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith 833 : ‘One needs to consider that a 
person’s privacy is also part of their security (…)’ (PSR13). 
Participants who appeared to favour public security recommended two specific tests for the 
continuous retention of DNA: necessity and proportionality tests. Prior to the establishment 
of the NDNAD, PACE prescribed a necessity test or relevance requirement, namely, that the 
sample will confirm or disprove the involvement of the subject, for the initial collection of 
DNA samples from individuals (see section 2.4.1). However, this test was relaxed with the 
introduction of the CJPOA which classified saliva as a non-intimate sample.834 The principal 
human right examined in the Marper ruling was the right to privacy (Article 8 of the 
Convention), which emphasises the need for proportionality and necessity. One respondent 
posited that the retention of DNA should only be allowed if the two tests are satisfied. This 
suggests a case-by-case approach or a clustered approach (i.e. cases of the same kind) to the 
retention of DNA data rather than a ‘blanket’ approach835: 
Concerning the issue of public security vs individual interests, I believe that in 
any case there should be proportionality. Retention of DNA should only be 
considered when it is absolutely necessary and should be proportionate in the 
specific case. If the case passes the necessity and proportionality test then the 
benefits should outweigh any possible human rights or ethical concerns (PSR5).  
In addition to the above views, some participants commented that the initial decision to 
include data on the NDNAD should consider factors such as the type or seriousness of crime 
and the characteristics of the individual (convicted or suspect). Currently, the minimum 
threshold for inclusion on the NDNAD is an arrest for a recordable offence. The data can 
then be speculatively searched and retained until the conclusion of investigations or any 
proceedings. The only exceptions allowing continuous retention are when an individual is 
convicted or has a conviction history or other statutory criteria are met (see section 2.4.1). 
These opinions were generally consistent with the core principles established by the 
Biometrics Commissioner.836 However, the recommended principles under the PoFA regime 
pertain to biometrics retention whilst the comments made by respondents consider the 
                                                 
833 Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: Science and Public Protection (n 47). 
834 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 58 (3). 
835 McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets’ (n 44). 
836 Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, ‘Principles for Assessing Applications for Biometric Retention’ 
(Office of the Biometrics Commissioner 2013) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254444/P
rinciples_for_Assessing_applications_under_PACE.pdf> accessed 4 February 2019. 
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criteria for initial inclusion in the NDNAD. This broadens the scope of proportionality in 
DNA databasing:  
The level of enhancement that a NDNAD would offer to either the investigation 
or prosecution of a crime is dependent on the crime in question. In relation to the 
protection of public security there would need to be safeguards/restrictions in 
place surrounding at what point you are entered into the database i.e. when you 
are convicted of a crime or when you were formally a suspect but have been 
cleared, major crime or minor crime, when are you removed from the database? 
(PSR36) 
Crime control and due process: The final themes identified from the text analysis were 
crime control and due process. Views in favour of crime control tended to be based on a 
strong belief in the crime-solving capacity and deterrence effect of DNA evidence. Some 
thought that the retention of DNA is significant and essential in ensuring the safety of the 
public. Hence, a pragmatic retention approach informed by trends in crime was 
recommended here: 
I personally believe that in current times where crime appears to be on the 
increase and given the casual use of violence, particularly using weapons such 
as knives and guns we need fresh and pragmatic approach to how we use and 
retain forensic DNA. (PSR114) 
Participants who expressed strong opinions in support of DNA retention gave little 
importance to civil liberties. They perceived DNA evidence to be accurate and conclusive 
in the prevention, detection and prosecution of crime. This was in line with the justifications 
of the Gaughran majority,837 and the crime control perspective held by Lord Brown in the 
2004 case involving S and Marper. The Law Lord reasoned that:  
The more complete the database, the better the chance of detecting criminals, 
both those guilty of crimes past and those whose crimes are yet to be committed. 
The better chance too of deterring from future crime those whose profiles are 
already on the database. And these, of course, are not the only benefits. The 
larger the database, the less call there will be to round up the usual suspects.838 
In addition to the above opinions, one participant thought that emphasis on civil liberties and 
ethics was either influenced by criminality or philosophical complexities. This suggests that 
                                                 
837 Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (Secretary of State for the Home 
Department intervening) (n 120), paras 40-41. 
838 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Respondent) ex parte LS (by his mother and litigation 
friend JB) (FC) (Appellant) and R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Respondent) ex parte 
Marper (FC) (Appellant) (n 72), para 88. 
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meanings attached to the benefits of DNA retention may be rationalised within the concept 
of ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’:839  
Placing abstract concerns about ethics on something that very concretely stops 
people getting hurt and killed, and catches perpetrators, and provides 100% 
scientific confidence in prosecuting is invalid, and probably itself immoral. (…) 
The only people who do have a problem with a DNA database are 1) criminals, 
and 2) philosophy and ethics academics who struggle with polarised concepts of 
right and wrong, blame, etc. (PSR29) 
In contrast to respondents who favoured crime control, some participants prioritised human 
rights (including privacy) of individuals. It was agreed by some participants that the 
NDNAD is a useful policing tool. However, civil liberties should be the foremost 
consideration in the retention of DNA. These views appeared to correspond with the 
Guaghran dissent840 and the privacy-by-design approach promoted by the Forensic Genetics 
Initiative:841 
While the database is utilised by officers on a daily basis to make arrests, charge 
individuals, and for CPS to eventually prosecute, human rights law should 
always prevail. If serious flaws arise in the current system then the human rights 
of suspects comes first and the system must be revised. (PSR118) 
In support of due process, one participant reasoned that recent advancements in the use of 
digital information mean there is a need to exercise caution in the storage of biometric 
information. This view illustrates the power dynamic between technology and privacy, and 
its recognition as an important consideration in the debates on proportionality:  
In an age where warfare has been placed into the digital realm and the players 
are not exclusively countries, but also includes political parties, companies and 
special interest groups, the less digital information of a person being stored, the 
better it is. (PSR195) 
6.1.2 Summary of results 
To sum up, the results show that participants are sceptical about the ability of the NDNAD 
to enhance crime prevention. However, their views on crime detection, investigation and 
                                                 
839 Human Genetics Commission, Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear? (n 44); Machado and Silva, ‘“Would 
You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the National Forensic DNA Database?’ (n 676). 
840 Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (Secretary of State for the Home 
Department intervening) (n 120), paras 50-103. 
841 Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, Establishing Best Practice for Forensic DNA Databases (n 88). 
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prosecution were positive. These benefits were thought to outweigh the civil liberty 
implications of retaining DNA data. 
The text analysis revealed that the scope of proportionality does not only cover the inclusion 
and retention criteria for the NDNAD but also encompasses aspects such as speculative 
searching and the use of data. Methods suggested regulating these aspects of DNA 
databasing were the case-by-case, clustered, privacy-by-design and pragmatic approaches. 
Some participants appeared to favour a blanket or indiscriminate approach. The different 
regulatory modes were informed by issues of privacy and public security.  
To some respondents, arriving at the most appropriate approach to regulate the database 
requires evidence of its actual utility or probative value of DNA hits. This information may 
be important because the text analysis showed that the perceived effectiveness of the 
NDNAD may be affected by external factors such as police actions, crime patterns and 
institutional relationships. 
6.2 Discussion and conclusion 
The results showed that the participants are optimistic about the ability of the NDNAD to 
assist the police in detecting, investigating and prosecuting crime. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies that show a positive outlook on the benefits of forensic DNA databases 
in solving crime.842 The above finding may be attributed to the current output performance 
of the NDNAD, and the wide coverage of high-profile cases in reports of stakeholders and 
the media, where DNA hits were instrumental in apprehending offenders.843 The literature 
suggests that the public may be susceptible to the inaccurate representation of forensic DNA 
applications in the media, where its benefits are highlighted at the expense of its 
limitations.844 Whilst this may apply to members of the public who are unaware of the actual 
operation and effectiveness of the NDNAD, very few participants selected ‘do not know’. 
                                                 
842 Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659); 
Gamero and others, ‘A Study of Spanish Attitudes Regarding the Custody and Use of Forensic DNA 
Databases’ (n 666); Curtis, ‘Public Perceptions and Expectations of the Forensic Use of DNA’ (n 642); 
Curtis, ‘Public Understandings of the Forensic Use of DNA’ (n 642); Dundes (n 666); Teodorović and others 
(n 122). 
843 FIND Strategy Board, Annual Report 2017 to 2018 (n 16); Gordon Thomas Honeywell Governmental 
Affairs, ‘United Kingdom Murder Case Selected as 2018 DNA Hit of the Year’ (DNA Resource, 4 May 
2018) 
<http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/2018%20Hit%20of%20the%20Year/Rome%20Press%20Release
%20Website%20Final%202.pdf> accessed 3 April 2019; BBC News, ‘Melanie Road Murder: Man Jailed for 
1984 Melanie Road Murder’ BBC News (9 May 2016) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-somerset-
36245888> accessed 6 December 2018. 
844 Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659). 
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Further, the free-text responses showed that some participants were aware of the challenges 
of DNA analysis/databasing and the responses may reflect the available evidence on the pros 
and cons of the NDNAD. 
The specified functions of the NDNAD considers its potential to prevent crime.845 This may 
include the deterrence of crime and the incapacitation of offenders leading to a reduction in 
crime. The results revealed doubt about this public security function of the NDNAD. Similar 
findings have been reported by Machado and Silva 846  in Portugal and qualitative 
interviews847 with criminal justice professionals in the UK. The literature indicates that 
offenders may change their modus operandi to prevent being caught. This may include 
taking DNA transfer precautions or migrating to a new jurisdiction where they are unknown 
to the system to commit crime.848 Further, custodial periods may be short and the high rate 
of recidivism among offenders means the deterrent effect of forensic DNA databases may 
be negligible. 
Across the social groups examined, there was no statistically significant association with the 
perception of the public security functions of the NDNAD. However, less educated 
participants tended to be positive about the ability of the NDNAD to prevent crime whilst 
the other groups were sceptical. Exposure to information about the benefits and limitations 
of DNA technology is more likely to be high among the more educated public than less 
educated members of the public. Further, members of the public with a lower level of 
education may be susceptible to biased media and television portrayal of DNA technology. 
These factors may partly explain the results of this study. Consistent with this result, 
Machado and Silva849 found that scepticism about the public security functions of forensic 
DNA databases may be more common in groups with a higher level of education relative to 
those with less education. 
The results suggested that the public may favour the benefits of the NDNAD over its civil 
liberty implications. This ‘utilitarian view’ suggests that the public gives special importance 
to the potential benefits of databases and may be willing to trade some of their privacy for 
security. However, the concept of a trade-off between privacy and security is thought to be 
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 182 
 
problematic since security encompasses the protection of privacy. 850   Whilst this is 
emphasised in human rights law,851 there are certain circumstances where the pursuance of 
specific security objectives, such as crime resolution, may require interference with another 
specific security objective, such as individual privacy protection. The utilitarian view may 
be significant where individuals consider the potential impact of DNA hits in resolving 
complex serious offences such as rape and murder. For example, there are occasional calls 
for a UDNAD or screening of some unconvicted groups when an unresolved serious crime 
comes to the attention of the public.852 This may occur when people are drawn to empathize 
with individuals who are victims of crime or are directly affected by crime.853  
The demographic analysis showed that females and young adults tended to favour the 
utilitarian view. The literature shows that females are more affected by crime than males.854 
Further, more crimes are committed by males than females and the composition of the 
NDNAD reflects this observation. More than 80% of the subject profiles on the database are 
from males.855 Hence, males may be more concerned about civil liberties than females. This 
may explain why male participants were more likely to favour a restricted database than 
females.  
According to the privacy paradox, there is a gap between the privacy attitudes and behaviour 
of individuals.856 Whilst there is limited research on the influence of age on the privacy 
paradox, it has been hypothesised that young adults may be less concerned about privacy or 
are more likely to take actions to protect their privacy or trade their privacy for personal 
benefits.857 This trend may be linked to the dis/agreement with the utilitarian view among 
the young study participants. 
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The qualitative insights about the public security functions of the NDNAD revealed a 
concern about data security and function creep. This was consistent with several studies that 
have reported concerns about the security of data including data misuse.858 In this study, 
some participants were concerned about the risk of hacking. One of the key aspects of 
creating a national forensic DNA database is the development of a secure computer network 
platform to manage the database. The NDNAD, for example, is not available on the internet 
and access to the database is tightly regulated. Whilst the database is for the police, it is only 
accessed by a small number of vetted staff at the Home Office. Third-party agencies such as 
insurance companies have no direct access to the database. These operational strategies 
prevent any cyber-attacks, hacking of the system or any unintended uses. The data security 
issues raised by participants suggests that information about the technical security of the 
NDNAD may be inadequate in the public domain. This information may be crucial in 
enhancing transparency and public trust in the governance of the NDNAD. 
It was clear from the responses that some participants were aware of the limitations of DNA 
evidence in a criminal investigation. These limitations have been critically scrutinised in the 
literature including issues of transfer and persistence of DNA, and interpretation of 
full/partial matches and mixed profiles. 859  Most criminal investigations are complex, 
involving tactical decisions by investigative officers, use of various technical and scientific 
techniques, interrogation of individuals and the utilisation of several evidence types.  
However, where DNA is available, it is often portrayed as the most (or only) significant 
aspect of the investigation, overlooking other critical aspects of the case. A risk highlighted 
by McCartney860 is the potential overreliance on DNA due to a misunderstanding of its 
potential and limitations among criminal justice professionals. These reasons suggest that 
the optimistic and utilitarian view expressed by participants about the benefits of the 
NDNAD may not be based on reliable evidence about the probative value of DNA. Machado 
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and Silva report that direct knowledge and experience of how DNA is used in criminal 
investigations may be linked to a more moderate view about its potential.861  
The study participants inferred different modes of regulation for aspects of the NDNAD with 
justifications based on either civil liberty or public security reasons or both.  One approach 
was the case-by-case regulatory model involving the assessment of each case to determine 
whether the inclusion and retention of DNA data in the NDNAD are necessary to enhance 
public security. It was thought that this approach may be compatible with the principle of 
proportionality. Whilst this may be ideal,862 there are several uncertainties in predicting the 
future ‘usefulness’ of DNA data based on the nature or characteristics of the case and the 
relevant subject. Further, the case-by-case approach may be more difficult to manage since 
it will be based on the discretion of an officer. The approach may also lead to a loss of crime 
detection in some cases. The current PoFA regime includes a form of case-by-case retention 
for individuals arrested for a serious offence.  According to the 2015 report of the Biometrics 
Commissioner,863 a ‘bright-line’ rule for automatic retention or deletion may be cheaper than 
discretionary retention. Hence, a major disadvantage of the case-by-case approach is its 
administrative impact.    
The second inferred mode was the clustered approach, which may be described as an 
improvement of the case-by-case model where cases of the same characteristics are subject 
to automatic inclusion and retention in the NDNAD. Such cases should be supported with 
adequate evidence of the relevance and usefulness of the inclusion and retention of data in 
the NDNAD. There is presently no such model under the PoFA regime. This may be 
attributed to difficulties in establishing such a knowledge-base.864 The current regulatory 
model includes a blanket rule for inclusion and speculative searching (–arrest for a 
recordable offence) and mainly bright-line rules for continued retention of DNA data from 
different categories of individuals. These rules are not adequately supported by empirical 
evidence on the actual effectiveness of inclusion and retention, particularly data from 
unconvicted individuals.865  
The analysis of the free-text responses also suggested a pragmatic model of regulation 
informed by crime control. Under this approach, the inclusion and retention of DNA data in 
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the NDNAD, and the use of DNA data is determined by the nature and trends in crime. This 
could be compared to the occasional mass screening or intelligence-led screening (ILS) of 
defined groups of people to solve a specific serious DNA-related crime.866  The ILS is 
sometimes commissioned in DNA-related cases where the perpetrator is unknown, and no 
matches are found in a national DNA database. According to a 2006 report by Wenzel,867 
the success rate of ILS in Europe is about 72%. This shows that the pragmatic approach 
could be potentially effective in solving such specific crimes. However, ILS is very 
expensive, laborious and may require the voluntary cooperation of the target individuals 
based on informed consent. In the investigation of the murder of Louise Smith in 1996, the 
UK spent over £200,000 in sampling more than 4500 individuals.868 Regarding voluntary 
participation, this may be problematic where individuals exercise their right to refuse 
sampling. Further, samples cannot be used for other investigations and may be destroyed on 
completion of the case.869 These challenges mean the pragmatic approach may be difficult 
to implement on a large scale.  
The last model inferred from the qualitative responses of participants is the privacy-by-
design approach. This model emphasises due process and the civil liberties of individuals 
and posits that human rights should be the principal consideration in the regulation of the 
key aspects of DNA databasing such as inclusion, retention and use of DNA data. Whilst 
this model is promoted in debates about DNA databasing,870 it may be difficult to achieve 
the public security outcomes of databases under this approach. This is because strict 
adherence to civil liberties may preclude the inclusion and retention of data from all 
unconvicted individuals. This means the police may not be able to detect some crimes. The 
Portuguese national DNA database currently implements a form of strict privacy-by-design 
with an inclusion criterion covering individuals convicted of offences with ≥3 year’s prison 
term.871 It is not clear how its actual effectiveness compares with the UK NDNAD. However, 
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Santos et al.872 found a higher performance ratio (H/N) for the UK NDNAD (0.31) compared 
to other EU countries (≤ 0.30).  
In conclusion, the views of the study participants indicate high perceived effectiveness of 
the National DNA Database in terms of its utilisation in detecting, investigating and 
prosecuting crime. In considering the balance between public security and civil liberties, the 
respondents tended to favour a utilitarian view (i.e. for the greater good) which weighs the 
security of the society above individual interests. An appraisal of the regulatory models 
inferred from the qualitative responses indicates the clustered approach may be the most 
appropriate. This is an evidence-driven model that emphasises the relevance and usefulness 
of collecting DNA, the inclusion and retention of DNA data in the NDNAD and use of the 
data in solving crime. Since the law governing DNA databasing may be considered as a 
societal choice, it is important for the public to be fully informed about the actual benefits 
and risks of databases. The results obtained in this study suggest a public demand for such 
information to shape the law governing the NDNAD, ensuring that the law is specific, 
accurate and representative of the actual benefits of databases.  
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Chapter 7: Inclusion criteria for the National DNA Database 
Forensic DNA comparisons can be carried out with or without a national DNA database. 
The use of a database is only relevant to solving cold cases or no-suspect crimes. The 
inclusion criteria can be described as the minimum requirement for the initial entry of a DNA 
profile from a known individual in the NDNAD. Several ‘inclusion determiners’ have been 
proposed in the literature including the seriousness of an offence, contact with the police or 
arrest, risk of crime, involvement in crime, recidivism, and citizenship/residency.873 As part 
of the third aim of this research, this chapter examines the responses of participants to the 
public survey about who to include in the database. Section 7.1 presents the findings from 
the survey, followed by the discussion and conclusions in section 7.2. The original 
contribution of the chapter is the establishment of the current support for the NDNAD 
inclusion criteria. Further, the analysis provides insights into the justifications for the entry 
or non-entry of DNA profiles in the NDNAD. 
7.1 Public survey results on inclusion criteria 
The public survey sought to understand the views of the public about who to include in the 
NDNAD. The views of the study participants are presented in Figure 7.1. Overall, 39% of 
participants preferred an inclusion criterion ranging from arrestees to convicted individuals 
(termed ‘suspect criteria’). The second preferred criterion was consistent with the current 
PACE inclusion criteria (named ‘PACE criteria’), ranging from arrestees to convicted 
individuals plus volunteers (30%). This implies that at the minimum, most participants 
(69%) favour the inclusion of ‘suspects’. However, there was no majority view for the 
composition of this suspect group (i.e. whether convicted, charged, arrested individuals or a 
combination of these (Figure 7.1)). About a quarter (25%) of the participants thought DNA 
data of all citizens/residents should be included in the NDNAD (‘population criteria’).   
Of the 10 (5%) respondents who selected ‘other’, five indicated ‘none’ (i.e., nobody should 
be included in the NDNAD). One participant noted that ‘anyone who has DNA taken 
(including victims of crime) should be stored’ (PSR172). This inclusion criteria, termed 
‘crime criteria’, suggest a non-discriminatory approach encompassing data from suspects, 
victims, officers and, possibly, witnesses. Another respondent thought the inclusion criteria 
should be restricted to those convicted of violent/sexual crimes (‘serious offenders’ 
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criteria’). Two other respondents preferred an inclusion criterion restricted to serious 
offenders’ data plus either specific volunteers or subjects of a criminal investigation. One 
participant was ‘not sure’ about the inclusion criteria.  
 
Figure 7.1 - Responses to the question ‘In your opinion, which category of individuals should have their 
DNA profiles included in the National DNA Database’ (n = 201). 
Social groups of respondents showed a trend of differing views regarding the category of 
individuals to include in the NDNAD (Table 7.1). The responses of participants were coded 
under the following defined terms to simplify statistical analysis: suspect criteria, PACE 
criteria, population criteria and other. There was no statistically significant association 
between the social groups and the preferred inclusion criteria (all p > 0.05). A majority of 
both males (74%) and females (67%) preferred a minimum inclusion criterion of ‘suspects’. 
A higher fraction of females were more likely to favour the population criteria than males 
(27% versus 22%). The trend for the age category showed that most participants in the 
different age groups favoured an inclusion criterion that includes at least suspects. Middle 
or older adults874 (76%) were more likely to favour this criterion than young adults875 (65%). 
For the population criteria, young adults (31%) tended to prefer this approach than middle 
or older adults (19%) but these differences were statistically insignificant. 
The demographic analysis also showed that irrespective of educational level, most 
respondents prefer a minimum inclusion criterion of suspects. A higher percentage of 
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respondents with a bachelor’s degree (81%) were more likely to favour this approach than 
those with a PhD/masters (66%) or < bachelor’s degree (63%), showing that the preference 
of participants may not be linked to an increase in education. Preference for the population 
criteria was higher among participants with no bachelor’s degree (38%) than those with a 
PhD/masters (26%) or bachelor’s degree (19%).  
For the specialisation area category, it was observed that most participants in each of the 
three groups preferred the minimum inclusion criteria of suspects: BHSS (71%); LCS (71%); 
NFAS (69%). Participants who specialised in NFAS (28%) were more likely to favour the 
population criteria than the others (22% BHSS; 19% LCS). 
Table 7.1 - Opinions on category of individuals to include on the NDNAD by gender, age, educational level 
and specialisation area. 
 
In addition to the category of individuals to include in the NDNAD, participants were asked 
separately about eligible types of offences for the inclusion of convicted individuals. Two 
hundred participants answered this question. Figure 7.2 shows mixed views on the type of 
offence for which DNA data of convicted individuals should be included in the NDNAD. 
The proportion of participants that favoured the inclusion of data for qualifying/serious 
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offences (35%) and all offences (32%) were relatively comparable. The percentage of those 
who chose all recordable offences was 16% and those who selected all qualifying and minor 
offences was 12%. Overall, whilst participants shared divergent views on the eligible offence 
types, the results suggest a near consensus (~94%) to include data from convicted 
individuals. Some participants (~5%) chose ‘other’ and provided comments on offence 
eligibility. The range of opinions among this group were ‘none’, only serious offences and 
‘justified’ offences. A few participants also chose not applicable (2%). These were mainly 
participants who thought all citizens/residents should be included in the NDNAD. 
 
Figure 7.2 - Responses to the question ‘In your opinion, for what types of offences should the DNA profile of 
a convicted individual be stored on the DNA database?’ (n = 200). 
To allow for statistical analysis, the offence type option ‘all qualifying and minor offences’ 
were recoded under ‘all recordable offences’ since they are broadly the main types of 
recordable offences. The demographic analysis showed no statistically significant 
association between gender, age or specialisation area and eligibility of offence type for 
convicted individuals (Table 7.2). The educational level category showed a statistically 
significant association (p = 0.042). Overall, the results suggest that most participants in each 
social group support the inclusion of data from convicted individuals. However, there were 
diverse views on the eligible type of offence except in the educational level category. Most 
participants with no university degree (63%) were more likely to favour an inclusion 
criterion covering individuals convicted of any offence. Relatively, 28% of participants with 
a university degree and 30% of those with a PhD/masters chose all offences. Those with a 
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university degree (42%) were more likely to favour ‘all recordable offences (recoded)’ than 
the PhD/masters (24%) and < university degree (6%) groups.  
A further question asked under the NDNAD inclusion criteria was the eligible type of 
offences for ‘innocent’ individuals (i.e. those charged or arrested but not convicted of an 
offence).  The total number of participants who answered this question was 199. As shown 
in Figure 7.3, the results suggest that most respondents (~70%) favour the inclusion of data 
from this category of individuals. However, opinions on the eligible type of offences were 
mixed with no majority preference: 29% for all qualifying offences; 25% for all offences; 
13% for all recordable offences and 4% for all qualifying and minor offences. Some 
participants (22%) selected ‘not applicable’ for this question. These were mostly those who 
thought the inclusion criteria should be restricted to convicted individuals or cover all 
citizens/residents. Sixteen respondents (8%) chose ‘other’ and provided comments about 
their preference. The ranges of views were ‘none’ for charged and/or arrestees, all offences 
for only charged individuals, and case-by-case criteria.  
 
Figure 7.3 - Responses to the question ‘In your opinion, for what types of offences should the DNA profile of 
a charged or arrested but not convicted individual be stored on the DNA database?’ (n = 199). 
The analysis of the social groups showed a statistically significant association between 
gender or age and eligibility of offence type for charged or arrested but not convicted 
individuals (Table 7.3). The educational level and specialisation area groups showed no 
statistical significance. Generally, it was apparent that most participants in each social group 
favoured the inclusion of data from this ‘innocent’ group but differed on the eligibility of 
the offence types. In the gender category, males (38%) were statistically significantly (p = 
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0.022) more likely to favour ‘all qualifying/serious offences’ than females (23%). Females 
(22%) were more likely to favour ‘all recordable offences (recoded)’ than males (8%). For 
the age category, the preference for all recordable offences was more likely in young adults 
(25%) than in middle or older adults (8%) (p < 0.001). Participants in the middle/older age 
group (31%) were more likely to select ‘not applicable’ than young adults (14%). These 
were predominantly those who thought the inclusion criteria should be limited to convicted 













7.1.1 Reasons for the category of individuals to include in the database 
The qualitative responses about the NDNAD inclusion criteria provided insights into the 
reasons for the preference of participants. Regarding the category of individuals to include 
in the database, there were 88 responses (44% of participants). The comments were coded 
under five key themes: crime control, due process, proportionality, practical considerations 
and other inclusion categories. 
Crime control and due process: The predominant themes in the qualitative responses were 
crime control and due process. Of those that inclined towards crime control, some expressed 
views that opposed the established principle of innocent until proven guilty. These 
participants either preferred an expansive database or a database of all citizens/residents 
(population criteria). They reasoned that every member of society could be or become a 
suspect or victim of a crime: ‘Everyone, even me, is a potential criminal. And a potential 
victim. The database helps everyone’ (PSR29). The crime control view was also supported 
by the idea that a larger database means a more effective database. Some participants thought 
a larger database can aid an investigation, resolve crimes quickly and deter criminals:  
We would be able to solve crimes and provide a safer country to live in. I believe 
this would deter people from believing they could commit a crime and get away 
with it. I have been interested in this idea for a long time now. This should be 
mandatory. We would save time, money and resources. (PSR105) 
Another reason provided by participants who supported a crime control system was the 
concept of ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’. Some thought a comprehensive database was a 
‘common sense’ approach considering its potential effectiveness:  
I feel, and have always felt, that individual DNA data should be stored on the 
database from birth. A controversial opinion I know, but I believe that the classic 
argument prevails - unless you have something to hide you have nothing to fear. 
(PSR88) 
The last reason in support of a comprehensive database was equity and its potential research 
benefits. Some participants thought such a system will be less discriminatory and fairer, with 
the database functioning as a civil register similar to a ‘Register of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages’ (PSR28). These participants also expressed concern about privacy but thought 
this was more of securing the data on the database and preventing misuse rather than 
avoiding data inclusion:  
It is fairer to have a record for all citizens rather than save the DNA profiles for 
specific groups. Plus, I assume this profile could be used for scientific/research 
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reasons. It is important, however, to regulate access and storage of this 
information to safeguard privacy and fair use of the records. (PSR34) 
Participants who leaned towards due process reasoned that the rights of an individual should 
not be compromised without adequate legal justifications. These participants thought that 
absent a conviction, the DNA records of innocent individuals should not be included in the 
database. The basis of this position was the established legal concept of ‘innocent until 
proven guilty’. They thought the ‘right to privacy of the innocent citizen outweighs the 
potential benefits to the state’ (PSR37).  Some participants linked privacy to personal 
freedom and reiterated the legal protections established for personal data in non-law 
enforcement domains. One participant cited the GDPR876 as an example to illustrate the 
importance of upholding the basic human rights of innocent individuals:  
The process of collecting DNA can be intrusive, it is personal data, and personal 
data in every other walk of life is protected, especially given GDPR. The only 
people who have been demonstrated to be guilty of an offence are those 
convicted in court - everyone else is innocent until proven otherwise. (PSR13) 
In addition to the above views supporting due process, some participants thought data from 
volunteers may be included. However, this should be limited to adults or specific people and 
adhere to the principles of informed consent, avoiding any form of coercion. One of these 
participants further thought an expansive database could introduce some form of bias in 
police detective work. This view was in line with the work of McCartney,877 where some 
interviewees thought the reliance on DNA could abbreviate police investigations: ‘I 
personally feel that a widespread database infringes human rights and could unfairly 
prejudice police work. It shouldn't be used to replace actual investigation and police work’ 
(PSR151). 
One participant who favoured the above views also thought due process should apply to data 
from convicted individuals. This was founded on the concept of ‘spent convictions’ under 
the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.878 It was thought that the inclusion of data from 
convicted individuals should be limited to a fixed period:  
It is reasonable for DNA testing to be used to either clear suspects or provide 
evidence of crime.  However, the principle that people are assumed to be 
innocent should not be compromised by this.  This means that no-one who has 
not been convicted of a crime should have DNA stored. I can see why those 
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convicted of a crime might have that right withdrawn, but that should be for a 
specified period (a bit like the way convictions become 'spent' after a certain 
period of time).  I would not trust the police with anything beyond this. (PSR155) 
Proportionality: Among participants who opposed the population inclusion criteria or a 
comprehensive database, some considered elements of the principle of proportionality rather 
than due process as their basis. Firstly, they thought the relevance or necessity of including 
the DNA data of a specific group should be established.  This should consider whether the 
entry of the DNA data will improve the efficiency of the database or not. To some 
participants, this ‘proportionality link’ between the inclusion of data and the desired public 
security objectives may be justifiable for only convicted individuals, potential recidivistic 
individuals or some arrestees:   
It is not necessary to DNA fingerprint every individual to have an efficient 
NDNAD. Volunteers are relevant to boost numbers to give a better demographic 
of people on the database and to aid in research. (PSR7) 
Only retaining the DNA of convicted individuals ensures a critical link to 
proportionality. (PSR9) 
I chose this answer because this group of people [convicted and charged 
individuals] seem to be the most likely to reoffend. (PSR48) 
One participant further mentioned that the police should make a case for every individual 
arrest. This participant reasoned that some arrestees may evade charging, making it difficult 
to identify serial offenders:  
I don't believe persons arrested and not charged should have their DNA profile 
stored. On the one hand, it may be the case that the person is a serial offender 
and perhaps escapes charges and therefore it will be harder to determine future 
offences committed by him in the future. On the other, large numbers of persons 
are arrested and are completely innocent. Your DNA should not be held, if you 
do not wish it to be, if the police cannot make a convincing case that you should 
be charged by CPS. (PSR118) 
A second proportionality element considered by participants was whether the inclusion of 
DNA data was non/excessive relative to the desired objective of resolving crime. Some 
participants based their argument on the ‘excess information’ contained in DNA, consistent 
with the concept of genetic exceptionalism.879 This was linked to a fear of function creep in 
future applications of DNA data. These participants thought only convicted individuals’ 
merit the risk of giving up their DNA records because ‘it’s the price you pay for the crime 
                                                 
879 Williams and Johnson, ‘“Wonderment and Dread”’ (n 646). 
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you commit, you have demonstrated a ‘failure to reassure’ society by having committed a 
crime’ (PSR109). Another participant expressed the above views in the following terms:  
There is an argument for the retention of the DNA profile of all citizens and 
assuming that the profile holds no information that might be used to indicate 
health etc. then this would be acceptable.  However, we don't know what 
information might be gleaned from the profiles in the future and therefore in my 
opinion it is safest and most supportable to retain only the profiles of those 
convicted of an offence. (PSR83) 
Another proportionality element accentuated by respondents was the reliability/adequacy of 
the database technology and/or the system. These considered the accuracy of data, risk of 
security breach and contamination. Again, this was linked to a fear of function creep and the 
genetic exceptionalism of DNA:  
I hold a real tension in my mind; I can see the enormous risks in having a 
(potentially hackable) database of (potentially mis-classified or contaminated or 
fraudulently re-assigned) unique biological data. Who can say what future uses 
a government could put that to; what if someone claims to have identified a 
genetic marker for tax avoidance or sexual offending or violence or whatever 
and whichever government wants to win the next election runs on a platform that 
they will prevent X percentage of all crime by monitoring those with that marker. 
Which will quickly lead to arguments that the innocent have nothing to hide so 
everyone should be swabbed at birth. And then looms the prospect of pre-
emptive detention. (PSR109) 
A fourth proportionality reason was the belief that the inclusion of particular suspect groups 
ensures a right balance between civil liberties and public security. Another view linked to 
this balance element was that the inclusion of charged or arrested but unconvicted 
individuals unfairly increases their probability of arrest or conviction in the future. Some of 
these participants also emphasised that the NDNAD is for only offenders. The composition 
of the suspect group differed among these participants. Whilst some thought data from only 
serious crime offenders should be included, others thought it should cover all convicted 
individuals: 
This [those convicted of violent/sexual crimes] seems more proportionate in its 
balance of human rights (privacy under Article 8) than covering all convicted 
people – e.g. those convicted of petty theft or non-violent crimes. (PSR174) 
I think this [convicted individuals] strikes the best balance between distributive 
justice (best served by "all citizens") and respect for privacy. It doesn't seem fair 
that charged/arrested but unconvicted individuals should have their chances of 
future arrest/conviction increased by being on the database. (PSR179) 
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Practical reasons and other inclusion categories: The last themes from the qualitative 
responses on the category of individuals to include in the NDNAD were practical 
considerations on the inclusion criteria and other categories of individuals. These 
participants opposed either a database of unconvicted individuals, arrested but not convicted 
individuals or all citizens/residents. Some participants reasoned that authorities cannot be 
trusted with the management of DNA information: ‘The police have not shown themselves 
overly keen on removing samples, so only people convicted of a crime by a jury or judge 
should have their DNA retained’ (PSR12). Another participant cited the possibility of human 
error to support their preference: ‘People make mistakes and that could include the recording 
of my details against an incorrect DNA profile etc. Only CONVICTED should therefore 
justify that risk’ (PSR102).  
Another practical consideration was that an arrestee database may create an opportunity for 
law enforcement to target specific groups of the population: ‘I worry that including 'arrested' 
individuals can lead to an abuse of power, since arrests can be made for various reasons and 
can be used to target specific at-risk populations.’ (PSR26). One participant also mentioned 
that a comprehensive database may drain scarce resources and increase the administrative 
burden on database managers. Further, a UDNAD means some individuals may be sampled 
against their will. This was described as unethical and a breach of privacy.   
The data of the entire population (majority who have no connection with crime) 
will be a drain on scarce resources. Further, it will increase the administrative 
burden on managers of databases. Additionally, such a database will be unethical 
and will infringe on the privacy of individuals if all are compelled to donate 
samples against their will. (PSR5) 
Some participants highlighted consideration of re-arrest history or chances of recidivism to 
inform the category of individuals to include in the database. One of these participants 
thought the inclusion criteria should target re-arrested individuals and this data should be 
stored for a fixed retention period: ‘Re-arrested individuals: this should be for a limited 
duration in the absence of a prosecution or, subject to quasi-judicial oversight, in exceptional 
circumstances’ (PSR33). For convicted individuals, another participant mentioned that 
whilst data of convicted individuals should be included in the NDNAD, the retention period 
should be based on proof of future offending:  
Profiles should only be retained for a proscribed period of time. This period of 
time should be supported with evidence - for example if convicted individuals 
are most likely to reoffend in the 2 years following their release from prison then 
2 years might be a sensible period. (PSR147) 
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7.1.2 Reasons for the eligible offence type if convicted of an offence 
The NDNAD inclusion criteria for convicted individuals can either be blanket or selective 
based on the seriousness of offence(s). The quantitative responses showed mixed views with 
no majority preference for a particular offence category. There were 46 comments (23% of 
participants) to the question about the eligible type of offences if an individual is convicted 
of a crime. This provided some insights into the reasons for the preference of respondents. 
Three main themes were coded from the responses: effectiveness of DNA/database; 
proportionality; and punishment and other reasons. 
Effectiveness of DNA/databases: Most of the comments were related to the enhancement 
of the effectiveness of the database. Participants thought the inclusion of data from 
individuals convicted of particular type of offences could improve crime prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution: 
[All offences:] Limited resources should not be deployed to investigate when the 
DNA database could support investigations. (PSR172) 
Recordable offences would need require DNA profiling to further convince in 
the argument in court. (PSR133) 
Essential for qualifying offences but typing of criminals that commit minor 
offences may have an impact on volume crime. (PSR7) 
DNA is crucial in the identification of offenders of sexual crimes. (PSR151) 
Some participants held that judging the probability of future offending based on the offence 
type in current or past conviction is difficult. Thus, they thought the eligible offence criteria 
should either be all offences, all recordable offences or all qualifying and minor offences. 
The uncertainty in offending behaviour was linked to the heterogeneity of offences 
committed by one individual.  
It is difficult to predict all types of offences that an individual may be involved 
in. A person convicted of a minor offence may be involved in very serious 
offences. Hence, the threshold should be all offences. (PSR5) 
Small crimes often lead to bigger crimes. Number of historical cases solved 
because individual arrested on minor offence many years later. (PSR23) 
Individuals may begin offending on a minor scale and then have their offending 
escalate to more serious offences.  For e.g., a flasher may later rape. (PSR83) 
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Besides uncertainty, one respondent linked their reasons to public security risks associated 
with the changing categorisation of offences. This may be linked to the ‘jurisdiction effects’ 
of DNA databasing as suggested by Vailly and Bouagga.880 The participant expressed a 
strong belief in the capacity of the database to solve crime and thought the inclusion criteria 
should cover all offences. It was thought that this approach will prevent the exclusion of 
potential future offenders:  
All offences as the categories of crime could change suddenly which could lead 
to people being left off the database. If an (any) offence has been committed and 
a person charged then their biometric data should be stored (we can keep their 
personal data so why not biometric?) This could act as a future deterrent to more 
serious crime and/or could result in faster detection of future crimes. (PSR119) 
Proportionality: Relying on the relevance element of proportionality, some participants 
thought the eligible offence type should be serious offences. They thought recidivism is low 
among minor offenders who are often innocuous. Others thought including all offenders may 
lead to a diminishing return. The discriminatory inclusion criteria suggested by participants 
placed emphasis on justifications for data storage. Some thought a case-by-case approach 
may be suitable for minor offenders: ‘We need to be able to give a reason as to why we are 
storing it. It might be justifiable to store it for a less serious offence but it could be case 
dependent’ (PSR198). 
Some participants expressed views indicating the excessiveness of DNA databasing 
practices. It was thought that the category ‘qualifying offences’ is a deliberate attempt by the 
Government to expand the inclusion criteria for the NDNAD. This participant thought the 
inclusion criteria for convicted individuals should be limited to serious ‘arrestable’ offences. 
Another respondent shared a critical view linked to the causes of crime and genetic 
exceptionalism. It was thought that no individual (convicted or not) should have their data 
stored due to the possible future risk of associating DNA to the cause of crime: ‘DNA might 
be used to show a proclivity to violence to assert guilt in criminal proceedings - an poor 
defendant who cannot afford legal advice would be unable to defend against such a spurious 
and subjective argument’ (PSR89).  
                                                 
880 Vailly and Bouagga (n 858). 
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One participant who disfavoured the inclusion of minor crime offenders thought there is no 
proof that such offenders go on to commit serious crimes. Further, minor offences can be 
investigated by other efficient means without relying on DNA:    
Some recordable offences are minor offences.  There is no evidence that 
commission of these offences would make these offenders more likely to commit 
more serious offences.  There is no legal or equitable justification to store DNA 
profiles for minor offences that can just as easily be investigated using other 
means, such as fingerprints or "eye-see" witnesses, etc. (PSR74) 
Some of the reasons associated with proportionality were linked to a balance in offence 
punishment or security of data.  It was thought that including traffic offenders in the database 
will be unfair. In contrast, another participant thought the inclusion criteria should cover all 
offenders if the security of data is assured.    
Punishment and other reasons: There were a few respondents who maintained that 
inclusion in the database should be a default process for all offenders. This was generally in 
line with the notion of the ‘law-abiding citizen’ in the public perspective study by Machado 
and Silva881 in Portugal. The participants thought the inclusion of convicted individuals 
should be a direct consequence of breaking the law regardless of the circumstances. Further, 
considering the impact of crime on victims, there may be bias in judging the seriousness of 
an offence:  
If you have committed any type of offence, then you have broken the law and 
should be subject to some sort of penalty regardless of the severity. Part of this 
process is to provide biometric data. Some offences may not seem serious but 
can cause as much distress for victims (ASB/harassment) as murder. (PSR42) 
7.1.3 Reasons for the eligible offence type if charged or arrested but unconvicted 
The quantitative results showed divergent views on the eligible offence types for individuals 
charged or arrested but not convicted of a crime. There were 48 comments (24% of 
participants) on the reasons for the preference of respondents. The key themes from the 
responses were coded as due process, proportionality, uncertainties about the individual’s 
status, the effectiveness of DNA/database and other reasons.  
Due process: Some respondents thought DNA data from unconvicted individuals should not 
be stored irrespective of the offence type. A few participants noted that the only exceptions 
                                                 
881 Machado and Silva, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the National Forensic 
DNA Database?’ (n 676). 
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to this rule are volunteers or individuals charged of particular offences. The reasoning of the 
participants was based on the principle of innocent until proven guilty. It was thought that 
the only justifiable trigger of inclusion in the NDNAD is a conviction. Some equated the 
storage of DNA records to being treated as a guilty person, a breach of personal and family 
freedom, abuse of power, stigmatisation and a threat to civil liberties. Referring to the bio-
surveillance power of DNA and the risk of function creep, one participant suggested 
inclusion on the database should be on a voluntary basis (whether convicted or not):  
Mapping someone’s criminality to their DNA (and consequently the DNA of 
their relatives, close relatives or descendants) would annihilate the freedom of 
those individuals. It is not a far step to then assess their DNA on job applications. 
For these reasons no contextual information whatsoever should be added to 
someone’s DNA record unless they volunteer it. (PSR89) 
Proportionality: Elements of proportionality that featured in the reasons of some 
participants were the relevance of DNA storage, non-/excessiveness, and balance of public 
and private interests. There were mixed views on the eligible offence type among this group. 
The opinions ranged from only serious offences to all offences or none. One participant 
reasoned that DNA records are relevant in serious crimes: ‘Only serious offences (sexual, 
serious violence (s47 and above)), or other victim-based crimes only because other matters 
are less important and do not justify the need’ (PSR102). Another respondent alluded to a 
limited justification for minor offences and the excessive collection of personal information: 
‘I do not see how a minor offence requires to show all your genetic code’ (PSR101). 
One participant held that limiting the inclusion criteria for unconvicted individuals to 
qualifying offences and exceptional cases is a ‘reasonable compromise’. However, to others 
who preferred inclusion for all offences, this compromise or balance may be better calibrated 
if arrested (but not charged) individuals are excluded. It was thought that charged indicates 
a higher level of suspicion than an arrested individual:  
An arrest is aimed at assisting police with enquiries it does not mean that there 
is sufficient evidence to charge that person. If a person is charged then you would 
assume that there is evidence of their guilt. This should be assessed on a case by 
case basis. (PSR119) 
The balance of interests was also referred to by a participant who supported a comprehensive 
database. It was thought that absent a UDNAD, only convicted individuals should have their 
DNA records stored: ‘Only convicted individuals should have their profiles stored (unless 
the law is that all individuals should have theirs stored)’ (PSR112).  
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Uncertainties: Participants emphasised the complexities in determining all crimes an 
unconvicted individual may be associated with. The fact that the offending behaviour of an 
individual may cut across minor and serious offences was highlighted. The respondents 
thought a charged or arrested individual may either be innocent or guilty of the current or 
other known/unknown crimes. Further, some individuals may not be convicted due to legal 
or procedural technicalities. Respondents who expressed these views thought the inclusion 
criteria should cover at least individuals arrested or charged (but unconvicted) for a serious 
offence. They reasoned that data from these individuals could enhance public security: ‘Not 
sure on this, if you're brought to trial but not convicted due to a technicality or something 
similar then if circumstances of the case change the profile of a charged person could be 
advantageous’ (PSR36). 
In contrast to the above uncertainties, participants who were against the inclusion of data 
from unconvicted individuals placed emphasis on the fact that they could be innocent. 
Moreover, participants were concerned that permitting this criterion may create an 
opportunity for law enforcement officers to abuse their powers: ‘Charged does not mean 
convicted. In this way you could press charges on everybody in the country and get their 
DNA’ (PSR145). 
Another aspect of uncertainties related to repeated arrests or charging of unconvicted 
individuals. One participant thought the eligible offence type for unconvicted individuals 
should probably be serious offences. However, it was held that repeated arrests or charges 
for other offences should trigger inclusion in the database:  
It might be suitable to do so if charged with a serious offence however if a person 
is repeatedly arrested and charged with offences it might be prudent to store their 
DNA as repeated offences could indicate possibility for further and more serious 
offences. (PSR198) 
Effectiveness and other reasons: Some participants who preferred the inclusion of 
unconvicted individuals for all qualifying offences thought this will enhance the prosecution 
and investigation of crime. Others who preferred ‘all qualifying and minor offences’ or ‘all 
offences’ reasoned that this will make the database more effective in resolving crime. This 
reason was also cited by a participant who supported a UDNAD. The lack of evidence on 
effectiveness was mentioned by one participant who supported inclusion of only convicted 
individuals. It was thought that this evidence should be balanced with civil liberties: ‘It 
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should depend on how effective storing DNA profiles actually is for law enforcement, 
balanced against people's right to privacy’ (PSR82).  
A participant who thought only convicted individuals should have their data stored 
commented that the criteria should cover individuals handled by out of court disposals: 
‘None. But the criteria needs to include non-judicial disposals such as cautions etc.’ 
(PSR37).  
7.1.4 Summary of results 
The quantitative results suggest most participants support a minimum inclusion criterion of 
an undefined suspect group. There was an indication of a near consensus to include DNA 
data from convicted individuals in the NDNAD. Most respondents with less education 
preferred an inclusion criterion that captures all offenders. A majority of those with higher 
education preferred a selective approach. For unconvicted individuals, it was apparent that 
most participants preferred an inclusion criterion covering an undefined group of charged 
and/or arrested individuals. Whilst males were more likely to favour an inclusion criterion 
covering ‘all qualifying/serious offences’, females were more likely to favour ‘all recordable 
offences’. Young adults were more favourable to ‘all recordable offences’ than middle/older 
adults.  
Several reasons for the preference of participants emerged from the qualitative analysis of 
free-text responses. Reasons in support or opposed to the different categories of individuals 
ranged from crime control, due process, proportionality and practical considerations and 
uncertainties about criminality. Some of these reasons and views on punishment and 
effectiveness were cited in relation to the eligible type of offences for convicted and 
unconvicted individuals. 
7.2 Discussion and conclusion 
The comparison of a crime scene profile and the reference profile of an individual arrested 
for that crime can be carried out without entry of the reference profile in the NDNAD.882 
The inclusion of the reference profile in the NDNAD is relevant for detecting matches with 
other unsolved past crimes or enhancing the chances of detection in future crimes if there is 
a tendency for recidivism. Hence, entry in the NDNAD has been considered as treating 
                                                 
882 Wallace (n 591). 
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individuals as potential suspects.883 In this research, most participants favoured an inclusion 
criterion of at least ‘suspects’, ranging from arrestees to convicted individuals. This was 
consistent with the Serbian study that found that ~58% of respondents preferred the entry of 
DNA records from either ‘convicted individuals’, ‘convicted individuals and suspects’, or 
‘convicted individuals, suspects and volunteers’.884 The results highlighted the uncertainties 
in determining the actual usefulness of DNA data inclusion from different categories of 
individuals, which is in line with the comments by some respondents. Whilst it was 
acknowledged by some participants that inclusion of data from unconvicted individuals may 
constitute a breach of privacy, others thought restricting the criteria to only convicted 
individuals could lead to missed opportunities in detecting some crime. This quandary has 
been noted in the UK reviews, 885  and by the Biometrics Commissioner in relation to 
biometric retention.886  
The literature shows considerable support and opposition to a universal or comprehensive 
national DNA database.887 This study found that a quarter of respondents favour a UDNAD, 
which was lower than more recent findings in countries such as Switzerland 888 (29%), 
Serbia889 (~35%) and Italy890 (35%). The result is generally consistent with the trend in the 
UK where qualitative research and reviews have found an objection to UDNAD by a 
majority of different groups.891 Whilst a UDNAD could be beneficial in enhancing public 
security,892 it has several practical limitations that require consideration.893 One of the most 
important consideration is the fact that DNA is relevant in solving only a small fraction of 
all crime (currently < 1% in the UK).894 This means a significant number of samples from 
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the entire population will be of no value. A second challenge is a fact that such a database 
cannot be built without informed consent and a guarantee of the right to withdraw this 
consent. For this reason, it will be practically impossible to achieve universality. From a 
critical perspective, the right approach to the expansion of the NDNAD is through voluntary 
participation by clearly establishing the actual effectiveness of including data from 
volunteers.   
Though statistically insignificant, the study found that females, young adults, participants 
with no university education and those specialising in science exhibited a more permissive 
view about the category of individuals to include in the NDNAD. Existing public perspective 
studies suggest some limited statistically significant association between socioeconomic 
factors and the inclusion criteria for DNA databases.895 The Switzerland study found that 
females are more supportive of an expansive database and voluntary participation in 
databases. 896  Machado and Silva 897  found that young adults are more likely to favour 
voluntary participation in databases. A few studies have identified a higher preference for 
an expansive database and voluntary participation in databases among groups with lower 
levels of education.898 There is presently no studies that have considered the association 
between academic background or specialisation and perceptions about DNA databasing. 
However, findings by Machado and Silva,899 whilst insignificant, indicate a more optimistic 
view about DNA databasing among applied science (health) professionals. The above 
studies are indicative of the potential influence of socioeconomic characteristics on public 
views about DNA database inclusion criteria. Since most completed studies900 in this area 
(including this present study) employ non-probability sampling,901 this observation may 
require further investigation through representative surveys and qualitative interviews to 
confirm the effects of socioeconomic factors. 
                                                 
895 Machado and Silva, ‘What Influences Public Views on Forensic DNA Testing in the Criminal Field?’ (n 
656). 
896 Zieger and Utz (n 663). 
897 Machado and Silva, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the National Forensic 
DNA Database?’ (n 676). 
898 Dundes (n 666); Machado and Silva, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the 
National Forensic DNA Database?’ (n 676); Zieger and Utz (n 663). 
899 Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659). 
900 See section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4 




Support for a DNA database of convicted individuals is very high among existing surveyed 
populations: 65% in the US study;902 72% in the Spanish study,903 and 65% in the New 
Zealand survey904. In line with these findings, the results in this present study suggested very 
strong support (93.5%) for the inclusion of DNA data from convicted individuals in the 
NDNAD. However, there were mixed views whether this should be restricted to 
qualifying/serious offences, all qualifying and minor offences, all recordable offences or all 
offences. This indicates uncertainties about using the seriousness of an offence, which has 
been considered by the courts,905  as a determiner of inclusion in the NDNAD. Several 
countries across Europe apply this in the operation of their national database.906 For example, 
the criteria in Austria covers ‘individuals suspected and/or convicted of a dangerous 
assault’.907 In England and Wales, the seriousness of an offence is only considered in relation 
to the retention periods for data from juveniles convicted of an offence. Forensic DNA data 
from all recordable offenders are permitted to be entered in the NDNAD. The findings from 
this study suggest that the current inclusion criteria may be supported ‘in spirit’, but this may 
be due to a weak evidence base on the usefulness of inclusion of data from individuals 
convicted of specific types of offences.  
Only participants with no university education favoured the inclusion of DNA data from 
individuals convicted of any offence and this was statistically significant. Those with a 
higher level of education were supportive of more restrictive inclusion criteria for convicted 
individuals. This result confirms the findings of Dundes908 where support for a database of 
convicted violent offenders was high among more educated participants. Generally, less 
educated individuals tend to express permissive views about DNA databasing.909 A possible 
explanation for this observation could be the level of exposure and awareness of DNA 
databasing. Firstly, Gamero et al.910 found an increased awareness of DNA fingerprinting 
among individuals with a higher level of education.  The qualitative study by Anderson et 
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al.911 showed how awareness of the pros and cons of DNA databasing informed a change in 
support for a UDNAD to a more restricted database. The implication of the finding in this 
present study is that strategies should be adopted to promote the awareness of the benefits, 
limitations and risks of forensic DNA databasing among the public. This may ensure that 
the ‘societal choice’ about the law governing DNA databases is well informed across the 
different members of the public.   
The category of unconvicted people arrested or charged with an offence has been described 
as an intermediary group between convicted individuals and the general unconvicted 
(innocent) population.912 In New Zealand, Curtis913 found high support (52-62%) for the 
inclusion of data from unconvicted individuals arrested or suspected of a sexual or violent 
offence. Support for those arrested or suspected of any crime was low (38-40%) in the 
study.914 The results in this present study indicated general strong support (69.8%) for the 
inclusion of DNA data from the intermediary group. However, views on the eligible types 
of offence were mixed. This means that the public may be uncertain about the characteristics 
of unconvicted individuals who may be eligible for entry in the database. Whilst the 
seriousness of an offence may be an important factor for some members of the public, others 
may place less importance on the severity of offence as a determiner of inclusion in the 
NDNAD. The qualitative responses illustrated the different legitimate reasons that may be 
cited to justify the different positions. These included issues of civil liberties, proportionality, 
uncertainties about guilt/innocence and the utility of databases, which are in line with 
previous studies.915 The results may be explained by the fact that there is limited information 
about the overall effectiveness of including data from unconvicted individuals arrested or 
charged with different types of offences. The Marper decision identified this as critical 
information that is required to justify the selective treatment of data from different 
individuals within the unconvicted population.916 
It was found that females and young adults were more favourable of the inclusion of DNA 
data from unconvicted individuals arrested or charged of a recordable offence. 
Comparatively, males were more supportive of a restriction to serious offences whilst 
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middle/older adults were more supportive of no inclusion of data except convicted 
individuals. The results suggest that females and young adults are more likely to share 
permissive views about DNA databasing than males and middle or older adults. This is in 
line with the findings of views on the public security functions of the database.917 There are 
several possible explanations for the results above. Firstly, females are more affected by 
crime; hence may have a stronger belief in the public security benefits of including data from 
the intermediary group. In contrast, males are more likely to be sampled than females; hence 
they may be more concerned about the civil liberty risks of inclusion in the database. With 
respect to age, young adults have been found to exhibit a privacy paradox918 which may be 
linked to their perception about privacy-related technologies such as the national DNA 
database. This may explain the findings in this present study. 
In conclusion, the public may be supportive of including DNA data from individuals who 
have had contact with the police in the NDNAD. The current inclusion criteria for the 
NDNAD allows entry of DNA data from all individuals who have been arrested for a 
recordable offence, whether convicted or unconvicted. However, the results in this present 
study suggest that a selective rather than a blanket inclusion criterion may be more 
appropriate. Nevertheless, it is not clear what restrictions the public may prefer due to 
uncertainties about the potential usefulness of data inclusion and issues of civil liberties. This 
implies that an evaluation of the actual value of including data from convicted individuals 
and arrested or charged but unconvicted individuals may help calibrate the composition of 
the NDNAD to enhance public security. Further, this will inform public opinion about the 
inclusion criteria for the NDNAD. 
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Chapter 8: Retention periods for forensic DNA records 
The retention periods for forensic DNA records have been scrutinised by several reviews 
and the courts.919 The current law governing the NDNAD requires the retention of DNA 
profiles until the conclusion of investigations or proceedings except for data from individuals 
convicted of an offence, arrested or charged with a qualifying offence, and those subject to 
retention by statute920. The retention periods for the excepted categories of individuals range 
from a minimum of 2 – 5 years for unconvicted individuals and some convicted juveniles to 
a maximum of indefinite for all convicted adults and some convicted juveniles.921 All DNA 
samples are required to be destroyed after profiling or within a 6 month period, or until its 
purpose is fulfilled if subject to the CPIA exception. As part of the third aim of this research, 
the public survey asked participants about their views on the length of retention for DNA 
samples and profiles from different categories of individuals, as specified by law. This 
Chapter details the survey results in section 8.1. A discussion of the results is presented in 
section 8.2. The Chapter makes an original contribution by identifying the current public 
views about the retention period for convicted and unconvicted individuals. Additionally, 
the chapter provides insights into the key justifications for the support of specific regimes. 
8.1 Public survey results on retention periods 
8.1.1 DNA sample retention period for convicted individuals 
The results showed that most participants (68%) support a long-term retention period for 
DNA samples from serious crime offenders, ranging from indefinite, until death and 100 
years (Figure 8.1). The current PACE sample retention window (until a profile is generated 
to 6 months) was supported by 28% of respondents. Those who selected other (5%) 
supported either ‘no retention’, a short period (such as ‘until proceedings are complete’) or 
intermediate and flexible periods (10 or 40 years, and 1 year after the end of their sentence).  
In contrast to the above, most participants favoured a short-term sample retention period for 
adults and first-time juveniles convicted of a minor crime (Figure 8.1). The PACE sample 
window was supported by 51% and 54% of participants for adults and first-time juvenile 
minor offenders, respectively. Those who selected other (16% for adult minor offenders, and 
18% for first-time juvenile minor offenders) preferred no retention/taking of samples from 
                                                 
919 S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44); Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) (n 120). 
920 E.g. retention on grounds of national security 
921 See details in section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2 
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these groups or alternative short periods ranging from ‘until completion of proceedings’ to 
1 or 5 years. A few participants suggested intermediate or flexible periods ranging from 
‘until length of sentence’, 1 or 5 years plus the length of sentence, 10 or 15 years, and a case-
dependent approach. 
 
Figure 8.1- Opinions of participants on retention period of DNA samples from convicted individuals. 
Demographic analysis 
Social groups were analysed to determine whether there is an association between 
demographic characteristics and the perceived sample retention period. The different 
retention periods were recoded into three to simplify the statistical analysis: long-term 
(indefinite/100 years/until death), short-term (until a profile is generated/6 months/3 months) 
and other. For serious offenders, only the age category showed a statistical significance (p 
= 0.014) in association (Table 8.1).  The majority of both young adults (68%) and middle or 
older adults (67%) preferred a long-term sample retention period for serious offenders. 
However, middle or older adults (10%) were more likely to select ‘other’ than young adults 
(1%). The short-term sample retention period was preferred by a higher percentage of young 
adults (31%) than middle or older adults (23%). Overall, most participants in the different 
social groups preferred a long-term sample retention period for individuals convicted of a 
serious offence (Table 8.1). 
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The data for minor offenders (Table 8.2) showed a significant association between 
educational level and preferred retention period (p < 0.001). A majority of participants with 
no university degree (67%) were more likely to favour a long-term sample retention period 
than those with a university degree (33%) or higher education (30%).  Conversely, most 
participants with a university degree (65%) or higher education (50%) were more likely to 
select a short-term sample retention period than those without a university degree (13%).  
For all the other social groups, a majority or a larger proportion of participants favoured a 
short-term sample retention period for individuals convicted of a minor offence. There was 
no statistically significant association between gender, age, or specialisation area and the 
preferred retention period (Table 8.2). 
Table 8.3 presents the demographic analysis of the views of participants regarding juveniles 
convicted of a first minor offence. There was a statistically significant association between 
the age (p = 0.024) or educational level (p = 0.005) of participants and the retention period. 
A large proportion of both young adults and middle or older adults preferred a short-term 
sample retention period for this category of juvenile offenders. Most young adults (62%) 
were more likely to select the short-term retention period than middle or older adults (44%). 
The short-term period was also preferred by most participants with a university degree (67%) 
or higher education (54%). A majority of respondents with no university degree (56%) were 
more favourable of a long-term sample retention period than those with a university degree 
(26%) or postgraduate education (26%).  The two other social groups showed no statistically 
significant association with the retention period. Generally, it was observed that a large 
proportion of participants in each social group preferred a short-term sample retention period 























8.1.2 DNA profile retention period for convicted individuals 
Figure 8.2 shows that most participants (83%) favour a long-term (indefinite/until death/100 
years) retention period of DNA profiles from individuals convicted of a serious crime. 
Relatively, 47% and 40% of participants favoured a long-term period for minor offenders 
and juveniles convicted of a first minor offence, respectively. Whilst only 11% of 
participants favoured a sentence-based retention period for serious offenders, this was 
preferred by 38% of participants for both minor offenders and the first-time juvenile 
offenders, respectively.  
Some participants selected ‘other’ and provided alternative approaches or similar retention 
periods to the above. Of the 7% of participants who selected ‘other’ for serious offenders, 
many suggested ‘no retention of data’. Others proposed either a ‘1 year + length of sentence’, 
‘indefinite until conviction quashed’, ‘40 years’ or ‘5 years after death’ retention periods. A 
similar trend was observed for those who selected ‘other’ for minor offenders (15%). Most 
of these respondents favoured no retention of data. A few proposed up to 12 months 
retention, 1 year plus the length of sentence, 10 years after imprisonment, less than 5 years 
or a case-by-case approach. Most of the participants who selected ‘other’ for the first-time 
juveniles (21%) suggested no retention of DNA profiles. Others proposed either retention 
until they are 18 years old, between 1 month and 5 years, 1 year + length of sentence, 5 years 
after imprisonment or a case dependent approach. 
 





Table 8.4 presents a demographic analysis of the views of the study participants about the 
retention period for DNA profiles of serious offenders. To simplify the statistical analysis, 
the retention periods were recoded as long-term (indefinite/100 years/until death), sentence-
based (length of sentence/10 years + length of sentence/5 years + length of sentence) and 
other. There was a statistically significant association between specialisation area and the 
perceived retention period for DNA profiles (p = 0.003). Whilst a majority of participants 
specialising in the various fields favoured a long-term retention period for serious offenders, 
BHSS (86%) and NFAS (89%) participants were more likely to select this option than LCS 
(59%) participants (Table 8.4). About a quarter of LCS participants (27%) preferred the 
sentence-based retention period compared to 7% BHSS and 6% NFAS. The ‘other’ option 
(mainly participants against data retention or who prefer other alternatives) was also 
preferred by a higher percentage of LCS (15%) participants than BHSS (7%) and NFAS 
(5%) participants. In all the other social groups, more than three-quarters of participants 
preferred a long-term retention period of DNA profiles from serious offenders (Table 8.4).  
Unlike the results for serious offenders, the social groups showed a pattern of moderate 
views for the long-term retention of DNA profiles from minor offenders (Table 8.5). A larger 
proportion of participants (but less than two-thirds) in the gender, age and educational level 
groups preferred a long-term retention period followed by the sentence-based option. A 
similar trend was observed for the specialisation area group except for LCS participants who 
preferred the long-term and sentence-based retention periods equally. The Chi-square test 
showed a statistically significant association between age and the perceived retention period 
(p = 0.048). More than half (51%) of young adults favoured the long-term retention period 
compared to 42% of middle or older adults. The ‘other’ option (i.e. no retention or other 
alternatives) was favoured by 22% of middle or older adults compared to 9% of young adults. 
The analysis of social groups revealed mixed and/or split views across the different lengths 
of retention of DNA profiles from juveniles convicted of a first minor offence (Table 8.6). 
Two social groups (age: p = 0.018; and specialisation: p = 0.012) showed a statistically 
significant association with the retention period of DNA profiles. For the age group, the 
‘other’ option (i.e. no retention or other alternatives) was favoured by 30% of middle or older 
adults compared to 14% of young adults. The sentence-based retention period was preferred 
by 44% of young adults compared to 31% of middle or older adults. Preference for the long-
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term retention period was relatively comparable in young (42%) and middle/older adults 
(39%). In the specialisation group, LCS (33%) and BHSS (30%) participants were more 
likely to select the ‘other’ option than NFAS participants (10%). The long-term retention 
period was favoured by 43% BHSS and 46% NFAS respondents compared to 28% LCS. 
The sentence-based retention period was preferred by 44% NFAS and 40% LCS participants 
compared to 27% BHSS participants. 
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8.1.3 Reasons for the DNA sample and profile retention periods for convicted 
individuals 
Some participants provided qualitative insights into the retention periods for DNA samples 
(n = 46; 23%) and profiles (n = 34; 17%) taken from convicted individuals. The key themes 
from the responses were the usefulness of sample/profile retention, respect for civil liberties, 
DNA profile adequacy, and concepts of punishment and rehabilitation. 
The basis for selecting a particular sample/profile retention period for convicted individuals 
was influenced by the idea that the sample/profile could be useful in future, either in the 
short-term or long-term. Some participants thought the reference sample could serve a 
quality assurance purpose, provide an opportunity to upgrade databases and reduce ‘costly’ 
resampling:922  
The DNA should be stored so that advantage can be taken of new technology in 
the future (e.g. whole genome sequencing). (PSR25) 
[I]t will be more costly to re-sample individuals than to store the already obtained 
sample. The focus should be on the security of the sample to guide against any 
misuse or unethical applications. (PSR5) 
Other participants linked sample/profile retention (short or long-term) to the public security 
functions of the database, emphasising on the prevention or detection of crime, cold case 
review, resolution of miscarriage of justice and the potential of familial searching: ‘Family 
links will be aided by retention, partial DNA hits can then be searched on families to track 
suspects’ (PSR21). Some participants supported the above reason (i.e. safeguarding public 
security) by drawing on the concept of recidivism: ‘This is because people can flip at any 
point in time so the longer we have it in the system, the better’ (PSR192). A case was also 
made for the potential power of DNA in predicting criminal behaviour: ‘In the future, DNA 
samples could be used to investigate if criminal behaviour was connected to a gene, for 
example’ (PSR101).  
Participants who strongly adhered to civil liberty reasons thought only samples of serious 
offenders should be retained either for a short or long-term period: ‘This is such an intrusion 
into somebody's civil liberties that conviction of a minor offence should not warrant such 
breach of privacy’ (PSR13). For DNA profiles, these participants (i.e. civil liberty advocates) 
raised concerns about using retained data in familial searches and function creep: ‘I don't 
like the idea of using DNA against others who have not been convicted - who may be related’ 
                                                 
922 Bramley (n 42). 
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(PSR166).  Such participants shared strong opinions and thought DNA records should not 
be retained, whether convicted or not: ‘DNA profiles should not be stored regardless of type 
of the criminal offence’ (PSR50).  
The third reason cited by participants for sample retention periods was the adequacy of the 
DNA profile. These participants thought samples should be retained until a profile is 
generated since the profile is enough in identifying individuals: ‘If a profile is what is needed 
to identify someone then surely the sample is no longer needed’ (PSR194). 
Lastly, some participants considered sample/profile retention as an integral part of the 
consequences of committing a crime and should be either proportionate/consistent with 
sentence or held indefinitely: ‘The person has been convicted of a crime, indefinitely on a 
NDNAD should be standard as a result of that. If they never commit another crime then they 
have nothing to worry about in relation to being on a database’ (PSR36). Many respondents 
who held this view (i.e. ‘consequential’ retention) thought the retention period should be 
‘analogous to time until conviction is “spent”’ (PSR155) or reflect principles of 
rehabilitation of offenders. One participant questioned, ‘[W]hen a person has paid their dues, 
aren’t they allowed to return to society?’ (PSR195). This reasoning was elaborated in more 
detail by another participant in the following terms: 
[T]he offender should be able to feel that they have made amends for their 
offence through completing their sentence to be able to move on with their lives. 
The retention of their DNA signifies that the State does not believe they have 
changed and expects them to reoffend. 1 year after the end of their sentence 
should be sufficient to catch those prolific offenders who reoffend within a year 
of release… Juveniles should feel that they have a fresh start when they become 
an adult and their past mistakes do not overly affect them. It is a means of the 
state showing trust and respect for them. (PSR100). 
8.1.4 DNA sample retention period for unconvicted individuals 
Charged individuals 
The opinions of participants on the retention of DNA samples from unconvicted individuals 
charged with a serious offence is presented in Figure 8.3. The results show that a majority 
(55%) of respondents favour a short-term923 retention period for this category of individuals, 
with a large proportion (31%) favouring retention ‘until the conclusion of 
                                                 




investigations/proceedings’. A little over one-third (38%) of participants favoured a long-
term924 retention period and 8% of participants selected ‘other’ (mainly no taking/retention 
of samples or up to 5 years retention). A similar trend was observed for unconvicted 
individuals charged with a minor offence. About 64% of participants preferred the short-
term sample retention period compared to about 25% for the long-term period and about 
11% for other approaches (no retention of samples, case-dependent or up to 5 years 
retention) (Figure 8.3).  
 
Figure 8.3 - Opinions of participants on retention period of DNA samples from unconvicted individuals 
charged with an offence. 
Demographic analysis 
Table 8.7 shows the analysis of the opinions of social groups about the sample retention 
periods for unconvicted individuals charged with a serious offence. A majority of 
participants in each social group favoured a short-term sample retention period except the 
educational level group. Whilst most participants with higher education favoured a short-
term period, about three-quarters of those with no university degree preferred a long-term 
                                                 
924 i.e. indefinite or 100 years or until death of subject 
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retention period. There was a statistically significant association between gender (p = 0.012), 
age (p = 0.003) or educational level (p = 0.017) and the DNA sample retention period. About 
44% of females favoured the long-term sample retention period compared to 28% of males. 
Young adults (46%) were more likely to select the long-term retention period than middle 
or older adults (28%). Participants with no university degree (75%) were more likely to 
favour the long-term retention period than those with a university degree (40%) or higher 
education (32%). The opposite was observed for a short-term retention period (19% of those 
with no university degree versus 55% university degree and 60% postgraduate education).  
The demographic analysis of the views of participants regarding the sample retention period 
for unconvicted individuals charged with a minor offence is shown in Table 8.8. The result 
was similar to those charged (but unconvicted) with a serious offence. In all but the 
educational level group, a majority of participants preferred a short-term sample retention 
period for unconvicted individuals charged with a minor offence. Fisher’s Exact test showed 
a significant association between educational level and the sample retention period (p = 
0.025). Most participants with no university degree (56%) preferred a long-term sample 
retention period relative to 28% of those with a university degree and 20% of those with 
postgraduate education.  In contrast, a majority of participants with a university degree 
(66%) or higher education (67%) were more likely to select a short-term sample retention 
period than those without a university degree (38%). 
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Like the results for unconvicted individuals charged with an offence, most participants 
favoured a short-term retention period for DNA samples from unconvicted individuals 
arrested for a serious (60%) or minor (66%) offence (Figure 8.4). A larger proportion of 
participants preferred retention of DNA samples ‘until the conclusion of 
investigations/proceedings’ (38% for serious offence and 42% for minor offence). The long-
term retention period was favoured by 32% and 23% of participants for unconvicted 
individuals arrested for a serious and minor offence, respectively. The percentages of those 
who selected ‘other’ were 8% if arrested for a serious crime and 11% if arrested for a minor 
offence. These mainly suggested no retention or collection of DNA samples, up to 5 years 
retention or a case-dependent approach. 
 
Figure 8.4 - Opinions of participants on retention period of DNA samples from unconvicted individuals 
arrested for an offence. 
Demographic analysis 
The analysis of the views of the survey participants showed that a majority of participants in 
all the social groups favoured a short-term sample retention period for unconvicted 
individuals arrested for a serious offence (Table 8.9). The only exception was the educational 
level group where most individuals with a university degree or above favoured a short-term 
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sample retention period, but a majority of those with no university degree preferred a long-
term retention period. The educational level group showed a statistically significant 
association with the perceived DNA sample retention period (p = 0.013). Approximately 
63% of respondents with no university degree chose the long-term sample retention period 
relative to 36% of those with a university degree and 26% of those with postgraduate 
education. Participants with a university degree (60%) or postgraduate education (65%) were 
more likely to favour the short-term period than those with no university degree (25%).  
For unconvicted individuals arrested for a minor offence, the demographic analysis showed 
that support for the short-term sample retention period was common, except for the 
educational level group (Table 8.10). The trend of the results was comparable to those 
arrested for a serious offence. A statistically significant association was found between 
educational level and perceived sample retention period using Fisher’s Exact test (p = 
0.010). A majority of respondents with no university degree (53%) chose the long-term 
sample retention period compared to 27% of those with a bachelor’s degree and 18% of 
those with postgraduate education.  In contrast, most participants with a university degree 
(69%) or postgraduate education (67%) were more likely to favour the short-term sample 
retention period than those without a university degree (40%). Section 8.2.2 discusses the 
above results for unconvicted subjects in the context of the available literature. 
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8.1.5 DNA profile retention period for unconvicted individuals 
Charged individuals 
Generally, the long-term profile retention period (indefinite/100 years/until death) was 
supported by 45% of the study participants if an unconvicted individual is charged with a 
serious offence (Figure 8.5). This was almost equal (46%) to those who favoured a short-
term profile retention period (6-years/3-years/until the conclusion of investigations or 
proceedings). In contrast, a majority of participants (57%) favoured the short-term period 
for those charged with a minor offence whilst 31% preferred the long-term retention period. 
A large proportion of participants favoured the retention of DNA profiles until the 
conclusion of investigations or proceedings if an unconvicted individual is charged with a 
serious (34%) or minor offence (44%) (Figure 8.5). 
About 9% of participants selected ‘other’ for unconvicted individuals charged with a serious 
offence. Many of these respondents proposed ‘no retention of data’. Others suggested that 
the current PoFA regime should be maintained or a case-dependent approach should be 
adopted. Those who selected ‘other’ for unconvicted individuals charged with a minor 
offence (13%) also suggested no profile retention or a case-dependent approach. One 





Figure 8.5 - Opinions of participants on retention period of DNA profiles from unconvicted individuals 
charged with an offence. 
Demographic analysis 
Table 8.11 presents a demographic analysis of the views of the study participants about the 
retention period for DNA profiles of unconvicted individuals charged with a serious offence. 
There was a statistically significant association between gender (p = 0.008) or age (p = 
0.002) and the retention period for DNA profiles. More than half of females (51%) preferred 
long-term retention of profiles compared to 35% of males. A larger proportion of males 
(49%) preferred the short-term retention period. Most young adults (55%) were more likely 
to select the long-term retention period than middle or older adults (34%).  A majority of 
middle or older adults (51%) favoured the short-term retention period.  
In the educational level group, a majority of participants with no university degree (63%) 
were more likely to select the long-term retention period than those with a university degree 
(51%) or higher education (41%). However, this was not statistically significant. Most LCS 
participants (52%) preferred the short-term retention period. Support for the long-term or 
short-term retention periods was split equally in the BHSS and NFAS participants. 
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The Chi-square test showed a statistically significant association between age and the profile 
retention period (p = 0.038) for unconvicted individuals charged with a minor offence (Table 
8.12). A majority of both young adults (57%) and middle or older adults (57%) favoured the 
short-term retention period. However, 36% of young adults favoured the long-term retention 
period compared to 25% of middle or older adults. The ‘other’ option (i.e. no data retention 
or other alternatives) was chosen by 18% of middle or older adults relative to 8% of young 
adults. Overall, most participants in each of the social groups favoured the short-term 
retention period except those with no university education (Table 8.12).  
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A majority of participants favoured the short-term (6-years/3-years/until the conclusion of 
investigations or proceedings) retention of DNA profiles from unconvicted individuals 
arrested for a serious (53%) or minor offences (58%) (Figure 8.6). A greater part of 
respondents preferred the retention of DNA profiles until the conclusion of investigations or 
proceedings if an unconvicted individual is arrested for a serious (43%) or minor offence 
(46%).  
Many respondents who chose ‘other’ for unconvicted arrestees (10% for serious arrestees 
and 14% for minor arrestees) preferred ‘no retention of data’. A few participants 
recommended that the current PoFA periods should apply or retention on a case-by-case 
basis. A 10-year retention period was suggested by one participant for unconvicted 
individuals arrested for a minor offence.  
 
Figure 8.6 - Opinions of participants on retention period for DNA profiles from unconvicted individuals 
arrested for an offence. 
Demographic analysis 
Table 8.13 presents a demographic analysis of the views of the study participants about the 
retention period for DNA profiles from unconvicted individuals arrested for a serious 
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offence. A large part of participants in all the social groups preferred the short-term retention 
period except respondents with no university degree who favoured the long-term retention 
period (63%). Only the age group showed a statistically significant association with the 
perceived retention period for DNA profiles (p = 0.002). Young adults (46%) were more 
likely to favour the long-term retention period than middle or older adults (27%). About 16% 
of middle or older adults chose ‘other’ (mainly no retention or other approaches) compared 
to 5% of young adults. 
Like the results above, most participants in each of the social groups supported the short-
term retention of DNA profiles from unconvicted individuals arrested for a minor offence 
(Table 8.14). The only exception was participants with no university degree who favoured 
long-term retention. The age (p = 0.035) and educational level (p = 0.022) groups showed a 
statistically significant association with the perceived retention period (Table 8.14). Both 
young adults and middle or older adults almost equally preferred the short-term retention 
period. However, middle or older adults (20%) were more likely to select ‘other’ (no 
retention or other alternatives) than young adults (9%). About 32% of young adults favoured 
the long-term retention period compared to 23% of middle or older adults.  
For the educational level group, participants with a university degree (34%) or higher (22%) 
were less likely to select the long-term retention period than those without a university 
degree (56%). The opposite was observed for the short-term retention period (38% < 
university degree versus 61% postgraduates and 59% university degree). 
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8.1.6 Reasons for the DNA sample and profile retention period for unconvicted 
individuals 
Among the study participants, the short-term retention period was the most common for 
DNA samples/profiles from unconvicted individuals. The free-text responses provided some 
useful insights into the preference of participants about the retention periods for DNA 
samples (n = 29; 14%) and profiles (n = 30; 15%). The main coded themes were respect for 
civil liberties, the usefulness of retention, DNA profile adequacy, and concepts of 
punishment and rehabilitation.  
Many participants who provided qualitative feedback cited civil liberties to support their 
preference for specific short retention periods or no collection of DNA. Legal and ethical 
principles such as innocent until proven guilty, informed consent, right to privacy, and 
personal freedom were the main reasons provided by these participants:  
Unconvicted people are innocent until proven guilty and convicted. There is no 
difference between them and anyone else walking about, so this is tantamount to 
saying everyone should have samples retained, and this is a step too far. (PSR13)  
Some participants felt retaining the DNA would ‘undermine the criminal justice system’ 
(PSR170) and invite ‘overzealous arrest/charging of marginalised individuals’ (PSR92). 
Others thought the continuous retention of samples/profiles from unconvicted individuals 
was unnecessary and lacked justification: ‘If not convicted of an offence, there should be no 
need to store the DNA sample, beyond the end of the proceedings’ (PSR74). Some 
participants felt the retention of profiles may only be justified in the case of serious offences: 
‘If there is evidentiary value in serious offences, this may outweigh the human rights 
infringement. However, if the person is not convicted, the sample and profile should be 
destroyed’ (PSR174). 
There were comments that justified the short or long-term retention of DNA samples/profiles 
by citing potential future uses such as upgrading the database, maintaining public security, 
preventing a miscarriage of justice and repeated sampling of individuals. A further 
justification was the need to allow a reasonable time to destroy DNA samples. One 
participant conceptualised the utilisation of DNA within the principle of solidarity, 925 
reasoning that:  
                                                 
925 Helena Machado and Susana Silva, ‘Public Participation in Genetic Databases: Crossing the Boundaries 
between Biobanks and Forensic DNA Databases through the Principle of Solidarity’ (2015) 41 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 820. 
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We are all potential criminals and victims. I believe all our DNA should be 
stored, even if we have never committed a crime, or feel we never would, (in 
which case surely you’ve nothing to worry about!) DNA identifies VICTIMS 
too, a point which the paranoid and scientifically illiterate gutter press never 
mentions! (PSR29) 
Some participants who leaned toward the usefulness of DNA also raised concerns about 
function creep and maintained that DNA profiles should be limited to comparison with crime 
scene profiles: ‘Storing the profiles isn't the issue; it's what is done with those profiles 
involuntarily that is. Using to compare to DNA found at a crime? Okay. Using them to plot 
Jo Schmo's family tree? No.’ (PSR26). 
Another reason mentioned by participants was the adequacy of the DNA profile. These 
participants felt only the DNA profile is required for identification and hence the samples 
should be destroyed after profiling.  
Finally, one participant expressed views suggesting that contact with the police 
(arrested/charged) indicates potential to commit subsequent crime, justifying a long-term 
retention of samples/profiles: ‘No smoke without fire, so if I am arrested but not charged but 
subsequently commit a crime and get caught I should suffer the consequences’ (PSR96). 
8.1.7 Summary of results 
The quantitative analysis showed strong support (61 - 80%) for the long-term retention of 
DNA samples from only serious offenders. The most common long-term retention period 
was indefinite. There was moderately strong support to strong support (41 - 80%) for the 
short-term retention of DNA samples from minor offenders, juveniles convicted of a first 
minor offence, and charged or arrested but unconvicted individuals. Sample retention until 
a profile is generated, until the conclusion of investigations/proceedings or until its purpose 
is fulfilled were the most common short-term periods. Support for other retention periods 
was either limited (1 - 20%) or moderate (21 - 40%). 
Regarding the retention of DNA profiles, there was very strong support (81-100%) for the 
long-term retention of profiles from serious offenders, with indefinite retention as the most 
common. The results revealed moderately strong support (41 – 60%) for the long-term 
retention of profiles from minor offenders, first-time juvenile offenders (minor), and 
unconvicted individuals charged with a serious offence. Support for the short-term retention 
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period was moderately strong for unconvicted individuals charged or arrested for an offence. 
The most common short-period was until the conclusion of investigations or proceedings.  
The qualitative responses showed that preference for a particular retention period was 
influenced by the following reasons: respect for civil liberties, usefulness/effectiveness of 
DNA sample/profile retention, DNA profile adequacy, and concepts of punishment and 
rehabilitation. The next section discusses the results on the retention periods for DNA 
samples and profiles included in the NDNAD. 
8.2 Discussion and conclusion 
8.2.1 Convicted individuals 
The results obtained in this study showed that the public may favour a long-term retention 
period for DNA samples and profiles from serious offenders. The opposite was observed for 
minor offenders in relation to DNA sample retention. Views on the retention period for 
profiles from minor offenders was almost split between long-term and sentence-based 
periods. In comparison to the current PoFA regime, there are some discrepancies between 
the position of the study participants and the current rules. Firstly, the current law applies a 
short retention period for all DNA samples. However, the study participants favoured a long-
term period for serious offenders. Secondly, the PoFA rules allow indefinite retention of 
profiles from all offenders except juveniles convicted of a first minor offence. The support 
for this rule was not as clear as the views on the retention of data from serious offenders. 
These findings mean that the seriousness of an offence may be a determiner of the beliefs of 
the public about how long DNA records from convicted individuals are retained.  
Several reviews and consultations completed in the UK have cited consideration of the 
gravity of an offence in determining retention periods for data from convicted individuals.926 
This factor is accounted for in the decision process of the Biometrics Commissioner in 
relation to the extended retention of data from unconvicted individuals. 927  A possible 
                                                 
926 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (n 45); Human Genetics Commission, Citizens’ Inquiry into the Forensic 
Use of DNA and the National DNA Database: Citizens’ Report (n 651); Home Office, Keeping the Right 
People on the DNA Database: Summary of Responses (n 653); Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) (n 120). 
927 Office of the Biometrics Commissioner (n 836); FIND Strategy Board, ‘Applications to the Biometrics 
Commissioner under PACE’ (Forensic Information Database Strategy Board 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/764558/A




explanation for this position (i.e. retention based on offence seriousness) may be linked to 
the conceptualisation of national DNA databases as a criminal electronic archive and a 
means of punishment for offenders. 928  In line with this, some participants highlighted 
concepts of punishment to justify their position about the length of retention for the different 
convicted groups. The results generally suggest that a more discriminatory approach for the 
retention period of data from convicted individuals may be more acceptable to the public. A 
possible reform could be a sentence-based retention period of data from adults convicted of 
a minor offence. However, this policy should be empirically supported to strike the right 
balance between the competing public and individual interests.  
The pattern of responses by young adults and middle/older adults showed that the latter may 
exhibit a more restrictive view. This is because the middle/older participants were more 
likely to select other (mainly no retention or other alternatives) for DNA samples from 
serious offenders and the convicted juvenile group. Also, young adults tended to be more 
favourable of the long-term retention of DNA profiles from minor offenders and the 
sentence-based period or long-term period for juveniles. The results corroborate the finding 
that young adults may be more optimistic about the benefits of DNA databases (Chapter 6). 
Thus, they may be more supportive of the retention of data from convicted individuals, 
whether in the short-term or long-term.     
It was found that participants with no university education favoured a long-term retention 
period for DNA samples and profiles from adult minor offenders and juveniles convicted of 
a first minor offence. This indicates educational level may have an influence on beliefs about 
the retention criteria for the NDNAD. Several studies have found that individuals with a 
higher level of education are likely to express restrictive views about DNA databasing.929 
This is thought to be due to an increased awareness of the practical details of DNA databases 
among this group.930 The apparent consistency of this trend suggests a need to promote 
                                                 
928 Machado and Silva, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the National Forensic 
DNA Database?’ (n 676); Machado and Silva, ‘Voluntary Participation in Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 676). 
929 Zieger and Utz (n 663); Machado and Silva, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in 
the National Forensic DNA Database?’ (n 676); Machado and Silva, ‘What Influences Public Views on 
Forensic DNA Testing in the Criminal Field?’ (n 656). 
930 Gamero and others, ‘A Study of Spanish Attitudes Regarding the Custody and Use of Forensic DNA 
Databases’ (n 666); Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA 
Databases’ (n 659); Machado and Silva, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the 
National Forensic DNA Database?’ (n 676). 
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awareness of DNA databases among the lay public, particularly members of the public with 
a lower level of education.  
In this study, participants specialising in law, criminology and security were significantly 
more sceptical about the long-term retention of DNA profiles from offenders. This may 
reflect an enhanced level of awareness of the actual benefits and limitations of DNA 
databasing among these members of the public.931 However, Teodorović et al.932 found that 
legal professionals (62%) in Serbia were more likely to favour indefinite retention of DNA 
data relative to the general public (39%). This finding was attributed to the fact that these 
group may lack technical knowledge and training about DNA databasing. Hence, their views 
may be influenced by the overemphasis of the benefits of DNA in the media (CSI effect).  
The more restrictive view exhibited by the participants in this study may be due to a more 
balanced awareness of DNA databasing through the popularity of legal challenges in the UK 
and European courts,933 consistent publication of reports and reviews about DNA and the 
NDNAD, government consultations about DNA/biometric policy, and application of DNA 
evidence in casework (‘Forensic effect’). 
8.2.2 Unconvicted individuals 
The 2011 survey by the MPA Civil Liberties Panel found that 84% of respondents opposed 
the retention of DNA profiles from unconvicted individuals in the NDNAD.934 In this study, 
most participants favoured the short-term retention of DNA samples and profiles from 
unconvicted individuals charged or arrested for an offence. The only exception was the 
retention of DNA profiles from those charged with a serious offence. There were split views 
between long-term and short-term retention of data. The results generally support the 
Mapper decision to differentiate between convicted individuals and unconvicted individuals 
in DNA databasing.935 It also shows that, unlike the MPA Civil Liberties Panel survey, the 
respondents in this study consider the retention of DNA from unconvicted individuals to be 
potentially valuable. The results also suggest a possible differential treatment of unconvicted 
individuals based on the gravity of the offence and the weight of evidence in the relevant 
case. Generally, the views expressed by the participants support the ‘spirit’ of the current 
                                                 
931 Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659); 
Zieger and Utz (n 663). 
932 Teodorović and others (n 122). 
933 S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44); Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) (n 120). 
934 MPA Civil Liberties Panel (n 40). 
935 S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44). 
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law (PoFA) to retain DNA records of unconvicted individuals for a relatively short period 
and informed by offence seriousness and the evidence of the case.   
The study found that females are more likely to support the long-term retention of DNA 
samples and profiles from unconvicted individuals charged with a serious offence. This may 
be linked to the gender effects of crime. Women have been reported to be more supportive 
of crime prevention efforts than males.936 This means they may be more optimistic about 
DNA databasing and are likely to express permissive views.937 On the other hand, males 
may express restrictive views because they are more likely to be sampled and included in 
the NDNAD. The high proportion of data from males in the NDNAD means men may be 
more concerned about civil liberties. The abovementioned factors may explain the gender 
differences in views about DNA databasing. 
It was also found that young adults tended to be more supportive of the prolonged retention 
of DNA samples and profiles from unconvicted individuals charged or arrested with an 
offence. As noted in the qualitative responses, this view is primarily supported by reasons 
for improving the effectiveness of the database and controlling crime. 938  The trend of 
permissive views among young adults is consistent throughout the results, confirming the 
possible influence of age on views about DNA databasing. The actual reasons for the 
differences in views among young adults and middle/older adults are not clear. However, 
this observation may be linked to the privacy paradox (attitudes and behaviours towards 
privacy technology),939 and a further quantitative and qualitative research among young 
adults may clarify this hypothesis.  
As stated earlier, the literature suggests that educational level may be linked to attitudes 
toward DNA databasing.940 Similar to the results for convicted individuals, a majority of 
participants with no university education were more likely to favour the lengthy retention of 
DNA samples and profiles from unconvicted individuals. This clearly confirms a possible 
relationship between the level of awareness and attitudes towards DNA databasing. The 
implication of these results is the development of public sensitisation programmes to ensure 
                                                 
936 Jon Hurwitz and Shannon Smithey, ‘Gender Differences on Crime and Punishment’ (1998) 51 Political 
Research Quarterly 89. 
937 Zieger and Utz (n 663); Tozzo, Fassina and Caenazzo (n 677); Guerrini and others (n 665). 
938 Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659); 
Teodorović and others (n 122). 
939 Barnes (n 857); Gerber, Gerber and Volkamer (n 36). 
940 Dundes (n 666); Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA 
Databases’ (n 659); Teodorović and others (n 122); Zieger and Utz (n 663). 
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that all members of the public are able to make an informed choice about the law and policy 
governing the national DNA database.  
To summarise, this study found that a discriminatory retention model for convicted 
individuals may be more acceptable to the public. Presently, only DNA data from convicted 
juveniles are subject to a discriminatory retention arrangement based on offence seriousness 
and recidivism. All DNA data from convicted adults are subject to indefinite retention. The 
discriminatory approach generally considers the gravity of an offence, with most participants 
favouring a long-term retention period for serious offenders and a short-term, long-term or 
sentence-based period for minor offenders. The discriminatory model was also preferred for 
unconvicted individuals, which was generally consistent with the current arrangement under 
PoFA.  The findings suggested that the public may be more accepting of a short retention 
period for unconvicted individuals. However, this policy should consider the seriousness of 
the offence and the evidence in the relevant case. It is worth noting that this study is based 
on a non-representative sample of the public hence the results cannot be generalised. 
However, the findings make an original contribution by furthering the understanding of the 
existing positions and views about forensic DNA retention in England and Wales. This may 
be useful in pending court appeals, such as the Gaughran case, about the proportionality of 
the current regime.941 The findings may also be valuable to policymakers and contribute to 
the development of the legal framework for the NDNAD and other biometric databases.  As 
observed in the responses, there is limited clarity about the specific length of retention for 
the different categories of individuals. To avoid arbitrary decisions on specific long-term or 
short-term periods, evidence on the actual benefits of retaining data for a particular period 
(e.g. 5 years versus 10 years) should be provided and shared with the public.  This will help 
ensure that the ‘societal choice’ of the public about the rules to govern DNA databases is 
informed, robust, balanced and transparent.
                                                 
941 Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (Secretary of State for the Home 
Department intervening) (n 120); Wiles, Annual Report 2018: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of 
Biometric Material (n 115), para 3. 
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Chapter 9: Voluntary participation in the National DNA 
Database 
Voluntary participation in forensic DNA databases has been explored by several studies.942 
This aspect of DNA databasing is important because the collection of reference DNA is 
gradually becoming a common routine or administrative process943 for individuals linked to 
the chain of custody in DNA-related incidents or offences. This may include victims, law 
enforcement officers, DNA consumable manufacturers, crime scene officers, witnesses and 
arrestees. The current law governing the NDNAD allows individuals to voluntarily provide 
their DNA data to be held in the database.944 This applies if the individual cannot be included 
in the database on any other statutory grounds (such as being arrested, charged or convicted 
of a crime). As part of this process, the volunteer is required to provide informed written 
consent; consent can be withdrawn at any time, and if consent is given, the profile can be 
retained until the purpose for which it was taken is fulfilled. The general rule for DNA 
samples applies to volunteers – destruction after profiling or up to 6 months. In line with the 
third aim of this research, the survey explored the conditions that may influence volunteers 
to participate in the NDNAD by asking participants whether they would be willing to provide 
their DNA records under certain given circumstances. Participants were also asked about the 
retention periods for DNA samples and profiles taken from volunteers. The results of the 
public survey are presented in section 9.1 below. This is followed by the discussion in section 
9.2. The Chapter makes an original contribution by identifying the main motivations and 
justifications for voluntary participation in the NDNAD. 
9.1 Public survey results on voluntary participation in the NDNAD 
The responses of the participants are presented in Figure 9.1. A majority of participants 
(52%) answered ‘Yes’ if their DNA records can assist the police in resolving crime. More 
than half (51%) of respondents answered ‘No’ if they are only a witness to a crime. A 
relatively large percentage of participants answered ‘Yes’ if they are a victim of an offence 
(41%) and if their data is stored in a separate volunteer’s database (43%).  
                                                 
942 Machado and Silva, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the National Forensic 
DNA Database?’ (n 676); Machado and Silva, ‘Voluntary Participation in Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 676); 
Teodorović and others (n 122). 
943 i.e. similar to taking the name, age and residence of a person 




Figure 9.1 - Opinion of participants to the question ‘Would you volunteer to donate your DNA records to be 
retained on the National DNA Database if...’ 
Demographic analysis 
The analysis of the responses of social groups about voluntary participation in the NDNAD 
if one is a victim of a crime is summarised in Table 9.1. Generally, a greater proportion of 
males, females, young adults, participants specialising in NFAS and those with a university 
degree or higher answered ‘yes’ to this question. Only the specialisation area showed a 
statistically significant association with the perceived participation in the NDNAD if one is 
a victim of a crime (p = 0.040). A majority of NFAS participants (51%) were more likely to 
answer yes than LCS (31%) and BHSS (30%) participants. The NFAS respondents were less 
likely to select ‘perhaps’ than the other two groups (16% versus 36% BHSS and 38% LCS).  
Table 9.2 shows a similar pattern of response across the different social groups in relation to 
voluntary participation in the NDNAD if one is a witness to a crime. A majority or a large 
part of participants in each social group answered ‘No’ to this question. No statistically 
significant associations were found between the social groups and responses. 
The analysis of the responses of social groups showed that a majority of females, young 
adults, participants with a university degree or lower, and those specialising in LCS and 
NFAS are willing to provide their DNA records if it can assist the police in resolving crime 
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(Table 9.3). A relatively large proportion of males, participants with postgraduate education 
and those specialising in BHSS also answered yes. The social groups showed no statistically 
significant association with the perceived voluntary participation in the NDNAD if the data 
can assist the police.  
In relation to participation in the NDNAD if the data is stored in a separate database, a large 
proportion of participants in each social group answered in the affirmative except the LCS 
participants who answered no (Table 9.4). Most participants with no university degree (53%) 
answered yes to this question. Again, there was no statistically significant association 
between the social groups and responses.  
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9.1.1 Retention period for DNA samples from volunteers 
About three quarters (73%) of participants preferred a short-term retention period for DNA 
samples from volunteers, ranging from until its purpose is fulfilled to 6 months (Figure 9.2). 
A large proportion of the participants (42%) were in favour of retention of samples until the 
purpose for which it was taken is fulfilled. The long-term retention period (indefinite/100 
years/until death) was favoured by 20% of participants. Those who selected ‘other’ (~8%) 
mainly thought the retention period should be determined by the volunteer. Some maintained 
that samples should not be taken or retained. One participant thought retention of volunteers’ 
data should be informed by statistical evidence of its potential value.  
 
Figure 9.2 - Opinion of participants to the question ‘How long should the physical DNA sample taken from 
volunteers be retained?’ (n = 200) 
The analysis of social groups revealed no statistically significant association between 
demographic characteristics and the perceived sample retention period for volunteers (all p 
> 0.05; Table 9.5). A majority of participants in all the social groups favoured the short-term 






Table 9.5 - Opinions on retention period for DNA samples taken from volunteers; by gender, age, 
educational level and specialisation 
 
9.1.2 Retention period for DNA profiles from volunteers 
A majority of participants (54%) favoured the retention of volunteer DNA profiles until its 
purpose is fulfilled (Figure 9.3). Overall, 61% of participants supported a short-retention 
period (until its purpose is fulfilled/3-years/6-years). A little over a quarter of respondents 
(28%) preferred the long-term retention period (indefinite/100 years/until death). 
Participants who chose ‘other’ (11%) either thought the retention period should be 




Figure 9.3 - Opinion of participants to the question ‘How long should the DNA profile of volunteers be 
retained on the database?’ (n = 199) 
Table 9.6 shows the statistical analysis of social groups about the retention of volunteer DNA 
profiles. Generally, a majority of participants in each social group preferred a short-term 
profile retention period except participants with no university education who were split 
between long-term and short-term periods. Only age was statistically significantly associated 
with the perceived retention period for DNA profiles of volunteers (p = 0.035). Preference 
for the short-term (64% versus 57%) and long-term (30% versus 26%) periods was higher 
among young adults than middle or older adults. Conversely, young adults (6%) were less 










Table 9.6 - Opinions on retention period for DNA profiles of volunteers; by gender, age, educational level 
and specialisation 
 
9.1.3 Reasons for voluntary participation in the National DNA Database 
The quantitative results showed that most respondents are likely to participate in the database 
if their DNA profile can assist the police. The qualitative responses revealed some of the 
reasoning of participants. The key themes from the 40 comments (20%) were the usefulness 
of DNA information and consideration of civil liberties.  
Participants who subscribed to the usefulness of DNA information reasoned that their DNA 
could establish their innocence, eliminate them from an inquiry, and assist police 
investigations: ‘I sometimes hear of cases where groups of people are asked to volunteer to 
solve a particularly horrific crime where the police are struggling for leads. I think I'd agree, 
but I'm not sure I'd want it retained’ (PSR142). Some justified their position by drawing on 
the concept of ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’: ‘I have nothing to hide! As crass as it sounds 
I think this is the crux of it all’ (PSR114). Others based their reasoning on the principle of 
solidarity and their experience of the criminal justice system:  
I would consent to my DNA being stored on any database. It doesn’t do me any 
harm whatsoever, and if I became a victim of crime it could help me. If I 
committed a crime it could help those victims. (PSR29) 
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I used to work as a CSI for the UK police so understand the value of DNA in 
investigations. (PSR42) 
Some of the above respondents provided additional conditions for voluntary participation in 
the database. These were the destruction of records after fulfilling its purpose, one-time 
search of the NDNAD, and use of records in only serious offences.  
Respect for civil liberties was the predominant reason for participants who would be 
reluctant or refuse to participate in the NDNAD voluntarily. The specific concerns were 
distrust of authorities, the usefulness of databases, the abuse of power, function creep, data 
security, autonomy, personal freedom and proportionality.  Some of these participants linked 
their reasoning to their experience in the criminal justice system:  
I work in the field of forensic DNA and genetics, and I appreciate the problems 
around the information and technology. I should be definitely in favour of such 
a database, but other technologies are misused to such an extent that I don't think 
we should be using DNA in the same way, given the vastly increased amount of 
personal information stored in DNA. (PSR12) 
Some participants who expressed strong restrictive views thought the use of DNA should be 
limited to research in population genetics and diseases. However, such databases should be 
based on the ethical principles of medical research:  
I am interested in the outcomes of mapping heredity, transmission and resistance 
to disease etc. But databases around these can be ran on a voluntary basis, openly 
and democratically and people can opt out at their discretion. (PSR89) 
Regarding the length of volunteer sample and profile retention, there were 21 (10.4%) and 
27 (13.4%)) comments respectively. Two main themes emerged from the qualitative 
responses: usefulness of sample/profile retention and civil liberties. Some participants who 
inclined to the former reasoned that long-term retention of DNA samples/profiles from 
volunteers can assist the police ‘to catch criminals’ (PSR96) or help the police resolve cases.  
However, others thought it is unnecessary to retain samples/profiles after the purpose for 
which they were taken has been fulfilled. To one participant, this regime ‘will encourage 
volunteers to help with elimination’ (PSR114). A few participants thought only the DNA 
profile is useful (profile adequacy), hence the sample should be destroyed after profiling:  
If there is nothing riding on the accuracy of the profile, then it doesn't need to be 
stored beyond the profile's generation. Plus, I assume that a volunteer would be 




In contrast to the above, participants who placed emphasis on civil liberties posited that 
volunteers are not criminals and hence should be treated with higher protection than 
offenders. These participants favoured a short-term sample/profile retention period. The 
specific protections recommended were participation by informed consent; withdrawal of 
consent and destruction of records at any point in time; restriction of the use of data to cases 
beneficial to the individual or the specific purpose for which it was taken; and autonomy of 
volunteers to specify retention periods: 
[T]he DNA of volunteers should be treated with greater care than that of those 
on the criminal database as they haven't been accused or have committed any 
crime so their rights require greater protection as they pose no particular threat 
to the public. (PSR70) 
9.1.4 Other comments on DNA retention 
Some participants (n = 42; 21%) provided additional comments on their concerns about 
forensic DNA retention and DNA analysis in general. The predominant themes were civil 
liberties, the effectiveness of DNA and the implementation efficiency/cost of retention 
regimes.  
Most participants were concerned about civil liberties. The issues raised were the privacy of 
genetic data, misuse of genetic records or unknown uses of personal data, informed consent, 
function creep, distrust of authorities, the likelihood of wrong arrests and charges, and 
overreliance on DNA. Some felt there should be adequate assurance of the protection of data 
to encourage voluntary participation. In relation to this concern, a few participants criticised 
the inconsistent interpretation of consent by authorities:  
At present, there is an almost sanctioned policy of taking samples before people 
are charged under the pretext of this being by consent. In my experience, this 
does not happen, and samples should not be taken until after charge. (PSR13) 
Previous evidence shows the government misinterprets consent to suit their 
needs. The potential for misuse is too great (PSR37). 
In contrast to the comments above, some participants reiterated their support for DNA 
profiling or databasing on grounds of enhancing public security: ‘I support DNA profiling. 
I think it’s the biggest investigative tool in the 20/21st century and it keeps developing’ 
(PSR114). Those who favoured a more expansive database reasoned that ‘innocent people 
have nothing to fear’ (PSR96). Others considered that the usefulness of DNA is contextual 
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and subject to appropriate interpretation. Hence, the retention and use of DNA should be 
‘necessary and not just in case’ (PSR170).  
Lastly, a few participants thought the administrative aspects of DNA retention is inefficient 
and expensive. There were concerns about discretionary retention practices, availability of 
resources and compliance. It was thought that aspects of data retention that require police 
discretion should be independently assessed and recorded. The concerns about the 
implementation efficiency/cost of DNA databasing was expressed by one participant in the 
following terms: ‘My main concern is whether for resource reasons (esp. with fiscal 
austerity), police organisation/culture and the historically unreliable PNR systems, the 
statutory retention regime is fully complied with’ (PSR33). 
9.1.5 Summary of results 
In summary, the quantitative results showed that the predominant condition for voluntary 
participation in the database is the usefulness of the volunteer’s data in case resolution. There 
was strong support for the short-term retention of samples and profiles from volunteers, with 
a majority favouring retention until the purpose for which the DNA (and derived data) was 
taken is fulfilled. The preference for a particular retention period was influenced by reasons 
of civil liberties, usefulness/effectiveness of DNA sample/profile retention, DNA profile 
adequacy, and concepts of punishment and rehabilitation. Participants also highlighted 
concerns about the implementation efficiency or cost of DNA databasing. 
9.2 Discussion and conclusion 
This study found that the main condition that could influence the public to voluntarily 
participate in the NDNAD is the value of their own DNA records in helping the police solve 
crime. This reason was noted by some participants in the qualitative responses and has been 
cited in studies about voluntary participation in national DNA databases.945 It has been 
observed that some members of the public may neutralise the risks of DNA databases 
(infringement of civil liberties) by appealing to moral concepts of solidarity, altruism, and 
                                                 
945 Curtis, ‘Public Perceptions and Expectations of the Forensic Use of DNA’ (n 642); Machado and Silva, 
‘Voluntary Participation in Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 676); Curtis, ‘Public Understandings of the Forensic 
Use of DNA’ (n 642). 
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utilitarianism.946 The results suggest that an awareness of the direct contribution of DNA 
data may encourage voluntary participation in the NDNAD.  
It was observed that conditions of status, such as a victim or witness of crime or creation of 
a separate volunteer’s database may be limited in encouraging voluntary participation in the 
NDNAD. This means the inclusion of volunteer data in the NDNAD as a routine or 
administrative process is unsupported. One of the main reasons for including DNA data of 
victims and witnesses in the NDNAD is to facilitate their elimination from a criminal 
inquiry. However, this type of elimination can be carried out without entry of the data in the 
NDNAD. The crime scene profile from the relevant crime for which they have been sampled 
can be directly compared to their reference profile. This may be a possible explanation for 
the refusal or reluctance to voluntarily participate in the database on these grounds. Other 
possible reasons, as cited in the free-text responses, may be issues of civil liberties, distrust 
of authorities and the conceptualisation of the database as a criminal database and a means 
of punishment.947  
The establishment of separate elimination databases has been either proposed or 
implemented for law enforcement officers or individuals involved in the chain of custody of 
biological samples from crime scenes in many countries. As stated earlier, the PED and CED 
serve this purpose in England and Wales. Inclusion in these types of databases may be 
voluntary and/or anonymous, and the database may be speculatively searched. Whilst the 
available evidence show some acceptance of such databases, there has been resistance to 
participation among crime scene workers (CSWs) based on civil liberty reasons.948 In a 
Canadian study, it was observed that participation in elimination databases increased when 
CSWs were introduced to the benefits of inclusion in such a database – preventing specious 
investigative leads.949 Whilst elimination databases may be justified for CSWs and other 
officers who are frequently involved in the chain of custody of evidence, this may not be 
appropriate for the general public. This is because a hit in a civilian elimination database 
may lead to a risk of surveillance and arrest. Further such databases may be subject to 
familial searching. These factors may explain the reasons why a separate volunteer’s 
database may not encourage voluntary participation. Overall, the results in this present study 
                                                 
946 Machado and Silva, ‘Voluntary Participation in Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 676). 
947 Curtis, ‘Public Understandings of the Forensic Use of DNA’ (n 642); Machado and Silva, ‘Voluntary 
Participation in Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 676). 
948 Lapointe and others (n 395). 
949 Lapointe and others (n 395). 
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suggest that the major factor to encourage individuals to voluntarily partake in the NDNAD 
is the potential contribution of the volunteer’s data to crime resolution. This implies a 
requirement for authorities to establish how the DNA records of a specific volunteer can 
contribute to police investigations prior to sampling and inclusion.  Further to this evidence, 
a system could be initiated to alert volunteers about how their DNA records assisted law 
enforcement officers to resolve crime. This may be done through text messages or email. 
The specialisation of participants was significantly associated with the voluntary 
participation in the NDNAD if one is a victim of crime. The participants who specialised in 
the fields of natural, formal and applied sciences were more likely to answer ‘yes’, 
suggesting a more permissive view than those specialising in law, criminology and security 
or business, humanities and social sciences. The literature indicates scientists may be more 
optimistic of the potential of databases than professionals working in law enforcement.950  
This view may be drawn from a more theoretical perspective about the benefits of science 
including the value of DNA. Comparatively, it is thought that criminal justice professionals 
may be influenced by a more practical ‘forensic-effect’ compared to other members of the 
public.951 This exposure suggests a high awareness of both the positives and negatives of 
DNA, informing a more moderate view among this group. Regarding participants 
specialising in business, humanities and social sciences, their views may be influenced by a 
high appreciation of civil liberties and less knowledge about the benefits of science and 
technology. However, there is a need for further research to explore this hypothesis. 
A majority of participants in this study thought volunteer samples and profiles should be 
retained for a short period of time, mainly until the sampling purpose is achieved. This 
suggests a wide acceptance of the current law on the retention of DNA records from 
volunteers. The age range of participants was found to be significantly associated with views 
on retention periods for DNA profiles from volunteers. Middle or older adults were less 
likely to favour the retention of DNA data from volunteers. This appears to support the 
literature about the relatively more permissive view of young adults about biometric data.952  
In summary, the results of the public survey about voluntary participation in the NDNAD is 
in agreement with the PoFA regime. However, the data showed that clarity on the value of 
                                                 
950 Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659). 
951 Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659). 
952 Machado and Silva, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the National Forensic 
DNA Database?’ (n 676). 
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volunteer’s data to crime resolution may encourage participation in the NDNAD. The value 
of volunteer DNA databases has become popular in the advent of private genealogy 
databases which use DNA records to build the family tree of individuals.953 These have been 
used by law enforcement officers to help resolve some serious cold cases, such as the Golden 
State Killer case in the United States.954 Issues of privacy with such databases have prompted 
the development of policies that favour privacy-by-design and informed consent.955 Whilst 
this policy has led to the exclusion or unavailability of this non-criminal justice data for law 
enforcement purposes, some individuals have voluntarily opted-in.956 This trend may be 
influenced by the emphasis of the benefits or value of such data in the media. However, it is 
not clear whether the overall contribution of such data is significant to the resolution of all 
DNA-related crime and whether such databases present any practical risks to the individual 
and their biological relatives (such as unwanted surveillance, investigation, and potential 
criminalisation of a family).957 In some cases where private genealogy databases have been 
used, it has been observed that these cases could have been solved using familial searching 
in a database of convicted individuals.958 This is because the identified suspects already had 
biological relatives with conviction records. An understanding of the necessity of volunteers’ 
databases and their actual advantages and disadvantages may inform the public about 
whether to voluntarily participate or not participate in such databases.     
                                                 
953 Debbie Kennett, ‘Using Genetic Genealogy Databases in Missing Persons Cases and to Develop Suspect 
Leads in Violent Crimes’ (2019) 301 Forensic Science International 107. 
954 BBC News, ‘US Suspect Traced Using Genealogy Sites’ BBC News (27 April 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43916830> accessed 25 July 2018. 
955 Seth Augenstein, ‘GEDmatch Changes Are “Blow” to Law Enforcement – and Forensic Genealogy’ 
(Forensic Magazine, 20 May 2019) <https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2019/05/gedmatch-changes-blow-
law-enforcement-and-forensic-genealogy> accessed 7 June 2019. 
956 Seth Augenstein, ‘GEDmatch Update: Genealogy Database “Opt-in” Numbers Climb’ (Forensic 
Magazine, 30 May 2019) <https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2019/05/gedmatch-update-genealogy-
database-opt-numbers-climb> accessed 7 June 2019. 
957 Granja and Machado (n 656). 
958 Kennett (n 953). 
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Chapter 10: Effectiveness of DNA retention regimes: 
stakeholder views 
10.1 Introduction 
The fourth aim of this research was to understand the views of primary stakeholders 
(‘experts’) about the effectiveness of the different retentions regimes for the NDNAD. Seven 
effectiveness criteria were identified from the literature review, which served as a basis for 
the development of an online questionnaire. This was piloted and sent to 109 identified 
NDNAD stakeholder bodies/organisations involved in the collection and processing of DNA 
samples, use of the NDNAD, oversight and operation of the NDNAD, and those with a 
special interest in the operation/use of the NDNAD in England and Wales. The study was 
conducted following approval by the Northumbria Faculty of Business and Law Ethics 
Committee (Appendix XIV). This chapter is organised as follows. Section 10.2 details the 
survey methodology for this project. The results of the stakeholder survey are presented in 
section 10.3. The implications of the findings are discussed and summarized in sections 10.4 
and 10.5, respectively. The original contribution of this chapter is the identification of the 
regime considered as the most effective among stakeholders. Further, the chapter provides 
insights into the justifications of members of the expert group and how the NDNAD regime 
may be improved. 
10.2 Methodology 
The details of the survey methodology, including its advantages and challenges, are covered 
in Chapter 5. In this project, a survey questionnaire was developed and emailed to the 
NDNAD stakeholder organisations/bodies/individuals between November 2017 and July 
2018. The stakeholder agencies/groups were invited to circulate the link to the online 
questionnaire among staff, members or employees. The NDNAD stakeholders included in 
the study were the 43 Police Forces in England and Wales; the British Transport Police 
(BTP); 3 FSPs; 3 managers and oversight bodies of the NDNAD; and 59 relevant criminal 
justice institutions, policymakers and forensic genetics and human rights agencies. A copy 
of the questionnaire, organization and participant consent forms are provided in Appendix 
VI, VII and VIII, respectively. Organizations and respondents were required to sign the 
consent forms before participating in the study. Information collected from the survey 
respondents were anonymised.  
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10.2.1 Survey design 
10.2.1.1 Questionnaire design 
After establishing the aims and objectives of this project, a review of the literature identified 
seven effectiveness criteria for assessing the efficacy of forensic DNA data retention 
regimes:  
(1) the crime-solving capacity of the DNA database,  
(2) incapacitation effect the database,  
(3) deterrence effect of DNA data retention,  
(4) protection of genetic privacy of individuals,  
(5) proportionality of the retention regime,  
(6) the time, resources and effort required to implement the retention regime 
(implementation efficiency), and  
(7) the cost of implementation or cost-effectiveness.959   
The seven effectiveness criteria informed the set of questions considered in the survey. These 
included a combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions using Likert scales, 
checkbox (CBQ), and MCQ questions. Twenty questions related to the effectiveness criteria 
were initially generated for inclusion in the survey instrument. To refine these questions, in-
depth discussions were held with the researcher’s supervision team, law and forensic science 
academics, law enforcement policy professionals and potential respondents were also 
consulted to streamline the set of questions for the survey. 
The first section of the final questionnaire consisted of a short introduction of the 
effectiveness criteria being assessed and the different retention regimes governing the 
England and Wales NDNAD. The second section covered questions related to the general 
demographic information of participants including gender, age range, and employment 
information. These set of simple and easy to answer questions were included at the beginning 
to put respondents at ease before responding to the main questions.960 Questions related to 
all seven effectiveness criteria were captured in the subsequent sections of the questionnaire.  
                                                 
959 Bieber (n 89); Nuffield Council on Bioethics (n 45); S and Marper v The United Kingdom (n 44); Gabriel, 
Boland and Holt (n 12); Wallace (n 591); MacGregor, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention 
and Use of Biometric Material (n 80); McCartney, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets’ (n 44); 
McCartney, Wilson and Williams (n 44); Wallace and others (n 107). 
960 Murray (n 797); Oppenheim (n 809). 
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The primary aim of the questionnaire was to gather the perspectives of stakeholders on the 
efficacy of the NDNAD retention regimes, focussing on their effectiveness rating of the 
regimes based on the seven criteria. The questionnaire also sought the views of respondents 
on ways the retention regime for the NDNAD could be improved. The attached introductory 
letter explained the focus of the survey (see Appendix VI). The standard type of questions 
asked were Likert scales and closed questions. To ensure flexibility in the responses, an 
‘other’ or free-text option was included as part of the fixed question options. Like the public 
survey instrument, the Likert scale options were word-labelled to ensure that the ratings are 
reliable.961 The last section of the questionnaire included a ranking question which was 
aimed at assessing the level of importance of the seven effectiveness criteria. Finally, open-
ended questions were provided to allow respondents to comment on the implementation 
efficiency of the PoFA regime, any additional effectiveness criterion that was not measured 
or provide any other general comments. 
10.2.1.2 Pre-test and pilot study 
A pre-test of the stakeholder questionnaire was conducted among potential respondents, 
academics and researchers at the Northumbria University School of Law and Centre for 
Forensic Science. The purpose was to assess the clarity, layout, comprehensibility and 
validity of the questionnaire. Items that were difficult to understand or answer by 
respondents, such as the meaning of the effectiveness criteria, were reworded or explained 
and retested. The form of data and reliability of the questionnaire was assessed in a pilot test 
among attendees of the ESRC Research Seminar series on genetics, technology, security and 
justice. These include forensic genetics academics, forensic scientists, criminal justice 
officials and forensic biometrics policymakers. The assessment criteria/questions considered 
by participants in the pre-test and pilot test of the instrument is provided in Appendix IX. 
The questionnaire assessment form measured how long it takes to complete the survey 
questionnaire, and the rating of the level of appropriateness of the instrument in terms of 
length, layout, content and design. Participants were also asked to indicate the level of 
difficulty in completing the survey questionnaire. Open-ended questions were provided for 
participants to suggest improvements to the survey instrument or comment on any items that 
are ambiguous or difficult to understand.  The feedback from the pre-test and pilot study 
                                                 
961 Fowler and Cosenza (n 787). 
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were analysed to identify any issues with the form of data, reliability and validity. This 
resulted in minor changes to the questionnaire.   
10.2.1.3 Survey implementation 
The final self-administered questionnaire was designed and administered using the Online 
Surveys software. A cover letter was emailed to 109 NDNAD stakeholder 
organisations/agencies with the link to the online survey. The introductory email asked the 
agencies to forward the survey to their staff mailing list inviting them to participate in the 
study. Agencies that replied to the email requested that the responses of employees should 
be treated as individual responses and should not be associated with the organisation. Others 
replied that staff or members of the agency or organisation should be contacted directly in 
their individual capacity. Due to this challenge, organisational consent forms were not 
signed. However, all individual respondents were required to sign the participant consent 
form before completing the questionnaire.   
Participants were required to rate each retention regime based on the seven effectiveness 
criteria. They were also asked to suggest ways of improving the retention regime for the 
NDNAD. Initially, a rough estimate of the average number of participants per 
organization/agency was 5, resulting in an expected total population size of 540 respondents. 
A nonprobability sampling was chosen because of difficulty in estimating the exact number 
of the target population. This is due to unavailability of a reliable sampling frame. However, 
the inclusion of all the relevant stakeholder organizations was to ensure that the data is 
representative of the population. The respondent progress report for the stakeholder survey 
is shown in Appendix X. This shows that the survey was accessed 384 times (this may 
include multiple clicks by an individual). Thirty-one complete responses were received at 
the end of the stakeholder survey. The low sample size may be due to the reluctance of 
organisations/bodies to be associated with the study. This means that the results of the survey 
cannot be generalised. However, descriptive analysis of the data could provide useful 
information for further research about the views of stakeholders on the effectiveness of the 
NDNAD retention regimes. The findings also complement the results of the public survey 
in creating a more balanced picture on DNA databasing. This is significant because the study 
is the first to quantitatively assess perceived effectiveness of NDNAD retention regimes 
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among this expert group, building on previous qualitative studies/reviews on this specific 
subject.962 
10.2.2 Survey data analysis 
The IBM SPSS statistical software version 24 was used to analyse the responses from the 
survey. The Shapiro-Wilk test963 was used to assess whether the distribution of the dataset 
was normal or not. A non-normal distribution confirms the appropriateness of non-
parametric statistics which makes no distributional assumptions that require parameters, 
such as, the mean and standard deviation.964 The non-parametric Friedman test or Friedman 
ANOVA965 was used in assessing the differences in the rating of the effectiveness of the 
three different retention regimes. The Friedman test was used because the dependent variable 
was measured using Likert scales (i.e. ordinal data). Further, the rating of the three regimes 
was carried out by the same group of participants.966 The qualitative or free-text responses 
were analysed with the aid of the NVivo software which aids in the organisation and coding 
of qualitative data.967  
10.3 Results 
10.3.1 Characteristics of respondents 
Out of the 31 respondents to the stakeholder questionnaire, a majority (68%) were law 
enforcement experts, 16% were forensic science specialists, 13% specialised in law and 
legislation, and 3% specialised in medicine (Table 10.1). Most participants (94%) were in 
their middle ages or older (35 to ≥ 65 years) and there were more males (74%) than females 
(26%). The total years of experience of most respondents (90%) was more than 10 years, 
indicating that most respondents were working within the criminal justice system prior to 
the Marper ruling in 2008.  
  
                                                 
962 Williams and Johnson, ‘“Wonderment and Dread”’ (n 646); Home Office, Keeping the Right People on 
the DNA Database: Summary of Responses (n 653). 
963 Andy Field, Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS (4th edn, SAGE Publications, Ltd 2013). 
964 Lucy (n 812); Craig Adam, Essential Mathematics and Statistics for Forensic Science (Wiley-Blackwell 
2010). 
965 Field (n 963). 
966 Field (n 963). 
967 Bryman (n 312) 601-617. 
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Table 10.1 - Characteristics of respondents to the NDNAD stakeholder survey (n = 31) 
  
10.3.2 Level of importance of the seven effectiveness criteria 
The survey tested seven effectiveness criteria derived from the literature review. Using a 7-
point scale (1 = low importance; 7 = extremely important), the respondents were asked to 
rate the level of importance of each criterion. Figure 10.1 presents a box plot of the ratings 
of the study participants. Overall, most respondents rated each criterion to be important. 
However, crime-solving capacity was rated as an extremely important criterion (median 
score of 7) in assessing the effectiveness of retention regimes. The median scores for the 
other criteria were 5 for incapacitation effect, deterrence effect and proportionality; 4.5 for 
implementation efficiency and implementation cost; and 4 for protection of genetic privacy.  
Five respondents provided additional comments to the open-ended question about other 
criteria to measure in assessing the effectiveness of DNA retention regimes. The free-text 
responses were coded with the aid of NVivo and five general themes emerged: effectiveness 
of the Scottish Model; the impact of technological advancements; efficiency of 
investigations; impact of the level of crime; and efficiency of legal checks of DNA hits. 




Figure 10.1 - Box plot of participant responses to the question ‘How would you rate the level of importance 
of the seven effectiveness criteria?’ (1 = low importance; 7 = extremely important). 
10.3.3 Crime-solving capacity 
A majority (94%) of the 31 respondents thought that the expansive regime is the most 
effective regime for solving crime. The data for the level of effectiveness of the retention 
regimes were first tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The data was found to 
be non-normal (p < 0.05; α = 0.05) hence confirming the need for non-parametric testing 
using the Friedman test. There was a statistically significant difference in the perceived level 
of effectiveness of the three retention regimes, χ2 (2) = 39.851, p < 0.001. The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was carried out in a post hoc analysis with a Bonferroni correction (p set at 
< 0.017).968 As shown in Table 10.2, the expansive regime was rated to be of much higher 
effectiveness than either the restrictive (Z = -4.419; p < 0.001) or semi-restrictive regimes 
(Z = -4.500; p < 0.001). Among the participants, a DNA database regulated by an expansive 
                                                 
968 Field (n 963). 
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regime regarded as extremely effective in solving crime, with an average score of 4.5 on a 
5-point Likert scale. The average score for both the restrictive and the semi-restrictive 
regimes was 3 and there was no significant difference in the rating of these two regimes (Z 
= -1.418; p = 0.156).  
Table 10.2 - Average level of effectiveness of the retention regimes by crime-solving capacity (1 = Not at all 
effective; 5 = extremely effective) 
 
*The total number of participants was 31. One participant was excluded because the ratings of the two other 
regimes were not completed. 
When asked about what could improve the crime-solving capacity of the database, most 
respondents (84%, n = 26) favoured indefinite or long-term (100 years/until death) retention 
of DNA samples and/or profiles of arrestees (Table 10.3). One respondent selected ‘other’ 
and suggested ‘unrestricted retention of DNA material. Ideally taken at birth and linked to 
biometric identification record’ (R2/FS).  
Table 10.3 - Opinions regarding what could improve the crime-solving capacity of the NDNAD 
 
10.3.4 Incapacitation effect 
Most respondents (90%) thought that a DNA database governed by an expansive regime has 
the most effective incapacitation effect. Two respondents (7%) chose the restrictive regime 
whilst one respondent (3%) chose the semi-restrictive regime. The Friedman test was carried 
out on the data for the level of effectiveness of the incapacitation effect following the Shapiro 
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Wilk test for normality. The data was found to be non-normally distributed (p < 0.05; α = 
0.05). The Friedman test showed a statistically significant difference in the level of perceived 
effectiveness of the incapacitation effect of the different regimes, χ2(2) = 36.072, p < 0.001. 
Table 10.4 shows the median (IQR) perceived level of effectiveness for the different 
retention regimes. On a 5-point scale, the median scores of the regimes were 4 for the 
expansive regime and 3 for both the restrictive and semi-restrictive regimes.  
Like the results for crime-solving capacity, the expansive regime rated significantly higher 
than both the restrictive (Z = -3.892; p < 0.001) and semi-restrictive (Z = -3.629; p < 0.001) 
regimes following the Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a Bonferroni correction (p < 0.017). 
Although the median scores for the restrictive and semi-restrictive were the same, there was 
a significant variation (Z = -2.840; p = 0.005). The IQR shows that ~25% of the ratings for 
the semi-restrictive regime was lower than a score of 3 whilst ~25% for the restrictive regime 
was lower than 2. On average, the expansive regime was perceived to have a very effective 
incapacitation effect whilst the other two regimes were thought to be moderately effective.  
Table 10.4 - Average level of effectiveness of the retention regimes by incapacitation effect (1 = Not at all 
effective; 5 = extremely effective) 
 
Table 10.5 presents the response to the question about what will improve the incapacitation 
effect of the NDNAD. A similar trend of responses as the crime-solving capacity was 
observed. A majority of respondents (84%, n = 26) favoured the long-term or indefinite 
retention of DNA samples and/or profiles of all arrestees. One respondent favoured DNA 




Table 10.5 - Opinions regarding what could improve the incapacitation effect of the NDNAD 
 
10.3.5 Deterrence effect 
A majority of respondents (90%) chose the expansive regime as the regime with the most 
effective deterrence effect. Two respondents (7%) chose the restrictive regime and one 
respondent (3%) chose the semi-restrictive regime. The data for the level of effectiveness of 
the deterrent effect of the different regimes were found to be non-normal using the Shapiro-
Wilk test (p < 0.05; α = 0.05). On a 5-point scale, the average scores for the restrictive, 
expansive and semi-restrictive regimes were 2, 3.5 and 3, respectively. The median (IQR) 
ratings of the different regimes are shown in Table 10.6. The Friedman test showed a 
statistically significant difference in the rating of the different retention regimes (χ2 (2) = 
23.754; p < 0.001). Post hoc analysis using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a Bonferroni 
correction (p < 0.017) showed that the expansive regime performed better than the restrictive 
(Z = - 3.461; p = 0.001) and semi-restrictive regimes (Z = -3.727; p < 0.001).  There was 
no statistically significant difference between the restrictive and semi-restrictive regimes (Z 
= -0.774; p = 0.439). 
Table 10.6 - Average level of effectiveness of the retention regimes by deterrent effect (1 = Not at all 
effective; 5 = extremely effective) 
 
*The total number of participants was 31. One participant was excluded because the ratings of the regimes 
were not completed. 
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Respondents were also asked about what could improve the deterrence effect of the 
NDNAD. Table 10.7 shows the distribution of responses amongst the study population. A 
majority of respondents expressed expansive views to enhance the deterrence effect of the 
NDNAD. Fourteen participants (45%) favoured indefinite or long-term retention of DNA 
samples and/or profiles of all arrestees. More than a quarter of respondents (32%) suggested 
indefinite retention of DNA samples and/or profiles of all citizens. Three respondents (10%) 
selected a retention period of 6 years for DNA profiles of all unconvicted individuals. The 
free-text response by four participants (13%) who selected ‘other’ was coded using NVivo 
and two main themes emerged: support for DNA databasing from birth and lack of evidence 
to demonstrate the deterrent effect of DNA. These themes are discussed in section 10.4. 
Table 10.7 - Opinions regarding what could improve the deterrence effect of the NDNAD 
 
10.3.6 Proportionality 
In addition to the rating of the public security functions of the DNA database, participants 
were asked to rate the level of proportionality of the three retention regimes (Table 10.8). 
There were 30 complete responses to this question out of the 31 respondents. The Shapiro-
Wilk test showed that the data was not normally distributed (p < 0.05; α = 0.05). The median 
(IQR) for the different retention regimes is shown in Table 10.8. The median scores on a 5-
point scale were 4 for the restrictive regime, 2 for the expansive regime and 4 for the semi-
restrictive regime. There was a statistically significant difference in the rating of the level of 
proportionality of the regimes using the Friedman test (χ2 (2) = 35.320; p < 0.001). 
Following the Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a Bonferroni correction (p < 0.017), the rating 
of both the restrictive and semi-restrictive regimes differed significantly with the expansive 
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regime. On average, the expansive regime was rated to be slightly skewed toward public 
interest whilst the restrictive and semi-restrictive were perceived to be slightly skewed 
toward individual interest.  
Table 10.8 - Average level of proportionality of the retention regimes (1 = extremely skewed toward public 
interest; 5 = extremely skewed toward individual interest) 
 
*The total number of participants was 31. One participant was excluded because the rating of one regime 
was not completed. 
10.3.7 Implementation efficiency 
This criterion measured the level of the perceived difficulty in the implementation of the 
different retention regimes. There were 30 complete responses to this question. The test for 
normality showed that the data was not normally distributed, requiring nonparametric 
statistics (Shapiro-Wilk test: p < 0.05; α = 0.05). Table 10.9 presents the median (IQR) 
rating of the different regimes. The average scores on a 5-point scale were: 3 for restrictive 
regime, 2 for expansive regime and 3 for semi-restrictive.  The Friedman test showed a 
statistically significant difference in the ratings of perceived difficulty in implementation (χ2 
(2) = 15.728; p < 0.001). Pairwise comparisons were performed using the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test with a Bonferroni correction (p < 0.017). This revealed that the expansive regime 
was perceived to be easier to implement than the semi-restrictive regime (Z = -3.095; p = 
0.002). There was no statistically significant difference in the rating of the expansive versus 
the restrictive regime (Z = -2.224; p = 0.026) or the semi-restrictive versus the restrictive (Z 
= -1.822; p = 0.068). 





Six out of the 30 respondents to this question provided further comments on the 
implementation efficiency of the current semi-restrictive (PoFA) regime.  These were coded 
in NVivo and the main themes were: labour-intensive and time-consuming processes and 
procedures; questioned proportionality; understanding of the legislation; and complexity. 
Section 10.4 covers the discussion of these themes.  
10.3.8 Implementation cost 
The cost-effectiveness of implementing the three different retention regimes was also 
assessed using the questionnaire. Participants were asked to rate the retention regimes based 
on their perception about the level of resources and financial input required to implement 
the regimes. This question was answered by 29 out of the 31 respondents. The Shapiro-Wilk 
test showed that the data was not normally distributed (p < 0.05; α = 0.05). Table 10.10 
shows the median (IQR) for the different regimes. The median score on a 5-point scale for 
each regime was 3. There was a statistically significant difference in the rating of the cost-
effectiveness of the regimes using the Friedman test (χ2 (2) = 9.465; p = 0.009). The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a Bonferroni correction (p < 0.017) was used to carry out 
pairwise comparisons. There were no significant differences between the expansive and 
restrictive regimes (Z = -1.947; p = 0.052) or the semi-restrictive and restrictive regimes (Z 
= -1.252; p = 0.210). However, there was a significant difference between the semi-
restrictive and expansive regimes (Z = -2.688; p = 0.007). Although the median score for 
the different regimes was the same, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is based on rank sums 
which may differ significantly. From Table 10.10, it can be observed that ~25% of the ratings 
for the expansive regime were below 3 whereas ~25% were below 2 for the semi-restrictive 
regime. This shows that the expansive regime received higher ratings than the semi-
restrictive.  





10.3.9 Protection of genetic privacy 
The protection of genetic privacy criterion had the lowest median rating (4) in terms of the 
level of importance. Participants were asked to select the most appropriate regime for 
protecting the genetic privacy of individuals. Twenty-nine out of the 31 respondents 
answered this question. More than half of respondents (55%) selected the restrictive regime. 
Six participants (21%) selected the expansive regime whilst 7 (24%) chose the semi-
restrictive regime. Using a 5-point Likert scale, participants were asked to rate their level of 
satisfaction with the genetic privacy protection of the three regimes. All 31 participants 
answered this question. The median (IQR) rating is presented in Table 10.11. The data was 
found to be non-normal when tested with the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05; α = 0.05). On 
average, each regime was rated to be satisfactory (median score of 4). The Friedman test 
revealed a statistically significant difference in the level of satisfaction of the three regimes 
(χ2 (2) = 13.830; p = 0.001). Again, post hoc analysis was conducted using the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test with a Bonferroni correction (p < 0.017). There was no statistically 
significant difference between the semi-restrictive and restrictive regimes (Z = - 1.667; p = 
0.096). However, the two other pairs of regimes were statistically significant: expansive vs. 
restrictive regime (Z = -2.886; p = 0.004); expansive vs semi-restrictive (Z = -2.804; p = 
0.005). Whilst the median scores for the different regimes are equal, the non-parametric test 
used is a rank-sum test hence may reveal a significant difference in the ratings. The IQR for 
the different regimes shows that ~25% of the ratings were below a score of 2 for the 
expansive regime compared to 4 and 3 for the restrictive and semi-restrictive regimes, 
respectively. This indicates that most of the ratings for the restrictive and semi-restrictive 
regimes were higher than the expansive. 
Table 10.11 - Average level of satisfaction with the genetic privacy protection of the retention regimes (1 = 
not at all satisfactory; 5 = very satisfactory) 
 
When asked what could improve the protection of genetic privacy in a multiple selection 
question, 10 respondents (32%) selected ‘Fixed retention of profiles of all convicted 
individuals based on maximum sentence of offence’. Four respondents (13%) supported 
‘Fixed retention of profiles of all convicted individuals based on duration of actual sentence’. 
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For unconvicted individuals, 11 respondents (36%) chose deletion of all DNA records whilst 
10 (32%) chose retention of DNA profiles based on informed consent.  
Six participants (19%) provided comments on what could improve the genetic privacy 
protection of individuals. These responses were coded with the help of the NVivo software. 
The main themes identified were privacy restrictions and data security considerations, which 
are discussed in section 10.4.  
10.3.10  Overall effectiveness 
In addition to questions on the individual effectiveness criteria, participants were asked to 
rate the overall effectiveness of the different retention regimes. All 31 respondents answered 
this question. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality showed that the data was not normally 
distributed (p < 0.05; α = 0.05). The median (IQR) rating of the different retention regimes 
is shown in Table 10.12. The 5-point average scores were 3, 4 and 3 for the restrictive, 
expansive and semi-restrictive regimes, respectively. There was a statistically significant 
difference in the ratings using the non-parametric Friedman test (χ2 (2) = 31.605; p < 0.001). 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a Bonferroni correction (p < 0.017) showed that the 
expansive regime was perceived to be more effective than the restrictive regime (Z = -4.128; 
p < 0.001) and the semi-restrictive regime (Z = -4.109; p < 0.001). There was no statistically 
significant difference between the restrictive and semi-restrictive regimes (Z = -1.713; p = 
0.087). Overall, the expansive regime was rated to be very effective whilst the other two 
regimes were rated to be moderately effective on average.  
Table 10.12 - Average level of overall effectiveness of the retention regimes (1 = not at all effective; 5 = 
extremely effective) 
 
Lastly, participants were asked to provide any other comments related to DNA retention. 
Four participants responded to this question. These responses were coded in NVivo to 
identify the key themes in the responses. The main codes generated were: an overemphasis 
on privacy; expansive DNA databasing and factors that impact on effectiveness. Section 




10.4.1 Effectiveness criteria for retention regimes 
Generally, the seven effectiveness criteria were rated to be important among the primary 
stakeholders, considered as an expert group, confirming these as possible performance 
indicators for DNA retention regimes and DNA databases. The results showed that the 
participants placed more importance on the crime-solving capacity of the NDNAD than any 
other outcome. This result was expected since most participants worked in law enforcement 
and crime-solving is part of their primary functions. The result is also consistent with studies 
that suggest that criminal justice professionals may consider the crime-fighting potential of 
databases as a top priority.969  
In addition to the seven effectiveness criteria, participants suggested other areas that may be 
important in assessing the effectiveness of retention regimes. The first was the effectiveness 
of the ‘Scottish Model’ which has not yet been tested.970 The main difference between the 
PoFA regime and the Scottish Model is the retention of data from juveniles convicted of a 
first minor offence (minimum of 5 years plus the length of sentence versus indefinite) and 
unconvicted individuals arrested for a serious offence (minimum of 3 years by discretion 
versus automatic deletion). This shows that the Scottish Model operates by bright-line rules 
whilst the PoFA regime is more selective in some respects. One participant was of the view 
that the Scottish Model should have been adopted fully for the NDNAD. It was thought that 
the implementation of the PoFA regime was complicated. The ease of implementation of 
bright-line rules was noted in the 2015 annual report of the Biometrics Commissioner.971 
However, the benefits of the Scottish Model compared to the PoFA regime may require 
further exploration to determine whether it is more effective in achieving the functions of 
the NDNAD whilst protecting privacy. There are difficulties with the Scottish Model which 
are considered in section 10.4.3. The respondent’s view suggests the importance of 
considering ‘comparative regime analysis’ as part of the seven effectiveness criteria.  
Another aspect of effectiveness stressed by some participants was the impact of 
technological advancements on the public security functions of the NDNAD. In addition to 
the quality of the law, factors, such as science and technology, and the criminal justice 
                                                 
969 MPA Civil Liberties Panel (n 40); Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of 
Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659); Teodorović and others (n 122). 
970 MPA Civil Liberties Panel (n 40). 
971 MacGregor, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 80). 
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process can contribute to the actual effectiveness of DNA databases.972 This implies that the 
assessment of the effectiveness of the law governing the NDNAD should control for such 
factors. It was thought that improvements in the sensitivity of DNA testing may have an 
adverse effect on DNA identifications:  
The interaction between [the] number of DNA 'identifications' produced each 
year to the retention regime, DNA chemistry changes and use of technology to 
resolve mixtures (DNAboost & statistical DNA mixture resolution).  I suspect 
that DNA Idents may have fallen due to increased DNA chemistry sensitivity 
(less inhibition) leading to more mixtures and less direct DNA matches (eg 
introduction of DNA17 & 24). (R6/LE) 
In relation to technological advancements, one participant mentioned the cost implications 
of carrying out profile upgrades in the NDNAD. This suggestion may be considered under 
the implementation cost criterion which assesses the financial inputs required to implement 
the retention regime. The respondent also implied the ethical cost of obtaining further DNA 
samples if upgrades are required. Again, this proposal may be placed under the privacy 
protection criterion which is concerned about the protection of individual civil liberties: 
The upgrade of samples from SGM to SGM+ to DNA17 means there are three 
different levels of profile held. One issue we have is, which profiles already on 
the system need upgrading (at an extra cost to the force). There is another issue 
in getting further samples where a DNA 17 is required by the Forensic Provider 
to do a better comparison. (R4/FS) 
The third aspect of effectiveness assessment mentioned by one participant was the efficiency 
of police investigations. The investigation of crime involves the use of several techniques 
and procedures. This may or may not include DNA evidence.  Several studies have attempted 
to assess the detection rate for crimes involving DNA and non-DNA cases.973 Although the 
detection rate appears to be relatively high in DNA related cases, the findings suggest that 
not all DNA crimes are solved. In some cases, this may be attributed to the fact that the 
reference profile of the suspect is not on record. Hence, no hits are generated from the 
national database. One participant suggested a comparative assessment of the effectiveness 
of police investigations in no-hit cases: 
I would be more interested in the effectiveness and efficiency of police 
investigation when there is DNA evidence but no result on the database because 
the offender has never been put on record. I have seen hundreds of officers on a 
                                                 
972 See illustration of conceptual framework in Figure 4.3.  
973 Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Sexual Offence Cases in Court’ (n 711); Briody, ‘The Effects 
of DNA Evidence on Homicide Cases in Court’ (n 711); Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Property 
Offences in Court’ (n 711); Roman and others (n 716). 
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murder investigation having to pursue other lines of enquiry despite having the 
offender's DNA sample due to his lack of previous conviction. (R2/FS) 
In a qualitative study with law enforcement officers, forensic professionals and political 
campaigners, McCartney 974  found concerns about the potential abbreviation of police 
investigative work due to overreliance on DNA. The suggestion above is important because 
it can reveal whether other police detective techniques are effective or not, and also whether 
DNA is actually necessary to solve a crime. This highlights a consideration of ‘investigative 
efficiency assessments’ as part of the effectiveness criteria for retention regimes.  
Other aspects of regime assessment proposed by some participants were the impact of the 
level of crime and the efficiency of legal checks of DNA hits. As shown in the public 
survey,975 there appears to be considerable support for a discriminatory retention regime that 
is based on the seriousness of offences or level of crime. However, this is thought to be a 
potential public security risk due to the level of variation in the criminal career of 
individuals.976 An analysis of the seriousness of offences as an indicator of retention in the 
NDNAD may help resolve this dilemma. Further, this will help determine the most 
appropriate composition of the NDNAD that will improve public security and privacy. The 
‘crime level assessment’ may be carried out by applying the seven effectiveness criteria.  
The limitations of the PoFA IT configuration for the NDNAD has led to a need to check the 
lawfulness of DNA hits.977 This procedure may have cost implications in the operation of 
the database.  This point was highlighted by one participant as an issue that is worth 
considering in effectiveness assessments.  This suggestion may be considered as part of the 
implementation cost criterion. 
In summary, the results confirmed the seven effectiveness criteria from the literature review 
in the assessment of retention regimes: crime-solving capacity of the NDNAD, 
incapacitation effect, deterrent effect, implementation efficiency, implementation cost, 
proportionality and genetic privacy protection. Additional criteria deduced from the 
qualitative responses were comparative regime analysis and investigative efficiency 
assessments. The former compares the effectiveness of two simultaneous retention regimes 
                                                 
974 McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (n 14). 
975 See Chapter 8 
976 MPA Civil Liberties Panel (n 40). 
977 See Chapter 3 for detailed analysis of the implementation of PoFA 
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in two or more jurisdictions. The latter compares the effectiveness of different police 
investigative approaches to DNA databasing.    
10.4.2 Comparison of the public security impact of retention regimes 
An expansive regime is a permissive legal framework that allows the inclusion of all arrestee 
DNA data in a database and the indefinite retention of the data. In this study, the specialist 
group thought a DNA database regulated by an expansive regime is more effective for the 
prevention and resolution of crime. This was reflected in their responses on what could 
improve the current retention regime. Most participants chose a long-term retention period 
for data from all arrestees with one participant suggesting DNA databasing from birth. For 
the purposes of deterring crime, about one-third of participants supported a UDNAD. The 
results suggest a more solid belief in the potential of DNA databasing among law 
enforcement professionals. The trend is consistent with the results of Teodorovic et al.,978 
which found a general permissive outlook among criminal justice professionals in Serbia.  
However, the public survey results and other studies suggest scepticism among criminal 
justice professionals about DNA databasing due to enhanced knowledge about its benefits 
and limitations. 979  This was observed in a few comments by some participants in the 
stakeholder survey about the deterrent effect of the NDNAD. Whilst these selected the 
expansive regime as the most effective, they thought repeated offenders may take greater 
precautions and the available evidence on recidivism cast doubts on this potential effect: 
Deterrence is a hard one to judge as no-one can ever know what the true numbers 
might be of people that were deterred from committing a crime simply because 
their DNA was on record. We see many, many repeat offenders so it wouldn't 
matter which regime was in place as they would still undertake their crimes. I 
suspect there will always be a percentage that do 'change their ways' or have a 
conscience and so might be deterred but I simply don't know. (R3/FS) 
In light of the available literature980 and the public survey results, there appears to be a 
potential ‘crime control paradox’ among criminal justice professionals where they may 
generally favour the expansion DNA databases ‘in theory’ but may be sceptical about its 
impact due to the influence of their professional experience. Further exploration of this 
finding is needed to understand the nature of this ‘paradox’.  
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979 Machado and Silva, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases’ (n 659). 




10.4.3 Comparison of the implementation efficiency and cost of retention regimes 
A forensic DNA database competes with other police investigative/intelligence tools on 
scarce resources. Hence to ensure efficiency in the delivery of a database, it is imperative to 
develop a system that is easy to operate and manage. The study found that the primary 
stakeholder group considered the expansive regime to be the easiest system to implement. 
Firstly, the expansive regime operates mainly via bright-line rules or blanket criteria. This 
may be easier to embed in automated IT systems than a system that includes case-by-case 
criteria or regular updates and changes. This was evident in comments about the current 
semi-restrictive regime where participants mentioned that it is labour-intensive, time-
consuming and complex. These responses were generally consistent with comments by the 
Biometrics Commissioner981 about the complexity of discretionary retention under the PoFA 
regime: 
It took literally months and months to meet the compliance of the current regime. 
We're a small force in comparison to others and it took us at least 2-3 months to 
do the various stages of the DNA implementation and that was deemed to be the 
easier of the two (fingerprints being the other) as DNA is done solely on 
databases. (…) [T]he on-going work involved (as obviously it adjusts every day) 
isn't too time-consuming, but it is all extra work that wasn't necessary on the 
expansive regime. (R3/FS) 
The Restrictive requires loads of man hours checking court results before 
samples could be submitted this also caused delays in getting the profiles onto 
the DNA database. The Semi-restrictive the problem is checking the retention 
period of the profiles. (R4/FS) 
In the 2011 report of the MPA Civil Liberties Panel, 982  Gary Pugh, then Chair of the 
NDNAD Strategy Board, expressed concerns about administrative difficulties with the 
‘Scottish Model’ which is similar to PoFA.  In line with this observation, some participants 
questioned the proportionality of the PoFA regime and highlighted concerns about the 
management and resource demands of the current law:  
The original legislation (PoFA) was flawed needing changes. I suspect there will 
be future challenges on the proportionality of the legislation potentially leading 
to more complex management demands and cost. (R6/LE) 
The document analysis (Chapter 3) identified a gap in the understanding of the current semi-
restrictive regime. This was identified as part of the complexities with the PoFA regime:  
                                                 
981 MacGregor, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 80). 
982 MPA Civil Liberties Panel (n 40). 
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It was about knowledge and understanding of the legislation and the expected 
timeframes. These need to be clear and understood right from the outset to 
prevent any failings in practice (RS7/LE). 
Clearly, the comments about the efficiency of the PoFA regime reflects a low input or 
engagement of specialist groups in the development of the legislation. It is indicative that 
decisions about the appropriate law to govern forensic DNA records may not be balanced. 
Apart from administrative difficulties, this approach may introduce public security risks, 
with one participant stating that the PoFA regime ‘favours criminals’ (R11/LW).  
In relation to implementation efficiency is the financial cost of operating the NDNAD. The 
annual budget for operating the database is reported to be between £1 million and £4 million 
as of 2015 to 2019.983 Among the study participants, the expansive regime was thought to 
be a more cost-effective system than the semi-restrictive regime. Reviews into the cost 
implications of the retention regimes indicate that the restrictive regime and the semi-
restrictive regime may lead to multiple sampling of the same individuals.984 In contrast, the 
Biometrics Commissioner suggests that the destruction of DNA samples may reduce the cost 
of sample storage.985 It is not clear if the deletion of profiles from unconvicted individuals 
following a short retention period may also reduce the cost of running the database. Whilst 
the semi-restrictive regime may have reduced the cost of sample storage, it is worth noting 
that it has introduced new offices and procedures which may add to the cost of operations. 
For example, the office of the Biometrics Commissioner and its work require funding. The 
PoFA regime also requires an upgrade of the database IT system. These multiple factors may 
explain the views of the study participants on the cost-effectiveness of the different retention 
regimes.  
The actual financial gains of the NDNAD is not known and difficult to measure due to 
several confounders. One challenge is the fact that no case is resolved by DNA alone or 
DNA-only cases are very rare. In the United States, Speaker986 found that the estimated 
return on investment (ROI) of testing the backlog of untested sexual assault kits was about 
9,874% to 12,962% for a caseload of 100. Whilst a crude estimate, it suggests high cost-
effectiveness in relation to sexual offences.  An analysis of the overall and actual ROI of the 
                                                 
983 FIND Strategy Board, Annual Report 2017 to 2018 (n 16) 31; National DNA Database Strategy Board, 
Annual Report, 2014 to 2015 (n 78) 25. 
984 Bramley (n 42). 
985 MacGregor, Annual Report 2014: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 76). 
986 Paul J Speaker, ‘The Jurisdictional Return on Investment from Processing the Backlog of Untested Sexual 
Assault Kits’ (2019) 1 Forensic Science International: Synergy 18. 
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NDNAD may allow a more objective assessment of its cost-effectiveness under different 
retention regimes.  
10.4.4 Comparison of the proportionality and privacy impact of retention regimes 
Proportionality has been a central concept in the regulation of forensic biometrics. The 
principle has been considered within the framework of balancing the interests of the public 
and the civil liberties of the individual. However, there is no consistent method for measuring 
proportionality and how this balance may be achieved.987 In this study, none of the retention 
regimes was considered to be proportional by the expert group. Whilst the expansive regime 
was rated to be biased towards public interests, the restrictive and semi-restrictive regimes 
were thought to favour individual interest.  
The results showed that the current semi-restrictive regime and the restrictive regime are 
perceived to be better in protecting the genetic privacy of individuals. This view is generally 
consistent with the literature that advocates for the civil liberties of individuals and the 
promotion of a privacy-by-design system.988 There were mixed views on what could enhance 
the protection of privacy in the operation of the NDNAD, with one respondent emphasising 
the need to establish an appropriate balance. Some participants were of the view that the 
retention of data from convicted individuals should be commensurate with either the 
maximum sentence for their offence, the duration of their offence or until death (- for reasons 
of recidivism). In the case of unconvicted individuals, some participants thought all data 
should be deleted or retained based on informed consent or dependent on offence types (such 
as terrorism and sexual offences). 
However, a few participants made comments that tended to devalue the privacy implications 
of data retention, which was in agreement with views of criminal justice professionals in the 
qualitative study by Johnson and Williams.989 Whilst some of these participants emphasised 
the benefits of DNA data retention, others thought that the only privacy issue with the 
retention of DNA profiles is the identifying information linked to the data: 
The region of the DNA profiled for the current DNA database (STR not Y-STR 
or mtDNA) is non-coding apart from determining the sex genes of the donor.  As 
such I do not interpret this information as a genetic privacy issue (profile only 
                                                 
987 Adam Ramshaw, ‘The Case for Replicable Structured Full Proportionality Analysis in All Cases 
Concerning Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 39 Legal Studies 120. 
988 Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, Establishing Best Practice for Forensic DNA Databases (n 88). 
989 Williams and Johnson, ‘“Wonderment and Dread”’ (n 646). 
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separate to the sample).  The privacy issue is the personal information connected 
to the DNA profile. A person’s privacy is impacted by retention of this personal 
data.  Retention of the DNA sample, I would consider as a privacy issue as it 
contains the complete genomic information for that person. (R6/LE) 
In line with the above comment, another participant thought the focus should be on securing 
the information in the database and not what is included in the NDNAD. Although this 
participant selected the restrictive regime as the most effective in protecting privacy, it was 
thought that the inclusion of all residents/citizens in the database may eliminate bias in court 
proceedings: 
At this time the presence of a DNA database [match] as part of prosecution 
informs the court the suspect has previous convictions. If the database included 
everyone's profile this would eliminate bias. It is only a problem if the database 
is not secure or used outside the present legal restrictions. Database restrictions 
should only be on how it is used not what information is put on it. (R2/FS) 
In conclusion, the comments on the protection of privacy highlight the difficulties in 
configuring the right balance between civil liberties and the protection of public security. 
Firstly, the conception of privacy varies between individuals, which informs the relative 
value placed on different competing interests in DNA data retention. Whilst a restricted 
regime may be supported for privacy reasons and ‘in principle’, criminal justice 
professionals may be concerned about the effect of such a regime on their role to ensure the 
safe delivery of justice. This may reflect why the specialist group rate privacy lower than 
other outcomes of operating the NDNAD. 
10.4.5 Overall effectiveness of retention regimes 
Overall, the expert group thought the expansive regime was the most effective among the 
three regimes. This means whilst civil liberties (including privacy) may be important in DNA 
databasing, this may be outweighed by the potential public security benefits of databasing 
and the ease of implementation of the database system. This overall view is generally 
consistent with the utilitarian view expressed by participants in the public survey. In the 
qualitative responses, one participant reflected on the misunderstanding of DNA databases 
by the public and overemphasis on privacy. This was consistent with the devaluing of civil 
liberties among some criminal justice professionals.990 The participant reasoned that the 
                                                 
990 Williams and Johnson, ‘“Wonderment and Dread”’ (n 646). 
 289 
 
NDNAD is robust and there is limited evidence to demonstrate the actual privacy risks of 
inclusion in the database: 
A rating of privacy implies that a sliding scale exists and that a more expansive 
database would increase a rate of misuse or false conviction. Has there been any 
false convictions based on having a profile on the database? I would claim the 
database and its use is robust and therefore restriction serves no apparent purpose 
other than to appease public concern due to a lack of understanding of how the 
database functions and is used. (R2/FS) 
The Marper ruling noted that concerns about the conceivable future uses of private 
information is legitimate and relevant in DNA databasing.991 Whilst this is important, the 
comment above highlights a need to also determine (quantify) the real civil liberty risks of 
DNA databasing. This information will help policymakers in determining the appropriate 
balance between public and private interests.     
Two respondents further emphasised the potential benefits of an expanded database, with 
one commenting that ‘PACE [Expansive regime] was very effective in detecting crime. 
PoFA has had the opposite effect and less crime is detected’ (R13/FS). The accuracy of this 
claim is unknown. However, the current output data shows that the match rate of the 
NDNAD has increased under PoFA.992 An investigation of the actual value and impact of 
NDNAD hits may help substantiate this hypothesis. The second respondent favoured a 
UDNAD, reasoning that the PoFA regime is complex and introduces public security risks: 
The 'issue' with the introduction of PoFA and the new regime is that there is the 
potential to play the system. If you get NFA'd for a crime then it will drop off 
PNC and you become a first-time arrestee the next time you come in....NFA'd 
again and your biometrics are wiped again and so it goes on. Each time you are 
NFA'd another record of arrest is removed from PNC (obviously local records 
will hold intelligence but other forces won't be aware of this) and then this leads 
to the whole DBS thing and will we have another Ian Huntley scenario? I 
appreciate this might be a rare occurrence but surely once is once too often? But 
then the only way to fully resolve this (and possibly increase the deterrence rate) 
would be to obtain biometrics across the board from all people aged 10 and 
above for instance. Big Brother-ish absolutely, do I agree, no not really but it 
depends what the overall 'want' is - do we want to be able to conclude all crimes 
and know whose biometrics are at them at all times, or are we satisfied with only 
knowing a proportion? My musings anyway... (R3/FS) 
Although a comprehensive database may resolve the technical issues with the NDNAD and 
assist in the resolution of crime, this may not be cost-effective or lead to a diminishing 
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return.993 This is because DNA is only applicable in a small proportion of crime and the 
DNA of a majority of individuals in such a database will be redundant. The goal to maximise 
the utility of the NDNAD may be achieved by investigating its actual effectiveness and 
identifying patterns in the records included in the database; this would ensure that the 
database is aimed at the right individuals. Lastly, the technical challenge with the NFA issue 
may be resolved by developing an effective intelligence network among local forces.  
The impact of external factors (such as, crime scene processing, police efficiency, 
intelligence practices, tactical crime investigations and evidentiary management) on the 
effectiveness of NDNAD hits has been highlighted in several studies.994 One respondent 
reflected on these regime independent factors, emphasising the need to consider these as part 
of effectiveness assessments:   
The effectiveness of DNA under all three schemes is dependent on factors such 
as how good is the profile obtained from the scene, where has the profile been 
obtained from and supporting evidence. (R4/FS) 
It is worth noting that the findings in this study lack generalisation to the entire primary 
stakeholder group for the NDNAD due to the small sample size. Nevertheless, the findings 
balance the general view expressed in the public survey, which supports a selective regime 
that considers individual privacy and the protection of public security. The findings are 
important in ensuring a more balanced decision-making process about the development of 
the legal framework for the NDNAD.  
10.5 Conclusion 
The stakeholder survey assessed the views of individuals with a direct functional or special 
interest in the operation of the NDNAD. In addition to the seven effectiveness criteria, two 
additional criteria were identified for consideration in the assessment of the effectiveness of 
retention regimes. Hence, factors that may be considered as key indicators of an effective 
retention regime are crime-solving capacity, incapacitation effect, deterrent effect, privacy 
protection, proportionality, implementation efficiency and cost, comparative performance of 
regimes, and investigative efficiency. Overall, the primary stakeholder group considered the 
expansive regime to be the most effective for two main reasons: 1) the enhancement of the 
public security of the society in terms of solving crime and preventing or deterring crime; 2) 
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ease of implementation and cost-effectiveness of the operation of the database. The study 
participants thought case resolution and other outcomes of the database were more important 
than individual interests, supporting a utilitarian view. The results imply a need for reflection 
on the actual positive aspects of the expansive regime that may be incorporated in the current 
law to maximise the utility of the NDNAD.  
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Chapter 11: General discussion and conclusion 
This research sought to assess the efficacy of NDNAD retention regimes. In this chapter, the 
findings of the different aspects of the research are collectively analysed and discussed. The 
chapter answers the fifth aim of the research by drawing out possible reforms that may 
improve the law governing the NDNAD. Firstly, a document analysis of reports of oversight 
bodies was carried out to answer the first aim of the research; this was to identify the benefits, 
challenges, risks and emerging issues associated with the implementation of the PoFA 
regime. The findings showed some positive impact on the match rate of the NDNAD 
compared to previous regimes. This suggests an enhancement of the potential effectiveness 
of the NDNAD under the PoFA regime. Another positive outcome was an improvement in 
the protection of the genetic privacy of individuals, which may reinforce public confidence 
in the operation of the NDNAD.  
The review indicated challenges with the configuration of the Police National Computer, 
legal and procedural issues and understanding of the law among stakeholders. It was 
apparent that public security and privacy risks are still present with the PoFA regime as some 
data may have been unlawfully deleted or retained or legally destroyed at the potential risk 
of crime detection or resolution. The findings from the document analysis imply that whilst 
the PoFA regime may be beneficial in some respects, there is a considerable gap between 
the law and practice. This gap suggests a need to re-evaluate the proportionality of the 
present regime.995 One critical lacuna identified in the review was the inadequate or absence 
of systematic data about the actual effectiveness of retaining DNA records from different 
categories of individuals and for different retention periods. 996  This is mainly due to 
difficulties in isolating the sole impact of DNA hits on case resolution, which is attributed 
to the fact that DNA evidence is usually used in conjunction with other evidence. 997 
However, it should be possible to determine the initial role of DNA hits (i.e. the generation 
of unknown investigative leads that are relevant to a case) which can offer insights on the 
effectiveness of retention regimes. 
To inform the direction of the empirical research for this study, a narrative literature review 
was carried out on the efficacy of DNA databasing. The literature review confirmed the gaps 
identified in the document analysis: discrepancies between law and practice, and the limited 
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information on the actual effectiveness of DNA databasing. The effect of these gaps has been 
the development of DNA database policy and standards set by arbitrary decisions by 
policymakers.998 These decisions are sometimes made in consultation with the public, which 
may be driven by the idea that the legal framework for databases is a societal choice rather 
than being based on individual preference.999 A democratic approach has thus been proposed 
for the development of the NDNAD regime.1000  
The review identified several sociological studies focused on the database effectiveness and 
its governing rules. Overall, significant public support for DNA databasing was observed; 
this was justified by a belief in the enhancement of public security via this investigative tool. 
However, views on the inclusion criteria and retention periods for reference profiles were 
mixed. The key concerns of the public are the security of genetic data, privacy, 
proportionality and effectiveness of databases. The social research findings clearly 
demonstrate a need for authorities to articulate to the public: 1) the actual effectiveness of 
DNA databases; and 2) the actual risks of running the database. This information would 
assist the public in making an informed decision on how DNA databases should be regulated.  
Another aspect of the narrative review was an examination of the literature on the potential 
and/or actual effectiveness of DNA databasing. Overall, the available evidence is only 
indicative of the effectiveness of DNA databases, particularly in serious violent and sexual 
crimes. The literature suggests that the contribution of DNA and databases to the resolution 
of all crime is low and multiple reasons account for this observation. Firstly, most crimes do 
not involve DNA. Secondly, a very limited proportion of crime scenes are screened for DNA. 
A third reason is that the utility of DNA matches is dependent on the competency and 
efficiency of the police, prosecutors and other participants in the criminal justice process. 
These factors imply that DNA databases should be a specialised rather than a generalised 
system (or perceived as a ‘catch-all’ investigative tool). However, a gap identified in the 
literature is the lack of evidence to demonstrate the actual value of retaining data from 
specific groups of convicted and unconvicted individuals. Further, there are limited studies 
that compare the value of DNA profiling alone and DNA databases. These findings confirm 
the concerns of the Biometrics Commissioner regarding the complex evidence on the 
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attrition rate and effectiveness of the NDNAD.1001 This presents a hurdle in attempting to 
define inclusion and retention criteria for the NDNAD that would maximise its 
effectiveness.1002  
Considering the above findings, a key question emerges: Is the current law (PoFA) 
legitimate? The second and third aims of this research explored this question via an online 
public survey. The survey results showed high perceived effectiveness of the NDNAD in 
enhancing the specified legal purposes of detecting, investigating and prosecuting crime, 
which is consistent with other studies.1003 Similar to findings from the Portuguese study,1004 
the survey results showed scepticism regarding the effectiveness of the NDNAD in 
enhancing crime prevention. However, a utilitarian view was favoured by the respondents. 
The insight from the survey is a need to make the effectiveness of the NDNAD towards its 
legal functions (section 63T(1)(c) of PACE) more demonstrable. This is relevant to ensure 
that the law is specific, accurate and representative of the actual roles of the NDNAD (for 
example, the generation of unknown investigative leads). Further, an accurate understanding 
of the actual benefits and risks of the NDNAD will allow the public to make an informed 
choice about the rules to govern its operation.  
Another aspect of the survey explored views of participants about the inclusion criteria for 
the NDNAD. Under the current PoFA law, the minimum criteria for entry of DNA data in 
the NDNAD is an arrest for a recordable offence. The survey results indicated a more 
selective approach may be preferred by the public although views on the characteristics of 
eligible individuals were mixed. This was due to uncertainties about the value of including 
data of specific individuals and concerns about civil liberties. The results support the need 
for a continuous evaluation of how data from individuals with conviction records, arrestees 
and charged individuals can contribute to public security goals. This is relevant because it 
may allow the public to make an informed judgement about who to include in the database, 
which will support the decisions of policymakers. 
The survey also examined views on how long data from different individuals should be 
retained. The PoFA regime allows the indefinite retention of DNA data from convicted 
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adults. The results, however, showed that a discriminatory approach may be preferable to 
members of the public. Factors considered under this approach include the seriousness of an 
offence and reoffending history. Most participants thought data from serious offenders 
should be retained for a long period of time whereas data from less serious offenders should 
be retained for a short time period or should be based on the length of their sentence. The 
basis of this view is mainly drawn from civil liberty concerns and due process. A similar 
trend was also observed for data from unconvicted individuals, which is currently supported 
by PoFA. However, decisions on specific long-term or short-term periods should be 
considered cautiously and supported by adequate systematic evidence on the actual value of 
retention. Information about the potential or actual impact of existing retention periods or 
categories on public security should be made available to the public. This type of analysis is 
currently being pursued by the Biometrics Commissioner for section 63G data. The available 
evidence suggests a 9% match rate (H/N) for individuals whose data are included under 
section 63G.1005 However, it is not clear whether these matches are cold or warm hits, and 
how they contributed to police investigations. 
Lastly, the public survey inquired about whether participants would be willing to voluntarily 
participate in the NDNAD. The views of participants were generally consistent with PoFA 
rules which require informed consent, provides a right to withdraw consent, and require 
retention of data until its sampling purpose is fulfilled. The above rules apply in the absence 
of any mandatory inclusion/retention conditions. The survey results showed that the main 
condition that could influence voluntary participation in the NDNAD is the potential 
contribution of the volunteer’s data to crime resolution. This reinforces the general trend in 
this study of a need to evaluate the actual effectiveness of existing retention regimes. 
Evidence on the actual impact of existing retention regimes would allow the public to make 
an informed choice to voluntarily participate or not participate in the NDNAD. 
Using the seven effectiveness criteria from the literature review as a basis, the stakeholder 
survey examined the views of experts about the effectiveness of NDNAD retention regimes. 
The participants considered the expansive regime to be more effective than the restrictive 
and PoFA regimes. One of the reasons for this preference was that the expansive regime 
enhances the resolution and prevention of crime. Further, the expansive regime is easier to 
implement. Overall, the results from the surveys indicate that the PoFA regime requires 
                                                 
1005 Wiles, Annual Report 2018: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (n 115). 
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reform. However, these changes should not be based on arbitrary decisions but should be 
supported by systematic evidence on the actual benefits and risks of operating the NDNAD. 
A critical understanding of the interaction between the law and the operation of the database, 
its impact on public security and civil liberty outcomes should allow the identification of 
appropriate systems that can be incorporated in the law to enhance the utility of the NDNAD. 
The survey findings provide an empirical basis to inform decisions on the development of 
the current legal framework for the National DNA Database. 
11.1 Limitations of the study 
One of the main limitations of the surveys was the non-probability sampling approach used. 
This means the findings cannot be generalised to the entire population in England and Wales 
or the ‘expert’ population. However, the results provide an empirical basis to advise on 
policies to develop the National DNA Database. As noted in the survey methodology, the 
topic of DNA databasing appeals to a limited number of members of the public. This makes 
it difficult to conduct surveys employing the probability sampling method. A possible way 
of overcoming this challenge, and improving future research, is through consistent 
sensitisation of the ‘lay’ public about DNA databasing and forensic biometrics. This could 
be in the form of a government-sponsored television programme on forensic biometrics that 
brings together experts and different stakeholders for panel discussions. Additionally, 
targeted sensitisation conferences may be organised as part of public engagement activities 
to promote science. Short and simplified surveys could be conducted as part of such 
sensitisation and awareness programmes to generate a more representative view of the public 
and stakeholders about the different aspects of DNA databases and other biometrics. 
Another limitation of the surveys relates to the potential for leading questions, and implied 
positive assumptions or misunderstanding of terminologies by some members of the public 
and stakeholders. For example, one participant thought the questions carried an assumption 
supporting the police use of DNA databases. Whilst acknowledging the potential for this 
misunderstanding, all closed-ended questions in the public survey included an ‘other’ option 
to allow for flexibility of responses. A few participants in the public survey were not sure 
about the meaning of the classification of offences as a qualifying offence, serious offence, 
minor offence and recordable offence. These participants suggested including examples of 
such offences in a future questionnaire. Whilst this was considered at the preparatory stage 
of the questionnaire, it was thought that most members of the public will be familiar with 
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the meaning of the classification of crime in England and Wales. Further, it was thought that 
an incomplete list of examples may introduce bias in the responses. Since very few 
participants mentioned such issues, the results should not be impacted significantly. 
Moreover, these participants indicated their preferences/opinions in the free-text responses, 
allowing for coding and analysis. A future research suggestion may be an inclusion of a 
comprehensive glossary of terms in the survey questionnaire. Participants with no 
knowledge or limited understanding of certain terminologies may refer to the glossary before 
or during the completion of the questionnaire. 
11.2 Study recommendations 
Based on the findings from this study, the recommendations below are suggested to improve 
the development of the legal framework governing the National DNA Database. These 
suggestions may also be pursued in future research to support decisions of policymakers.  
1. Possible amendment of the legal definition/scope of the public security functions of 
the NDNAD to fit its actual outcomes. For example, the purpose of DNA retention 
may be framed as to generate unknown and probative investigative leads. The current 
anticipated legal outcomes, including the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of crime, should be investigated systematically.   
2. Introduction of a legal requirement to evidence the public security functions of the 
NDNAD. This will ensure that evaluation programmes are prioritised by relevant 
stakeholders from the onset of the development of NDNAD policies and legal 
reforms. Under such reform, any technical or IT infrastructure developed to 
implement the law should allow for the effectiveness (potential or actual) of the 
regime to be assessed.    
3. Given that the public survey results favoured a discriminatory retention approach for 
convicted adults based on offence seriousness, there should be a wide government 
consultation and analysis of output and outcome data from the NDNAD to ascertain 
whether the current indefinite retention regime for convicted adults should be 
amended to enhance proportionality.  
4. With the potentially high level of support for the expansive regime among primary 
stakeholders, the proposed/implied best practices (such as, automation of regime 
procedures) and efficient elements (such as, national intelligence network) of the 
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expansive regime should be evaluated and adopted into the current retention regime, 
where appropriate.  
5. To maximise the effectiveness of the database and inform policy and public 
confidence in the use of the NDNAD, an independent programme of research should 
be established to systematically review the effectiveness of retention regimes against 
specific key indicators. This should include indicators about the public security 
outcomes and the actual/perceived civil liberty risks of the NDNAD. 
6. In relation to the importance of empowering the public to make an informed decision 
about the rules governing the NDNAD, a simplified and statutory channel (such as, 
media broadcast) should be created to sensitize the public about the facts of DNA 
databasing (and other forensic biometrics). 
7. To partly account for the public support and legitimacy of the NDNAD, there should 
be a statutory scheme to regularly assess public perceptions about DNA databasing 
and other biometrics. This may be in the form of a Biometrics Perception Index 






Appendix I – Match rate analysis project 
The initial aims of this research were to assess the potential effectiveness of the NDNAD 
using match rates (MR). The challenges with the configuration of the database limited the 
type of data that could be extracted to answer the aims of the project. The data that could be 
obtained from the database is presented in Appendix XI. This appendix outlines the proposed 
methodology for this project. As illustrated in the framework for this research, it is expected 
that changes in the law will result in differences in the composition of the database within a 
given period or retention regime. This will impact the overall performance of the database 
and potentially its significance to public security. It is also expected that the different 
retention categories (e.g. convicted, charged and arrested individuals) defined by law will 
contribute to the output of the database differently. The research, therefore, sought to 
determine the potential value of DNA data retention towards crime detection, investigation, 
prosecution and resolution for different retention categories.  Finally, the value of the 
database is dependent on the length of DNA data retention. Hence, the different time limits 
introduced by the law will impact on the performance of the database. The research sought 
to determine the value of different retention lengths (e.g. 3 years old data versus 6 years old 
data).  
Match rate analysis methodology 
The research aimed to statistically determine the potential effectiveness of the different 
retention regimes by analysing available match rate data from the NDNAD. The statistical 
analysis study was approved by the NDNAD Strategy Board and the Ethics Group 
(Appendix XV). 
NDNAD Match rate analysis  
The justification for forensic DNA data retention has mainly relied on criminal career 
research including re-offending and/or re-arrest rates.1006 This empirical approach, though 
important, only offers limited insight into the categories of individuals to include in DNA 
databases and the appropriate length of retention. In this study, match rate analysis was 
considered to be a more appropriate method to estimate the actual potential value of DNA 
                                                 
1006 Crime and Policing Analysis Unit (n 109); Tseloni and Pease (n 63); Houlding and Wilson (n 749); 
Kazemian, Pease and Farrington (n 744); Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: 
Science and Public Protection (n 47). 
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retention to crime-fighting, and thus determine the most effective retention regime. The 
approach can help establish the relative value of convicted individuals and non-convicted 
arrestee’s DNA data. Additionally, it can show the time frame within which DNA retention 
is of value to crime detection or investigation. The two types of match rates proposed by 
ENFSI (H/C and H/N) were considered in this research because they offer different 
perspectives on the value of DNA retention. The crime-solving match rate (H/C) shows the 
fraction of crimes that can be detected or solved by the database. The database-size match 
rate (H/N) expresses the fraction of individuals in the database who are linked to crime 
scenes via their DNA profile. A high H/C shows that more crimes are likely to be detected 
by the police whilst a high H/N indicates that the database is representative of the active or 
previously active criminal population.1007  
One of the major limitations of using match rate analyses is that it only provides a snapshot 
of the potential value of DNA databases. This limits its applicability in demonstrating the 
efficacy of DNA retention regimes. A DNA hit does not automatically solve a crime or 
conclusively establish that a matched individual is the perpetrator of the crime. Several 
factors affect the usefulness of a DNA hit. Whilst the crime-solving match rate of one data 
set (such as convicted individuals’ data) may be higher than another (such as non-convicted 
arrestee data), a follow-up of the DNA hits may show reverse case resolution or conviction 
rates.  The literature review shows that database hit outcomes such as conviction rate are 
more accurate measures of the DNA database and/or retention regime efficacy.1008 However, 
there are no reliable data on DNA conviction rates. Secondly, it is difficult to establish the 
isolated impact of DNA hits on conviction since it is rarely used as the sole evidence in 
criminal cases. Other types of evidence are normally required to secure a conviction. The 
match rate analysis was chosen as a suitable method for this study for the above-mentioned 
reasons. Also, match rate data are already available or could be estimated easily.  
Description of the dataset and empirical strategy 
Historical NDNAD MR data and corresponding database size (number of crime scene 
profiles and reference profiles) from 1995 to 2017 will be accessed from the NDNAD 
Delivery Unit (NDU). The SGM, SGM+ and NGM reference-crime DNA matches will be 
included. Firstly, the match rates (H/C and H/N) will be classified by the three different 
retention regimes. The annual rate observations for the regimes are 6 restrictive, 12 
                                                 
1007 Santos, Machado and Silva (n 29). 
1008 Bieber (n 89); Gabriel, Boland and Holt (n 12). 
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expansive and 4 semi-restrictive. The average H/C and H/N for each regime will be 
compared. Secondly, the H/C and H/N will be filtered by retention categories and compared 
within and between each retention regime. The retention categories considered in this study 
are presented in Table AI.1. There are 7 categories within the restrictive regime, 14 within 
the expansive regime, and 15 within the semi-restrictive regime. The categories were based 
on the characteristics of each retention regime as defined by law and concepts derived from 
literature.  
Table AI.1 – Retention categories considered for match rate comparisons 
Retention regime Retention category 
Restrictive regime (1995 -2001) All convicted individuals 
All individuals convicted of qualified offence 
All individuals convicted of minor offence 
Adults convicted of qualified offence 
Adults convicted of minor offence 
Under 18 convicted of qualified offence 
Under 18 convicted of minor offence 
Expansive regime (2001 – 2013) All convicted individuals 
All individuals convicted of qualified offence 
All individuals convicted of minor offence 
Adults convicted of qualified offence 
Adults convicted of minor offence 
Under 18 convicted of qualified offence 
Under 18 convicted of minor offence 
All non-convicted arrestees/individuals charged 
Non-convicted individuals arrested/charged for qualified 
offence 
Non-convicted individuals arrested/charged for minor offence 
Non-convicted adults arrested/charged for qualified offence 
Non-convicted adults arrested/charged for minor offence 
Non-convicted minors arrested/charged for qualified offence 
Non-convicted minors arrested/charged for minor offence 
Semi-restrictive regime (2013 – 
2017) 
All convicted individuals 
All individuals convicted of qualified offence 
All individuals convicted of minor offence 
Adults convicted of qualified offence 
Adults convicted of minor offence 
Under 18 convicted of qualified offence 
Under 18 convicted of first minor offence 
Under 18 convicted of two or more minor offences 
All non-convicted arrestees/individuals charged 
Non-convicted individuals charged for qualified offence 
Non-convicted individuals arrested for qualified offence 
Non-convicted adults charged for qualified offence 
Non-convicted adults arrested for qualified offence 
Non-convicted minors charged for qualified offence 
Non-convicted minors arrested for qualified offence 
 
Finally, the annual match rates will be filtered by subject profile retention lengths (in years) 
for each retention regime and for the different retention categories. Table AI.2 illustrates the 
strategy for the retention length filtering. The retention length ranges from ≤ 1 year to 22 
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years, with a total of 253 rate observations. The match rates for the different retention lengths 
in each financial year will be compared (row comparisons: e.g. 2009/10: a – o (Table AI.2)). 
The average match rates for each retention length column (i.e. MR for all financial years: a 




Table AI.2 – Illustration of the classification of match rates by subject profile retention lengths 
Year DNA data retention length (years)  
 a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v 
1995/96 ≤ 1                      
1996/97 ≤ 1 >1 – 2                     
1997/98 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3                    
1998/99 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4                   
1999/2000 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5                  
2000/01 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6                 
2001/02 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7                
2002/03 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8               
2003/04 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9              
2004/05 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10             
2005/06 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11            
2006/07 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12           
2007/08 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13          
2008/09 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14         
2009/10 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14 >14-15        
2010/11 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14 >14-15 >15-16       
2011/12 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14 >14-15 >15-16 >16-17      
2012/13 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14 >14-15 >15-16 >16-17 >17-18     
2013/14 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14 >14-15 >15-16 >16-17 >17-18 >18-19    
2014/15 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14 >14-15 >15-16 >16-17 >17-18 >18-19 >19-20   
2015/16 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14 >14-15 >15-16 >16-17 >17-18 >18-19 >19-20 >20-21  
2016/17 ≤ 1 >1 – 2 >2-3 >3-4 >4-5 >5-6 >6-7 >7-8 >8-9 >9-10 >10-11 >11-12 >12-13 >13-14 >14-15 >15-16 >16-17 >17-18 >18-19 >19-20 >20-21 >21-22 
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Statistical analysis of match rate data 
The match rate data will be analysed using the IBM SPSS Statistics software (version 24). 
It is expected that the MR data will include all the annual rates within the period being 
studied therefore descriptive statistics (DS)1009 will be used for analysis. Inferential statistics 
(IS)1010 was considered inappropriate because it examines a statistical sample drawn from a 
population (i.e. the complete set of data or observations) to make generalisations about the 
entire population. Further, the sample size for some categories is too small to allow 
comparisons.  
Appendix II – Search terms and keywords for academic database search 
  
 
1. (“National DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Databank” OR “DNA 
profiling” OR “DNA analysis”) AND (“law” OR “legislation” OR “retention regimes” OR “legal 
framework” OR “Inclusion criteria” OR “retention period”) AND (“United Kingdom” OR “England 
and Wales”) 
2. (“National DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Databank” OR “DNA 
profiling” OR “DNA analysis”) AND (“effectiveness” OR “efficiency” OR “efficacy” OR 
“performance” OR “impact”) AND (“United Kingdom” OR “England and Wales”) 
3. (“National DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Databank” OR “DNA 
profiling” OR “DNA analysis”) AND (“public security” OR “public safety” OR “national security” OR 
“public protection” OR “crime resolution” OR “crime detection” OR “crime prevention” OR “crime 
prosecution”) AND (“United Kingdom” OR “England and Wales”) 
4. (“National DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Databank” OR “DNA 
profiling” OR “DNA analysis”) AND (“privacy” OR “civil liberties” OR “human rights” OR 
“proportionality” OR “ethics”) AND (“United Kingdom” OR “England and Wales”) 
5. (“National DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Database” OR “Forensic DNA Databank” OR “DNA 
profiling” OR “DNA analysis”) AND (“interview” OR “survey” OR “public views” OR “public 




                                                 
1009 Lucy (n 812); Martin G Larson, ‘Descriptive Statistics and Graphical Displays’ (2006) 114 Circulation 
76; Murray J Fisher and Andrea P Marshall, ‘Understanding Descriptive Statistics’ (2009) 22 Australian 
Critical Care 93; Gill Marshall and Leon Jonker, ‘An Introduction to Descriptive Statistics: A Review and 
Practical Guide’ (2010) 16 Radiography e1. 
1010 Shane Allua and Cheryl Bagley Thompson, ‘Inferential Statistics’ (2009) 28 Air Medical Journal 168. 
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Appendix V – Public survey respondent progress 
Page p.1 p.2 p.3 P.4 p.5 p.6 p.7 p.8 p.9 p.10 p.11 – 
complete 
responses 

























































Appendix X – Stakeholder survey respondent progress 
Page p.1 p.2 p.3 P.4 p.5 p.6 p.7 p.8 p.9 p.10 – 
complete 
responses 
Number 207 46 7 23 60 3 2 0 5 31 
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Appendix XI – National DNA Database match statistics from 2003/04 – 2016/17 
Month 














































Apr-03 1153.00 4793.00 24.06 541.00 33322.00 1.62        
May-03 1272.00 4840.00 26.28 716.00 38871.00 1.84        
Jun-03 1330.00 5449.00 24.41 714.00 37856.00 1.89        
Jul-03 1344.00 5327.00 25.23 801.00 45359.00 1.77        
Aug-03 1178.00 4365.00 26.99 638.00 38375.00 1.66        
Sep-03 1474.00 5437.00 27.11 655.00 36603.00 1.79        
Oct-03 1544.00 5664.00 27.26 663.00 38108.00 1.74        
Nov-03 1102.00 4127.00 26.70 645.00 35069.00 1.84        
Dec-03 1181.00 4401.00 26.83 553.00 33149.00 1.67        
Jan-04 1280.00 4827.00 26.52 774.00 39335.00 1.97        
Feb-04 1513.00 5210.00 29.04 702.00 42220.00 1.66        
Mar-04 1686.00 5786.00 29.14 788.00 57030.00 1.38  228463 2527728 26.63 1.74 3.58 0.635234 
              
Apr-04 1270.00 4673.00 27.18 576.00 36877.00 1.56        
May-04 1401.00 4492.00 31.19 633.00 32507.00 1.95        
Jun-04 1650.00 5290.00 31.19 793.00 42825.00 1.85        
Jul-04 1689.00 4821.00 35.03 783.00 43291.00 1.81        
Aug-04 1566.00 4509.00 34.73 829.00 49153.00 1.69        
Sep-04 1447.00 4478.00 32.31 622.00 31832.00 1.95        
Oct-04 1773.00 4931.00 35.96 931.00 48573.00 1.92        
Nov-04 1634.00 4921.00 33.20 896.00 49035.00 1.83        
Dec-04 1584.00 4762.00 33.26 831.00 48064.00 1.73        
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Jan-05 1958.00 5286.00 37.04 818.00 44039.00 1.86        
Feb-05 2168.00 5443.00 39.83 807.00 45925.00 1.76        
Mar-05 2263.00 5642.00 40.11 850.00 48996.00 1.73  232343 3085766 34.25 1.80 4.03 0.661197 
              
Apr-05 2263.00 5217.00 43.38 961.00 50577.00 1.90        
May-05 3543.00 10719.00 33.05 918.00 52704.00 1.74        
Jun-05 3097.00 6884.00 44.99 937.00 53404.00 1.75        
Jul-05 2647.00 5097.00 51.93 800.00 50578.00 1.58        
Aug-05 2697.00 5153.00 52.34 907.00 54437.00 1.67        
Sep-05 2930.00 5646.00 51.90 1049.00 64118.00 1.64        
Oct-05 2894.00 5173.00 55.94 920.00 61915.00 1.49        
Nov-05 2756.00 5309.00 51.91 1024.00 67869.00 1.51        
Dec-05 2190.00 3965.00 55.23 856.00 55153.00 1.55        
Jan-06 2864.00 5481.00 52.25 960.00 63247.00 1.52        
Feb-06 2527.00 4966.00 50.89 910.00 70888.00 1.28        
Mar-06 2684.00 5164.00 51.98 974.00 70349.00 1.38  271903 3785571 49.65 1.58 4.13 0.874161 
              
Apr-06 2477.00 4637.00 53.42 865.00 49407.00 1.75        
May-06 2584.00 4926.00 52.46 1011.00 70413.00 1.44        
Jun-06 2582.00 4793.00 53.87 899.00 55778.00 1.61        
Jul-06 2483.00 4871.00 50.98 1001.00 66370.00 1.51        
Aug-06 2513.00 4663.00 53.89 1097.00 78647.00 1.39        
Sep-06 2660.00 4647.00 57.24 1018.00 64478.00 1.58        
Oct-06 2395.00 4716.00 50.78 951.00 59470.00 1.60        
Nov-06 2354.00 4503.00 52.28 905.00 63636.00 1.42        
Dec-06 2125.00 3715.00 57.20 738.00 48701.00 1.52        
Jan-07 2628.00 4756.00 55.26 849.00 55135.00 1.54        
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Feb-07 2336.00 4407.00 53.01 822.00 54461.00 1.51        
Mar-07 2542.00 4583.00 55.47 888.00 55968.00 1.59  285848 4428376 53.82 1.54 3.86 0.670201 
              
Apr-07 2606.00 4643.00 56.13 788.00 50077.00 1.57        
May-07 2451.00 4430.00 55.33 808.00 54718.00 1.48        
Jun-07 2567.00 4325.00 59.35 857.00 49701.00 1.72        
Jul-07 2382.00 4282.00 55.63 913.00 55273.00 1.65        
Aug-07 2416.00 4388.00 55.06 764.00 49025.00 1.56        
Sep-07 2591.00 4256.00 60.88 839.00 48632.00 1.73        
Oct-07 2486.00 4261.00 58.34 732.00 55322.00 1.32        
Nov-07 2313.00 4550.00 50.84 706.00 48716.00 1.45        
Dec-07 1858.00 3169.00 58.63 587.00 38827.00 1.51        
Jan-08 2277.00 4131.00 55.12 825.00 52176.00 1.58        
Feb-08 2188.00 4016.00 54.48 581.00 41707.00 1.39        
Mar-08 2284.00 4128.00 55.33 677.00 46854.00 1.44  324400 5056740 56.26 1.53 2.80 0.562002 
              
Apr-08 2639.00 4593.00 57.46 847.00 48849.00 1.73        
May-08 2596.00 4331.00 59.94 822.00 47059.00 1.75        
Jun-08 2534.00 4216.00 60.10 766.00 48983.00 1.56        
Jul-08 2543.00 4214.00 60.35 938.00 50190.00 1.87        
Aug-08 2419.00 3906.00 61.93 901.00 54260.00 1.66        
Sep-08 2467.00 4278.00 57.67 803.00 45214.00 1.78        
Oct-08 2549.00 4275.00 59.63 802.00 47159.00 1.70        
Nov-08 2201.00 3727.00 59.06 840.00 49276.00 1.70        
Dec-08 2071.00 3501.00 59.15 1277.00 43675.00 2.92        
Jan-09 2689.00 4353.00 61.77 1764.00 48117.00 3.67        
Feb-09 2162.00 3668.00 58.94 1254.00 44959.00 2.79        
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Mar-09 2501.00 5157.00 48.50 2088.00 53069.00 3.93  350033 5617604 58.71 2.26 3.74 0.522839 
              
Apr-09 2368.00 4588.00 51.61 1805.00 45570.00 3.96        
May-09 2306.00 3887.00 59.33 2078.00 48771.00 4.26        
Jun-09 2271.00 4465.00 50.86 1665.00 50568.00 3.29        
Jul-09 2206.00 3694.00 59.72 1586.00 48756.00 3.25        
Aug-09 2103.00 3707.00 56.73 1344.00 43614.00 3.08        
Sep-09 2595.00 4465.00 58.12 1368.00 45291.00 3.02        
Oct-09 2087.00 3549.00 58.81 1227.00 46380.00 2.65        
Nov-09 1619.00 2775.00 58.34 1356.00 36555.00 3.71        
Dec-09 2065.00 3379.00 61.11 1356.00 47926.00 2.83        
Jan-10 2010.00 2949.00 68.16 1405.00 36892.00 3.81        
Feb-10 1953.00 3028.00 64.50 1255.00 34232.00 3.67        
Mar-10 2088.00 3487.00 59.88 1341.00 37823.00 3.55  375620 6135990 58.93 3.42 4.74 0.418368 
              
Apr-10 2134.00 3532.00 60.00 1284.00 38255.00 3.36        
May-10 2195.00 3461.00 63.00 1051.00 33824.00 3.11        
Jun-10 2293.00 3528.00 65.00 1537.00 36911.00 4.16        
Jul-10 2195.00 3337.00 66.00 1155.00 37665.00 3.07        
Aug-10 2068.00 3180.00 65.00 1185.00 35303.00 3.36        
Sep-10 1893.00 3081.00 61.00 1054.00 35671.00 2.95        
Oct-10 1779.00 2746.00 65.00 1228.00 35342.00 3.47        
Nov-10 1845.00 2945.00 63.00 1486.00 35241.00 4.22        
Dec-10 1462.00 2335.00 63.00 1323.00 30897.00 4.28        
Jan-11 1882.00 3090.00 61.00 1192.00 36698.00 3.25        
Feb-11 1802.00 3045.00 59.00 1051.00 35104.00 2.99        
Mar-11 2110.00 3625.00 58.00 1018.00 37391.00 2.72  400786 6171950 62.42 3.41 3.63 0.383315 
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Apr-11 1858.00 3040.00 61.00 784.00 31673.00 2.48        
May-11 2186.00 3547.00 62.00 863.00 37952.00 2.27        
Jun-11 2166.00 3554.00 61.00 811.00 35885.00 2.26        
Jul-11 2080.00 3384.00 61.00 846.00 34242.00 2.47        
Aug-11 2530.00 3917.00 65.00 911.00 36360.00 2.51        
Sep-11 2037.00 3394.00 60.00 889.00 34873.00 2.55        
Oct-11 1948.00 3206.00 61.00 661.00 30979.00 2.13        
Nov-11 1914.00 3221.00 59.00 689.00 33967.00 2.03        
Dec-11 1560.00 2567.00 61.00 569.00 30236.00 1.88        
Jan-12 1929.00 3198.00 60.00 732.00 32987.00 2.22        
Feb-12 1671.00 2793.00 60.00 538.00 29227.00 1.84        
Mar-12 1892.00 3046.00 62.00 550.00 30464.00 1.81  405848 6969396 61.08 2.20 2.18 0.341077 
              
Apr-12 1664.00 2755.00 60.40 419.00 27138.00 1.54        
May-12 1681.00 2774.00 60.60 538.00 29934.00 1.80        
Jun-12 1642.00 2611.00 62.89 419.00 27564.00 1.52        
Jul-12 1803.00 3023.00 59.64 440.00 30684.00 1.43        
Aug-12 1809.00 2957.00 61.18 528.00 33339.00 1.58        
Sep-12 1754.00 2692.00 65.16 582.00 29478.00 1.97        
Oct-12 1690.00 2803.00 60.29 650.00 33907.00 1.92        
Nov-12 1701.00 2794.00 60.88 663.00 31918.00 2.08        
Dec-12 1526.00 2339.00 65.24 546.00 27227.00 2.01        
Jan-13 1904.00 2896.00 65.75 521.00 32233.00 1.62        
Feb-13 1801.00 2729.00 65.99 439.00 28777.00 1.53        
Mar-13 1835.00 2817.00 65.14 466.00 30119.00 1.55  428634 6737973 62.76 1.71 1.45 0.308847 
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Apr-13 1829.00 2824.00 64.77 350.00 28960.00 1.21        
May-13 1881.00 2920.00 64.42 375.00 30844.00 1.22        
Jun-13 1914.00 2907.00 65.84 370.00 28305.00 1.31        
Jul-13 2071.00 3018.00 68.62 409.00 32002.00 1.28        
Aug-13 1992.00 2915.00 68.34 388.00 29007.00 1.34        
Sep-13 1938.00 2879.00 67.32 351.00 28878.00 1.22        
Oct-13 1978.00 3121.00 63.38 433.00 30180.00 1.43        
Nov-13 1711.00 2741.00 62.42 426.00 28659.00 1.49        
Dec-13 1714.00 2650.00 64.68 421.00 29649.00 1.42        
Jan-14 1734.00 2987.00 58.05 424.00 35908.00 1.18        
Feb-14 1847.00 2813.00 65.66 376.00 28571.00 1.32        
Mar-14 2029.00 3252.00 62.39 472.00 31160.00 1.51  456856 5716085 64.66 1.33 1.05 0.39604 
              
Apr-14 1833.00 2798.00 65.51 388.00 26617.00 1.46        
May-14 2119.00 3226.00 65.69 476.00 31322.00 1.52        
Jun-14 1930.00 2909.00 66.35 447.00 30083.00 1.49        
Jul-14 2073.00 3072.00 67.48 802.00 25206.00 3.18        
Aug-14 1874.00 2877.00 65.14 397.00 23736.00 1.67        
Sep-14 2034.00 3138.00 64.82 452.00 24528.00 1.84        
Oct-14 2068.00 3274.00 63.16 493.00 27387.00 1.80        
Nov-14 1937.00 3140.00 61.69 378.00 24333.00 1.55        
Dec-14 1951.00 3064.00 63.67 441.00 25048.00 1.76        
Jan-15 1941.00 3137.00 61.87 489.00 25520.00 1.92        
Feb-15 1813.00 2977.00 60.90 405.00 24161.00 1.68        
Mar-15 2047.00 3321.00 61.64 454.00 23805.00 1.91  486691 5766369 63.99 1.82 1.16 0.409617 
              
Apr-15 1841.00 3336.00 55.19 417.00 24400.00 1.71        
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May-15 2137.00 3510.00 60.88 433.00 23648.00 1.83        
Jun-15 2136.00 3358.00 63.61 451.00 24786.00 1.82        
Jul-15 2283.00 3659.00 62.39 518.00 26071.00 1.99        
Aug-15 1952.00 3119.00 62.58 394.00 22389.00 1.76        
Sep-15 2220.00 3410.00 65.10 430.00 23670.00 1.82        
Oct-15 2220.00 3451.00 64.33 486.00 25808.00 1.88        
Nov-15 2035.00 3179.00 64.01 401.00 22510.00 1.78        
Dec-15 1824.00 2806.00 65.00 385.00 22826.00 1.69        
Jan-16 2062.00 3111.00 66.28 471.00 27615.00 1.71        
Feb-16 1961.00 3043.00 64.44 367.00 23049.00 1.59        
Mar-16 2218.00 3388.00 65.47 481.00 25539.00 1.88  519678 5860642 63.27 1.79 1.01 0.42468 
              
Apr-16 2234.00 3329.00 67.10 481.00 25448.00 1.89        
May-16 2196.00 3341.00 65.70 404.00 23971.00 1.69        
Jun-16 2218.00 3388.00 65.47 481.00 25539.00 1.88        
Jul-16 2219.00 3300.00 67.20 453.00 24550.00 1.85        
Aug-16 2254.00 3306.00 68.18 434.00 22984.00 1.89        
Sep-16 2376.00 3546.00 67.00 428.00 21153.00 2.02        
Oct-16 2313.00 3431.00 67.40 476.00 20384.00 2.34        
Nov-16 2288.00 3529.00 64.80 444.00 21032.00 2.11        
Dec-16 2190.00 3387.00 64.70 382.00 18145.00 2.11        
Jan-17 2348.00 3523.00 66.60 468.00 23506.00 1.99        
Feb-17 2025.00 3193.00 63.40 392.00 20170.00 1.94        
Mar-17 2294.00 3556.00 64.50 434.00 22607.00 1.92  555,362 6,024,032 66.00 1.97 0.95 0.447458 
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Oral presentations  
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6. Amankwaa, OA. “How to assess the efficacy of forensic DNA database retention 
regimes?” Doctoral and Faculty Research Conference (DFRC), Faculty of Business and 
Law, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, 29th June 2017.  
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Poster presentations  
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Appendix XIII – Normality Testing 
Crime-solving capacity 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Restrictive regime .268 30 .000 .853 30 .001 
Expansive regime .311 30 .000 .760 30 .000 
Semi-restrictive regime .288 30 .000 .858 30 .001 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Incapacitation effect 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Restrictive regime .270 31 .000 .859 31 .001 
Expansive regime .237 31 .000 .817 31 .000 
Semi-restrictive regime .298 31 .000 .807 31 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Deterrence Effect 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Restrictive regime .293 30 .000 .854 30 .001 
Expansive regime .185 30 .011 .903 30 .010 
Semi-restrictive regime .231 30 .000 .882 30 .003 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Proportionality 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Restrictive regime .242 30 .000 .857 30 .001 
Expansive regime .227 30 .000 .862 30 .001 
Semi-restrictive regime .260 30 .000 .857 30 .001 






Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Restrictive regime .240 30 .000 .904 30 .011 
Expansive regime .233 30 .000 .841 30 .000 
Semi-restrictive regime .224 30 .001 .869 30 .002 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Implementation cost 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Restrictive regime .223 29 .001 .912 29 .019 
Expansive regime .243 29 .000 .894 29 .007 
Semi-restrictive regime .268 29 .000 .867 29 .002 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Protection of genetic privacy 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Restrictive regime .306 31 .000 .819 31 .000 
Expansive regime .210 31 .001 .900 31 .007 
Semi-restrictive regime .297 31 .000 .840 31 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Overall effectiveness 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Restrictive regime .219 31 .001 .883 31 .003 
Expansive regime .227 31 .000 .847 31 .000 
Semi-restrictive regime .244 31 .000 .889 31 .004 



















Adam C, Essential Mathematics and Statistics for Forensic Science (Wiley-Blackwell 2010) 
Allua S and Thompson CB, ‘Inferential Statistics’ (2009) 28 Air Medical Journal 168 
Amelung N and Machado H, ‘Affected for Good or for Evil: The Formation of Issue-Publics 
That Relate to the UK National DNA Database’ (2019) 28 Public Understanding of Science 
590 
Anderson C and others, ‘The National DNA Database on Trial: Engaging Young People in 
South Wales with Genetics’ (2011) 20 Public Understanding of Science 146 
Applied Biosystems, GlobalFilerTM PCR Amplification Kit: User Guide (Thermo Fisher 
Scientific Inc 2016) 
Aquilina K, ‘Public Security versus Privacy in Technology Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2010) 
26 Computer Law & Security Review 130 
Asplen C, ‘ENFSI Survey on the DNA Profile Inclusion, Removal, and Retention of 
Member State’s Forensic DNA Database’ <http://enfsi.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/enfsi_report_on_dna_legislation_in_europe_0.pdf> accessed 19 
February 2018 
Augenstein S, ‘GEDmatch Changes Are “Blow” to Law Enforcement – and Forensic 
Genealogy’ (Forensic Magazine, 20 May 2019) 
<https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2019/05/gedmatch-changes-blow-law-enforcement-
and-forensic-genealogy> accessed 7 June 2019 
——, ‘GEDmatch Update: Genealogy Database “Opt-in” Numbers Climb’ (Forensic 
Magazine, 30 May 2019) <https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2019/05/gedmatch-update-
genealogy-database-opt-numbers-climb> accessed 7 June 2019 
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, ‘National Criminal Investigation DNA 
Database’ (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, 24 June 2016) 
<https://www.acic.gov.au/our-services/biometric-matching/national-criminal-
investigation-dna-database> accessed 12 July 2017 
——, ‘Submission to Productivity Commission’s Inquiry into Data Availability and Use’ 
(ACIC 2016) 
——, 2017-18 Annual Report (ACIC 2018) 
Baichuan G, Jianxiong P and Bing L, ‘The Tactics System and Capacity-Building of 
National DNA Database’ (2016) 41 Forensic Science and Technology 259 
Barnes SB, ‘A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United States’ (2006) 11 First 
Monday <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v11i9.1394> accessed 21 May 2019 
Baroness Williams of Trafford, ‘Response to the Biometrics Commissioner’s Annual Report 




data/file/812404/Government_response_to_BC_annual_report_2018.pdf> accessed 11 
September 2019 
Baskin D and Sommers I, ‘Solving Residential Burglaries in the United States: The Impact 
of Forensic Evidence on Case Outcomes’ (2011) 13 International Journal of Police Science 
& Management 70 
BBC News, ‘Serial Rapist Jailed for Life’ BBC News (14 April 1999) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/319446.stm> accessed 19 January 2017 
——, ‘New DNA Facility Gives Hope of “cold Case” Justice in Scotland’ BBC News (2 
February 2015) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-31091812> 
accessed 29 September 2019 
——, ‘Melanie Road Murder: Man Jailed for 1984 Melanie Road Murder’ BBC News (9 
May 2016) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-somerset-36245888> accessed 6 
December 2018 
——, ‘US Suspect Traced Using Genealogy Sites’ BBC News (27 April 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43916830> accessed 25 July 2018 
Beattie K, ‘S and Marper v UK: Privacy, DNA and Crime Prevention’ [2009] European 
Human Rights Law Review 229 
Bennett C and others, ‘Reporting Guidelines for Survey Research: An Analysis of Published 
Guidance and Reporting Practices’ (2011) 8 PLOS Medicine e1001069 
Benschop CCG and others, ‘Low Template STR Typing: Effect of Replicate Number and 
Consensus Method on Genotyping Reliability and DNA Database Search Results’ (2011) 5 
Forensic Science International: Genetics 316 
Berg JM, Tymoczko JL and Stryer L, Biochemistry (7th edn, WH Freeman and Company 
2012) 
Berger MA, ‘The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal Justice System’ (2006) 34 
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 320 
Bhati A and Roman CG, ‘Evaluating and Quantifying the Specific Deterrent Effects of DNA 
Databases’ (2014) 38 Evaluation Review 68 
Bieber FR, ‘Turning Base Hits into Earned Runs: Improving the Effectiveness of Forensic 
DNA Data Bank Programs’ (2006) 34 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 222 
——, ‘Evaluation of Forensic DNA Mixture Evidence: Protocol for Evaluation, 
Interpretation, and Statistical Calculations Using the Combined Probability of Inclusion’ 
(2016) 17 BMC Genetics <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5007818/> 
accessed 15 November 2017 
Biometrics Commissioner, ‘Consultation Paper on Applications to the Biometrics 
Commissioner under s.63G PACE Summary of Responses’ (Office of the Biometrics 
Commissioner 2013) 
Blakemore B and Blake C, ‘Can the National DNA Database Be Effective and Comply with 
Human Rights Legislation?’ (2012) 85 The Police Journal 191 
 347 
 
Blank G, Bolsover G and Dubois E, ‘A New Privacy Paradox: Young People and Privacy 
on Social Network Sites’ (Social Science Research Network 2014) SSRN Scholarly Paper 
ID 2479938 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2479938> accessed 21 May 2019 
Børsting C and Morling N, ‘Next Generation Sequencing and Its Applications in Forensic 
Genetics’ (2015) 18 Forensic Science International: Genetics 78 
Brace I, Questionnaire Design: How to Plan, Structure and Write Survey Material for 
Effective Market Research (Kogan Page Ltd 2004) 
Bradburn NM, Sudman S and Wansink B, Asking Questions: The Definitive Guide to 
Questionnaire Design - for Market Research, Political Polls, and Social and Health 
Questionnaires (2nd edn, Jossey-Bass 2004) 
Bramley B, ‘DNA Databases’ in Jim Fraser and Robin Williams (eds), Handbook of forensic 
science (Willan Publishing 2009) 
Brierley D and Bentham M, ‘Mother of Sally Anne Bowman: Store Everyone’s DNA on a 
National Database’ (Evening Standard, 31 March 2009) 
<http://www.standard.co.uk/news/mother-of-sally-anne-bowman-store-everyones-dna-on-
a-national-database-6860416.html> accessed 20 June 2018 
Briody M, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Sexual Offence Cases in Court’ (2002) 14 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 159 
——, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Homicide Cases in Court’ (2004) 37 Australian & 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 231 
——, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Property Offences in Court’ (2006) 17 Current 
Issues in Criminal Justice 380 
Briody M and Prenzler T, ‘D.N.A. Databases and Property Crime: A False Promise?’ (2005) 
37 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 73 
Britton DM, Jacobsen SK and Howard GE, The Gender of Crime (2nd edn, Rowman & 
Littlefield 2017) 
Brower G and Reimer N, ‘Maryland v. King: Possibly the Most Important Criminal 
Procedure Case in Decades’ (2013) 14 Engage 29 
Brown TA, Genomes (2nd edn, Wiley-Liss 2002) 
Bryman A, Social Research Methods (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 
Budowle B and others, ‘CODIS and PCR-Based Short Tandem Repeat Loci: Law 
Enforcement Tools’ (Promega Corporation 1998) <https://www.promega.co.uk/-
/media/files/resources/conference-proceedings/ishi-02/oral-presentations/17.pdf?la=en> 
accessed 17 October 2017 
Burrows J and Tarling R, ‘Measuring the Impact of Forensic Science in Detecting Burglary 
and Autocrime Offences’ (2004) 44 Science & Justice 217 
 348 
 
Buscaino J and others, ‘Evaluation of a Rapid DNA Process with the RapidHIT® ID System 
Using a Specialized Cartridge for Extracted and Quantified Human DNA’ (2018) 34 
Forensic Science International: Genetics 116 
Business Dictionary, ‘What Is Efficacy? Definition and Meaning’ (BusinessDictionary.com) 
<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/efficacy.html> accessed 3 April 2017 
Butler J, Forensic DNA Typing (2nd edn, Elsevier 2005) 
——, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing: Methodology (Elsevier 2012) 
Caddy B, Taylor GR and Linacre AMT, ‘A Review of the Science of Low Template DNA 
Analysis’ (Home Office 2008) 
Cambridge Dictionary, ‘Meaning of “Efficacy” in the English Dictionary’ (Cambridge 
Dictionary) <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/efficacy> accessed 3 April 
2017 
Campanelli P, ‘Testing Survey Questions’ in Edith Desirée de. Leeuw, Joop J Hox and Don 
A Dillman (eds), International Handbook of Survey Methodology (Taylor and Francis Group 
2008) 
Carifio J and Perla R, ‘Resolving the 50-Year Debate around Using and Misusing Likert 
Scales’ (2008) 42 Medical Education 1150 
Carifio J and Perla RJ, ‘Ten Common Misunderstandings, Misconceptions, Persistent Myths 
and Urban Legends about Likert Scales and Likert Response Formats and Their Antidotes’ 
(2007) 3 Journal of Social Sciences 106 
Carling MJ and others, ‘The Contribution of Forensic Science to Murder and Other Serious 
Crime Investigation in England and Wales in 2009-10’ (National Policing Improvement 
Agency; Unpublished) 
Cayuqueo P, ‘Gobierno Chileno Impulsa Registro de ADN de Presos Políticos Mapuches’ 
(América Latina en movimiento, 28 January 2009) 
<https://www.alainet.org/es/active/28694> accessed 8 November 2017 
CCRC, ‘Who We Are’ (Criminal Cases Review Commission) 
<http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are/> accessed 14 March 2017 
Clayton TM and others, ‘Further Validation of a Quadruplex STR DNA Typing System: A 
Collaborative Effort to Identify Victims of a Mass Disaster’ (1995) 76 Forensic Science 
International 17 
Clayton TM and others, ‘Analysis and Interpretation of Mixed Forensic Stains Using DNA 
STR Profiling’ (1998) 91 Forensic Science International 55 
Cobain I, ‘Killer Breakthrough – the Day DNA Evidence First Nailed a Murderer’ The 
Guardian (7 June 2016) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/07/killer-dna-
evidence-genetic-profiling-criminal-investigation> accessed 18 October 2017 
Committee of Ministers, ‘Recommendation No. R(87) 15 to the Member States on 




——, ‘Recommendation No. R (92) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
the Use of Analysis of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) within the Framework of the Criminal 
Justice System’ (1992) I 25 899 Council of Europe 1 
Corder GW and Foreman DI, Nonparametric Statistics for Non-Statisticians: A Step-by-Step 
Approach (Wiley 2009) 
Cotton EA and others, ‘Validation of the AMPFlSTR® SGM PlusTM System for Use in 
Forensic Casework’ (2000) 112 Forensic Science International 151 
Council of the European Union, ‘Council Resolution of 9 June 1997 on the Exchange of 
DNA Analysis Results’ (1997) C 193 Official Journal of the European Communities 2 
——, ‘Council Resolution of 25 June 2001 on the Exchange of DNA Analysis Results’ 
(2001) C 187 Official Journal of the European Communities 1 
——, ‘Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the Stepping up of Cross-Border 
Cooperation, Particularly in Combating Terrorism and Cross-Border Crime’ (2008) L 210 
Official Journal of the European Union 1 
——, ‘Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the Implementation of Decision 
2008/615/JHA on the Stepping up of Cross-Border Cooperation, Particularly in Combating 
Terrorism and Cross-Border Crime’ (2008) L 210 Official Journal of the European Union 
12 
——, ‘Implementation of the provisions on information exchange of the “Prüm Decisions”’ 
(Council of the European Union 2017) 
——, ‘Draft Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the “PRÜM DECISIONS” Ten 
Years after Their Adoption’ (Council of the European Union 2018) 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10550-2018-INIT/en/pdf> accessed 11 
July 2018 
Crime and Policing Analysis Unit, ‘DNA Retention Policy: Results of Analysis Relating to 
the Protections of the “the Scottish Model”’ (Home Office 2011) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98399/dna
-retention-policy.pdf> accessed 6 June 2017 
CRIMTRAC, Annual Report 2006-07 (CRIMTRAC 2007) 
——, Annual Report 2015 - 2016 (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission 2016) 
Croning MD and others, ‘Automated Design of Genomic Southern Blot Probes’ (2010) 11 
BMC Genomics 74 
Cross TP and others, ‘Biological Evidence in Adult and Adolescent Sexual Assault Cases: 
Timing and Relationship to Arrest’ [2017] Journal of Interpersonal Violence 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260517704229> 
CTED and UNOCT, United Nations Compendium of Recommended Practices for the 
Responsible Use and Sharing of Biometrics in Counter-Terrorism (Counter-Terrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate 2018) 
 350 
 
Curtis C, ‘Public Perceptions and Expectations of the Forensic Use of DNA: Results of a 
Preliminary Study’ (2009) 29 Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 313 
——, ‘Public Understandings of the Forensic Use of DNA: Positivity, Misunderstandings, 
and Cultural Concerns’ (2014) 34 Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 21 
Cyranoski D, ‘China Expands DNA Data Grab in Troubled Western Region’ (2017) 545 
Nature News 395 
Dahl JY and Sætnan AR, ‘“It All Happened so Slowly” – On Controlling Function Creep in 
Forensic DNA Databases’ (2009) 37 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 83 
Dale C, ‘The Impact of DNA on Criminal Investigation’ (2016) 7 Journal of Intellectual 
Disabilities and Offending Behaviour 105 
Davis RC and others, ‘The Effects of Legislation Mandating DNA Testing in Sexual Assault 
Cases: Results in Texas’ [2019] Violence Against Women 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801219838330> accessed 8 June 2019 
de Leeuw ED, Data Quality in Mail, Telephone and Face to Face Surveys (TT-Publikaties 
1992) 
——, ‘Choosing the Method of Data Collection’ in Edith D de Leeuw, Joop J Hox and Don 
A Dillman (eds), International Handbook of Survey Methodology (Taylor and Francis Group 
2008) 
de Leeuw ED and Hox JJ, ‘Self-Administered Questionnaires; Mail Surveys and Other 
Applications’ in Edith D de Leeuw, Joop J Hox and Don A Dillman (eds), International 
handbook of Survey Methodology (Taylor and Francis Group 2008) 
de Leeuw ED, Hox JJ and Dillman DA, ‘The Cornerstones of Survey Research’ in Edith D 
de Leeuw, Joop J Hox and Don A Dillman (eds) (Taylor and Francis Group 2008) 
De Moor S, Vandeviver C and Vander Beken T, ‘Integrating Police-Recorded Crime Data 
and DNA Data to Study Serial Co-Offending Behaviour’ (2018) 15 European Journal of 
Criminology 632 
——, ‘Are DNA Data a Valid Source to Study the Spatial Behavior of Unknown Offenders?’ 
(2018) 58 Science & Justice 315 
Dedrickson K, ‘Universal DNA Databases: A Way to Improve Privacy?’ (2017) 4 Journal 
of Law and the Biosciences 637 
Di Pasquale F and others, ‘Investigator® Quantiplex Kit: For Reliable Quantification of 
Human DNA in Forensic Samples’ (2011) 3 Forensic Science International: Genetics 
Supplement Series e413 
DiMauro S and Davidzon G, ‘Mitochondrial DNA and Disease’ (2005) 37 Annals of 
Medicine 222 




——, ‘A New DNA Act’ (DNA Project - South Africa) <http://dnaproject.co.za/legislation-
homepage/legislation/a-new-dna-act> accessed 13 March 2018 
Doleac JL, ‘The Effects of DNA Databases on Crime’ (Social Science Research Network 
2016) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2556948 
——, ‘How Do State Crime Policies Affect Other States? The Externalities of State DNA 
Database Laws’ (Social Science Research Network 2016) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 
2892046 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2892046> accessed 11 January 2017 
——, ‘The Effects of DNA Databases on the Deterrence and Detection of Offenders’ (Social 
Science Research Network 2016) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2811790 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2811790> accessed 22 May 2017 
Downey J, Stephens M and Flaherty J, ‘The “Sluice-Gate” Public Sphere and the National 
DNA Database in the UK’ (2012) 34 Media, Culture & Society 439 
Dundes L, ‘Is the American Public Ready to Embrace DNA as a Crime-Fighting Tool? A 
Survey Assessing Support for DNA Databases’ (2001) 21 Bulletin of Science, Technology 
and Society 369 
Dunsmuir WTM, Tran C and Weatherburn D, Assessing the Impact of Mandatory DNA 
Testing of Prison Inmates in NSW on Clearance, Charge and Conviction Rates for Selected 
Crime Categories (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 2008) 
Durlauf SN and Nagin DS, ‘Imprisonment and Crime’ (2011) 10 Criminology & Public 
Policy 13 
Economics and Resource Analysis Group, ‘DNA Retention Policy: Re-Arrest Hazard Rate 
Analysis’ (Home Office 2009) 
Edwards A and others, ‘DNA Typing and Genetic Mapping with Trimeric and Tetrameric 
Tandem Repeats.’ (1991) 49 American Journal of Human Genetics 746 
Edwards MC and Gibbs RA, ‘Multiplex PCR: Advantages, Development, and Applications.’ 
(1994) 3 Genome Research S65 
Eisenhauer ER and others, ‘Participants’ Understanding of Informed Consent for 
Biobanking: A Systematic Review’ (2019) 28 Clinical Nursing Research 30 
El-Alfy SH and Abd El-Hafez AF, ‘Paternity Testing and Forensic DNA Typing by 
Multiplex STR Analysis Using ABI PRISM 310 Genetic Analyzer’ (2012) 10 Journal of 
Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology 101 
ENFSI, ‘ENFSI Survey on DNA Databases in Europe-June 2016’ (ENFSI, 2017) 
<http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ENFSI-Survey-on-DNA-Databases-in-
Europe-June-2016.pdf> accessed 11 April 2017 
ENFSI DNA Working Group, DNA Database Management Review and Recommendations 
(ENFSI 2016) 
——, DNA Database Management Review and Recommendations (ENFSI 2017) 
——, ‘STRidER 2.0’ (STRidER) <https://strider.online/> accessed 11 October 2017 
 352 
 
ESR, ‘ESR 2017 Annual Report’ (Environmental Science and Research 2017) 
——, ‘Forensic: Crime Science & Intelligence’ 
<https://www.esr.cri.nz/assets/Uploads/Forensic-Brochure-WEB-spreads.pdf> accessed 21 
March 2018 
——, ‘Annual Report 2018’ (Environmental Science and Research 2018) 
<https://www.esr.cri.nz/assets/Uploads/ESR-ANNUAL-REPORT-2018-WEB-
FINAL2.pdf> accessed 2 September 2019 
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)’ (2016) 119 
Official Journal of the European Union 1 
European Union Committee, ‘The United Kingdom’s Participation in Prüm’ (House of 
Lords 2015) 
Europol, ‘Europol Information System (EIS) Leaflet’ (Europol, 9 December 2013) 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/europol-information-system-eis-
leaflet> accessed 6 June 2018 
——, Europol Programming Document: 2018 – 2020 (Europol 2018) 
Fallik S and Wells W, ‘Testing Previously Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits: What Are the 
Investigative Results?’ (2014) 26 Criminal Justice Policy Review 598 
Fan W, Khan N and Lin L, ‘China Snares Innocent and Guilty Alike to Build World’s 
Biggest DNA Database’ Wall Street Journal (27 December 2017) 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-snares-innocent-and-guilty-alike-to-build-worlds-
biggest-dna-database-1514310353> accessed 27 February 2018 
FBI, ‘Rapid DNA’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 20 September 2017) 
<https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/rapid-dna> accessed 11 
March 2019 
——, ‘CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018) 
<https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-
sheet> accessed 8 February 2018 
——, ‘CODIS - NDIS Statistics as of July 2019’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019) 
<https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics> accessed 
3 September 2019 
——, ‘Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
<https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis> accessed 17 October 
2017 




FBI National Press Office, ‘FBI Brings CODIS Software to Mauritius’ (FBI, 22 August 
2012) <https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-brings-codis-software-to-
mauritius> accessed 10 November 2017 
FGPI, ‘Chile - FDNAPI Wiki’ (Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, 2015) 
<http://dnapolicyinitiative.org/wiki/index.php?title=Chile#cite_note-ftn3-3> accessed 8 
November 2017 
——, ‘DNA Databases in Australia and New Zealand’ 
<http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/Australia_and
_New_Zealand.pdf> accessed 19 March 2018 
Field A, Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS (4th edn, SAGE Publications, Ltd 2013) 
FIND Strategy Board, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2016 to 2017 (Forensic 
Information Database Strategy Board 2018) 
——, ‘Applications to the Biometrics Commissioner under PACE’ (Forensic Information 
Database Strategy Board 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/764558/Applications_to_the_Biometrics_Commissioner_under_PACE__Septemb
er_2018.pdf> accessed 18 September 2019 
——, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2017 to 2018 (Forensic Information 
Database Strategy Board 2019) 
Fink A, How to Conduct Surveys: A Step-by-Step Guide (6th edn, Sage Publications, Inc 
2017) 
Fisher MJ and Marshall AP, ‘Understanding Descriptive Statistics’ (2009) 22 Australian 
Critical Care 93 
Fonneløp AE and others, ‘Contamination during Criminal Investigation: Detecting Police 
Contamination and Secondary DNA Transfer from Evidence Bags’ (2016) 23 Forensic 
Science International: Genetics 121 
Ford P, ‘Discussion Paper: Further Independent Review of Part 1D of the Crimes Act 1914’ 
(Forensic Procedures Review Committee 2009) 
——, ‘DNA Forensic Procedures: Further Independent Review of Part 1D of the Crimes Act 
1914’ (Forensic Procedures Review Committee 2010) 
Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, ‘Global Summary’ (Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, 
10 February 2016) <http://dnapolicyinitiative.org/wiki/index.php?title=Global_summary> 
accessed 11 April 2017 
——, ‘Welcome to the Genetics Policy Initiative!’ (Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, 5 
July 2016) <http://dnapolicyinitiative.org/> accessed 3 September 2019 
——, ‘DNA Policy Info by Country’ (Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, 2017) 




——, Establishing Best Practice for Forensic DNA Databases (FGPI 2017) 
<http://dnapolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/BestPractice-Report-plus-
cover-final.pdf> accessed 3 October 2017 
Forensic Science and Pathology Unit, ‘DNA Expansion Programme 2000–2005: Reporting 
Achievement’ (Home Office 2005) 
Forensic Science Regulator, DNA Contamination Detection -The Management and Use of 
Staff Elimination DNA Databases (Forensic Science Regulator 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/355995/D
NAcontaminationDetection.pdf> accessed 31 August 2017 
——, The Control and Avoidance of Contamination in Crime Scene Examination Involving 
DNA Evidence Recovery (Forensic Science Regulator 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/536827/FS
R-anti-contamination.pdf> 
Fowler FJ and Cosenza C, ‘Writing Effective Questions’ in Edith Desirée de. Leeuw, Joop 
J Hox and Don A Dillman (eds), International Handbook of Survey Methodology: (Taylor 
and Francis Group 2008) 
Fraser J, Forensic Science: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2010) 
Fraser J, ‘Cold-Case Review: UK Experience’, Encyclopedia of Forensic and Legal 
Medicine (Second Edition) (Elsevier 2016) 
Fraser J and Scottish Government (Funder), ‘Acquisition and Retention of DNA and 
Fingerprint Data in Scotland’ (University of Strathclyde 2009) Report 
<http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/18671/> accessed 11 October 2016 
Gabriel M, Boland C and Holt C, ‘Beyond the Cold Hit: Measuring the Impact of the 
National DNA Data Bank on Public Safety at the City and County Level’ (2010) 38 The 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 396 
Gaines ML and others, ‘Reduced Volume PCR Amplification Reactions Using the 
AmpFlSTR Profiler PlusTM Kit’ (2002) 47 Journal of forensic sciences 1224 
Gamero J-J and others, ‘Study of Spanish Public Awareness Regarding DNA Databases in 
Forensic Genetics’ (2003) 1239 International Congress Series 773 
——, ‘Some Social and Ethical Aspects of DNA Analyses and DNA Profile Databases’ 
(2006) 1288 International Congress Series 777 
——, ‘Spanish Public Awareness Regarding DNA Profile Databases in Forensic Genetics: 
What Type of DNA Profiles Should Be Included?’ (2007) 33 Journal of Medical Ethics 598 
——, ‘A Study of Spanish Attitudes Regarding the Custody and Use of Forensic DNA 
Databases’ (2008) 2 Forensic Science International: Genetics 138 
Garrett R and Grisham CM, Biochemistry (5th edn, Brooks/Cole, Cengage Learning 2012) 
Gavison R, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421 
 355 
 
Ge J and others, ‘Future Directions of Forensic DNA Databases’ (2014) 55 Croatian Medical 
Journal 163 
Gerber N, Gerber P and Volkamer M, ‘Explaining the Privacy Paradox: A Systematic 
Review of Literature Investigating Privacy Attitude and Behavior’ (2018) 77 Computers & 
Security 226 
Gettings KB and others, ‘STR Allele Sequence Variation: Current Knowledge and Future 
Issues’ (2015) 18 Forensic Science International: Genetics 118 
——, ‘Sequence Variation of 22 Autosomal STR Loci Detected by next Generation 
Sequencing’ (2016) 21 Forensic Science International: Genetics 15 
Giannelli PC, ‘Independent Crime Laboratories: The Problem of Motivational and Cognitive 
Bias’ [2010] Utah Law Review 247 
Gibbons JD and Chakraborti S, Nonparametric Statistical Inference (4th edn, Marcel Dekker 
2003) 
Gill P and others, ‘Interpreting Simple STR Mixtures Using Allele Peak Areas’ (1998) 91 
Forensic Science International 41 
Gill P and Clayton T, ‘The Current Status of DNA Profiling in the UK’ in Jim Fraser and 
Robin Williams (eds), Handbook of forensic science (Willan Publishing 2009) 
Gill P, Jeffreys AJ and Werrett DJ, ‘Forensic Application of DNA “Fingerprints”’ (1985) 
318 Nature 577 
Goodwin W, ‘DNA Profiling: The First 30 Years’ (2015) 55 Science & Justice 375 
Gordon Thomas Honeywell Governmental Affairs, ‘United Kingdom Murder Case Selected 
as 2018 DNA Hit of the Year’ (DNA Resource, 4 May 2018) 
<http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/2018%20Hit%20of%20the%20Year/Rome%20
Press%20Release%20Website%20Final%202.pdf> accessed 3 April 2019 
Gordon-Smith T, ‘Structure and Function of Red and White Blood Cells’ (2013) 41 
Medicine 193 
Goulka J and others, ‘Toward a Comparison of DNA Profiling and Databases in the United 
States and England’ (RAND Corporation 2010) 
Gouveia N and others, ‘Massively Parallel Sequencing of Forensic Samples Using Precision 
ID MtDNA Whole Genome Panel on the Ion S5TM System’ (2017) 6 Forensic Science 
International: Genetics Supplement Series e167 
Granja R and Machado H, ‘Ethical Controversies of Familial Searching: The Views of 
Stakeholders in the United Kingdom and in Poland’ (2019) 44 Science, Technology, & 
Human Values 1068 
Green BN, Johnson CD and Adams A, ‘Writing Narrative Literature Reviews for Peer-
Reviewed Journals: Secrets of the Trade’ (2006) 5 Journal of Chiropractic Medicine 101 
Greenspoon SA and others, ‘QIAamp Spin Columns as a Method of DNA Isolation for 
Forensic Casework’ (1998) 43 Journal of Forensic Sciences 1024 
 356 
 
Gregory AT and Denniss AR, ‘An Introduction to Writing Narrative and Systematic 
Reviews — Tasks, Tips and Traps for Aspiring Authors’ (2018) 27 Heart, Lung and 
Circulation 893 
Groth AN, Longo RE and McFadin JB, ‘Undetected Recidivism among Rapists and Child 
Molesters’ (1982) 28 Crime & Delinquency 450 
Groves RM and others, Survey Methodology (2nd edn, John Wiley & Sons Inc 2009) 
Guerrini CJ and others, ‘Should Police Have Access to Genetic Genealogy Databases? 
Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other Criminals Using a Controversial New Forensic 
Technique’ (2018) 16 PLOS Biology <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006906> 
Haned H and others, ‘Estimating the Number of Contributors to Forensic DNA Mixtures: 
Does Maximum Likelihood Perform Better Than Maximum Allele Count?’ (2011) 56 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 23 
Haned H and others, ‘The Predictive Value of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator of the 
Number of Contributors to a DNA Mixture’ (2011) 5 Forensic Science International: 
Genetics 281 
Harbison S and Bright J-A, ‘New Zealand’s DNA Profile Databank– Celebrating 20 Years 
of Success’ (Auckland, 2015) 
Harbison SA, Hamilton JF and Walsh SJ, ‘The New Zealand DNA Databank: Its 
Development and Significance as a Crime Solving Tool’ (2001) 41 Science & Justice 33 
Hares DR, ‘Selection and Implementation of Expanded CODIS Core Loci in the United 
States’ (2015) 17 Forensic Science International: Genetics 33 
Harrison DL and Draugalis JR, ‘Evaluating the Results of Mail Survey Research’ (1997) 37 
Journal of the American Pharmacists Association 662 
Hazel JW and others, ‘Is It Time for a Universal Genetic Forensic Database?’ (2018) 362 
Science 898 
Heathfield LJ, ‘Policy Required for Entry of DNA Profiles onto the National Forensic DNA 
Database of South Africa’ (2014) 110 South African Journal of Science 1 
Hochmeister MN, ‘DNA Technology in Forensic Applications’ (1995) 16 Molecular 
Aspects of Medicine 315 
Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: Science and Public 
Protection (Home Office 2009) 




response2835.pdf%3Fview%3DBinary> accessed 3 June 2017 
——, ‘Protection of Freedoms Act 2012: How DNA and Fingerprint Evidence Is Protected 





is-protected-in-law> accessed 8 October 2016 
——, Governance Rules for the National DNA Database Strategy Board. (Home Office 
2014) 
——, ‘DNA Population Data to Support the Implementation of National DNA Database 
DNA-17 Profiling’ (DATA.GOV.UK, 7 September 2014) <https://data.gov.uk/dataset/dna-
population-data-to-support-the-implementation-of-national-dna-database-dna-17-
profiling> 
——, ‘International DNA Exchange Policy for the United Kingdom’ (Home Office 2015) 
——, Prüm Business and Implementation Case (Home Office 2015) 
——, ‘Government Sets out Case for Joining Prüm’ (GOV.UK, 26 November 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-sets-out-case-for-joining-prum> 
accessed 5 July 2018 
——, Review of the Use and Retention of Custody Images (Home Office 2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/custody-images-review-of-their-use-and-
retention> accessed 9 April 2017 
——, ‘Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group Terms of Reference, Code of Practice & 
Working Protocol’ (Home Office 2017) 
——, Memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee: Post-Legislative Scrutiny of the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Home Office 2018) 
——, ‘UK and EU Law Enforcement Boost Co-Operation on DNA Databases’ (GOV.UK, 
13 June 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-eu-law-enforcement-boost-
co-operation-on-dna-databases> accessed 7 September 2019 
——, ‘National DNA Database Statistics: Q1 2019 to 2020’ (Home Office 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/national-dna-database-statistics> accessed 21 
August 2019 
Home Office and Brokenshire J, ‘Protection of Freedoms Act Implementation and National 
DNA Database Annual Report 2012 to 2013’ (GOV.UK, 24 October 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/protection-of-freedoms-act-implementation-
and-national-dna-database-annual-report-2012-to-2013> accessed 11 March 2016 
Houlding B and Wilson SP, ‘Considerations on the UK Re-Arrest Hazard Data Analysis’ 
(2011) 10 Law, Probability & Risk 303 
House J and others, ‘Improving the Effectiveness of the National DNA Data Bank: A 
Consideration of the Criminal Antecedents of Predatory Sexual Offenders’ [2006] Canadian 
Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
<https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/abs/10.3138/cjccj.48.1.61> accessed 24 June 2019 
House of Commons, ‘House of Commons Hansard Debates for 10 March 1999: DNA 
Sampling’ (www.parliament.uk, 10 March 1999) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990310/debtext/90310-
16.htm#90310-16_head0> accessed 8 May 2019 
 358 
 
House of Lords, ‘Prüm: UK Opt-In’ (Hansard Online, 9 December 2015) 
<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2015-12-
09/debates/15120956000220/Pr%C3%BCmUKOpt-In> accessed 26 March 2018 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, Human Genetic Databases: 
Challenges and Opportunities (HL 2001) 
Hu N and others, ‘Current Developments in Forensic Interpretation of Mixed DNA Samples 
(Review)’ (2014) 2 Biomedical Reports 309 
Hughes C, ‘RE: Ethical Advice on the Retention of DNA Profiles, Fingerprints and Custody 
Images from Convicted Persons until They Are 100 Years Old’ (2 November 2017) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/657875/Ethical_advice_on_the_retention_of_DNA_profiles_fingerprints_and_cus
tody_images_from_convicted_persons_until_they_are_100_years_old.pdf> accessed 4 
May 2018 
Human Genetics Commission, Public Attitudes to Human Genetic Information (Human 
Genetics Commission 2001) 
——, ‘Inside Information: Balancing Interests in the Use of Personal Genetic Data’ (Human 
Genetics Commission 2002) 
——, Citizens’ Inquiry into the Forensic Use of DNA and the National DNA Database: 
Citizens’ Report (Human Genetics Commission 2008) 
——, Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear? Balancing Individual Rights and the Public Interest 
in the Governance and Use of the National DNA Database (Human Genetics Commission 
2009) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/nov/uk-dna-human-genetics-
commission.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017 
Human Rights Watch, ‘China: Police DNA Database Threatens Privacy’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 15 May 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/15/china-police-dna-database-
threatens-privacy> accessed 30 May 2017 
Hurwitz J and Smithey S, ‘Gender Differences on Crime and Punishment’ (1998) 51 
Political Research Quarterly 89 
Independent Advisory Group on the Use of Biometric Data in Scotland, Report of the 
Independent Advisory Group on the Use of Biometric Data in Scotland (Scottish 
Government 2018) 
INTERPOL, INTERPOL Handbook on DNA Data Exchange and Practice (Second, 
INTERPOL 2009) 
——, ‘Global DNA Profiling Survey Results 2016’ (INTERPOL 2016) 
——, ‘Forensics: DNA’ (INTERPOL, 2018) <https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-
expertise/Forensics/DNA> accessed 23 March 2018 
——, ‘Project Pink Panthers’ (INTERPOL, 2018) <https://www.interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Organized-crime/Project-Pink-Panthers#> accessed 28 March 2018 
 359 
 
——, ‘DNA’ (INTERPOL, 2019) <https://www.interpol.int/How-we-
work/Forensics/DNA> accessed 7 September 2019 
INTERPOL DNA Unit, INTERPOL Global DNA Profiling Survey: Results and Analysis 
2008 (ICPO-INTERPOL 2009) 
Irwin J and others, ‘Assessing the Potential of next Generation Sequencing Technologies for 
Missing Persons Identification Efforts’ (2011) 3 Forensic Science International: Genetics 
Supplement Series e447 
ISO, ‘ISO/IEC 17025:2005 - General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and 
Calibration Laboratories’ (International Organization for Standardization, May 2005) 
<https://www.iso.org/standard/39883.html> accessed 8 November 2017 
Jeffreys AJ and others, ‘DNA “Fingerprints” and Segregation Analysis of Multiple Markers 
in Human Pedigrees.’ (1986) 39 American Journal of Human Genetics 11 
Jeffreys AJ, Brookfield JFY and Semeonoff R, ‘Positive Identification of an Immigration 
Test-Case Using Human DNA Fingerprints’ (1985) 317 Nature 818 
Jeffreys AJ, Wilson V and Thein SL, ‘Hypervariable “minisatellite” Regions in Human 
DNA’ (1985) 314 Nature 67 
——, ‘Individual-Specific “fingerprints” of Human DNA’ (1985) 316 Nature 76 
Jeuniaux P and others, ‘Establishing Networks in a Forensic DNA Database to Gain 
Operational and Strategic Intelligence’ (2016) 29 Security Journal 584 
Jobling MA and Gill P, ‘Encoded Evidence: DNA in Forensic Analysis’ (2004) 5 Nature 
Reviews. Genetics 739 
Jobling MA, Pandya A and Tyler-Smith C, ‘The Y Chromosome in Forensic Analysis and 
Paternity Testing’ (1997) 110 International Journal of Legal Medicine 118 
Johnson D, Ludwig A and Younger B, ‘The Prüm Implementation, Evaluation and 
Strengthening (P.I.E.S.) of Forensic DNA Data Exchange: Northumbria University Final 
Report’ (Northumbria University 2015) 
Johnson P and Williams R, ‘Post-Conviction DNA Testing: The UK’s First “Exoneration” 
Case?’ (2004) 44 Science & Justice 77 
Kaye DH, ‘Why So Contrived? Fourth Amendment Balancing, Per Se Rules, and DNA 
Databases after Maryland v. King’ (2014) 104 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
535 
Kaye DH and Smith ME, ‘DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case 
for Population-Wide Coverage’ (2003) 2003 Wisconsin Law Review 413 
Kayser M, ‘Forensic DNA Phenotyping: Predicting Human Appearance from Crime Scene 
Material for Investigative Purposes’ (2015) 18 Forensic Science International: Genetics 33 




Kazemian L, Pease K and Farrington DP, ‘DNA Retention Policies: The Potential 
Contribution of Criminal Career Research’ (2011) 8 European Journal of Criminology 48 
Kees van der Beek, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Forensic DNA-
Databases’ (Promega Corporation 2015) <https://www.promega.com/-
/media/files/products-and-services/genetic-identity/ishi-26-oral-abstracts/9-van-der-
beek.pdf> accessed 9 April 2017 
Kelley K and others, ‘Good Practice in the Conduct and Reporting of Survey Research’ 
(2003) 15 International Journal for Quality in Health Care 261 
Kennett D, ‘Using Genetic Genealogy Databases in Missing Persons Cases and to Develop 
Suspect Leads in Violent Crimes’ (2019) 301 Forensic Science International 107 
Kiesler KM, Gettings KB and Vallone PM, ‘A Strategy for Characterization of Single 
Nucleotide Polymorphisms in a Reference Material’ (2015) 5 Forensic Science 
International: Genetics Supplement Series e363 
Kimpton C and others, ‘Evaluation of an Automated DNA Profiling System Employing 
Multiplex Amplification of Four Tetrameric STR Loci’ (1994) 106 International Journal of 
Legal Medicine 302 
Kimpton CP and others, ‘Automated DNA Profiling Employing Multiplex Amplification of 
Short Tandem Repeat Loci.’ (1993) 3 Genome Research 13 
Kindt EJ, Privacy and Data Protection Issues of Biometric Applications: A Comparative 
Legal Analysis (Springer Verlag 2013) 
Kisluk M, ‘Comparison of Data Protection in Forensic DNA Databanks in Canada and the 
United Kingdom’ (Masters, Unpublished, Central European University 2008) 
<http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2009/kisluk_michelle.pdf> accessed 12 May 2016 
Köhnemann S and Pfeiffer H, ‘Application of MtDNA SNP Analysis in Forensic Casework’ 
(2011) 5 Forensic Science International: Genetics 216 
Krimsky S and Simoncelli T, Genetic Justice: DNA Data Banks, Criminal Investigations, 
and Civil Liberties (Columbia University Press 2011) 
Krosnick JA and Presser S, ‘Question and Questionnaire Design’ in Peter V Marsden and 
James D Wright (eds), Handbook of Survey Research (2nd edn, Emerald Group 2010) 
Lammers M, ‘Are Arrested and Non-Arrested Serial Offenders Different? A Test of Spatial 
Offending Patterns Using DNA Found at Crime Scenes’ (2014) 51 Journal of Research in 
Crime and Delinquency 143 
Lammers M and Bernasco W, ‘Are Mobile Offenders Less Likely to Be Caught: The 
Influence of the Geographical Dispersion of Serial Offenders’ Crime Locations on Their 
Probability of Arrest’ (2013) 10 European Journal of Criminology 168 
Lammers M, Bernasco W and Elffers H, ‘How Long Do Offenders Escape Arrest? Using 
DNA Traces to Analyse When Serial Offenders Are Caught’ (2012) 9 Journal of 
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 13 
 361 
 
Langan PA and Levin DJ, ‘Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994’ (2002) 15 Federal 
Sentencing Reporter 58 
Langan PA, Schmitt EL and Durose MR, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison 
in 1994 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice 2003) 
Lapointe M and others, ‘Leading-Edge Forensic DNA Analyses and the Necessity of 
Including Crime Scene Investigators, Police Officers and Technicians in a DNA Elimination 
Database’ (2015) 19 Forensic Science International: Genetics 50 
Larson MG, ‘Descriptive Statistics and Graphical Displays’ (2006) 114 Circulation 76 
Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on the Establishment of a DNA Database 
(LRC 2004) 
——, Report: The Establishment of a DNA Database (LRC 2005) 
Lazer D (ed), DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The Technology of Justice (MIT Press 
2004) 
Leary D and Pease K, ‘DNA and the Active Criminal Population’ (2003) 5 Crime Prevention 
& Community Safety 7 
Lee J, ‘The Presence and Future of the Use of DNA-Information and the Protection of 
Genetic Informational Privacy: A Comparative Perspective’ (2016) 44 International Journal 
of Law, Crime and Justice 212 
Lee JH and others, ‘Public Perception of a Criminal DNA Database in Korea’ (2019) 7 
Public Perception of a Criminal DNA Database in Korea 75 
Lee SB, McCord B and Buel E, ‘Advances in Forensic DNA Quantification: A Review’ 
(2014) 35 ELECTROPHORESIS 3044 
Lehrach H, ‘DNA Sequencing Methods in Human Genetics and Disease Research’ (2013) 5 
F1000Prime Reports 
Levitt M, ‘Forensic Databases: Benefits and Ethical and Social Costs’ (2007) 83 British 
Medical Bulletin 235 
Lewis B, ‘Response to the Biometrics Commissioner’s Annual Report 2015’ (12 September 
2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/response-to-the-biometrics-
commissioners-annual-report-2015> accessed 16 March 2017 
Li R, Forensic Biology (2nd edn, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group 2015) 
Liberty, ‘Liberty’s Second Reading Briefing on the DNA Provisions in the Crime and 
Security Bill in the House of Commons’ (Liberty 2010) 
——, ‘Liberty’s Second Reading Briefing on the Protection of Freedoms Bill in the House 
of Commons’ (Liberty 2011) 
Liu F and others, ‘A Genome-Wide Association Study Identifies Five Loci Influencing 
Facial Morphology in Europeans’ (2012) 8 PLOS Genetics e1002932 
 362 
 
Lowe A and others, ‘The Propensity of Individuals to Deposit DNA and Secondary Transfer 
of Low Level DNA from Individuals to Inert Surfaces’ (2002) 129 Forensic Science 
International 25 
Lozano F and others, ‘Self-Administered versus Interview-Based Questionnaires among 
Patients with Intermittent Claudication: Do They Give Different Results? A Cross-Sectional 
Study’ (2016) 134 Sao Paulo Medical Journal 63 
Lucy D, Introduction to Statistics for Forensic Scientists (Wiley 2005) 
Ludwig A and Fraser J, ‘Effective Use of Forensic Science in Volume Crime Investigations: 
Identifying Recurring Themes in the Literature’ (2014) 54 Science & Justice 81 
Lynch M, ‘God’s Signature: DNA Profiling, the New Gold Standard in Forensic Science’ 
(2003) 27 Endeavour 93 
Lynch N and Campbell L, The Collection and Retention of DNA from Suspects in New 
Zealand (Victoria University Press 2015) 
Lyons EA and others, ‘A High-Throughput Sanger Strategy for Human Mitochondrial 
Genome Sequencing’ (2013) 14 BMC Genomics 881 
MacGregor A, Biometrics Commissioner: Consultation under the Protection of Freedoms 
Act 2012 (Office of the Biometrics Commissioner 2013) 
——, Annual Report 2014: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material 
(Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, UK 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/biometrics-commissioner-annual-report-
2013-2014> accessed 11 October 2016 
——, Annual Report 2015: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material 
(Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, UK 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/biometrics-commissioner-annual-report-
2014-to-2015> accessed 11 October 2016 
——, Further Report by the Biometrics Commissioner on Issues Raised in His 2015 Annual 
Report (Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, UK 2016) 
Machado H and Granja R, ‘Ethics in Transnational Forensic DNA Data Exchange in the EU: 
Constructing Boundaries and Managing Controversies’ (2018) 27 Science as Culture 242 
Machado H, Granja R and Amelung N, ‘Constructing Suspicion Through Forensic DNA 
Databases in the EU. The Views of the Prüm Professionals’ The British Journal of 
Criminology <https://academic.oup.com/bjc/advance-
article/doi/10.1093/bjc/azz057/5555659> accessed 7 September 2019 
Machado H, Santos F and Silva S, ‘Prisoners’ Expectations of the National Forensic DNA 
Database: Surveillance and Reconfiguration of Individual Rights’ (2011) 210 Forensic 
Science International 139 
Machado H and Silva S, ‘Criminal Genomic Pragmatism: Prisoners’ Representations of 




——, ‘“Would You Accept Having Your DNA Profile Inserted in the National Forensic 
DNA Database? Why?” Results of a Questionnaire Applied in Portugal’ (2014) 8 Forensic 
Science International: Genetics 132 
——, ‘Public Perspectives on Risks and Benefits of Forensic DNA Databases: An Approach 
to the Influence of Professional Group, Education, and Age’ (2015) 35 Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society 16 
——, ‘Public Participation in Genetic Databases: Crossing the Boundaries between 
Biobanks and Forensic DNA Databases through the Principle of Solidarity’ (2015) 41 
Journal of Medical Ethics 820 
——, ‘Voluntary Participation in Forensic DNA Databases: Altruism, Resistance, and 
Stigma’ (2016) 41 Science, Technology, & Human Values 322 
——, ‘What Influences Public Views on Forensic DNA Testing in the Criminal Field? A 
Scoping Review of Quantitative Evidence’ (2019) 13 Human Genomics 23 
Manfreda KL and Vehovar V, ‘Internet Surveys’ in Edith Desirée de. Leeuw, Joop J Hox 
and Don A Dillman (eds), International handbook of survey methodology (Taylor and 
Francis Group 2008) 
Mansuet-Lupo A, Rouger P and Van Huffel V, ‘Les Empreintes Génétiques: État de l’art En 
2007, Techniques, Applications et Législation’ (2007) 14 Transfusion Clinique et 
Biologique 334 
Mapes AA, Kloosterman AD and Poot CJ de, ‘DNA in the Criminal Justice System: The 
DNA Success Story in Perspective’ (2015) 60 Journal of Forensic Sciences 851 
Marjanović D and others, ‘Forensic DNA Databases in Western Balkan Region: 
Retrospectives, Perspectives, and Initiatives’ (2011) 52 Croatian Medical Journal 235 
Marques de Sá JP, Applied Statistics: Using SPSS, Statistica, MATLAB, and R (Second, 
Springer 2007) 
Marshall G and Jonker L, ‘An Introduction to Descriptive Statistics: A Review and Practical 
Guide’ (2010) 16 Radiography e1 
Martin A, ‘Cops Hacked the Police National Computer to Unlawfully Retain Suspects’ 
Biometric Data’ (The Register, 14 March 2016) 
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/14/cops_hack_police_national_computer_unlawfu
lly_retain_biometric_data/> accessed 14 March 2017 
Martin N, ‘Dead Man Named as Triple Murderer after DNA Tests’ (6 June 2002) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1396492/Dead-man-named-as-triple-
murderer-after-DNA-tests.html> accessed 4 September 2019 
Martin PD, Schmitter H and Schneider PM, ‘A Brief History of the Formation of DNA 
Databases in Forensic Science within Europe’ (2001) 119 Forensic Science International 
225 
Martins C and others, ‘DNA Quantification by Real-Time PCR in Different Forensic 
Samples’ (2015) 5 Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement Series e545 
 364 
 
McCartney C, ‘Forensic DNA Sampling and the England and Wales National DNA 
Database: A Sceptical Approach’ (2004) 12 Critical Criminology 157 
——, Forensic Identification and Criminal Justice: Forensic Science, Justice and Risk 
(Willan Publishing 2006) 
——, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (2006) 46 British 
Journal of Criminology 175 
——, ‘LCN DNA: Proof beyond Reasonable Doubt?’ (2008) 9 Nature Reviews Genetics 
325 
——, ‘Of Weighty Reasons and Indiscriminate Blankets: The Retention of DNA for 
Forensic Purposes’ (2012) 51 The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 245 
——, ‘Forensic Data Exchange: Ensuring Integrity’ (2014) 47 Australian Journal of 
Forensic Sciences 36 
McCartney C, Wilson TJ and Williams R, The Future of Forensic Bioinformation (Nuffield 
Foundation 2010) <http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/future-forensic-bioinformation> 
accessed 29 March 2017 
——, ‘Transnational Exchange of Forensic DNA: Viability, Legitimacy, and Acceptability’ 
(2011) 17 European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 305 
McEwen J and Reilly P, ‘A Review of State Legislation on DNA Forensic Data Banking.’ 
(1994) 54 American Journal of Human Genetics 941 
Milot E and others, ‘The National DNA Data Bank of Canada: A Quebecer Perspective’ 
(2013) 4 Frontiers in Genetics 1 
Ministry of Public Security, 法庭科学 DNA数据库建设规范 GA/T418—2003 (MPS 2003) 
<http://doc.mbalib.com/view/a114bddce06eeb3474cf3baff5c434aa.html> 
Moher D, ‘Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The 
PRISMA Statement’ (2009) 151 Annals of Internal Medicine 264 
Mountain H, ‘The Analysis of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA): DNA Profiling’ in Andrew 
Jackson and Julie Jackson (eds), Forensic science (3rd edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2011) 
MPA Civil Liberties Panel, Protecting the Innocent: The London Experience of DNA and 
the National DNA Database (Metropolitan Police Authority 2011) 
<http://policeauthority.org/metropolitan/downloads/scrutinites/dna.pdf> accessed 29 March 
2017 
Murray P, ‘Fundamental Issues in Questionnaire Design’ (1999) 7 Accident and Emergency 
Nursing 148 
National DNA Database Board, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2002 to 2003 
(Forensic Science Service 2003) 




——, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2004 to 2005 (NDNAD Board 2006) 
National DNA Database Ethics Group, 1st Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National 
DNA Database (National DNA Database Ethics Group 2008) 
——, Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database 2014 (National DNA 
Database Ethics Group 2015) 
——, Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database 2015 (National DNA 
Database Ethics Group 2016) 
——, Annual Report of the Ethics Group: National DNA Database 2016 (National DNA 
Database Ethics Group 2017) 
‘National DNA Database Strategy Board’ (GOV.UK) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/national-dna-database-strategy-board> accessed 
26 October 2017 
——, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2005 to 2006 (NDNAD Strategy Board 
2006) 
——, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2006 to 2007 (NDNAD Strategy Board 
2012) 
——, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2012 to 2013 (NDNAD Strategy Board 
2013) 
——, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2013 to 2014 (National DNA Database 
Strategy Board 2014) 
——, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2014 to 2015 (National DNA Database 
Strategy Board 2015) 
——, National DNA Database: Annual Report, 2015 to 2016 (National DNA Database 
Strategy Board 2017) 
National Forensic Oversight and Ethics Board, ‘Annual Report of the National Forensic 
Oversight and Ethics Board for the Period: 1 April 2015 - 31 March 2016; and Progress 
Report for the Period: 1 April 2016 - 16 November 2016’ (NFOEB 2016) 
——, ‘Annual Report 2017/18’ (NFOEB 2018) 
Nelson DL and Cox MM, Lehninger Principles of Biochemistry (4th edn, WH Freeman and 
Company 2005) 
Neuhuber F and others, ‘Female Criminals—It’s Not Always the Offender!’ (2009) 2 
Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement Series 145 
Neuman LW, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. (7th edn, 
Pearson Education Ltd 2014) 
New Zealand Police, ‘Annual Report 2017/18’ (New Zealand Police 2018) 
Nicholson E and others, ‘Protocol for a Thematic Synthesis to Identify Key Themes and 
Messages from a Palliative Care Research Network’ (2016) 9 BMC Research Notes 
 366 
 
NIST, ‘Core STR Loci Used in Human Identity Testing’ (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, 26 August 2015) <http://strbase.nist.gov/coreSTRs.htm> accessed 11 
October 2017 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues (2007) 
<http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/The-forensic-use-of-bioinformation-
ethical-issues.pdf> accessed 11 October 2016 
Office for National Statistics, ‘Overview of Violent Crime and Sexual Offences’ (Office for 
National Statistics, 11 February 2016) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/compendium/fo
cusonviolentcrimeandsexualoffences/yearendingmarch2015/chapter1overviewofviolentcri
meandsexualoffences> accessed 13 November 2017 
——, ‘Male and Female Populations’ (14 May 2019) <https://www.ethnicity-facts-
figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/demographics/male-and-female-
populations/latest> accessed 17 May 2019 
——, ‘Crime in England and Wales: Year Ending March 2019’ (Office for National 
Statistics 2019) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimei
nenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2019> accessed 4 September 2019 
Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, ‘Principles for Assessing Applications for 
Biometric Retention’ (Office of the Biometrics Commissioner 2013) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/254444/Principles_for_Assessing_applications_under_PACE.pdf> accessed 4 
February 2019 
Oppenheim AN, Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement (2nd edn, 
Continuum 1992) 
Parson W and others, ‘Massively Parallel Sequencing of Forensic STRs: Considerations of 
the DNA Commission of the International Society for Forensic Genetics (ISFG) on Minimal 
Nomenclature Requirements’ (2016) 22 Forensic Science International: Genetics 54 
Patyn A and Dierickx K, ‘Forensic DNA Databases: Genetic Testing as a Societal Choice’ 
(2010) 36 Journal of Medical Ethics; London 319 
Pease K, ‘DNA Retention after S and Marper’ in Home Office, Keeping the right people on 
the DNA database: Science and Public Protection (Home Office 2009) 
Penacino GA, ‘Organizing the Argentinean Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)’ (2006) 
1288 Progress in Forensic Genetics 11Proceedings of the 21st International ISFG Congress 
held in Ponta Delgada, The Azores, Portugal between 13 and 16 September 2005 780 
Penacino GA, ‘The New Genetic Database of Argentina’ (2008) 1 Forensic Science 
International: Genetics Supplement Series 658 
Perlin MW and others, ‘Validating TrueAllele® DNA Mixture Interpretation’ (2011) 56 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 1430 
Phelps R, Fisher K and Ellis A, Organizing and Managing Your Research (SAGE 
Publications, Ltd 2007) 
 367 
 
Phillips C, ‘Forensic Genetic Analysis of Bio-Geographical Ancestry’ (2015) 18 Forensic 
Science International: Genetics 49 
Phillips K, McCallum N and Welch L, ‘A Comparison of Methods for Forensic DNA 
Extraction: Chelex-100® and the QIAGEN DNA Investigator Kit (Manual and Automated)’ 
(2012) 6 Forensic Science International: Genetics 282 
Pickrahn I and others, ‘Contamination When Collecting Trace Evidence—An Issue More 
Relevant than Ever?’ (2015) 5 Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement Series 
e603 
Piquero AR and Blumstein A, ‘Does Incapacitation Reduce Crime?’ (2007) 23 Journal of 
Quantitative Criminology 267 
Police Committee, ‘DNA Board on Its 2015/16 Annual Report’ (Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group (PMG), 23 November 2016) <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23726/> 
accessed 12 March 2018 
Prainsack B and Kitzberger M, ‘DNA Behind Bars: Other Ways of Knowing Forensic DNA 
Technologies’ (2009) 39 Social Studies of Science 51 
QIAGEN, QIAamp® DNA Investigator Handbook (QIAGEN 2012) 
——, Investigator® Quantiplex Handbook (QIAGEN 2014) 
——, Investigator® ESSplex SE QS Handbook (QIAGEN 2015) 
Quinones I and Daniel B, ‘Cell Free DNA as a Component of Forensic Evidence Recovered 
from Touched Surfaces’ (2012) 6 Forensic Science International: Genetics 26 
Quintáns B and others, ‘Typing of Mitochondrial DNA Coding Region SNPs of Forensic 
and Anthropological Interest Using SNaPshot Minisequencing’ (2004) 140 Forensic Science 
International 251 
Ramshaw A, ‘The Case for Replicable Structured Full Proportionality Analysis in All Cases 
Concerning Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 39 Legal Studies 120 
RCMP, ‘Technology: The Canadian National DNA Data Bank’ (Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, 16 July 2003) <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nddb-bndg/techno-eng.htm> accessed 17 
October 2017 
RIBPG Management Committee, ‘Report of the Integrated Network of Banks of Genetic 
Profiles (November/2014)’ (Management Committee of RIBPG 2015) 
<http://www.justica.gov.br/sua-
seguranca/ribpg/relatorio/relatorio_ribpg_nov_2014.pdf/view> 
——, ‘Report of the Integrated Network of Banks of Genetic Profiles (May/2017)’ 
(Management Committee of RIBPG 2017) <http://www.justica.gov.br/sua-
seguranca/ribpg/relatorio/vi-relatorio-da-rede-integrada-de-bancos-de-perfis-geneticos-
_versao-final.pdf/view> 
Roberta J and Jendly M, ‘A Rendezvous between Forensic Science and Criminology: 
Toward a Public Forensic Criminology?’ in Quentin Rossy and others (eds), The Routledge 
International Handbook of Forensic Intelligence and Criminology (Routledge 2017) 
 368 
 
Roman JK and others, ‘The DNA Field Experiment: A Randomized Trial of the Cost-
Effectiveness of Using DNA to Solve Property Crimes’ (2009) 5 Journal of Experimental 
Criminology 345 
Roth A, ‘Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in Law 
Enforcement’ (2013) 11 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 295 
Rowland M, ‘UK: Government’s “Clumsy, Indiscriminate and Disproportionate” Approach 
to DNA Retention’ <http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=29534> accessed 2 July 
2018 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, ‘The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: 
Runciman Report’ (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 1993) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271971/22
63.pdf> accessed 14 November 2017 
Saiki RK and others, ‘Primer-Directed Enzymatic Amplification of DNA with a 
Thermostable DNA Polymerase’ (1988) 239 Science 487 
Sallavaci O, ‘Cross Border Exchange of Forensic DNA and Human Rights Protection’ 
(2015) 5 Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement Series e86 
Sanger F, Nicklen S and Coulson AR, ‘DNA Sequencing with Chain-Terminating 
Inhibitors’ (1977) 74 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America 5463 
Santos C and others, ‘Forensic Ancestry Analysis with Two Capillary Electrophoresis 
Ancestry Informative Marker (AIM) Panels: Results of a Collaborative EDNAP Exercise’ 
(2015) 19 Forensic Science International: Genetics 56 
Santos F, ‘Overview of the Implementation of the Prüm Decisions’ (EXCHANGE 2016) 
——, ‘The Transnational Exchange of DNA Data: Global Standards and Local Practices’ in 
K Jakobs and Knut Blind (eds), Proceedings of the 22nd EURAS annual standardisation 
conference: Digitalisation: Challenge and opportunity for standardisation. (Verlag Mainz 
2017) 
Santos F and Machado H, ‘Patterns of Exchange of Forensic DNA Data in the European 
Union through the Prüm System’ (2017) 57 Science & Justice 307 
Santos F, Machado H and Silva S, ‘Forensic DNA Databases in European Countries: Is Size 
Linked to Performance?’ (2013) 9 Life Sciences, Society and Policy 1 
Sato M and Sato K, ‘Maternal Inheritance of Mitochondrial DNA by Diverse Mechanisms 
to Eliminate Paternal Mitochondrial DNA’ (2013) 1833 Biochimica et Biophysica Acta 
(BBA) - Molecular Cell Research 1979 
Saunders MNK, ‘Web versus Mail: The Influence of Survey Distribution Mode on 
Employees’ Response’ (2012) 24 Field Methods 56 
Schneider PM, ‘DNA Databases for Offender Identification in Europe: The Need for 
Technical, Legal and Political Harmonization’, Second European Symposium on Human 




2/oral%20presentations/11.pdf> accessed 19 October 2017 
Schneider PM and Martin PD, ‘Criminal DNA Databases: The European Situation’ (2001) 
119 Forensic Science International 232 
Schroeder DA, ‘DNA and Homicide Clearance: What’s Really Going On’ (2007) 7 Journal 
of the Institute of Justice & International Studies 276 
Schwarz N and others, ‘The Psychology of Asking Questions’ in Edith Desirée de. Leeuw, 
Joop J Hox and Don A Dillman (eds), International handbook of survey methodology 
(Taylor and Francis Group 2008) 
Science and Technology Committee, ‘Forensic Science Strategy: Fourth Report of Session 
2016–17’ (House of Commons 2016) 
Scottish Police Authority, ‘Scots Forensic Service to Lead Europe in DNA Technology’ 
(Scottish Police Authority, 11 August 2015) 
<http://www.spa.police.uk/news/322981/296781/> accessed 23 December 2016 
Sepich J, ‘DNA Databases – Solving Crimes and Saving Lives - A Mother’s Story’ 
(ThermoFisher Scientific 2017) 
Shackleton D and others, ‘Development of Enhanced Sensitivity Protocols on the 
RapidHITTM 200 with a View to Processing Casework Material’ (2019) 58 Science & Justice 
411 
Sheng L, ‘Thinking about the Construction of Next Generation DNA Database’ (2013) 38 
Forensic Science and Technology 49 
Shils E, ‘Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes’ (1966) 31 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 281 
Siems M, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2018) 
Smith L and Bond J, Criminal Justice and Forensic Science: A Multidisciplinary 
Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 
Smith PJ and Ballantyne J, ‘Simplified Low-Copy-Number DNA Analysis by Post-PCR 
Purification’ (2007) 52 Journal of Forensic Sciences 820 
Soleto Muñoz H and Fiodorova A, ‘DNA and Law Enforcement in the European Union: 
Tools and Human Rights Protection’ (2014) 10 Utrecht Law Review 149 
Solove DJ, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (Yale 
University Press 2011) 
Speaker PJ, ‘The Jurisdictional Return on Investment from Processing the Backlog of 
Untested Sexual Assault Kits’ (2019) 1 Forensic Science International: Synergy 18 
Stahlkopf C, Males M and Macallair D, ‘Testing Incapacitation Theory: Youth Crime and 
Incarceration in California’ (2010) 56 Crime & Delinquency 253 
 370 
 
Sullivan K and others, ‘New Developments and Challenges in the Use of the UK DNA 
Database: Addressing the Issue of Contaminated Consumables’ (2004) 146S Forensic 
Science International S175 
Sullivan KM and others, ‘A Rapid and Quantitative DNA Sex Test: Fluorescence-Based 
PCR Analysis of X-Y Homologous Gene Amelogenin’ (1993) 15 BioTechniques 636 
SWGDAM, ‘History of Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM)’ 
(Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM)) 
<https://www.swgdam.org/about-us> accessed 26 February 2018 
Szkuta B, Ballantyne KN and van Oorschot RAH, ‘Transfer and Persistence of DNA on the 
Hands and the Influence of Activities Performed’ (2017) 28 Forensic Science International: 
Genetics 10 
Tamaki K and Jeffreys AJ, ‘Human Tandem Repeat Sequences in Forensic DNA Typing’ 
(2005) 7 Legal Medicine 244 
Tapsfield J and Bentley D, ‘Murdered Sally Anne Bowman’s Mother Backs Gordon Brown 
over DNA’ (The Independent, 9 April 2010) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/murdered-sally-anne-bowmans-mother-
backs-gordon-brown-over-dna-1940229.html> accessed 20 June 2018 
Tasselli G and others, ‘Complex DNA Mixture Analysis: Report of Two Cases’ (2015) 5 
Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement Series e664 
Taverne MD and Broeders APA, The Light’s at the End of the Funnel! - Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of the Transnational Exchange of DNA Profiles between the Netherlands and 
Other Prüm Countries (Paris Legal Publishers 2015) 
Teodorović S and others, ‘Attitudes Regarding the National Forensic DNA Database: Survey 
Data from the General Public, Prison Inmates and Prosecutors’ Offices in the Republic of 
Serbia’ (2017) 28 Forensic Science International: Genetics 44 
The Law Dictionary, ‘What Is EFFECTIVENESS? Definition of EFFECTIVENESS 
(Black’s Law Dictionary)’ (The Law Dictionary, 19 October 2012) 
<http://thelawdictionary.org/effectiveness/> accessed 8 April 2017 
——, ‘What Is EFFICACY? Definition of EFFICACY (Black’s Law Dictionary)’ (The Law 
Dictionary, 19 October 2012) <http://thelawdictionary.org/efficacy/> accessed 3 April 2017 
——, ‘What Is EFFICIENCY? Definition of EFFICIENCY (Black’s Law Dictionary)’ (The 
Law Dictionary, 19 October 2012) <http://thelawdictionary.org/efficiency/> accessed 9 
April 2017 
Thomson A, ‘NDNAD Effectiveness Metrics’ (Home Office; Unpublished) 
Tolfts L and Keay R, ‘Caught by His Lust for Call-Girls; a Chance Call about Cheque Fraud 
Led to Police Capturing Britain’s Most Wanted Serial Rapist in the Bedroom of This Hotel 
in Rugby’ (The Free Library, 15 April 1999) 
<https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Caught+by+his+lust+for+call-
girls%3B+A+CHANCE+CALL+ABOUT+CHEQUE+FRAUD...-a060456713> accessed 
19 January 2017 
 371 
 
Toom V, ‘Forensic DNA Databases in England and the Netherlands: Governance, Structure 
and Performance Compared’ (2012) 31 New Genetics and Society 311 
——, Cross-Border Exchange and Comparison of Forensic DNA Data in the Context of the 
Prüm Decision (European Parliament 2018) 
Tourangeau R and Smith TW, ‘Asking Sensitive Questions: The Impact of Data Collection 
Mode, Question Format, and Question Context’ (1996) 60 The Public Opinion Quarterly 
275 
Townsley M, Smith C and Pease K, ‘Using DNA to Catch Offenders Quicker: Serious 
Detections Arising from Criminal Justice Samples.’ (2006) 2 Genomics, Society and Policy 
28 
Tozzo P, Fassina A and Caenazzo L, ‘Young People’s Awareness on Biobanking and DNA 
Profiling: Results of a Questionnaire Administered to Italian University Students’ (2017) 13 
Life Sciences, Society and Policy 
Tracy PE and Morgan V, ‘Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for 21st Century 
Crime Control Criminology’ (2000) 90 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 635 
Tranfield D, Denyer D and Smart P, ‘Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence-
Informed Management Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review’ (2003) 14 British 
Journal of Management 207 
Tsakos G and others, ‘Comparison of the Self-Administered and Interviewer-Administered 
Modes of the Child-OIDP’ (2008) 6 Health and Quality of Life Outcomes 40 
Tseloni A and Pease K, ‘DNA Retention after Arrest: Balancing Privacy Interests and Public 
Protection’ (2011) 8 European Journal of Criminology 32 
United Kingdom Accreditation Service, ‘Lab 32: Accreditation for Suppliers to the UK 
National DNA Database’ (UKAS 2018) Issue 5 
Vailly J and Bouagga Y, ‘Opposition to the Forensic Use of DNA in France: The Jurisdiction 
and Veridiction Effects’ [2019] BioSocieties <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41292-019-00150-
y> accessed 10 May 2019 
van der Beek K, ‘The Prüm System: Taking Stock of over 10 Years of Transnational DNA 
Data Comparison and Looking Ahead’ (Exchange International Conference, Braga, 12 
November 2018) 
van Oorschot RA, Ballantyne KN and Mitchell RJ, ‘Forensic Trace DNA: A Review’ (2010) 
1 Investigative Genetics 14 
van Oorschot RAH and Jones MK, ‘DNA Fingerprints from Fingerprints’ (1997) 387 Nature 
767 
Verdon TJ, Mitchell RJ and van Oorschot RAH, ‘Evaluation of Tapelifting as a Collection 
Method for Touch DNA’ (2014) 8 Forensic Science International: Genetics 179 
Vervaele JAE, Graaf FCW de and Tielemans N, ‘The Dutch Focus on DNA in the Criminal 
Justice System: Net-Widening of Judicial Data’ (2013) Vol. 83 Revue Internationale de 
Droit Pénal 459 
 372 
 
VIEmedia, ‘Great Britain Started on July 8, 2019 with Austria Prüm-DNA-Cooperation’ (19 
July 2019) 
<https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20190719_OTS0083/grossbritannien-startete-
am-8-juli-2019-mit-oesterreich-pruem-dna-kooperation> accessed 7 September 2019 
Virkler K and Lednev IK, ‘Analysis of Body Fluids for Forensic Purposes: From Laboratory 
Testing to Non-Destructive Rapid Confirmatory Identification at a Crime Scene’ (2009) 188 
Forensic Science International 1 
Visher CA, ‘Incapacitation and Crime Control: Does a “Lock 'Em up” Strategy Reduce 
Crime?’ (1987) 4 Justice Quarterly 513 
Vraneš M, Scherer M and Elliott K, ‘Development and Validation of the Investigator® 
Quantiplex Pro Kit for QPCR-Based Examination of the Quantity and Quality of Human 
DNA in Forensic Samples’ (2017) 6 Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement 
Series e518 
Wallace H, ‘The UK National DNA Database: Balancing Crime Detection, Human Rights 
and Privacy’ (2006) 7 EMBO Reports S26 
——, ‘Forensic DNA Databases–Ethical and Legal Standards: A Global Review’ (2014) 4 
Egyptian Journal of Forensic Sciences 57 
Walport M, Craig C and Surkovic E, ‘Annual Report of the Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser 2015: Forensic Science and beyond: Authenticity, Provenance and Assurance’ 
(Government Office for Science 2015) 
Walsh SJ and others, ‘The Collation of Forensic DNA Case Data into a Multi-Dimensional 
Intelligence Database’ (2002) 42 Science & Justice 205 
Walsh SJ and others, ‘Comparing the Growth and Effectiveness of Forensic DNA 
Databases’ (2008) 1 Forensic Science International: Genetics Supplement Series 667 
Walsh SJ, Curran JM and Buckleton JS, ‘Modeling Forensic DNA Database Performance’ 
(2010) 55 Journal of Forensic Sciences 1174 
Wang DY and others, ‘Developmental Validation of the GlobalFiler® Express PCR 
Amplification Kit: A 6-Dye Multiplex Assay for the Direct Amplification of Reference 
Samples’ (2015) 19 Forensic Science International: Genetics 148 
Welch LA and others, ‘European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI): 
Evaluation of New Commercial STR Multiplexes That Include the European Standard Set 
(ESS) of Markers’ (2012) 6 Forensic Science International: Genetics 819 
Wells W, Fansher AK and Campbell BA, ‘The Results of CODIS-Hit Investigations in a 
Sample of Cases With Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits’ (2019) 65 Crime & Delinquency 
122 
Wenzel R, ‘Report on Criminal Cases in Europe Solved by ILS (DNA Mass Testing)’ 
(European Network of Forensic Science Institutes 2006) 
Werrett DJ, ‘The National DNA Database’ (1997) 88 Forensic Science International 33 
 373 
 
Westen AA and others, ‘Higher Capillary Electrophoresis Injection Settings as an Efficient 
Approach to Increase the Sensitivity of STR Typing’ (2009) 54 Journal of Forensic Sciences 
591 
Westin A, Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head 1970) 
Wiles P, Annual Report 2016: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric 
Material (Office of the Biometrics Commissioner, UK 2017) 
——, Annual Report 2017: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material 
(Office of the Biometrics Commissioner 2018) 
——, Annual Report 2018: Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material 
(Office of the Biometrics Commissioner 2019) 
Williams R and Johnson P, ‘Circuits of Surveillance’ (2004) 2 Surveillance & Society 1 
——, ‘“Wonderment and Dread”: Representations of DNA in Ethical Disputes about 
Forensic DNA Databases’ (2004) 23 New Genetics and Society 205 
——, ‘Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Intrusiveness: Issues in the Developing Uses of 
DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations’ (2005) 33 The Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics 545 
——, Genetic Policing: The Use of DNA in Criminal Investigations (Willan Publishing 
2008) 
Williams R and Wienroth M, Public Perspectives on Established and Emerging Forensic 
Genetics Technologies in Europe (EUROFORGEN-NoE 2014) 
<https://www.euroforgen.eu/fileadmin/websites/euroforgen/images/Dissemination_Docum
ents/WP4/Williams_and_Wienroth_-_2014_-_Public_perspectives.pdf> accessed 21 May 
2017 
Williamson R and Duncan R, ‘DNA Testing for All: There Are Two Fair Possibilities for 
Forensic DNA Testing: Everyone or No One.’ (2002) 418 Nature 585 
Wilson DB, McClure D and Weisburd D, ‘Does Forensic DNA Help to Solve Crime? The 
Benefit of Sophisticated Answers to Naive Questions’ (2010) 26 Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice 458 
Wilson MR and others, ‘Validation of Mitochondrial DNA Sequencing for Forensic 
Casework Analysis’ (1995) 108 International Journal of Legal Medicine 68 
Wilson-Wilde L and Pitman F, ‘Legislative and Policy Implications for the Use of Rapid 
DNA Technology in the Australian Context’ (2017) 8 Forensic Science Policy & 
Management: An International Journal 26 
Yang J and others, ‘The Advances in DNA Mixture Interpretation’ (2019) 301 Forensic 
Science International 101 
Yumei C, ‘On Legal Protection of Genetic Privacy of DNA Databases in China’ [2015] 
Hunan Social Science 84 
 374 
 
Zhang Z-W and others, ‘Red Blood Cell Extrudes Nucleus and Mitochondria against 
Oxidative Stress’ (2011) 63 IUBMB Life 560 
Zieger M and Utz S, ‘About DNA Databasing and Investigative Genetic Analysis of 
Externally Visible Characteristics: A Public Survey’ (2015) 17 Forensic Science 
International: Genetics 163 
List of cases 
Animal Defenders International v The United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 362 
Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 1999 [2000] UKHL 71 
Aycaguer v France [2017] ECHR 587 
Catt v The United Kingdom [2019] ECHR 76 
Gaughran v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (Secretary of State 
for the Home Department intervening) [2015] UKSC 29 
Maryland v King [2013] USSC 12–207 
MK v France [2013] ECHR 341 
R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire and R (on the application 
of Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2002] EWCA Civ 1275 
R v Bryon [2015] EWCA Crim 997 
R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Respondent) ex parte LS (by his mother and 
litigation friend JB) (FC) (Appellant) and R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
(Respondent) ex parte Marper (FC) (Appellant) [2004] UKHL 39 
R v FNC [2015] EWCA Crim 1732 
R v Tsekiri [2017] EWCA Crim 40 
R v Ward [1993] Crim App 96 
R v Weir [2000] EWCA Crim 43 
S and Marper v The United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581 
S, R (on the application of) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire & Anor [2002] EWHC 478 
(Admin) 




List of statutes and bilateral agreements 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Republic of Latvia on enhancing cooperation in preventing and combating serious 
crime 2008 
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 
Crimes Act 1914 
Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act 1997 
Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 
Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act No. 37 2013 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
Data Protection Act 2018 
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act 2000 
DNA Fingerprint Act 2005 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
Human Rights Act 1998 
Judicial Assistance Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
ESTONIA 2008 
Judicial Assistance Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
HUNGARY 2008 
Judicial Assistance Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
LITHUANIA 2008 
Judicial Assistance Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
MALTA 2008 
Judicial Assistance Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2008 
Justice for All Act 2004 
 376 
 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
ARGENTINA 2016 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
AUSTRIA 2010 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
BULGARIA 2012 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
CHILE 2013 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
CROATIA 2011 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
CYPRUS 2015 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
DENMARK 2010 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
FINLAND 2010 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
FRANCE 2012 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
GERMANY 2008 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
GREECE 2009 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
ICELAND 2012 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
IRELAND 2011 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
ITALY 2009 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
LIECHTENSTEIN 2012 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and NEW 
ZEALAND 2013 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
PORTUGAL 2009 




Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
SLOVENIA 2012 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and 
SWEDEN 2011 
Law Enforcement Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
CZECH REPUBLIC 2008 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
Police Reform Act 2002 
Policing and Crime Act 2017 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
USA Patriot Act 2001 
 
   
